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Public-Key Crypto Toolkit
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What we need is a toolkit which makes it easy to write public-key applications. This would be an easy interface to the routines in PGP. I was thinking of doing this in Clisp under Linux, since Lisp makes it easy to put together and take apart complex objects, and makes it easy to kick around objects of arbitrary size. Unfortunately Clisp does not seem to support calling C functions! Perhaps it could be hacked right into the Clisp source code, giving it a fast modmult, idea, md5, etc. Any ideas as to what language/method would be best for implementing a PK toolbox? This could really get the "Cypherpunks write code" ideal moving. Anyone want to help? It should not contain any cryptography in itself - you should link it with the crypto from pgp, optionally applying diffs to the source files first, so that there is no fear of distributing crypto or violating patents. --- MikeIngle(a)delphi.com Brought to you by AT&T ClipperPhones - reach out and tap someone!

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Re: Why RSA?
by accom!erc%accom＠uunet.UU.NET 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> My > reading of the comp.patents FAQ leads me to understand > that any use of PGP by an individual in the U.S. is in > violation of U.S. law (though the chances of being > prosecuted are vanishingly small). I doubt it - the reason why is because under patent law, ther is an exclusion granted for educational, research, or experimental purposes. So, if you're using PGP to make money, you are in violation of PKP's patents (assuming they are, in fact PKP's patents to begin with and that Stanford and MIT had the right to reassign exclusive rights to something that was developed with public funds) and they would be quite right (legally speaking) to come and sue your ass off. ;) > in violation of the earlier broader patent? Does PKP pay license > fees to Stanford, or were they granted exclusive rights by Stanford > as well as MIT? I doubt that this would stand up in court. Universities often grant development and marketing rights to patents for stuff developed by them, but I seriously doubt that this is what either the original drafters of the patent laws or Stanford had in mind when they granted rights to PKP to develop and market the stuff. -- Ed

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Re: nonrandom string
by remail＠tamsun.tamu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Return-Path: <@CORNELLC.cit.cornell.edu:cjl@micro.med.cornell.edu> > Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 17:02:49 EDT > From: cjl(a)micro.med.cornell.edu (Chris Leonard) > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: nonrandom string > > > I address this to the list at large hoping that one or more of you can > explain something unusual that I observed. A friend of mine and I have been > using PGP for several months and I just recently noted that in at least three > of the recent posts to me that the first 18 characters of the encrypted > message were identical. The first words of the plaintexts were not identical > and so I assume that these characters are something else, perhaps the stuffer > that I have heard mention of on this list. This repeating string is of > concern for obvious reasons (e.g. so much for anonymity), and I would like to > understand the cause of its recurrence. > > Please post to me and I will post a precis of the most reasonable suggestions. This is normal. PGP labels each message with a byte that defines its type (for messages between people this is a byte that indicates that what follows is public key encrypted) followed by type dependant information. Among the things in the first bunch of bytes are the KeyID (low order 64 bits, so this is eight of the bytes you see) of the destination's key. If you are always sending to the same person (i.e., the same key) these will always be the same.

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Re: Propriety of crypto on Munitions List
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com >In U.S. v Martinez, Elizabeth Martinez and her fiance were convicted >of violating the Arms Export Control Act by exporting cryptographic >hardware, namely "Videocipher II" video descrambling devices. I would guess that they have good grounds for an appeal now that the ITAR has been changed to except the VideocypherII (unless they were exporting studio or professional quality equipment): FEDERAL REGISTER VOL. 58, No. 139 Rules and Regulations DEPARTMENT OF STATE Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs 22 CFR Parts 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, and 130 [Public Notice 1832] Amendments to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations Part II 58 FR 39280 DATE: Thursday, July 22, 1993 ... Enumeration of Articles 121.1 -- General. The United States munitions list. (a) The following articles, services and related technical data are designated as defense articles and defense services pursuant to sections 38 and 47(7) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778 and 2794(7)). Changes in designations will be published in the Federal Register. Information and clarifications on whether specific items are defense articles and services unde this subchapter may appear periodically in the Defense Trade News published by the Center for Defense Trade. ... Category XIII-Auxiliary Military Equipment (a) Cameras... (b) Information Security Systems and equipment, cryptographic devices, software, and components specifically designed or modified therefor, including: (1) Cryptographic (including key management) systems, equipment, assemblies, modules, integrated circuits, components or software with the capability of maintaining secrecy or confidentiality of information or information systems, except cryptographic equipment and software as follows: ... (viii) Limited to receiving for radio broadcast, pay television or similar restricted audience television of the consumer type, without digital encryption and where digital decryption is limited to the video, audio or management functions. (The VideocypherII falls here) What were the dates of the conviction and appellate court decisions?

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Your signature line
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A response to my .sig forwarded to the list because this is a "hot" issue with cypherpunk implications. My improved HSA93 .sig: "The $1,000,000,000,000 a year Health Security Act of 1993 -- the most expensive government program in the history of mankind." The response: W >1 Trillion 1993-dollars is about 300 billion 1980-dollars - how much W >was the government spending then? I don't think prices have increased by more than 300% since 1980. General price inflation during most of the 80s was in the 4% or lower range per year. During the '80s, the Fed and State governments spent about 40% of the US health care dollars. Total 1992 spending public & private was circa $850 billion. Which would make government spending about $350 billion which I think it was. By January 1, 1997 when HSA93 is due to take full effect, health spending including inflation and the $70-$100 Billion in extra annual spending Slick Willie has plotted will push annual health spending up to circa $1,000,000,000,000.00 per annum. Granted, my .sig is marketing puffery. Note it does *not* say that the government will spend $1x10^12, but since the *program* is designed to encompass the whole health "system" it is correct to characterize the cost (to someone) of the program as $1x10^12 per year. They want the credit, they deserve the blame. W >World War II was much more expensive - maybe fewer direct dollars W >(even inflation-adjusted), but the cost in human lives was W >staggering, and even if you only value those lives in terms of lost W >earnings and losses to the market from lost consumption, that's a huge W >cost. (Don't know what it is, but it's likely to be much larger than W >the $1T/year times the 2-3 more years before Clinton gets thrown out on W >his ear :-) WWII was over in 5 years. HSA93 (like a baseball game) *could* go on forever. Also, we don't know how many people have died because of medical regulation (though, of course, medical regulation is larger in scope even than HSA93). Could be more than WWII. I don't expect the system to last that long, however. Duncan Frissell "If they want a name give them a name, if they want an address give them an address, if they want an SSN give them an SSN, if they want a Health Security Smartcard programmed with your entire medical and psychiatric history + xrays + CAT scans + MRIs + your genotype; give them a puddle of melted aluminum." --- WinQwk 2.0b#0

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Re: First amendment and ITARs
by baumbach＠atmel.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> The federal government undeniably possesses the power to regulate the > international arms traffic.... As a necessary incident to the power > to control arms export, the President is empowered to control the > flow of information concerning the production and use of arms. The > authority to regulate arms traffic would be of negligible practical > value if it encompassed only the exportation of particular military > equipment but not the exportation of blueprints specifying the > construction of the very same equipment. > > 579 F2d at 520. We accordingly concluded that the government could > permissibly restrict the flow abroad of data included in the Munitions > List. 579 F2d at 521. Finally, we held that the government's power > to issue such restrictions was not affected by the domestic availability > of the regulated data: > > Given the unquestionable legitimacy of the national interest in > restricting the dissemination of military information, the claim of > public availability in the United States is not a defense recognized > by the Constitution. I question the legitimacy of ITAR. There, it is no longer unquestioned. Which enumerated power of the congress is the president enforcing here? Raise all possible questions at the earliest convenience. It is the responsibility of your adversary, not the court, to argue the otherside. Justice is supposed to be blind. Anything else would IMHO be denial of due proccess, and should be overturned on appeal on those grounds. Peter Baumbach baumbach(a)atmel.com

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NIST Explains Clipper "Review" (fwd)
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In case you haven't heard: To: Cypherpunks <toad.com!cypherpunks> Date: Thu, 23 Sep 1993 16:51:12 EST Subject: NIST Explains Clipper "Revi NIST Explains Clipper "Review" The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has clarified the role of five experts selected by the agency to evaluate the government's Clipper Chip proposal and the underlying SKIPJACK cryptographic algorithm. In a recent letter to the CPSR Washington Office, NIST asserts that the panel was not established to provide "advice or recommendations" to the government. Rather, according to NIST, the reason for convening the group was "to provide the opportunity for independent experts to satisfy themselves as to the strength and effectiveness of the algorithm in order to encourage widespread acceptance of it in the marketplace." NIST concludes that the panel's evaluation therefore falls outside the scope of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, which opens the work of advisory panels to public scrutiny. In response to CPSR's request for documents relevant to the panel's review, the agency reveals that NIST has no records which were made available to or prepared for the five experts for the purpose of enabling them to evaluate the Clipper Chip proposal. Any such records would be in the possession of the National Security Agency, where all activities related to the work of the experts were conducted. This disclosure provides further confirmation that NSA, and not NIST, is the driving force behind the Clipper proposal, despite NIST's public role as the "proposing" agency. The only NIST document released to CPSR is a copy of the invitation sent to the five experts who participated in the evaluation. That letter describes the "key escrow" system and states that the escrowed keys will be made available "only to authorized government officials under proper legal authorizations, usually a court order." This language -- "usually a court order" -- suggests that there will be instances in which the escrow keys will be provided to government agents without presentation of a judicial warrant. The government has never clearly defined what will constitute "legal authorization" under the Clipper system. David L. Sobel CPSR Legal Counsel <dsobel(a)washofc.cpsr.org>

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Re: NIST Explains Clipper "Review"
by mjr＠TIS.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One thing that occurs to me: rather than arguing Clipper's technical merits, or whether or not it's Big Brother and therefore evil, we should be making the press aware of the fact that Clipper is going to cost major $$ for the taxpayers. This will be reflected in terms of increased cost on consumer electronics, and in the cost of administration of the key escrow system. Since both agencies for the escrow will be government, the taxpayers are going to bear the entire burden of the very complex (and presumably expensive) escrow management. Our CEO, Steve Walker, has asked how many court ordered wire taps are performed anually. Apparently, the number is very low (under 1,000) - we must question the cost effectiveness of a measure designed to protect wiretapping at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars, when apparently wiretapping is not that important a tool in the arsenal of law enforcement. Recently, at the NCSC conference, a Mr. Brooks from NSA spoke on the Clipper panel, and stated proudly that they had been working hard on clipper for over 3 years. Unfortunately, NSA's budget is classified, so we'll never find out how much this B1-bomber of telecommunications has already cost the taxpayer, but we need to bring the potential expense involved to the attention of our various representatives. In a time when people are losing their jobs and government is trying desperately to cut costs, we must ask ourselves if it would be more cost effective to spend the hundreds of millions of dollars clipper will cost the taxpayer on hiring more police officers, or on social programs. I don't believe that our elected representatives or the non-technical press understand the issues behind key escrow. We need to make them understand that effectively clipper means that the consumer will pay more for certain forms of electronics, that the taxpayer will pay more for administering programs of questionable usefulness, and that the government is using covert budgets to subsidize an attempt to compete in the telecommunications business. Our elected representatives and the press understand $300 government toilet seats. Perhaps we need to come up with a nice name for clipper. Rather than calling it the "big brother chip" perhaps we should call it the "B1 bomber of data communications" or point out that it is really an implicit tax on telecommunications. mjr. [PS - these are my personal opinions]

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Re: the public key minefield
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> derek(a)cs.wisc.edu (Derek Zahn) > >* in broad terms, what would I have to do to develop an > > algorithm that works from a user's perspective like > > p.k.c. (ie public/private keys, the central functional > > point of all the wonderful schemes based on pkc) but > > doesn't violate patents? L. Detweiler writes: > others have well addressed how patent issues are involved in this. b ut > this appears to be a simple technical question on one level. What do es > it take to come up with a good public key system? How about a poor public key system? What is the simplest public key system you can invent, if you didn't care that it is trivial to break? If the NSA can crack RSA, does that change the fact that it is a pkc? message=99 public_key= 1/3 private_key= 3 encrypted_message= message * public_key message= encrypted_message * private_key Would PKP reading of their patent claims cover this pkc? Seems overbr oad! No, because of the language in the patent which requires that it be infeasible to find the deciphering key from the enciphering key. Here's the claim, from patent 4218582, that covers all of public key cryptography: 1. In a method of communicating securely over an insecure communication channel of the type which communicates a message from a transmitter to a receiver, the improvement characterized by: providing random numbers at the receiver; generating from said random numbers a public enciphering key at the receiver; generating from said random numbers a secret deciphering key at the receiver such that the secret deciphering key is directly related to and computationally infeasible to generate from the public enciphering key; communicating the public enciphering key from the receiver to the transmitter; processing the message and the public enciphering key at the transmitter and generating an enciphered message by an enciphering transformation, such that the enciphering transformation is easy to effect but computationally infeasible to invert without the secret deciphering key; transmitting the enciphered message from the transmitter to the receiver; and processing the enciphered message and the secret deciphering key at the receiver to transform the enciphered message with the secret deciphering key to generate the message.

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Re: on the `R' in `RSA'
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'd also be interested in hearing of any other accounts that match my own passion for the subject :) Also, if others have any educated opinion, evidence, or theories of whether public key crypto was *undiscovered* by the NSA prior to the publication of Diffie and Hellman and RSA, I'd read them with great fascination. NSA claims to have developed public-key cryptography about ten years before the public discovery. See @article{Diffie88, author = {Whitfield Diffie}, journal = {Proceedings of the IEEE}, month = {May}, number = {5}, pages = {560--577}, title = {The First Ten Years of Public Key Cryptography}, volume = {76}, year = {1988} } a paper I hightly recommend to this entire list.

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