- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Modified Token Posting Scheme
by ed.falk＠Eng.Sun.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How about this simple policy scheme: 1) posts from known list members forwarded to list automatically 2) posts with "approval cookie" also forwarded automatically 3) otherwise, forwarded only after approval by moderator, whose charter only permits spam filtering. People who don't want to use their own name in a post, and also don't want to be bothered with creating a cookie are the only ones whose posts are delayed.

4 4

No Subject
by Bovine Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim C. May's aberrant sexual life has negatively impacted his mental integrity. o)__ (_ _`\ Tim C. May z/z\__)

1 0

RE: IWD_ism
by pclow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>John Young wrote: >> >> ... injecting the attackers' computers with "a polymorphic >> virus that wipes out the system, takes it down for weeks." > >Looks to me like somebody's trying to land a job writing X-Files >scripts. I beg to differ! Sounds more like Independence Day to me. Is Jeff Goldbum on the list?

1 0

PWL's how ?
by will 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How has the Windows PWL's been de-crytped ? Also I don't like to seem too much like a rookie, but was is a polymorphic virus ? . Marc Theriault * . * + * . * Email: WILL(a)BBSI.NET * . * . .+ ___ . . * + ___....-----'---'-----....___ . . ========================================= + * * . ___'---..._______...---'___ * . .

2 1

Moderation
by thad＠hammerhead.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think that this is a completely fabulous idea, an commend John and Sandy for doing this. Let me add my own suggestion. This will fail if flames migrate from cypherpunks-flames to cypherpunks, I would attempt to prohibit threads that only exist in cypherpunks-flames being continued into the moderated list. This'll be hard to do, Sandy, I know, but if you could think of a way to do this, I think that your experiment is more likely to succeed. Phrases like "As I said in the letter that only got sent to cypherpunks-flames" should cause the whole article to be yanked, IMHO. thad -- Thaddeus Beier thad(a)hammerhead.com Visual Effects Supervisor 408) 287-6770 Hammerhead Productions http://www.got.net/people/thad

4 3

Foreign spies snoop the Net, from The Netly News
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 6 Jan 1997 20:14:17 -0800 (PST) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Foreign spies snoop the Net, from The Netly News The Netly News http://netlynews.com/ SPY VS. SPY January 6, 1997 By Declan McCullagh (declan(a)well.com) Move over, James Bond. Take your last bow, Maxwell Smart. Modern spies are jacked into the Net, a recent report from the multiagency National Counterintelligence Center says. It claims the Internet is now the "fastest growing" means for foreign governments and firms to gather information about U.S. businesses. The eight-page quarterly report says that malevolent "foreign entities" are sorting through web sites, pounding on search engines and firing off e-mail queries to U.S. defense contractors in hopes of winnowing out sensitive data. "Use of the Internet offers a variety of advantages to a foreign collector. It is simple, low cost, non-threatening and relatively 'risk free' for the foreign entity attempting to collect classified, proprietary, or sensitive information... We also know foreign intelligence and security services monitor the Internet," says the report, which is distributed to government agencies and contractors. Search engines apparently serve spies well. Want a copy of something you shouldn't be able to get? Perhaps it was left in an unprotected directory; try Altavista. "Foreign intelligence services are known to use computers to conduct rudimentary on-line searches for information, including visits to governments and defense contractors' on-line bulletin boards or web sites on the Internet. Access to Internet advanced search software programs could possibly assist them in meeting their collection requirements," the NACIC briefing paper says. Beware of spam from spies, it warns: "These foreign entities can remain safe within their borders while sending hundreds of pleas and requests for assistance to targeted US companies and their employees." Of course! This is any e-mail spammer's modus operandi: Flood an astronomical number of addresses at an infinitesimal cost. Then hope that at least some recipients will respond with the information you want. This isn't the first time that the Clinton administration has painted economic espionage as a dire threat. Last February, FBI director Louis Freeh warned the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence of the possible harm. He said foreign governments are especially interested in "economic information, especially pre-publication data" including "U.S. tax and monetary policies; foreign aid programs and export credits; technology transfer and munitions control regulations... and proposed legislation affecting the profitability of foreign firms acting in the United States." Note to Freeh: That information already is online. For proposed legislation, try Thomas -- or for munition regulations, the White House web site is a good bet. But forget Freeh's rhetoric. The White House isn't serious about halting the overseas flow of American secrets over the Net. If it were, President Clinton would lift the crypto export embargo. Strong encryption is the most effective way for companies to fend off foreign data-pirates, but current regulations allow U.S. multinational firms to use only the cipher-equivalent of a toy cap gun. Worse yet, last week the Commerce Department moved further in the wrong direction by releasing its new encryption export regulations that continue to keep American businesses at a competitive disadvantage compared to their foreign competitors, which generally are less hampered by crypto export rules. "The new regulations are worse" than the old, says Dave Banisar, a policy analyst at the Electronic Privacy Information Center. Sure, France and Britain spy on us for economic purposes. But we're just as guilty. We snooped on the French -- and got several U.S. "diplomats" kicked out of France two years ago. We peeked at Japanese secrets during automobile trade negotiations -- and got caught then, too. Especially under President Clinton, economic intelligence has become part of the mission of our spy agencies. Yet if we complain about other countries while doing it ourselves, we become hypocrites. Stanley Kober, a research fellow at the Cato Institute, argues in a recent paper that it's "folly" for the U.S. to continue such spying and risk alienating political allies: "The world is still a dangerous place, and it would be folly for the democracies to engage in nasty intramural squabbles. Yet that is the danger that economic espionage against other free societies poses." "Washington ought to consider that it may need the cooperation of Paris (or other Western capitals) to help deal with a mutual security threat" from terrorism, Kober writes. I asked Kober what he thought of the NACIC report. "It strikes me as a normal security reminder," he says. "The specifics are fairly slim. It's not the sort of thing that's sent to everyone. It's sent to their clients, the people who have government contracts. Since the Internet is new, they're telling people to be careful." Indeed, netizens must be careful. It's common sense, really, and defensive driving for the Net. Encrypt that e-mail. Use the anonymizer at least once a day. Let paranoia be your watchword. That e-mail from your mother may come from the KGB. When you're not watching it, your monitor may be watching you. Be afraid, Maxwell Smart. Your shoe phone may be listening back. ###

1 0

DES Key Recovery update
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Gah. I should know better than to post before my sources give their official position. It will be a known plaintext attack. :-) I hope I'm not made regret jumping the gun again. Please DON'T bug RSA about this. Peter Trei ptrei(a)acm.org trei(a)process.com

1 0

Germany Passes Sweeping Cyberspace Legislation 01/06/97 (fwd)
by wb8foz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

BONN, GERMANY, 1997 JAN 6 (NB) -- By Sylvia Dennis. The German government passed a major round of legislation in the runup to Christmas that aims at regulating the Internet and protecting user privacy. No surprise there.... {} The law also prohibits the use of "cookies," software applets that trace a user's path across the Internet and recording the data they view. This is, to me! -- A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz(a)nrk.com & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433 is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

2 1

[ANNOUNCEMENT] Secure envelopes
by mixmaster＠remail.obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy C. May's aberrant sexual life has negatively impacted his mental integrity. /\ o-/\ Timothy C. May ///\|/\\\ / /|\ \

1 0

Re: High-tech tracking by police raises legal outcry
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:39 AM 1/6/97 -0600, Mike McNally wrote: >Secret Squirrel wrote: >> >> The technology, marketed by a company called Teletrac, is simple: >> A tramsmitter sends a radio signal to a computer ... > >Anybody know the frequencies used? > >(Anybody willing to guess whether the FCC might quietly introduce >prohibitions against scanners that can receive those frequencies?) > >(Gee, that looks paranoid.) This wouldn't do a great deal of good. The systems were already described as frequency-hopping. The hops are probably fast enough to outwit a scanner's receiver. However, it turns out that there is a comparatively simple way to detect such transmitters: An old-fashioned diode detector using modern components. Take a loop of wire (about a foot in diameter), add a microwave-capable signal diode to rectify the signal and send it to a small capacitor and then go to a DVM. (digital voltmeter.) (Sensitivity can be dramatically increased by also inserting a blocking capacitor in the loop and adding enough DC voltage to barely forward-bias the diode.) A momentary (or continuous) increase in output voltage indicates that the diode is rectifying AC, which indicates a transmitter. Buffering the DC-level signal and sending it to a set of earphones will indicate a pulsed transmitter. Interestingly, this is probably more or less the circuit that was originally used in 1970's Fuzzbuster-type radar receivers before the heterodyne systems were developed. The "disadvantages" of that circuit, in microwave-radar detection, are either not disadvantages or are in fact advantages in hidden-transmitter hunting. The first "disadvantage" was that this receiver was EXTREMELY broadband, practically "DC-to-daylight," or at least up to the rectification capability of the diode chosen. (I've implemented systems that will do 20 gigahertz easy, and I was using old diodes!) False triggers were a common result, due to hard-to-avoid rectification of CB and ham radio transmissions for example. In the case of transmitter hunting, that disadvantage is a solid advantage, because you don't need to know what frequency the transmitter is at. The second disadvantage, comparatively low sensitivity, was a problem if you're trying to detect a 100 milliwatt radar transmitter 300 meters away, but if you know you only have to search a car from a meter away, the inverse-square law indicates that you're going to see a signal with around 100,000 times the power level all other things being equal. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

1 0