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EFF WANTS YOU TO CALL FOR SENATE HEARINGS ON CLIPPER
by Mike Godwin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

EFF WANTS YOU TO CALL FOR SENATE HEARINGS ON CLIPPER *** Distribute Widely *** Feb. 15, 1994 Dear Friends on the Electronic Frontier, Thank you for your efforts in fighting the government's ill-considered Clipper proposal. We have already delivered over 2250 messages supporting H.R. 3627 to Rep. Cantwell, and your messages have continued to flood in. We'd now like to ask you to help us call for Congressional hearings on Clipper by writing to Senator Patrick Leahy c/o leahy(a)eff.org. As we have previously reported, the Clinton Administration has announced that it plans to proceed on every front to make the Clipper Chip encryption scheme a national standard and to discourage the development and sale of alternative powerful encryption technologies. If the government succeeds in this effort, the resulting blow to individual freedom and privacy could be immeasurable. So far, the government has resisted requests that it explain its policy. When the Presidential Decision Directive calling for Clipper deployment first appeared last spring, the Administration promised a report that re-evaluated cryptography and privacy policy in light of technological changes, the coming of the National Information Infrastructure, and the end of the Cold War. The Administration also made a commitment to meaningful public dialog before taking any major action on escrow deployment or new legislation. Yet in spite of the efforts of EFF, CPSR, ACLU, and other groups to provide extensive input to the Administration, the promised policy report never arrived, and the Administration has now said there will be no report after all. This failure of public accountability makes Congressional hearings an absolute necessity. There are individuals in Congress willing to look into the Clipper proposal and related policies--if they hear from you. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont), who chairs one of the key committees responsible for these issues, has asked for comments and concerns about the viability of the Clipper initiative. Here's where we need your help. *Please write Senator Leahy at leahy(a)eff.org and ask that the Senate hold hearings about Clipper.* Senate hearings may be the only means of ensuring public feedback about Clipper, and, just as important, they may be the only means of forcing the Administration to explain its Clipper policy. Please express your concerns about the United States' Clipper policy and cryptographic policy in general. Your letters in support of hearings will be printed out and delivered to the senator. And if you haven't written Rep. Maria Cantwell to show your support for H.R. 3627, her bill to relax export restrictions on encryption technology, now's the time to do so. Just send e-mail to cantwell(a)eff.org and put "I support H.R. 3627" in your Subject header. Letters in support of the bill will be printed out and delivered to Rep. Cantwell. Our fight to keep national encryption policy out in the open--and to continue allowing individuals to use encryption to ensure their own privacy--has only just begun. In the coming weeks and months, we will be working to give you more ways to make your voice heard on these vital public issues. Sincerely, Jerry Berman Executive Director Electronic Frontier Foundation

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Re: ?
by walter kehowski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

yahoo seriuos!

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The Difficulty of Source Level Blocking
by greg＠ideath.goldenbear.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- uunet!netcom.com!tcmay (Timothy C. May) writes: > Thus, so long as at least *one* remailer is not doing source > screening, and that at least some encryption is used (not all nodes > have to do it, obviously), then source-level screening will not work. It'd also be possible for two parties to collude; Alice agrees to pass Mallet's traffic, but tells the other remailers in the co-op that she'll filter Mallet's traffic. Digital signatures will allow her to pass only approved unapproved traffic (e.g., forged test-posts from Mallet won't be remailed by Alice). Where message tracing isn't possible, remailer operators will need to know and trust one another. > Very long term, when message costs are borne by the sender, this > problem goes away. (Others remain, such as death threats, extortion, > markets for murder, etc., but they're in a different category.) If you mean digital postage when you say "message costs", I don't see how charging Detweiler $.25 or so to send his messages is going to stop him; it might put a dent in the sheer volume, but probably not in the variety of inappropriate groups he chooses to annoy. If message costs are high enough to deter Detweiler, they're going to be high enough to deter legitimate and useful posts, too. The sender-of-record of inappropriate posts is still going to get heat from the net, whether or not they collected their digital postage. The best deal I've found so far for (bulk) mail delivery is UUPSI's $50/month flat-rate UUCP (local dialups many places) - is anyone aware of a cheaper alternative? Perhaps it's time to test the net's response to a remailer site whose response to complaints is "Sorry. People are rude. Nothing to be done about it." Have the owners of private remailers (rebma.mn.org, utter.dis.org, extropia.wimsey.com, according to Karl's list) taken flak from their service providers for remailing? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQCVAgUBLWFFlH3YhjZY3fMNAQH4WgP9FkWg2b0UXXLTiAYTJKVgCkOyOAaBc4Le b/JZ2DlFPTQQrKRQm4wYVxjZiOlnrVPlBu+uHYAIeAl5nKiNQBd82b/frYyFxHpt WD3zIlBLtfjdW8eOK+DZCswKPnpGPn5/i3EsxRzKYwKTTCPQwxL5ZwELBvFde+ER cebT75h4sgc= =Awkb -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Greg Broiles ".. has bizarre Cyberanarchist theories relating greg(a)goldenbear.com to human punishment." -- L. Detweiler

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Re: Detweiler remailer abuse
by qwerty＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To lefty, (Skip to end for remailer discussion). -----BEGIN POINTLESS FLAME BLOCK----- When a control freak has zero to actually say, yet has been infuriated, he turns to personal attack. If I am infuriating the control freaks, then I am doing my job admirably. >I suggest a short chat with Mr. Dictionary to determine the actual >definition of the word "censorship". In the immortal words of Inigo >Montoya, "You keep saying that, but I don't think it means what you seem >to believe it does." Which dictionary do you own? I personally own THREE 4 inch thick dictionaries, all modern. They cost me hundreds. I have a wooden stand to hold them up. As I am at lab, I do not have them available however and will have to go to the library.... I'm back. Censor: A supervisor or inspector especially of morals and conduct. An official empowered to examine written or printed matter (as manuscripts of books or plays) in order to forbid publication, circulation, or representation if it contains anything objectionable. An officer or official charged with scrutinizing communications to intercept, suppress, or delete material harmful to his country's or organization's interests. One who lacking official sanction but acting in society's interests scrutinizes communications, compositions, and entertainments to discover anything immoral, profane, seditious, heretical or otherwise offensive. Examine, cut out, parts of (a book, etc.); act as a censor. >>And after all, he wasn't the one who wrote that "Blacknet" blurb. >Was there a point to this statement? Yes. >Do you believe that drunk drivers should not be held responsible for their actions because they don't build their own cars? No. >Please feel entirely free to avoid using the old one while you wait >patiently for the new and perfect one to show up. I suggest you avoid >posting any further until you have _real_ _encryption_ running in your >laptop and _optical_ _fiber_ connecting you to all the places with which >you might consider communicating. This is good advice to anyone interested in maintaining privacy in a public forum. >>I can't take the IDEAL of the First Amendment lightly >>enough to do so either. >OK, I see we can add the First Amendment to the list of subjects on which >you are essentially totally ignorant. When you finish with Mr. >Dictionary, you might try puzzling out Mr. Bill of Rights. _It_ doesn't say >what you apparently think it does, either. Ideal: A conception of something in it's absolute perfection. An honorable or worthy principle or aim. First Amendment: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. I find it unfortunate that those who wrote the Bill of Rights limited its scope, to not apply also to industry and other organizations. And it is people who nit-pick the wording of the Constitution and its amendments who are turning the USA into a repressive state. Burn baby, burn. >Not nearly as amusing as _I_ find it to see know-nothing children >attempting to impress the big kids with their general level of >uninformedness. Part of the problem with this command-line interface we are using is that you can't see me, and thus you can't know me, for who I am as a person. Flaming one another isn't what we need. If you feel someone misunderstands something that you understand better, educate them. But realize that most cases of one person becoming infuriated at another stem from misunderstanding, a failure to communicate. So tell my why I should censor Larry 'cause I don't see why I should. It's a lost cause. He will simply aquire other accounts, or telnet to port 25 of a remailer and fake his address, but this time with greater ambition to do damage. The "know-nothing children attempting to impress the big kids with their general level of (sic) uninformedness" who wrote that Blacknet thing should think again about getting their thrills out of illegal activity, real or imagined. You wouldn't have this Detweiler problem if you called yourself "libertarians" instead of "Cypherpunks". You would increase you level of support by orders of magnitude as well. -----END POINTLESS FLAME BLOCK----- This following was my response to a discussion in e-mail. I expressed that I think the MEANS suggested to me to censor Detweiler would so more harm than good. It was pointed out to me that at least it would make it less convenient for him to abuse the remailers.... >And that extra work will anger him and fill him with the unfortunate >drive to do more damage, since in his mind our trying to fight him >means he has to try so much harder to point out to us whatever the hell >he is trying to point out. >Julf cutting off someone's account isn't effective either for someone >like Detweiler. I myself found out that I could telnet to anon.penet.fi >port 25 and simply fake my incoming address, and thus gain access to as >many new anon.penet.fi addresses as I wanted. >Again, I wish we could get a net modeled on the postal service, in >which there WAS NO "From: qwerty-remailer(a)netcom.com" in the headers. >The day someone posts kiddie porn via qwerty is the day I tell Netcom and >the police that I am running remailer, and that I will shut it down to >avoid this again, but that if they want to know who posted it they need >to look at Netcom's sendmail logs, and follow them to the next remailer. >And to avoid Detweiler becoming angry enough to post kiddie porn via >qwerty, I wish not to try to block him in ineffective ways. >What we need is an abuse filter, not a Detweiler filter, because he >can always post kiddie porn under another name. And honestly, I dont' >think he would ever post kiddie porn, or carry out any serious illegal >abuses. He could however make his point a lot clearer were he to >state it up front. His pranks do serve to warn us about possible >REAL abuses. And I wrote this, when told that Larry wasn't a responsible net.citizen, doesn't deserve to be treated as such: >I agree, but I'm not sure if the means suggested to me are going to >be effective. He will just aquire other accounts, or telnet to post >25 of a remailer, to get through, and this time with more passion >about doing real harm. Fight him and he'll fight back, with greater >ambition. I don't know the real answer. And are those who wrote that >Blacknet thing "responsible net.citizens"? If anyone should have been >censored, it was he who starting sending those things out in the first >place. >And I spoke of the "IDEAL" of the first amendment, which to me means >stopping someone from using a PUBLIC forum, normally available to all, >from expressing his views. If his Blacknet posts via Hal's remailer >be called performance art, and in a way they CAN, then I cannot YET >bring myself to censor them. And indeed part of the problem is that I >do NOT yet understand well enough about the internet, Blacknet, >Cypherpunks, and Detweiler to be confident that I'd be doing the right >thing. -=Xenon=- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLWD6lQSzG6zrQn1RAQFzUwP/cDRVTBeW/76wywDYKyzShbiNq5DQsAFG I72DHYailmY63mwAaMYmXeDnN21bJaUUkWd+JaWt0EzEPo6ruPVA44OphWsxoZy3 9BRr7ZWijIs4BlHMMtaObuRooM7MeCzfSjpU1C2ahB89+E8byWPpFyVzlIUiYuht 5CaHwkkeUzc= =el7y -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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REMAIL: Changes to chaos and bsu-cs remailers
by Chael Hall 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Today I installed an updated version of the anonymous remailer on the following remailers: nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu remailer(a)chaos.bsu.edu Recent changes: "Refuse" addresses now apply to From: lines as well as To: lines When sending from an address that is refused, you will receive a bounce message (only from chaos remailer) stating that remailer access is denied. When sending to an address that is refused, you will receive a bounce message (only from chaos remailer) stating that remailer recipient is illegal. When you forget the recipient address, you will receive a bounce message (only from chaos remailer) stating that a recipient is required. Please note that all bounces will only occur when using the chaos remailer. -- Chael Hall, nowhere(a)chaos.bsu.edu

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Re: cypherpunks meeting in Mt. View last weekend.
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 18:52 2/15/94 -0500, wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510 wrote: >Hi, Strick, ... > >Chip Rosenthal talked about >Habitat, an early Commodore-64-client+central-world-server system That was "Chip Morningstar", not "Chip Rosenthal".

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Another clipper editorial
by Jonathan Corbet 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following appeared as an unsigned editorial in the 2/14 Christian Science Monitor. It lacks the fire of Safire's piece, but it's nice to see anyway. CLIPPING PRIVACY With the rise of electronic mail, public data networks, and cordless and cellular phones has come a rise in devices to encode data to protect the users' privacy. But law enforcement officials worry that these advances will undercut their ability to secretly gather evidence through wiretaps and other surveillance methods. To respond to law enforcement's need, the Clinton administration reportedly is seeking a bill that would require phone and cable companies to use software designed to allow law enforcement agencies to monitor phone and data transmissions. Earlier this month, the administration decided to push federal agencies to include so-called Clipper Chips in computers and phones they use. If that extends to vendors and contractors, the chip may become a de facto industry standard. The chips were designed in conjunction with the National Security Agency to permit unscrambling of coded data transmissions. These moves represent potential dangers to privacy; they take on added urgency with the imminent marriage of computers, phones, and cable services in ways that reduce the diversity of people's means of communication even as they use those means for more activities. No one doubts the need for effective law enforcement. The government, however, should not be in the business of asking manufacturers to build secret backdoors into their equipment, particularly when government holds the keys. The proposals also raise questions as to how appealing United States technology exports will be overseas if such backdoor access is built in. Congress should take a hard look at any bill that tries to expand the government's ability to peer through the electronic blinds, no matter how well-meaning the motive.

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Re: Wide Spread use of PGP
by mdbomber＠w6yx.stanford.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I find Bob Cain's comments that PGP should not be used on a netcom account >disturbing. I think the priority that should be set is to get people using >PGP, "in the habit" and then make sure they are using it on a local PC or >Mac. > >Some people, believe it or not, might only have acess to a multi-user >systems. These people should not be denied acess to PGP. This is what I do. I connect to the net through SLIP and then use Eudora to retrieve my mail from a DECstation. PGP is secure that way. However, the password to attach to the POP server goes out in plaintext, and was undoubtedly compromised in the packet-sniffing incident we heard so much about. I have been trying to look into alternatives to plaintext passords flying around, but have only confused myself. What is available? Internet: mdbomber(a)w6yx.stanford.edu Matt Bartley GPS: 33 49' xx'' 117 48' xx'' (xx due to SA :-)

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Need a challenge?
by paul＠hawksbill.sprintmrn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I feel like a real slug posting this here, but we have several positions available for network engineers with heavy multiprotocol router background. If you're thick-skinned and competent, willing to relocate and don't mind forging ahead in a new digital forntier, let me know. The job is in the Washington DC area, the pay is substantial. E-mail to: _______________________________________________________________________________ Paul Ferguson US Sprint Enterprise Internet Engineering tel: 703.904.2437 Herndon, Virginia USA internet: paul(a)hawk.sprintmrn.com

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Re: Wide Spread use of PGP
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I agree with those who disagree with Bob Cain about use of PGP on insecure machines (i.e. machines you yourself don't control.) Yes, it's less secure than using it on a machine you control yourself. But it still gives you *some* security - for instance, if your correspondent is in some country with limited freedom of speech, such as China or Canada, your crossborder conversations are protected. Sure, the NSA will tap them, but as long as they're not tapping netcom's internal networks, and you're dialing in rather than telnetting in from somewhere else (sending your passphrase across the entire internet for the FBI\\\BadGuys to wiretap), you've gained some security. Of course you should use a personal machine with good security on it to discuss overthrowing your current government or trading in politically incorrect substances, like money. But even so, it increases the use and acceptability of encryption, and makes you more accessible for people in other not-sufficiently-free countries. [Note - I'm just picking on netcom because they're a popular service used by hundreds of subscribers. I'm not aware that they're being wiretapped, and I suspect that the legal implications of trying to do so would be interesting. Tapping their Internet connection would be legally easier than tapping their phones, though.] [Blatant Quasi-Commercial Mention: Some 10baseT hub vendors, starting with the AT&T SmartHub but followed by others as well, provide a no-eavesdropping feature, which prevents packets from being sent to incorrect destinations. Unlike bridges and routers, which limit traffic, the SmartHub replaces the data field with 10101010...., which it can do faster and less expensively since there isn't the complication of buffering, etc. One use in a dialup networking environment would be to put the herd of terminal servers and cpus on smart hubs, which limits the damage that can be done if some user breaks a system and starts snooping the net, since he'll only see packets for the machine he's on and not the whole broadcast. Obviously, in a larger environment, routers, etherswitches, etc. can handle more traffic, but the different technologies can be used together.] Bill # Bill Stewart AT&T Global Information Solutions, aka NCR Corp # 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566 Phone 1-510-484-6204 fax-6399 # email bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart(a)attmail.com # ViaCrypt PGP Key IDs 384/C2AFCD 1024/9D6465

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