- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Fair Credit Reporting Act and Privacy Act
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:28 AM 2/9/96, Duncan Frissell wrote: >Look, the reason we hate the CDA is because it restricts speech. >Restrictions on credit agencies gossiping about you are also speech >restrictions. If you are out in the world, people are going to talk about >you. The credit agencies are much easier to handle and less intrusive than >the women were who talked about you while beating cloth on the rocks in the >stream back in the old village. Recall that in 1914 America adopted the "Gossiping and Busybodies Fair Reporting Act," requiring all gossipers and busybodies to register their planned speech acts with the typically-named Privacy Ombudsman (now Ombudsperson). The modest registration fee of $75, a lot of money in 1914 of course, appears to have had a chilling effect on this market, as there are few if any gossiping women beating clothes on rocks at the stream. More seriously, what I find useful when thinking "There ought to be a law!" thoughts is to imagine how it might be enforced against _me_. Creative visualization. For example, while I get angry at times with TRW and TransUnion like everyone else, I imagine a welter of laws about the keeping of records and I imagine someone coming to *my* door and announcing that he was there to inspect the contents of my hard drives to determine if I had unlicensed data. (Tim Philp's idea that this would only apply to "corporations" or "businesses" (not clear which he means) misses the point. Am I, for example, a business? Having such laws kick in at some well-defined threshold would simply shift the nature of the information-gatherers...for example, they's subcontract out the record-keeping to a raft of smaller, linked entities. Then you'd have to prosecute people and companies for accessing illegal data banks, etc.) I am willing to support a few laws, about murder, theft, rape, etc., but not busybody laws trying to control what information people collect. If someone asks what the relevance to this list is of this issue, then they really are as dumb as dirt, and as dumb as endangered dirt, too. --Tim May Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Cypherpunks in 3/96 WIRED -\"Wisecrackers\" by Steven Levy
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Indeed, congrats Steven, a swell, crackerjack story well told. Flattering exhibits of Damien and DW. Ponder the garish payback frontis-pieces announcing Steven's tale of "a throbbing collaborative network of potential crackers -- and, maybe, thieves and saboteurs." Steven, your credit sez the next book is "Crypto," about the revolution in cryptography. Can you give a date for publication?

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Re: anonymous age credentials, sharing of
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:38 PM 2/14/96, Michael Froomkin wrote: >Suppose Alice is a CA who issues anonymous age credentials. >Bob is 15 >Carol is 25 > >Carol gets a legitimate anonymous age credential from Alice bound to an >anonymous public key generated for this purpose. Carol then gives the >key pair to Bob. Bob uses to do things only adults are legally permitted >to do. (It's not bound to Carol's everday keypair because that's not >anonymous....) > >What can stop Bob and Carol from subverting a scheme that relies on >anonymous age creditials in this manner? Nothing, except biometric methods (fingerprints, retinal scans, electronic signatures (the pen type), DNA, etc.) That is, if the credential is transferrable by transfer (not a syllogism), then it can be transferred. If, however, the credential needs some input from a local biometric input device, then this makes it harder to transfer the credential. Unless the biometric device is bypassed.... (Likewise, Carol could log on to the illegal activity and "let Bob watch." Another form of bypassing viewing credentials.) >If the answer is "nothing" this might mean that purveyors of "adult" >material might have no defense against a law requiring that they collect a >True Name + age creditential.... There are interesting questions here....mostly I think of the "True Name" as only another credential, but this is a complicated argument to make, and I don't have the time right now. (Also, Perry is even now composing a "what does this have to do with cryptography?" perrygram.) --Tim May Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Hey Derek: who are you? (toad.com is glitching...)
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Would the author of this message please reply to me by e-mail? I received it under the name <owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com>, with no subject whatsoever. The remailer is freakin' out... >The other question I have is: who do you think the "customers" of PGP >are? If you think the majority of PGP's customers are the >crypto-privacy activitst types, you are highly mistaken. PGP has hit >the main stream, and is being used by many non-crypto-aware people. >Probably more of them than there are of us. > >If you want to discuss this more, let's take it to private email, >please. > >-derek > > **** NEW PGP 2.6.2 KEY ********* 2048 bits Key ID:24201BA1 1996/02/13 Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> Key fingerprint = 23 B6 24 31 86 67 FB 35 C7 A7 AF 12 A1 61 E9 3D **** OLD KEY: DO NOT USE ANYMORE UNLESS FOR VERIFYING SIGNATURES **** 1024 bits Key ID:57214AED 1995/10/04 Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> Key fingerprint = 84 96 76 AE EB 7C AB 15 88 47 87 B0 18 31 74 9F

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Re: FW: Laugh Of The Day - Fri, Feb 02 1996 (fwd)
by cwalton＠jovanet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just have to ask-- what does this have to do with........ >few participants; the purists spend lots of time self-righteously >congratulating each other on keeping off-topic threads off the list). oh, never mind. i see now...... Conrad Walton http://www.industrial-artworks.com/ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- --- INDUSTRIAL ARTWORKS | POB 2815, El Segundo, CA 90245 | 1-310-640-3365

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Chek it out
by Zer0.Faith.Inc.＠website.chek.it.out 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Heights/2608 It's Kool, but still under construction.

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Common Carrier Status is Often a Red Herring
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[I picked a new thread title. Speaking of which, YACM (Yet Another Cyberspace Magazine) is out: "Herring," or "Red Herring," or "Pickled Herring." I only glanced at it long enough to see that it had the obligatory interview with cyberspace guru Marc Andreesen, the obligatory cover photo of Steve Jobs, and the obligatory other techno-rave articles. Probably several mentions of PGP, but I didn't bother to look for them. Needless to say, I put it back on the shelf before being too heavily contaminated.] At 7:48 PM 2/14/96, Declan B. McCullagh wrote: >Since you don't understand the way Federal criminal charges work, >there's no reason I should take your argument seriously. (Hint: The >*U.S. Attorney*, or an AUSA, files charges, not you, me, or a random >"athiest.") > >As for this mythical Bible being removed, that is irrelevant to this >discussion, which centers around a Bible being *prosecuted*. If I had a >Bible on my web site (perhaps the TCM Vernacular Translation!) I'd >remove it just to make a point. As I suspect the owner of the web pages >did. By the way, this is one reason why the "try to be like a common carrier" arguments are somewhat weak. Let me explain. I hear often on this list and in other places that Web sites and other Net sites should strive to be as much like common carriers as possible, that removing any items or discouraging controversial material (Zundelsites, militia sites, Sarin formulas, antifeminista material, etc.) will weaken their defense in a legal case. Well, I don't buy it. Maybe in the abstract, and in the long run, it has worked out that common carrier status involves non-intervention. However, in the real world it is _real prosecutors_ who decide who to go after. Real prosecutors who are ordered to prosecute a CDA case are not going to go after clean-living ISPs who happened to let one questionable item through, they're going to go after the rough trade, just as Declan suggests. Now, in the real world, does anybody think that "The Christian Fellowship Internet Service Provider," which has taken numerous steps to limit access to indecent material, is *more likely* to be prosecuted by federal prosecutors than "Buck Satan's Anything Goes Web Site"? (Hint: "Common carrier" status is not something that gets handed out to some Internet providers and not others. Second hint: so far as I have heard, there has not yet been any determination as to whether some ISPs are "common carriers" and others are not.) The realpolitik of it is that an ISP which tries to limit access by minors, which discourages Zundelsite material, and which makes soothing comments about Jess Helms and the Christian Right will of course be *far less likely* to be prosecuted under whatever CDA charges come up as some leftist, anarchist, radical ISP which takes a hands-off approach. Sad, but true. This is also known in legal circles as "the chilling effect." [ObPerry: "What does this have to do with the IPv6 domestic distibution?" ObAnswer: "Nothing. Since you're so concerned about people coding, go back to coding."] ---Tim May Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Carrying the Bible an Offense?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:41 PM 2/14/96, Sten Drescher wrote: >"Declan B. McCullagh" <declan+(a)CMU.EDU> said: > >DBM> (I assume your Bible argument is just posturing. No >DBM> U.S. Attorney, political appointees they, ever will prosecute >DBM> someone who puts the complete text of the King James Bible >DBM> online.) > > You assume wrong. While I certainly agree that no >U.S. Attorney would voluntarily prosecute such a case, what happens >when an athiest files charges against someone for carrying the Bible? >IANAL, but couldn't the U.S. Attorney be forced to prosecute? I'm also not a lawyer, but no prosecution is possible in this situation. Not in this country. A case must be presented to a grand jury (remember the Zimmermann case?) and no grand jury in the United States would do this. There are two further points which need clearing up: 1. Private citizens (the atheist in this case) do not file criminal charges. They may swear out a complaint ("I witnessed John Doe carrying a Bible"), but they do not file criminal charges. 2. The "carrying of a Bible" is not covered by the CDA. No prosecutor can be "forced" to prosecute, absent approval by a grand jury. (And if a prosecutor doesn't want to indict a ham sandwich, it won't be indicted.) --Tim May [This Bible excerpt awaiting review under the Communications Decency Act] And then Lot said, "I have some mighty fine young virgin daughters. Why don't you boys just come on in and fuck them right here in my house - I'll just watch!"....Later, up in the mountains, the younger daughter said. "Dad's getting old. I say we should fuck him." So the two daughters got him drunk and screwed him all that night. Sure enough, Dad got them pregnant....Onan really hated the idea of doing his brother's wife and getting her pregnant while his brother got all the credit, so he pulled out before he came....Remember, it's not a good idea to have sex with your sister, your brother, your parents, your pet dog, or the farm animals, unless God tells you to. [excerpts from the Old Testament, Modern Vernacular Translation, TCM, 1996]

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 13 Jan 97 6:48:59 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++++++++++++ 37:22 99.99% nym config(a)nym.alias.net **#*#*++#+-# 20:08 99.99% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de ++++++-++++ 1:15:41 99.96% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +++++++.-++* 2:25:45 99.91% replay remailer(a)replay.com *+* +--+*+** 35:43 99.87% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net ------+---- 2:54:30 99.81% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com *+******+ ** 4:00 99.67% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net +++*+ +* +*+ 35:01 99.61% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com ----+++++ -+ 53:56 99.60% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com #**#**** ++# 2:26 99.24% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ++++ +-++ + 1:18:06 99.21% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com +_.--++-++- 4:39:11 99.18% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com --- ------- 4:46:40 98.01% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net - --++++ + 1:05:02 97.84% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu ++++++ 35:13 95.73% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net + ####++* 39:45 74.33% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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No Subject
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Meanwhile > WANTED, DEAD OR ALIVE > JIM BELL > REWARD 13 demo-cyberbucks Send your contributions to: James D. Bell 7214 Corregidor Road Vancouver, WA (503) 696-3911 (503) 737-0284 (503) 737-0357 >An assassination-sponsoring society is _not_ a polite society. The first rule of not being seen is "Don't stand up".

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