- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

T.C.May `forgery'
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks, I did not write that letter. It was fowarded to me via an anonymous remailer. One among you sent it to me. The question is, which one? why? To those of you who are so confident it is a forgery-- why? perhaps it is, but you base your dogmatic convictions on nothing credible, simply your passionate, zealous enmity to me. BTW, this is my official resignation as Chief Cypherpunk Whistleblower. The position is a thankless, nasty job. There just really is no place for me in cyberspace.

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Tracking Contacts with Clipper
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A comment in sci.crypt about how Clipper will make it much easier for the Feds to track who's talking to whom... This is an important point, which I've seen mentioned a few times over the past 10 months, but not given nearly enough attention. To wit, if Clipjack phones are ever used by dissidents, subversives, Cypherpunks, etc., then the key block that goes out with every call--from both ends of course--will make recording the identities of both parties trivial. The "webs of trust" of PGP get replaced by "webs of co-conspirators." An easy way to track down associates. Further, merely using an encrypted phone with a "racketeer-influenced" person could conceivably enmesh one in the conspiracy. (This is merely speculation.) Whatever happened to the "phone remailer" project? The idea, floated about 15 months ago by parties who can speak up should they wish to (I only contributed some ideas, but was not the originator), was to create commercial phone banks that would scramble the origin and destination of call. Somewhat like call forwarding schemes (which wreak havoc with some wiretap procedures) and like the old stand-by of renting a room and having one phone wired to another phone. The idea here was to put these capabilities into a central switch and sell access, various optional services, etc. Out of the country would be even better. (Did you know that some of those ee-vil 900 phone sex outfits have moved to non-U.S. locations? Seems that U.S. law about blocking access, not to mention, antipornography laws, doesn't apply in places like Tijuana.) I could see some tie-ins with Voice PGP (the Soundblaster-based projects supposedly being worked on by several different groups). --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power:2**859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.

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Markoff on Cypherpunks
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For personal use only... Keyboarding by Lois Roth NEW YORK TIMES SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1994 Ideas & Trends Cyberspace Under Lock And Key By John Markoff SAN FRANCISCO In Silicon Valley some of the country's best computer hackers are talking about acts of civil disobedience in cyberspace. Their target is a plan by the Federal Government to discourage a proliferation of coding schemes that insure electronic conversations are private -- from everyone including the authorities. Under a plan being pushed by the Clinton Administration, the computer industry would be strongly encouraged to adopt a new data scrambling standard, embodied in a device called the Clipper Chip, that would allow law enforcement agencies, armed with court orders, to eavesdrop on electronic communications. Earlier this month, Vice President Al Gore said the proposed standard was an important law and order issue for the Administration. The danger, he warned, is that unchecked computer coding technology will make it possible for terrorists and criminals to have secret electronic conversations. The White House is also pressing for legislation that would require telephone networks, cable companies and wireless communications services to install systems that allow law enforcers to listen in. While the Clipper system is voluntary today, a coalition of Silicon Valley business executives and civil liberties advocates argues that there is no guarantee that it won't be made mandatory by a future Administration. In the meantime, it could become a de facto standard as companies that want to do Government business would have to install the chips in their products. Furthermore the Government could use existing export laws to require Clipper chips in any computers shipped to other countries. "They're asking us to ship millions of computers abroad with a chip stamped J. Edgar Hoover inside," said John Gage, director of the science office at Sun Microsystems Inc., a maker of computer work stations based in Mountain View, Calif. "We refuse to do it." A Silicon Valley group called Cypherpunks, which wants to make free and powerful cryptography available to the masses, has been discussing ways to trick officials into thinking the keys to the Clipper code have been stolen. Others are considering violating export restriction laws by sending thousands of copies of encoding software out of the country over the Internet. In fact, the ability to devise coding schemes -- unbreakable even by the most powerful supercomputers -- is so widespread that trying to impose a universal standard may be like trying to enforce Prohibition. Home- brew coding software can be easily exported by electronic rumrunners on computer disks or instantly sent over electronic networks to any city in the world. With Clipper, which was developed by the National Security Agency, communications are mathematically scrambled with an unbreakable code, but an extra set of two keys -- actually long numbers -- would permit authorized third parties to listen in, with the same restrictions that now apply to wiretapping. As a safeguard, both keys would be required to monitor conversations. But some opponents argue that the system could still be abused by Government officials or clever hackers who are able to steal the code. They also point out that despite claims that Clipper is necessary for national security, no other foreign Government or foreign company has indicated that it is willing to use a coding system that is breakable by the United States spying agencies. Even close allies like Canada and Britain have said they are not willing to adopt Clipper. Last week, Michael Nelson, an Administration official in charge of technology policy, broadcast an electronic mail message over the Internet to reassure computer users that the Government has no intention of enforcing mandatory encryption. But skeptics remain unpersuaded. "They are utterly transfixed with the horrible vision of the nuclear armed terrorist," said John Perry Barlow, a founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a public interest computer group that is campaigning to stop the Clipper chip. "This is the last ditch effort of the old superpowers trying to establish imperial control over cyberspace." Across the Internet, activists are discussing civil disobedience strategies while mainstream groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Computer Scientists for Social Responsibility are organizing a lobbying attempt against Clipper. But some hackers aren't waiting for the government to back down. They're pressing ahead with their networks. A programmer named Philip Zimmerman has written free software called Pretty Good Privacy for protecting electronic mail messages. The program touched off a Justice Department investigation after it was sent overseas through international networks. Now Mr. Zimmerman is working on another free program that will allow personal computers, equipped with microphones, speakers and conventional high-speed modems, to act as secure telephones, allowing their users to have private conversations that can't be overheard. This promises to be about as popular with Clipper supporters as radar detectors are with the highway patrol. "They were angry about Pretty Good Privacy," said Mr. Zimmerman. "They're going to go ballistic over this." --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Re: REAL WORLD ENCRYPTION
by W. Kinney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Sandy Sandfort writes: >I would like to start a new thread. I want to know what the >people on this list intend to do with cryptography in the "real >world." I read this as an invitation to rant. :-) This is going to be a little harsh, I'm afraid. > What do you want? What do you fear? I'm here for the crypto phase change. I'm here because of a technological perception about computation in general and encryption in particular. Crypto is a lever. Crypto is about mechanical advantage, small actions with big consequences in the progress of a major social change brought on by computation. Computers are changing the world in a way comparable to the invention of iron, or the printing press, or the steam engine. And cryptography is a pivotal point of influence in the direction that society will take in the next fifty or a hundred years. >My interest is more than academic. I am one of the Cypherpunks >involved in creating a digital bank. If the 700 or so people on >this list wouldn't open an account in a digital bank, chances are >no one else would either. The same goes, of course, for secure >phones, encrypted e-mail, and all the rest. Put the digital bank on Oceana and let them both sink together. Fuck overthrowing the government. As my mother would say, "vast plans in half-vast ways..." For what it's worth, I appreciate and admire the Vision. But it's impossible to take this grandiose stuff seriously when I'm still sending my password in cleartext over my phone line. Digicash is white noise until somebody has something to spend it on. Nobody's going to put their life savings in a bank named "crazed-libertarian(a)subversive.com". Get real. The problem is not a lack of vision or a lack of expertise, it's a lack of social acuity. All those damn unsubscribe messages are telling us something, and nobody seems to be listening. The problem is that the cypherpunks can't even run a mailing list that's easy for people of limited technical ability to use, much less a bank or an entire nation. Somebody this last week posted a proposal about an encrypted terminal program, something that comes up once in a while, and the only replies I saw were from people saying "Oh, WELL, this has already been taken care of - -- just get a TCP/IP protocol connection and implement kerberos and haven't you read RFC 10329-2394032.9292-11193742 anyway? This is all standardized." Except that I'm still sending my password over my phone line in cleartext. Pr0duct Cipher is working. Mike Ingle is working. Mike Johnson and Grady Ward are distributing. Julf and the Remailer People (who mean our net no harm) are giving people meaningful channels for speech. John Gilmore is insisting on observance of the law. These things are for real. We don't need a new government. We don't need a million metric tons of hexagonal concrete slabs floating off bermuda full of "pioneers". We don't need any bullshit toy banks. The crypto phase change will be brought about by a thousand small and unromantic actions. If we are to be visionaries and subversives, let us style ourselves as visionary and subversive bricklayers, working slowly and patiently and from the ground up. The crypto phase change is not about anarchy, it is about insisting on accountability from the government we already have. The crypto phase change is about user interfaces in Windows. It's about plug-and-play software that lets people secure their own privacy in an indifferent world. These are the things that will effect change. The rest is ego. >What Real World concerns you have about crypto? > >Talk to me. Talk back. -- Will "A skilled commander seeks victory from the situation" -- Sun Tzu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLV6sJPfv4TpIg2PxAQFK5QP+I7gz5NOi4GdzHToX/MnWL8YjpLFgZPFJ JRnwgxAw2QEMYdvORWckBFN/zgrLs7CTlgDT5Pz+uT2qEeYEXX/yRtMo9LLANeqe 8Gy8CnFWFCoC0s8Mt5rG96fG6Y4YAEAnRuYj0ZRb5vb3daU8+GPhfaXp6tr27H3a xkOioJoDG74= =L0+J -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: REAL WORLD ENCRYPTION
by an57322＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy wrote: > >I would like to start a new thread. I want to know what the >people on this list intend to do with cryptography in the "real >world." There are a number of Cypherpunk projects on the drawing >board or already deployed: Stego, encrypted phones, encrypted >and anonymous remailers, stealth PGP, a digital bank, etc. Do >the folks on this list intend to use these tools, or is your >interest only theoretical? > [stuff deleted] >My interest is more than academic. I am one of the Cypherpunks >involved in creating a digital bank. If the 700 or so people on >this list wouldn't open an account in a digital bank, chances are >no one else would either. The same goes, of course, for secure >phones, encrypted e-mail, and all the rest. If the bank provides international transfers then I would be your first customer. -=T.A.Z. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Safire Savages Clipper
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For personal use only as directed... _______________________________________________ New York Times: Monday, February 14, 1994 Essay William Safire SINK THE CLIPPER CHIP Washington Well-meaning law and intelligence officials, vainly seeking to maintain their vanishing ability to eavesdrop, have come up with a scheme that endangers the personal freedom of every American. Nobody doubts that F.B.I. wiretaps help catch crooks or that the National Security Agency's "Big Ears" alert us to the plans of terrorists. And nobody can deny that new technology makes it easier for the bad guys to encode their communications to avoid the eavesdropping of the good guys. But the solution that faceless Clinton officials are putting forward shows outdated law enforcement rooted in abysmal understanding of the information explosion. The Clinton notion, recycled from an aborted Bush idea, is to put the same encryption chip; in every telephone and computer made in the U.S. This new encoding device, or scrambler, would help you and me protect the privacy of our conversations and messages and bank accounts from each other. That sounds great, but here comes the catch: The Federal Government would know and be able to use the code numbers to wiretap each of us. To the tune of "I Got Algorithm," the Eavesdrop Establishment is singing that it will help us protect our privacy --- but not from intrusion by the Feds. In effect, its proposal demands we turn over to Washington a duplicate set of keys to our homes, formerly our castles, where not even the king in olden times could go. The "clipper chip" --- aptly named, as it clips the wings of individual liberty --- would encode, for Federal perusal whenever a judge rubber- stamped a warrant, everything we say on a phone, everything we write on a computer, every order we give to a shopping network or bank or 800 or 900 number, every electronic note we leave our spouses or dictate to our personal-digit-assistant genies. Add to that stack of intimate date the medical information derived from the national "health security card" Mr. Clinton proposes we all carry. Combine it with the travel, shopping and credit data available from all our plastic cards, along with psychological and student test scores. Throw in the confidential tax returns, sealed divorce proceedings, welfare records, field investigations for job applications, raw files and C.I.A. dossiers available to the Feds, and you have the individual citizen standing naked to the nosy bureaucrat. Assure us not that our personal life stories will be "safeguarded" by multiple escrows in the brave new world of snooperware; we saw only last month how political appointees can rifle the old-fashioned files of candidates and get off scot-free. Whenever personal information is amassed and readily available, it will be examined by the curious, and if it is valuable, it will be stolen by political hackers. Ah, but wouldn't it be helpful to society to have instant access to the encoded communications of a Mafia capo, or a terrorist ordering the blow-up of a skyscraper, or a banker financing a dictator's nuclear development? Sure it would. That's why no self-respecting vice overlord or terrorist or local drug-runner would buy or use clipper-chipped American telecommunications equipment. They would buy non-American hardware with unmonitored Japanese or German or Indian encryption chips and laugh all the way to the plutonium factory. The only people tap-able by American agents would be honest Americans --- or those crooked Americans dopey enough to buy American equipment with the pre-compromised American code. Subsequent laws to mandate the F.B.I. bug in every transmitter would be as effective as today's laws banning radar detectors. Tomorrow's law enforcement and espionage cannot be planned by people stuck in the wiretap and Big Ear mind-set of the past. The new Ultra secret is that the paradigm has shifted; encryption has overcome decryption. Billions now spent on passive technical surveillance must be shifted to active means of learning criminal or aggressive plans. Human informers must be recruited or placed, as "sigint" declines and "humint" rises in the new era; psychic as well as monetary rewards for ratting must be raised; governments must collude closely to trace transfers of wealth. Cash in your clipper chips, wiretappers: you can't detect the crime wave of the future with those old earphones on. --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Re: cypherpunks meeting in Mt. View last weekend.
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Strick, It was a pretty good meeting; large crowd. If you don't mind, I'll turn this into an informal meeting report for the list. I missed the first hour or so. Someone said Phil Zimmerman is working on Voice communication systems and wants volunteers. He's trying to do a portable, no-special-sound-cards, widely deployable system, presumably either trading sound quality for flexibility or depending on Internet or V.FAST? Pavel Curtis talked about LambdaMOO and the emerging democracy there - lots of the users are young, and about half are statists and half are Libs or Anarchists of various sorts. About 5000 people have accounts, it runs on a 256-meg Sun Scorpion and really needs even more horsepower. Interesting stuff on the social evolution there, and the lessons the Wizards learned about letting things develop on their own and staying out of the way while the players create stuff. It's largely a discussion world, I gather. About 2/3 of the participants just use telnet (lambda.parc.xerox.com 8888) instead of clients, which limits the ability of people to do fancy stuff with PGP or machine-assisted characters. Most are young (mean age <24, mode 19, mostly .edu, about 25% female.) parcftp.xerox.com for software. Chip Rosenthal talked about Habitat, an early Commodore-64-client+central-world-server system that he helped put out with QLink, which later became America OnLine. In Habitat, you have a graphical user interface, avatars who start out normal-looking but you can customize appearances (e.g. there's a Head Shop.) To fit in a C64/300baud world, they had to think a lot about what objects they needed and what kind of communication really needed to happen; they also found that when you get LOTS of users out there they can think up stuff lots faster than the sysadmins can, a lesson LambdaMOO also learned. (They spent two intensive weeks planning a quest for Something in a Dungeon for the users; the users found it in half an hour.) (Cooperation works *far* better than central planning!) Since it was originally a gaming world, you could get killed or kill other players, and much dissent and discussion about this gradually occurred. Eventually, enough players asked the Wizards to change this that they had a vote. It came out 50-50, of course, so the Wizards decided you couldn't get killed inside the town boundary but could get killed outside, and folks voted with their feet. The town elected a Sheriff (whose gun didn't work in town either.) Various discussions about how people felt about the Wizards having to obey the rules, etc. C64s eventually got old... Habitat ran partly in America and partly, longer, in Japan; Fujitsu bought out the remains and it's gradually coming back as a new Global Cyberspace Project or something like that. New Fujitsu custom hardware supports the current stuff, and there's a 7-layer protocol stack :-(, etc. Arthur Chandler, disguised in a suit :-), talked about BayMOO, where last week's cpunks virtual meeting was. mud.crl.com 8888. Arthur teaches social science of some sort at SFSU; I forget if it's polisci or anthropology or literature, but he's studying the kinds of social interactions that go on in MOOs. BayMOO has a much different balance of statism that LambdaMOO; some Lambdafolk came over to BayMOO and started talking about how neat it was to have Government and how BayMOO should get some, and people politely informed them they were crazy and ignored them. (Hypnocracy was working quite well, for you old folks in the audience :-) In BayMOO, the folks who run it are janitors, not wizards. BayMOO is basically running on borrowed time on crl.com; since they don't charge by the hour for connections, they're not making any money from all the load it's placing on the Sparc2, so it may eventually have to break up, charge money, or find a new home. Anybody have a machine to donate? The Little Garden may be able to lend some bandwidth, if I'm not misremembering John's comment. The fourth speaker was also very interesting, but memory fade is setting in, so I can't tell you who he was or what he said :-) but he was doing some formal modelling of some of the interactions, and I remember it being neat stuff. Oh, well. Somewhere along the line there was a lot of discussion about security, and how much of it needs to be done by the server, who would then need to be trusted (can you *really* trust a Wizard? :-) vs. peer-to-peer by clients. For people who use clients for their MUDs, it may be a lot more effective. Eric Hughes brought up a topic of how to name people across MUDs, which related to this topic and to several others and led to Notable DIsagreements among participants. The basic suggestion was that people should be able to bring names from other environments, e.g. Haakon of Lambda or Blast of BayMOO. While the primary context was simply MUD/MOOs, it touches on issues like global vs. local name spaces, centralized naming authorities and is-a-person (Tim May opposes it for this reason), server vs. client control, reputation servers, guilt-by-association, etc. Someone sensibly pointed out that you could create a Lapel Pin object in a MOO which could by used to provide any identifying information you want for people who want to look at it, and decide whether or not to trust it based on contents, signatures in it, etc. Tim's opposition is largely to the concept of central naming, which leads to government-controlled id trees instead of web-of-trust, and therefore lack of anonymity. (COmments by various on Clinton National Health ID card and Republican Not-An-Immigrant ID card.) Someone commented that you shouldn't really have A public key, you should have a ring of public keys for different things, so people remember that identity is contextual rather than True Name. Another problem is the unsettled question about how reputation servers should work, and whether by bringing an identity from a given group (e.g. LambdaMoo or CypherWonks) you drag along its reputation, as opposed to providing pointers for people to go look at your reputations in various places you hang out. Dinner was at the sushi-on-little-boats place in Mountain View. The group was separated due to lack of contiguous seating, and it became obvious after a ping or two that this was a Token Ring :-) NTP yielded about 65 seconds RTT; a packet containing begin 644 /vmunix was dropped into the bit bucket by one of the servers... Later icecream split into two discussions, one serious and one centered around Don's powerbook with the Rube Goldberg object-oriented mousetrap-making games. Can't tell you about the serious part, but the mousetraps were fun. Bill # Bill Stewart AT&T Global Information Solutions, aka NCR Corp # 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566 Phone 1-510-484-6204 fax-6399 # email bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart(a)attmail.com # ViaCrypt PGP Key IDs 384/C2AFCD 1024/9D6465

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No Subject
by Dirk Elmendorf 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unsubscribe delmendo(a)trinity.edu

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No Subject
by Dirk Elmendorf 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anybody know any anonymous news reader cites? Please send replies to delmendo(a)trinity.edu

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SCHEME for FULL-SPEC RETURN PATH
by Jon 'Iain' Boone 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This is a portion of mail that I sent to bill stewart. Since bill seems to busy to send a critique, could someone else comply, please? Jon Boone | PSC Networking | boone(a)psc.edu | (412) 268-6959 | PGP Key # B75699 PGP Public Key fingerprint = 23 59 EC 91 47 A6 E3 92 9E A8 96 6A D9 27 C9 6C - ------- Forwarded Message Date: Thu, 03 Feb 94 13:45:31 -0500 From: "Jon 'Iain' Boone" <boone(a)psc.edu> How secure do you think this is? Three remailers: anon1+(a)a.edu anon2+(a)b.com anon3+(a)c.org Originator: boone(a)psc.edu (really igi.psc.edu, as Message-ID: shows) Receiver: wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com ()Ka == contents inside () are encrypted with Public Key of A mail addressed to random+*(a)foo.edu == mail to user random(a)foo.edu, random's mail processor will deal with the +* The sender must encrypt his/her own address with the public key of the first remailer and put it in the X-A-R-P: field. Upon reciept of a message with X-A-S-P: set to non-empty, the re-mailer will strip off its portion of the address and decrypt the rest with its private key. It will add itself to the X-A-R-P: and encrypt it in the public key of the next remailer on the X-A-S-P: If there is nothing in the X-A-S-P: (after having removed its own address), then it needs to be sent to the To: address, so we set the From: address to be the contents of the X-A-R-P: with its own address pre- & post- pended. That way, the reciepient need not change his/her mail agent to respond via the X-A-R-P: (or even need to include the X-A-S-P: in the outgoing response). If the message doesn't have an X-A-S-P:, the remailer checks the "To:" for the contents of what would have been the X-A-S-P: with its own address pre- & post- pended. By stripping off its own address and de-crypting the resultant, it has the next address to send it to. Barring wire-tapping, your privacy is susceptible in the logs (syslog, etc.) of the first remailer (a.edu in my example) or if all the RSA-keys for a.edu, b.com and c.org are broken. To dampen wire-tapping, you could encrypt the contents of the message with padding, making traffic analysis more difficult. Comments? IGI.PSC.EDU: To: wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com X-A-S-P: anon1+"(anon2+"(anon3+(a)c.org)Kb"@b.com)Ka"@a.edu X-A-R-P: (boone(a)psc.edu)Ka From: boone(a)psc.edu Message-Id: <348723472.AA34890235(a)igi.psc.edu> A.EDU: To: wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com X-A-S-P: anon2+"(anon3+(a)c.org)Kb"@b.com X-A-R-P: (anon1+"(boone(a)psc.edu)Ka"@a.edu)Kb From: anon1+(a)a.edu Message-Id: <2349458.AA23575(a)a.edu> B.COM: To: wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com X-A-S-P: anon3+(a)c.org X-A-R-P: (anon2+"(anon1+"(boone(a)psc.edu)Ka"@a.edu)Kb"@b.com)Kc From: anon2+(a)b.edu Message-Id: <8980234.AA23489203(a)b.com> C.ORG: To: wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com X-A-R-P: anon3+"(anon2+"(anon1+"(boone(a)psc.edu)Ka"@a.edu)Kb"@b.com)Kc"@c.org From: anon3+"(anon2+"(anon1+"(boone(a)psc.edu)Ka"@a.edu)Kb"@b.com)Kc"@c.org Message-Id: <2343.AA123(a)c.org> ANCHOR.HO.ATT.COM: (Reply) To: anon3+"(anon2+"(anon1+"(boone(a)psc.edu)Ka"@a.edu)Kb"@b.com)Kc"@c.org From: wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com Message-Id: <99234.AA23492383(a)anchor.ho.att.com> C.ORG: To: anon2+"(anon1+"(boone(a)psc.edu)Ka"@a.edu)Kb"@b.com From: wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com Message-Id: <2342349324.AA2343242(a)c.org> B.COM: To: anon1+"(boone(a)psc.edu)Ka"@a.edu From: wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com Message-Id: <98234234.AA123213(a)b.com> A.EDU: To: boone(a)psc.edu From: wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com Message-Id: <7732432.AA52342(a)a.edu> Of course, some work would be necessary to accomodate double-blind conversations. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLV92F4SAMUrxt1aZAQErUQQAggfMfjxAXS0rk9AL5uZTNN9adGNJqMvF gC5QSlgSki2bmUzfeoq/2cSpdUx7vX9LPCGd88+RnnouyhCDhK0a6fOLGgEDrtar miKGU11Ernt/bQC6gwvBa+KuD7pceLM2mPGw9NLxLMwwajP/U6CxL2/bMXIQhxZ0 eMTM76QuEwE= =tfVg -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- #

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