- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: T.A.Z. on Disk
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>On Fri, 20 Jan 1995, Angus Patterson wrote: >> >> > I also saw another e-book site that had some more of [Bey's] stuff, can't >> > remember what it was though. > >On Fri, 20 Jan 1995, Mark Grant wrote: >> There's some more on the WWW at http://www.uio.no/~mwatz/bey/index.html. > >Bey sings the line that good is no different from evil, feeling >is better than thinking, and truth indistinguishable from lies. > >Sounds like a pile of crap to me. Still, I suppose that feelings >and lies are a poets job. Hm. Can we maybe head off the Ideology War before it becomes unstoppable? Cypherpunks write code, and do lots of other stuff too, but I'm hoping that endless political wars is something cypherpunks don't do, or at least try not to do on the cypherpunks list. [It's possible that the ideology of the list is as homogenously anarcho-capitalist as it seems, but I'd bet there's enough anarcho-others to sustain several never-ending political 'discussions' of the sort that will make the list even less useful then when we spent dozens of messages a day talking about logos.]

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RE: syrinx remailer up and running
by Johnathan Corgan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Well folks, the syrinx remailer is up and running now. The particulars: > >Address: syrinx(a)c2.org Could you post the capabilities of this remailer, like cpunk, hash, pgp, ksub, latent, etc.? == Johnathan Corgan "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent." jcorgan(a)scruznet.com -Isaac Asimov

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Re: traffic analyzing Chaum's digital mix
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > From: Hal <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> > > I know that the Eurocrypt 89 proceedings had some articles on > cryptanalyzing Chaum's mixes. My library has an excellent crypto > selection but is missing this volume. Can anyone who has read this say > whether there is anything in those papers that isn't obvious? I found a copy of these proceedings in the library today. There is a paper titled "How to break the direct RSA-implementation of MIXes" by Birgit Pfitzmann and Andreas Pfitzmann. Here is its abstract: MIXes are a means of untraceable communication based on a public key cryptosystem as published by David Chaum in 1981 (CACM 24/2 84-88). In the case where RSA is used as this cryptosystem directly i.e. without composition with other functions (e.g. destroying the multiplicative structure) we show how the resulting MIXes can be broken by an active attack which is perfectly feasible in a typical MIX-environment. The attack does not affect the idea of MIXes as a whole: if the security requirements of [Chaum's paper] are concretized suitably and if a cryptosystem fulfills them one can implement secure MIXes directly. However it shows that present security notions for public key cryptosystems, which do not allow active attacks do not suffice for a cryptosystem which is used to implement MIXes directly. We also warn of the same attack and others on further possible implementations of MIXes and we mention several implementations which are not broken by any attack we know. My interpretation is that PGP-based remailers are not susceptible to the attack described by this paper. (Of course, they are currently vulnerable to much more trivial ones.) Wei Dai -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLyMeCTl0sXKgdnV5AQFoggP/XzBFSyChFgNMrX3gCQSNfOiwHrAEKgpD a0TGYX9KBRqRd6cdDIdauDzFtPST1XjU/1RpYvlGjKIhOSd60JZwO+7185SJGBM9 q/4cqE/hOiHzB2gaoHiQFySDIkfFTeJdlIiTiS/OjbR5awkMCF+zU8cxPrgWTrxr /sM1C39O8Cc= =J20K -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Locksmith's Guild wants limit on free speech
by pstemari＠erinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:42 PM 1/22/95 -0500, John Young wrote: > ... >Both fear that they do not know the code well enough to take the risk of >being found at fault by random municipal inspections of construction. >A-E's dread the liability and blame by owners for well-known construction >corner-cutting, and owners suspect their professionals competency and >ethics -- afraid that the pros will certify in ignorance or cupidity and >that the owners will face costly corrections without having the traditional >scapegoat of over-weening government to justify cheating in the field. A classic example of people being unwilling to accept responsibility for the outcome of their own actions. That said, building inspection serve much the same function as code reviews, and are a "good thing" for exactly the same reason. I suspect that the A-E's will lobby for liability exemptions, and if they fail to get them, they will wind up going to private building inspectors/"code consultants" just like in-house accountants bring in outside auditors. --Paul J. Ste. Marie pstemari(a)well.sf.ca.us, pstemari(a)erinet.com

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NYT on Net Threat
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Toad is choking on a try 3 hours ago to send today's Markoff article on the new Net security threat Brian and others noted. Nail-biters can get it by email (if this passes the gory hole). Send blank message with subject: NEW_hak

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.30.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, as well as some help on how to use them, finger remailer.help.all(a)204.95.228.28 This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"vox"} = "<remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. post"; $remailer{"avox"} = "<anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl> cpunk pgp post"; $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"rebma"} = "<remailer(a)rebma.mn.org> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash"; $remailer{"soda"} = "<remailer(a)csua.berkeley.edu> eric post"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"usura"} = "<usura(a)replay.com> cpunk pgp. hash latent cut post"; $remailer{"desert"} = "<remail(a)desert.xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. post"; $remailer{"nately"} = "<remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"myriad"} = "<remailer(a)myriad.pc.cc.cmu.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"xs4all"} = "<remailer(a)xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<tomaz(a)flame.sinet.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk hash"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)nately.ucsd.edu> cpunk hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"q"} = "<q(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"syrinx"} = "<syrinx(a)c2.org> cpunk"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. Use "premail -getkeys remailer.help.all(a)204.95.228.28" as a stopgap to get PGP keys for the remailer, at least until Matt Ghio gets his machine situation straightened out. Fingering this address works too. Last ping: Mon 23 Jan 95 6:00:01 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- syrinx syrinx(a)c2.org #+ 4:59 99.14% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi *******+**** 33:13 99.99% rebma remailer(a)rebma.mn.org _..-*.--.- 18:00:23 97.74% rahul homer(a)rahul.net ****#-** *-# 31:58 96.61% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu ***+#-#* *+* 7:18 96.59% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com --+---+- --- 1:57:47 96.59% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu ++-*#+-- **# 40:31 96.47% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com ++++++.. +++ 5:46:02 96.10% soda remailer(a)csua.berkeley.edu -..-.._. . 8:44:34 96.08% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ##- ***- **# 20:48 95.82% mix mixmaster(a)nately.ucsd.edu +++++--+ ++ 1:01:24 95.72% nately remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu ++++++-+ ++ 48:18 95.72% q q(a)c2.org +++--+-- + 1:41:44 95.06% usura usura(a)replay.com - +--+- -** 39:18 93.78% xs4all remailer(a)xs4all.nl - *-+++ -** 27:43 92.93% myriad remailer(a)myriad.pc.cc.cmu.edu *** 4:16 87.80% vox remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl -- - -- 9:08:07 84.62% c2 remail(a)c2.org _ + 26:06:32 75.08% flame tomaz(a)flame.sinet.org _ -+ 9:15:23 34.58% desert remail(a)desert.xs4all.nl .--____ 62:05:22 29.80% For more info: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). Options and features cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. oldpgp Remailer does not like messages encoded with MIT PGP 2.6. Other versions of PGP, including 2.3a and 2.6ui, work fine. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. ek Encrypt responses in relpy blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. Raph Levien

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Re: hmmm, port 25
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

nutty elf writes, from tower.stc.housing.washington.edu, the message below. If I'd been watching recently for postings from that machine, I could point out who he probably was..... > From toad.com!owner-cypherpunks(a)ig1.att.att.com Sun Jan 22 03:18:20 1995 > Return-Path: <toad.com!owner-cypherpunks(a)ig1.att.att.com> > Received: from ig1.att.att.com by anchor.ho.att.com (4.1/EMS-1.1.1 SunOS) > id AA28663; Sun, 22 Jan 95 03:18:19 EST > Received: from att!toad.com by ig1.att.att.com id AA09271; Sun, 22 Jan 95 03:20:16 EST > Received: by gw1.att.com; Sun Jan 22 03:19:52 EST 1995 > Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP > id QQxzth02499; Sun, 22 Jan 1995 03:16:33 -0500 > Received: by toad.com id AA25129; Sun, 22 Jan 95 00:12:52 PST > Received: from northpole.org (tower.stc.housing.washington.edu) by toad.com id AA24523; Sun, 22 Jan 95 00:10:24 PST > Date: Sun, 22 Jan 95 00:09:36 PST > From: nutty_elf(a)northpole.org > Message-Id: <9501220810.AA24523(a)toad.com> > Subject: hmmm, port 25 > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Precedence: bulk > Status: RO > > That's strange, that last port 25 forgery didn't behave as expected. > Just checking it. > > --nutty elf >

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Re: Data Vaults (vs. Data Havens)
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim and Eric write things like: > I fully concur. The connotations of the word "haven" imply activities > that ordinary people don't see themselves doing. This means that > ordinary people won't generally use something called a "haven", even > if they might use exactly the same service called something else. We can always call them "Private Storage Servers" or some such; an interesting question is whether the main uses will be for retrieval by the storer, or by someone else, or by a bunch of others, and how we describe the service may affect that. Bill

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Re: The Remailer Crisis
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim writes: > One thing I should've noted is that a Linux-based cheap remailer is > mostly useless without a "live connection" to the Net. I disagree - live connections are great for fast-response systems, but we got along just fine in the uucp dialup world with occasional connections; in an environment like remailers where you _want_ batchy performance, the clunkiness can even be a "feature". I don't know how many providers are offerring uucp or ip dialout from their servers, or whether they're much cheaper than real ip, but you can do ok with, say, hourly polling to a TIA or term connection to fill your mailbox from a POP server, or nightly if that's enough. TIA also has the advantage over SLIP/PPP that outgoing mail from your system will _always_ have unverifiable IP addresses - you look like netcom.com, just like everyone else TIA-connecting from netcom does. And connections from shared-IP-address-pool systems like netcruiser or dialup PPP systems probably don't do much logging of who's used what IP address beyond when nameserver caches clear. Bill

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UN passes Information Super-Highway Beautification Resolution
by plaz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In regards to Tim's Internetpol comment: I wrote this back in april: ________________________________________________________________________________ Headline: Emergency Beautification of the InfoBahn UN Press Conference, April 8, 1996 UN Spokesperson Lance Rotweiler announced today that the "Information Super-Highway Beautification Resolution" had been passed in an Emergency Session of the UN Security Council. The resolution sets decency standards for electronic communications and grants broad powers to Interpol for enforcement of these standards. "There's a new sheriff in town," Rotweiler said. "It's time for child-pornographers, perverts and cryptoanarchists to get off the net. For too long, we have been allowing these sodomists to creep into our living rooms and seduce our children through the information highway. It's time to clean up." The resolution also calls for a ban on non-escrowed cryptography for personal communications and anonymous communications, which Rotweiler says is often used to conceal criminal and immoral activity. "Enforcement of the resolution has already begun," Rotweiler stated. "In Canada this morning, a warrant was issued for the arrest of a hacker who has blocked the removal of various usenet groups that advocate illegal and immoral activities, such as alt.sex.bestiality and alt.sex.bondage. We do regret that the individual chose to resist arrest and was shot under the mistaken assumption that he was armed, but as you know these groups were available to the average nine year old with a remote. You mess with our kids, and you deserve what you get." [Editors Note: The hacker, Brian Lee of Toronto Canada, was brandishing a mini-vac commonly used for cleaning computer keyboards, while shouting obscenities. The arresting officers mistook this appliance for a pistol and opened fire. Brian Lee is survived by a wife and 2.5 children. See related story "Pornography Accomplice Dies in Shoot-out"] "New operations are planned for the newly created branch of Interpol, which we are calling 'InfoPol'," Rotwieler continued. When asked whether the 'InfoPol' had world-wide jurisdiction, Rotweiler responded, "Yes, but certain holdouts in the community of nations are refusing to accept this. Most notably, Bolivia, Belize and Western Samoa, nations which make their stock and trade dealing with the criminal element. We expect these nations to come around, as the resolution calls for economic sanctions against those countries that refuse to cooperate in this great venture." End Note: When stepping away from the podium, Rotweiler was heard to mumble, "This ought to get her tentacles in a knot." When asked to explain this comment the UN spokeperson declared the press conference to be at an end. ________________________________________________________________________________ Geoff Dale | Mail me -> mailto:plaz@netcom.com AnarchyPPL Anarch | Visit me -> http://io.com/user/plaz/ Plastic Beethoven | Hire me -> http://io.com/user/plaz/rez.html plaz(a)netcom.com |AnarchyPPL Charter -> http://io.com/user/plaz/AnarchyPPL.html ________________________________________________________________________________ Do have nasty meme infestations? Well then, you need new Meme-Away! The most effective memicide spray on the market. *Now with extra CFCs*

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