- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Why Net Censorship Doesn't Work
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:29 AM 1/2/96 -0600, Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin] wrote: >Tell that to folks in the contries of used-to-be-Russia. Lots of old >Communist leaders getting back into power - some folks are even saying >that the old days under the Communists were better than living in a free >market economy. I said "modern" country. Even so, Russia and the rest are much more market dominated than they used to be. Transition will not be easy but I doubt if they'll go back. As for an eternity of slavery being superior to too rambunctious freedom -- we won't let them be that stupid. The "cancer of Anglo-Saxon values" is pretty powerful. >> Where are the pressure points where regulation can be applied? > >How about on the backbone itself? Since everyone goes through the htree >major backbones, all one would have to do is control access at those >points. Of course, that would lead to clandestine use of >store-and-forward LEOsats, s&f UUCP sites, etc. UUCP might even make a >comeback ;) That would require outlawry of crypto over the backbone and some way of convincing the backbone to run government approved code. Quite a bit of resistance would ensue. Have the Feds ever successfully mandated that large numbers of people run government code? DCF

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Re:US calls for measures against Internet porn
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Jan 03, 1996 14:47:35, 'anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com' wrote: >My original post, "US calls for measures against Internet porn" was a >satire. The entire point was that, by changing a few words in the >"China calls for measures against Internet porn" story, a statement by >a totalitarian communist regime could be made to look like official US >policy. Obviously, the project was a success, as people are taking it >seriously in spite of the fact that it had telltale clues, and that >the original source was revealed. > I was going to post on this topic, especially on a paraphrase of the (ostensible) original. I still want to, but let me play either the skeptical or responsible journalist (reader's choice of adjectives). Anonymous has *not* revealled the original source as he/it/she claimed. They have asserted it came from Xinhua news agency. Will Anonymous post a pointer to where we can access on the internet the original? News feed, date, and time of posting, as well as message ID should suffice. -- tallpaul -- Any political analysis that fits on a bumper sticker is wrong.

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A Mondex like Protocol
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Two Mondex units, upon command of their respective operators, can pass money from one to the other via infra_red signals. I think that this requires tamper proof units. I understand that the Mondex protocol is currently undisclosed. I have no information about that protocol but am merely trying to find a protocol that fits the little that I know about Mondex. Are there other guesses? Here is one way it might work. Upon an operator receive command, the payee unit transmits a DH greeting along with the value of a counter located in the payee unit. (The integrity of the counter value in the greeting is somehow ensured.) It continues to send this greeting while it awaits a greeting. Upon a pay command from its operator, a payer unit transmits a DH greeting and continues to send that while it awaits a greeting. When either unit receives a greeting it computes the shared secret key ala DH. The payer decrements its cash value and generates a pay order enciphered under the secret key. The pay order includes the counter value from the payee's greeting. This order is transmitted repeatedly until an acknowledgement is received or times out. If it times out then the money is lost. When the payee receives a pay order, it verifies that the counter value is correct and then increments the counter, preventing replay. The payee then increments its cash value and sends ciphered acknowledgements for a brief period. The payer may give one final acknowledgement acknowledgement which, if lost, merely means that the receiver will time-out sending acknowledgements. The common DH modulus is known to all units and but otherwise secret. This, of course, requires a extraordinary tamper resistance. Only the state must be kept secret, not the hardware behavior. Here is the money integrity argument for this protocol. The units are collectively responsible for preventing counterfeiting. For counterfeiting to happen some unit must increment its cash value when there was no corresponding decrement in another unit. A unit increments its cash value when it decodes a pay order from someone who knows the global secret DH modulus. That someone must have been a legitimate unit that decreased its cash value. Replay is impossible because each such transaction is uniquely identified by the recipient's counter value. The recipient never increments its cash value twice for the same counter value.

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Re: DOS/Windows remailer chaining
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:27 PM 1/2/96 +0100, nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) wrote: >Cypherpunks write code. With that phrase and the wave of attempts to >censor the 'Net, I've embarked on a quest to make remailers easier to use. > >Has anyone written an easy to use Windows or DOS application that will let >someone chain a message through several remailers, perhaps with support >for the mailer at alpha.c2.org? Yup. Private Idaho, www.eskimo.com/~joelm/ does just that, along with calling PGP to do things you commonly want done. >Would the writer of such a program, if in the US fall under the provisions >in ITAR? Obviously, calls to the PGP program would have to be made. I >recall reading that such hooks do fall under the ITAR. If this is true, so >much for a more user friendly version of chain for the masses. Depends on whether it's a "component" of an encryption system or not. But if you're not doing PGP, no problem at all (except of course that _real_ remailers only talk encrypted....) #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 # # "The price of liberty is eternal vigilance" used to mean us watching # the government, not the other way around....

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Re: "PGP-Scape"? (was Re: Our "New Order")
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- cp(a)proust.suba.com (Alex Strasheim) wrote: >> There's also less worry about secure transactions, since if >> everything's encrypted it's harder to tell if a transaction is taking >> place, viewing porno or subversive or religious, literature, or if >> you're just reading something mundane. > >I think I must be missing something here. Aren't you describing an SSL >web server? Different algorithms, but basically the same idea? No. SSL doesn't encrypt everything, just certain transactions (or am I wrong about this?) Something that keeps everything encrypted and anonymous. >Netscape 2.0 is out for real -- everyone can now pick their certs. GAK >just got harder. As opposed to the imaginary beta? - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMRcCsyoZzwIn1bdtAQEZYAF6Aql41weD0Dz+7aQbQ+OFyXeb8fPgoO9n o/muL79oNXntntKcqmaqSHWsxz/VuTX1 =69yF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Zimmermann Legal Defense Fund
by Philip L. Dubois 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- * MESSAGE FROM ZIMMERMANN DEFENSE TEAM FOR IMMEDIATE WIDE DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT MODIFICATION I write on behalf of Philip Zimmermann and his legal defense team for two reasons: to offer thanks and to make an announcement. First, we offer our thanks to all the generous souls who donated money and services to the Zimmermann Legal Defense Fund. Without you, we could not have mounted the defense that we did, and we would not have achieved the result that we did. Your contributions were made from a commitment to the causes of privacy and justice, and we are grateful. The announcement: as you may know, I am the only lawyer who was not working pro bono, i.e., without expectation of being paid. Three of our lawyers-- Ken Bass in D.C., Eben Moglen in New York, and Curt Karnow in San Francisco-- devoted hundreds of hours of time and substantial expenses for which they've not been paid. Tom Nolan in Palo Alto and Bob Corn-Revere in D.C. also spent a great deal of time on this case for which they were not paid. And, of course, Joe Burton in San Francisco toiled in obscurity on behalf of the other person who was also targeted by the federal investigation. I agreed up front not to bill for all my time, and judging from the rate of current contributions, it now appears that the Defense Fund will cover the fees and costs that I billed. I would like to see these other lawyers receive some compensation for their efforts. Accordingly, all donations to the Zimmermann Legal Defense Fund mailed, authorized, or generally "made" (as opposed to "received") after midnight local time on 14 February 1996 will be distributed among these other lawyers to defray their costs and, if possible, to compensate them for a little of their time. I make this announcement because people contributing to the Fund have a right to know that Mr. Zimmermann's actual defense costs are now covered and that additional donations will go to lawyers who agreed to work for free and who were absolutely essential to the defense. Again, my thanks. Philip L. Dubois Counsel for Philip Zimmermann Philip L. Dubois, P.C. 2305 Broadway Boulder, CO 80304-4106 voice: 303-444-3885 fax: 303-444-1051 email: dubois(a)dubois.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMRgCUbZ7C+AHeDONAQGJAAP+N82RobbmbRVljdE7t0tGEcfCeHN+pqwF +j31GjZU3qDNBtgXw30yTJSKOOjkg9fBRicNIQPsLarkTGDTYWUk2JSNcUVgNZiO /AjM/BnIjwms81DuGR1KivlMlw6lnhK46ncT4ijx5tMj2b8QaHiwkkwxznY3FTXi bNlo5J06cFA= =D12f -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Anti-US-censorship ammunition
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I received the following addresses from my request for non-US bomb-making material sites. (I'll post who gave them to me if he gives me permission). They should be useful as arguments against anyone who claims the US should shut off such information. -Allen http://www.mi.aau.dk/~clement/thb_title.html http://home.ptd.net/~wa2joc/terror.hb http://www.tvnorge.no/~thomasm/terror.htm http://www.cis.ksu.edu/~psiber/fortress/ter5ror/main.html

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DES for HP48?
by stainles＠bga.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- When the RC4 implimentation for the HP48 was posted, someone else mentioned the existence of a DES implimentation for the same machine. I remember seeing this mentioned on the list earlier as well, but... I've done searches with Archie, Alta Vista and Yahoo, as well as looking through the excellent hks.net archives, but I haven't been able to find it. Can someone point me in the right direction? (Since I'm probably just too stupid to construct a proper Yahoo search, and to keep list noise down, I'll sumarize privately e-mailed responses.) ==Dwight -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6ui iQCVAgUBMRgdEYY4AzhdF11FAQGrEwP6Aq+oTEOsss6XR30ra/Ft0fYtRJi0BW7+ KNw8Fx3C+s/ekBn+PmGbprsiDk3NBCzpNvZPylwCrmRrh71bu2ZUK/ZTkmJVDr56 7rFKoW0PL8KOZ9E58+u7NB2p/XuHRgtfTZgkEt2WvuPP/lgmVUPwUYSTg01fC+tN yPEZgQnLUKM= =WBl3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Electronic Grille Cipher?
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >An idea occurred to me the other day, for hiding multiple >> texts in one file using multiple keys. The gist of it is to [..] > I had a similar idea a bit back, and Lewis/Futplex kindly referred me > to some parts of the Archives discussing it. However, the main objection to What part of the archives? > this idea was that the cops would just do a search warrant for the second group > of information. My solution to this is to have quite a few groups of > information, which would admittedly make the spacing problem a bit hard. > The following might be an example for someone of such a scheme: That's a good solution. Another idea might be to stego the accounting info (real info ;) inside one of pictures using a similar method.... in some ways this method is better suited for stego since it becomes lunacy for the cops to insist that every picture or audiofile you have has something or many things hidden... (unless they've been watching you and know you keep accessing your jodi foster pix after a client visits you...) Rob. --- "Mutant" Rob <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a blank message with the subject "send pgp-key" (not in quotes) for a copy of my PGP key.

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Re: [NOISE] Paranormally Good Privacy
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:48 AM 2/6/96 -0800, Dave Del Torto wrote: >1996-02-06 PGP-Y > >Our paranormal testing program has already had one commercial spin-off. Our >engineers have developed a truly foolproof data security protocol. It is >called PGP-Y -- "Pretty Good Parasychology." The mechanism is simple. You >imagine that you have transmitted data to someone; that person then >imagines that he has received it. Using PGP-Y, any type of information can >be transmitted over the Internet with complete security. The key is that >the data is transmitted high over the net -- so high that the data actually >travels above the net rather than within it. The data is transmitted >telepathically (and for those who distrust electronic funds, we also have a >scheme for transmitting cash and gold plate telekinetically.) There were a number of times where I had to explain to users that the "T" in TCP/IP did not stand for "Telepathic". (Glad I am not doing that anymore... I would expect calls from people looking for that version. And when we would support it...) Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ Is the operating system half NT or half full?

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