- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

End to End encryption for PC AND UNIX
by nobody＠newsgate.cs.pdx.edu 29 Jun '93

29 Jun '93

Does anyone out there know if there is a program that will encrypt everything going over the phone line between a IBM MSDOS computer and a unix system?

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Digital Signature Scandal
by Bernard.A.Galler＠um.cc.umich.edu 29 Jun '93

29 Jun '93

- ------- Forwarded message Received: from eff.org by um.cc.umich.edu via MTS-Net; Mon, 28 Jun 93 19:01:51 EDT Received: by eff.org id AA18269 (5.65c/IDA-1.5/ident for interesting-people-exploder); Mon, 28 Jun 1993 19:01:33 -0400 Posted-Date: Mon, 28 Jun 1993 18:59:37 -0500 Message-Id: <9306282259.AA06949(a)linc.cis.upenn.edu> X-Sender: farber(a)linc.cis.upenn.edu Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Mon, 28 Jun 1993 18:59:37 -0500 From: farber(a)central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber) Subject: Digital Signature Scandal To: interesting-people(a)eff.org (interesting-people mailing list) [The following is an official announcement from the League for Programming Freedom. Please redistribute this as widely as possible.] Digital Signature Scandal Digital signature is a technique whereby one person (call her J. R. Gensym) can produce a specially encrypted number which anyone can verify could only have been produced by her. (Typically a particular signature number encodes additional information such as a date and time or a legal document being signed.) Anyone can decrypt the number because that can be done with information that is published; but producing such a number uses a "key" (a password) that J. R. Gensym does not tell to anyone else. Several years ago, Congress directed the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology, formerly the National Bureau of Standards) to choose a single digital signature algorithm as a standard for the US. In 1992, two algorithms were under consideration. One had been developed by NIST with advice from the NSA (National Security Agency), which engages in electronic spying and decoding. There was widespread suspicion that this algorithm had been designed to facilitate some sort of trickery. The fact that NIST had applied for a patent on this algorithm engendered additional suspicion; despite their assurances that this would not be used to interfere with use of the technique, people could imagine no harmless motive for patenting it. The other algorithm was proposed by a company called PKP, Inc., which not coincidentally has patents covering its use. This alternative had a disadvantage that was not just speculation: if this algorithm were adopted as the standard, everyone using the standard would have to pay PKP. (The same patents cover the broader field of public key cryptography, a technique whose use in the US has been mostly inhibited for a decade by PKP's assiduous enforcement of these patents. The patents were licensed exclusively to PKP by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Stanford University, and derive from taxpayer-funded research.) PKP, Inc. made much of the suspect nature of the NIST algorithm and portrayed itself as warning the public about this. On June 8, NIST published a new plan which combines the worst of both worlds: to adopt the suspect NIST algorithm, and give PKP, Inc. an *exclusive* license to the patent for it. This plan places digital signature use under the control of PKP through the year 2010. By agreeing to this arrangement, PKP, Inc. shows that its concern to protect the public from possible trickery was a sham. Its real desire was, as one might have guessed, to own an official national standard. Meanwhile, NIST has justified past suspicion about its patent application by proposing to give that patent (in effect) to a private entity. Instead of making a gift to PKP, Inc., of the work all of us have paid for, NIST and Congress ought to protect our access to it--by pursuing all possible means, judicial and legislative, to invalidate or annull the PKP patents. If that fails, even taking them by eminent domain is better (and cheaper in the long run!) than the current plan. You can write to NIST to object to this giveaway. Write to: Michael R. Rubin Active Chief Counsel for Technology Room A-1111, Administration Building, National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899 (301) 975-2803. The deadline for arrival of letters is around August 4. Please send a copy of your letter to: League for Programming Freedom 1 Kendall Square #143 P.O.Box 9171 Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139 (The League for Programming Freedom is an organization which defends the freedom to write software, and opposes monopolies such as patented algorithms and copyrighted languages. It advocates returning to the former legal system under which if you write the program, you are free to use it. Please write to the League if you want more information.) Sending copies to the League will enable us to show them to elected officials if that is useful. This text was transcribed from a fax and may have transcription errors. We believe the text to be correct but some of the numbers may be incorrect or incomplete. - --------------------------------------------------------------------- ** The following notice was published in the Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 108, dated June 8, 1993 under Notices ** National Institute of Standards and Technology Notice of Proposal for Grant of Exclusive Patent License This is to notify the public that the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) intends to grant an exclusive world-wide license to Public Key Partners of Sunnyvale, California to practice the Invention embodied in U.S. Patent Application No. 07/738.431 and entitled "Digital Signature Algorithm." A PCT application has been filed. The rights in the invention have been assigned to the United States of America. The prospective license is a cross-license which would resolve a patent dispute with Public Key Partners and includes the right to sublicense. Notice of availability of this invention for licensing was waived because it was determined that expeditious granting of such license will best serve the interest of the Federal Government and the public. Public Key Partners has provided NIST with the materials contained in Appendix A as part of their proposal to NIST. Inquiries, comments, and other materials relating to the prospec- tive license shall be submitted to Michael R. Rubin, Active Chief Counsel for Technology, Room A-1111, Administration Building, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899. His telephone number is (301) 975-2803. Applica- tions for a license filed in response to this notice will be treated as objections to the grant of the prospective license. Only written comments and/or applications for a license which are received by NIST within sixty (60) days for the publication of this notice will be considered. The prospective license will be granted unless, within sixty (60) days of this notice, NIST receives written evidence and argument which established that the grant of the license would not be consistent with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR 404.7. Dated: June 2, 1993. Raymond G. Kammer Acting Director, National Institute Standards and Technology. Appendix "A" The National Institute for Standards and Technology ("NIST") has announced its intention to grant Public Key Partners ("PKP") sublicensing rights to NIST's pending patent application on the Digital Signature Algorithm ("DSA"). Subject to NIST's grant of this license, PKP is pleased to declare its support for the proposed Federal Information Processing Standard for Digital Signatures (the "DSS") and the pending availability of licenses to practice the DSA. In addition to the DSA, licenses to practice digital signatures will be offered by PKP under the following patents: Cryptographic Apparatus and Method ("Diffie-Hellman") No. 4,200,770 Public Key Cryptographic Apparatus and Method ("Hellman-Merkle") No. 4,315,552 Exponential Cryptographic Apparatus and Method ("Hellman-Pohlig") No. 4,434,414 Method For Identifying Subscribers And For Generating And Verifying Electronic Signatures In A Data Exchange System ("Schnorr") No. 4,995,082 It is PKP's intent to make practice of the DSA royalty free for personal, noncommercial and U.S. Federal, state and local government use. As explained below, only those parties who enjoy commercial benefit from making or selling products, or certifying digital signatures, will be required to pay royalties to practice the DSA. PKP will also grant a license to practice key management, at no additional fee, for the integrated circuits which will implement both the DSA and the anticipated Federal Information Processing Standard for the "key escrow" system announced by President Clinton on April 16, 1993. Having stated these intentions, PKP now takes this opportunity to publish its guidelines for granting uniform licenses to all parties having a commercial interest in practicing this technology: First, no party will be denied a license for any reason other that the following: (i) Failure to meet its payment obligations, (ii) Outstanding claims of infringement, or (iii) Previous termination due to material breach. Second, licenses will be granted for any embodiment sold by the licensee or made for its use, whether for final products software, or components such as integrated circuits and boards, and regard- less of the licensee's channel of distribution. Provided the requisite royalties have been paid by the seller on the enabling component(s), no further royalties will be owned by the buyer for making or selling the final product which incorporates such components. Third, the practice of digital signatures in accordance with the DSS may be licensed separately from any other technical art covered by PKP's patents. Fourth, PKP's royalty rates for the right to make or sell products, subject to uniform minimum fees, will be no more than 2 1/2% for hardware products and 5% for software, with the royalty rate further declining to 1% on any portion of the product price exceeding $1,000. These royalty rates apply only to noninfringing parties and will be uniform without regard to whether the licensed product creates digital signatures, verifies digital signatures or performs both. Fifth, for the next three (3) years, all commercial services which certify a signature's authenticity for a fee may be operated royalty free. Thereafter, all providers of such commercial certification services shall pay a royalty to PKP of $1.00 per certificate for each year the certificate is valid. Sixth, provided the foregoing royalties are paid on such products or services, all other practice of the DSA shall be royalty free. Seventh, PKP invites all of its existing licensees, at their option, to exchange their current licenses for the standard license offered for DSA. Finally, PKP will mediate the concerns of any party regarding the availability of PKP's licenses for the DSA with designated representatives of NIST and PKP. For copies of PKP's license terms, contact Michael R. Rubin, Acting Chief Counsel for Technolo- gy, NIST, or Public Key Partners. Dated: June 2, 1993. Robert B. Fougner, Esq., Director of Licensing, Public Key Partners, 310 North Mary Avenue, Sunnyvale, CA 94033 [FR Doc. 93-13473 Filed 8-7-93; 8:45 am] - --------------------------------------------------------------------- Forwarded by: - -- Jim Gillogly Trewesday, 21 Forelithe S.R. 1993, 20:56 ------- End of Forwarded Message

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My Thesis Presentation... CHARON...
by Derek Atkins 28 Jun '93

28 Jun '93

You are invited to attend my Thesis Presentation, entitled "Charon: Kerberos Extensions For Authentication Over Secondary Networks" Date: Wednesday, June 30, 1993 Time: 12:30 - 2pm Place: MIT Room E40-382 (1 Amherst, Cambridge) You can pick up a PostScript copy of my Thesis either on Athena: attach warlord; cd /mit/warlord/Thesis/Thesis; more thesis.ps or via anonymous ftp to toxicwaste.mit.edu:/pub/charon/thesis.ps.Z Hope to see you there. Please forward this as you see fit. -derek Abstract In this thesis, I describe extensions to the Kerberos Authentication System to enable a secure method of Authentication over multiple networks. Kerberos was designed with a fully-connected IP network in mind, however when you add dialup capabilities to the picture, Kerberos doesn't expand to secure the whole connection. Charon was created to tackle this problem. It was developed to provide a way to securely authenticate to a login server over a modem connection, without allowing a passive attacker to gain enough information to impersonate the user. This means that a user can log into a Kerberized host without typing his password in clear-text over the phone. In addition, no modifications to the login server's base operating system need to be made in order to accomplish this.

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Digital Signature Scandal
by friedman＠gnu.ai.mit.edu 28 Jun '93

28 Jun '93

[The following is an official announcement from the League for Programming Freedom. Please redistribute this as widely as possible.] Digital Signature Scandal Digital signature is a technique whereby one person (call her J. R. Gensym) can produce a specially encrypted number which anyone can verify could only have been produced by her. (Typically a particular signature number encodes additional information such as a date and time or a legal document being signed.) Anyone can decrypt the number because that can be done with information that is published; but producing such a number uses a "key" (a password) that J. R. Gensym does not tell to anyone else. Several years ago, Congress directed the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology, formerly the National Bureau of Standards) to choose a single digital signature algorithm as a standard for the US. In 1992, two algorithms were under consideration. One had been developed by NIST with advice from the NSA (National Security Agency), which engages in electronic spying and decoding. There was widespread suspicion that this algorithm had been designed to facilitate some sort of trickery. The fact that NIST had applied for a patent on this algorithm engendered additional suspicion; despite their assurances that this would not be used to interfere with use of the technique, people could imagine no harmless motive for patenting it. The other algorithm was proposed by a company called PKP, Inc., which not coincidentally has patents covering its use. This alternative had a disadvantage that was not just speculation: if this algorithm were adopted as the standard, everyone using the standard would have to pay PKP. (The same patents cover the broader field of public key cryptography, a technique whose use in the US has been mostly inhibited for a decade by PKP's assiduous enforcement of these patents. The patents were licensed exclusively to PKP by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Stanford University, and derive from taxpayer-funded research.) PKP, Inc. made much of the suspect nature of the NIST algorithm and portrayed itself as warning the public about this. On June 8, NIST published a new plan which combines the worst of both worlds: to adopt the suspect NIST algorithm, and give PKP, Inc. an *exclusive* license to the patent for it. This plan places digital signature use under the control of PKP through the year 2010. By agreeing to this arrangement, PKP, Inc. shows that its concern to protect the public from possible trickery was a sham. Its real desire was, as one might have guessed, to own an official national standard. Meanwhile, NIST has justified past suspicion about its patent application by proposing to give that patent (in effect) to a private entity. Instead of making a gift to PKP, Inc., of the work all of us have paid for, NIST and Congress ought to protect our access to it--by pursuing all possible means, judicial and legislative, to invalidate or annull the PKP patents. If that fails, even taking them by eminent domain is better (and cheaper in the long run!) than the current plan. You can write to NIST to object to this giveaway. Write to: Michael R. Rubin Active Chief Counsel for Technology Room A-1111, Administration Building, National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899 (301) 975-2803. The deadline for arrival of letters is around August 4. Please send a copy of your letter to: League for Programming Freedom 1 Kendall Square #143 P.O.Box 9171 Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139 (The League for Programming Freedom is an organization which defends the freedom to write software, and opposes monopolies such as patented algorithms and copyrighted languages. It advocates returning to the former legal system under which if you write the program, you are free to use it. Please write to the League if you want more information.) Sending copies to the League will enable us to show them to elected officials if that is useful. ===================================================================== APPENDIX G: THE LETTERS I INTEND TO SEND ======================================== - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Dr Ross N. Williams Rocksoft Pty Ltd (ACN 008-280-153). 16 Lerwick Avenue Hazelwood Park 5066 Australia Net : ross(a)guest.adelaide.edu.au. Fax : +61 8 373-4911 (C/-Internode Systems) Work : +61 8 379-9217 Michael R. Rubin Acting Chief Counsel for Technology Room A-1111 Administration Building National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899 4 August 1993. Dear Mr Rubin, As a concerned member of the Australian public, and as a director of an Australian software company, I am writing in response to the notice "Notice of Proposal for Grant of Exclusive Patent License" published by NIST in the U.S. Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 108, dated June 8, 1993 under Notices and relating to U.S. Patent Application No. 07/738.431 and entitled "Digital Signature Algorithm." This notice affects myself and my company in its relationship to the US commercial environment and because of the propagation of patent claims internationally. The notice states that: >The prospective license will be granted unless, within sixty (60) >days of this notice, NIST receives written evidence and argument >which established that the grant of the license would not be >consistent with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR 404.7. I am writing because I believe that the license is NOT consistent with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 209. Here's why. In 35 U.S.C. 209. part (c)(1), the requirements specify a list of conditions (A)..(D) all of which must be met before a U.S. Federal agency may grant an exclusive or partially exclusive license. Part (A) says: >(A) the interests of the Federal Government and the public will >best be served by the proposed license, in view of the applicant's >intentions, plans, and ability to bring the invention to practical >application or otherwise promote the invention's utilization by >the public; I do not wish to debate this clause as satisified or not satisifed except to note that this clause defines NIST's primary goal as the public benefit, not the private. >(B) the desired practical application has not been achieved, or is not >likely expeditiously to be achieved, under any non-exclusive license >which has been granted, or which may be granted, on the invention; There is no reason why the DSA standard should not be widely implemented without the benefit of any patents at all. I am aware of the potential conflict that prospective implementers might have with Public Key Partners (PKP) of Sunnyvale California. However, I believe that this problem should be resolved by the free market and the patent system rather than by NIST. >(C) exclusive or partially exclusive licensing is a reasonable and >necessary initiative to call forth the investment of risk capital and >expenditures to bring the invention to practical application or >otherwise promote the invention's utilization by the public; and The history of innovation and technology diffusion in the computing industry clearly indicates that, in the absence of PKP, there would be no requirement to boost risk capital with the use of patents in order to diffuse the technology. As soon as a technologically workable standard is proclaimed, it will be adopted. In particular, the cost of implementing the standard in software is likely to be less than $30,000. As a result there will soon be many implementations. >(D) the proposed terms and scope of exclusivity are not greater than >reasonably necessary to provide the incentive for bringing the invention >to practical application or otherwise promote the invention's >utilization by the public. It is clause (D) to which I mainly take exception. In (A) I asserted that the goal of NIST should be the public good. In (B) and (C) I asserted that for a much-awaited cheap-to-implement standard such as the DSA, patents are not required in order to attract risk capital. These two clauses in combination with (D) imply that NIST should be doing its best to deliver the standard into the public domain, and if this is not possible, licensing it in the least-restrictive manner possible. Under the current proposal, NIST will license the DSA patent to PKP indefinitely; that is, until it runs out in the year 2010. However, PKP's patents, (which in the light of (A),(B), and (C) should be the sole motivation for the license proposal) expire in 1997 or soon after. This flies in the face of clause (D) which permits NIST to grant at most only the minimum reasonable license, in this case a license lasting only until 1997, after which the DSA patent should be placed in the public domain. This argument applies independent to any arguments stating that PKP have committed to behave in a certain "limited" way once granted the DSA patent licence; my argument applies to the time period over which the patent license is granted not the manner in which PKP conduct themselves during the period in which it is granted. Ideally thought, NIST should not grant DSS to PKP at all. I hope that the above provides a convincing argument that NIST would not be complying with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 209.(c)(1)(D) if it executed the proposed license. --O-- There are many alternatives to the proposed license that NIST could pursue. For example, NIST could simply issue a general public license to DSA. Or NIST could use it's patent powers to impose the following condition on all implementors: Condition: All implementations of the DSA must be constructed in accordance with <<new standard that NIST suboffice can create>> so that DSA can be quickly and cheaply replaced with other algorithms at a later date. If this move were adopted now, it would pave the way for RSA in 2000, or perhaps for an even better, hitherto uncreate, algorithm. Other, more aggressive strategies exist that could solve the problem too, the extreme being the taking of PKPs patents by "eminant domain". However, I realize that this would be extreme and am writing primarily to submit the objections given above. In addition to the above, I enclose three letters applying for: 1) A license of DSA for myself to use DSA. 2) A license of DSA for myself to implement and distribute DSA for free. 3) An unlimited commercial license for my company Rocksoft Pty Ltd, or failing this a non-commercial license. I would like to end this letter on a lighter note... During times of drought a farmer noticed that his cow was looking a bit thin so he sent his son out with the cow to find some nice green grass to munch on so that the cow would grow fat and yield lots of milk. The son walked the cow for miles and miles (making the cow even thinner in the process), but couldn't find any grass (this is actually the Australian outback). In the end he found a nice green paddock and set the cow grazing. Later the son returned to the homestead: Farmer : How'd it go son? Do we have a happy cow now? Son : Well sort of; I had trouble finding a grassy paddock. Farmer : But you found one in the end didn't you? Son : Yes, and I put the cow in the paddock. But soon another farmer came running out. He said it was his paddock --- he had rented it for three years --- and that I couldn't graze my cow there without giving him some milk. It was the only green paddock there was. Farmer : So what did you do? Son : I gave him the cow. Thank you for your kind attention. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you require any more information or clarification of the above. Yours sincerely, Ross Williams ------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Dr Ross N. Williams Rocksoft Pty Ltd (ACN 008-280-153). 16 Lerwick Avenue Hazelwood Park 5066 Australia Net : ross(a)guest.adelaide.edu.au. Fax : +61 8 373-4911 (C/-Internode Systems) Work : +61 8 379-9217 Michael R. Rubin Acting Chief Counsel for Technology Room A-1111 Administration Building National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899 4 August 1993. Dear Mr Rubin, I am writing in response to the notice "Notice of Proposal for Grant of Exclusive Patent License" published by NIST in the U.S. Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 108, dated June 8, 1993 under Notices and relating to U.S. Patent Application No. 07/738.431 and entitled "Digital Signature Algorithm." The notice states that: >Applications for a license filed in response to this notice will be >treated as objections to the grant of the prospective license. >Only written comments and/or applications for a license which are >received by NIST within sixty (60) days for the publication of this >notice will be considered. As such, I would like to apply, on behalf of my company Rocksoft Pty Ltd for a license of this patent. The following information is provided in accordance with 37 CFR 404.8. (a) Identification of the invention: Title: "Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)." Patent Application Serial Number: 07/738.431. United States Patent Number: To be issued as 5,231,668, I believe. (b) The type of license required is a commercial license requiring no royalties, OR FAILING THAT A NON-COMMERCIAL (i.e. non-profit) LICENSE requiring no royalty payments. (c) The organization applying for the license is "Rocksoft Pty Ltd", a company incorporated in Australia, whose formally registered address is c/- Nelson Wheeler 200 East Terrace Adelaide 5000 Australia whose Australian Company Number is 008-280-153, and whose postal address (please address correspondence to this address) is: 16 Lerwick Avenue Hazelwood Park 5066 Australia. (d) The representative of Rocksoft is: Name : Dr Ross N. Williams. Address: 16 Lerwick Avenue, Hazelwood Park 5066 Australia. Phone: +61 8 379-5020. (e) Rocksoft is a software consultancy employing only Ross Williams. The company has not yet successfully commercialized any products. (f) Source of information concerning availability of a license: various sources, including your Federal Register notice. (g) I am unable to determine whether Rocksoft Pty Ltd may be formally classified as a small business firm under 404.3(c). However, I would be very surprised if it is not, unless there is some requirement for it to be incorporated in the US. (h) Development plan. If a license is granted, Rocksoft will attempt to create an implementation of the DSA and either sub license it as a component or embed it in products requiring digital signatures. No plans more specific than this can be provided at this time. (1) Rocksoft expects that many hundreds of programmer hours could be committed to the project. Very little capital is available. However, if a license is secured, this may become available. (2) NO further statement on a development plan can be made at present. (3) Fields of use: Rocksoft wishes to use the technology in many diverse fields. (4) Geographic are of use: The whole world. Failing this, just Australia. (i) No previous licenses have been granted to Rocksoft under Federally owned inventions. (j) Known uses of DSA by industry or government: I have heard that ISC sells a product called dsaSIGN, and that Bellcore has implemented DSA. (k) Any other information. I am aware that one of the goals of the licensing of Federally owned inventions is to promote small business in the US and Rocksoft is a small business in Australia. I am hoping however that this application will be successful because it is an application for a non-exclusive, non-transferrable license. I understand that NIST may grant an exclusive DSA license to PKP, and that this license application will be treated as an objection to the PKP license. I would like this application to be treated as such. Thank you for your kind attention. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you require any more information or clarification of the above. Yours sincerely, Ross Williams ------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Dr Ross N. Williams 16 Lerwick Avenue Hazelwood Park 5066 Australia Net : ross(a)guest.adelaide.edu.au. Fax : +61 8 373-4911 (C/-Internode Systems) Work : +61 8 379-9217 Michael R. Rubin Acting Chief Counsel for Technology Room A-1111 Administration Building National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899 4 August 1993. Dear Mr. Rubin: I hereby apply for a personal license to use the Digital Signature Algorithm. 1. Title of invention: Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). 2. Patent Application Serial Number: 07/738.431. 3. United States Patent Number: To be issued as 5,231,668, I believe. 4. Source of information concerning availability of a license: Various sources, including your Federal Register notice. 5. Name and address of applicant: Dr Ross N. Williams 16 Lerwick Avenue Hazelwood Park 5066 Australia Net : ross(a)guest.adelaide.edu.au. Fax : +61 8 373-4911 (C/-Internode Systems) Work : +61 8 379-9217 6. Applicant's representative: not applicable. 7. I am an Australian citizen. 8. Approximate number of persons employed: not applicable. 9. I am not a small business firm. 10. Purpose: I would like a personal license allowing me to implement and use DSA. See #12. 11. Business and commercialization: not applicable; see #10. 12. Plans: I plan to use DSA to attach digital signatures to a variety of electronic documents, primarily for authentication. I plan to use DSA implementations, initially in software but perhaps later in hardware, from a variety of potential future sources. Investments: I may spend many hours programming a DSA implementation. 13. Fields of commercialization: not applicable; see #10. 14. I am not willing to accept a license for less than all fields of use of DSA. 15. I intend to implement and use DSA throughout the world. However, failing this a license for Australia and the U.S.A. would be appreciated. Failing this, a license for just Australia would still be useful. 16. Type of license: I would like a non-exclusive license which does not require royalty payments. 17. I have never been granted a license to a federally owned invention. 18. Known uses of DSA by industry or government: I have heard that ISC sells a product called dsaSIGN, and that Bellcore has implemented DSA. 19. Other information: I understand that NIST may grant an exclusive DSA license to PKP, and that this license application will be treated as an objection to the PKP license. Please note that PKP has stated its intent to make DSA free for personal use. Therefore, if NIST grants PKP a license and PKP acts according to its stated intent, there is no harm to anyone if I am granted this personal license. However, I do not trust PKP to act according to its stated intent, and I do not want to have to apply for a license from PKP even if it is royalty-free. So I ask that you grant me a license directly. Thank you for your kind attention. Please let me know if you need more information. Yours sincerely, Ross Williams ------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Dr Ross N. Williams 16 Lerwick Avenue Hazelwood Park 5066 Australia Net : ross(a)guest.adelaide.edu.au. Fax : +61 8 373-4911 (C/-Internode Systems) Work : +61 8 379-9217 Michael R. Rubin Acting Chief Counsel for Technology Room A-1111 Administration Building National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899 4 August 1993. Dear Mr. Rubin: I hereby apply for an implementor's license permitting me to sublicense the use of the Digital Signature Algorithm. 1. Title of invention: Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). 2. Patent Application Serial Number: 07/738.431. 3. United States Patent Number: To be issued as 5,231,668, I believe. 4. Source of information concerning availability of a license: Various sources, including your Federal Register notice. 5. Name and address of applicant: Dr Ross N. Williams 16 Lerwick Avenue Hazelwood Park 5066 Australia Net : ross(a)guest.adelaide.edu.au. Fax : +61 8 373-4911 (C/-Internode Systems) Work : +61 8 379-9217 6. Applicant's representative: not applicable. 7. I am an Australian citizen. 8. Approximate number of persons employed: not applicable. 9. I am not a small business firm. 10. Purpose: I would like a license allowing me to let others freely use my implementation of DSA, i.e., allowing me to sublicense the use of DSA at no cost. See #12. 11. Business and commercialization: not applicable; see #10. 12. Plans: I plan to create a source-code implementation of DSA in software, using computer resources which are already available to me. I plan to give this implementation to anyone who asks, and perhaps to publish this implementation via electronic or non-electronic means, for study and use by the academic and non-academic communities. I hope to have people hear about this implementation by a variety of means, including word of mouth. 13. Fields of commercialization: not applicable; see #10. 14. I am not willing to accept a license for less than all fields of use of DSA. 15. I intend to implement DSA in Australia (but distribute my implementations throughout the world). 16. Type of license: I would like a non-exclusive license which does not require royalty payments. 17. I have never been granted a license to a federally owned invention. 18. Known uses of DSA by industry or government: I have heard that ISC sells a product called dsaSIGN, and that Bellcore has implemented DSA. 19. Other information: I understand that NIST may grant an exclusive DSA license to PKP, and that this license application will be treated as an objection to the PKP license. Let me emphasize that this is not a commercial license application. I do not intend to collect any fees for the use of this implementation. Thank you for your kind attention. Please let me know if you need more information. Yours sincerely, Ross Williams ------------- ===================================================================== ---<End of Document>--- Paul Ferguson | "Government, even in its best state, Network Integrator | is but a necessary evil; in its worst Centreville, Virginia USA | state, an intolerable one." fergp(a)sytex.com | - Thomas Paine, Common Sense I love my country, but I fear its government.

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Geer Zolot White Paper: Clipper Initiative
by peter honeyman 28 Jun '93

28 Jun '93

------- Forwarded Message Geer Zolot White Paper: Clipper Initiative On April 16, 1993, the U.S. Government issued a "Public Encryption Management" directive, requesting that communications vendors install into their products chips that implement a secret algorithm with controversial key-escrow facilities. These chips (called "Clipper" and "Capstone") stem from work by the NSA (National Security Agency) and its contractors; they implement the SKIPJACK algorithm, which is classified SECRET and is therefore not available for public review. For more information on the initiative, consult the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Computer Security BBS at 301.948.5717 or via Internet ftp to csrc.ncsl.nist.gov in the /pub/nistnews directory. The Government states that one motivation for this initiative is to allow authorized wiretapping of encrypted communications by escrowing the keys corresponding to individual components. A pair of "entities" (choices not announced) will have responsibility for keeping keys secure and releasing them only to government officials who have received legal authorization to perform a wiretap. The Government recommends use of the chips instead of already existing cryptographic algorithms, such as the secret-key DES algorithm (a Federal Information Processing Standard and the basis of Kerberos and other network security tools) and the public-key RSA algorithm. Since DES and RSA have been subject to public scrutiny, experts have tested and confirmed their strength, which has led to their adoption within internationally-agreed networking standards; since SKIPJACK is secret and can never receive this scrutiny, it is unlikely that it will ever have such acceptance. Further, DES and RSA can run in both hardware and software, which satisfies performance and system integration requirements; the Government has limited Clipper/Capstone to hardware, which restricts the range of systems that may use it. For now, the Government is recommending that equipment vendors use the chips on a voluntary basis; however, some observers regard the initiative as an attempt to establish a precedent that could later lead to governmental restrictions on the availability and use of open cryptographic systems. This could limit innovation in cryptographic technology. Further, user organizations could lose control over protecting and managing the keys on which their security depends. This summer, the Government plans inter-agency discussions of future policies in this area; observers have noted that policy development should also reflect private sector interests. Concerns about personal privacy raise additional controversy. Significant debate on these topics is likely in upcoming months. Geer Zolot Associates believes that availability of open and exportable cryptography serves our clients' interests. Because of this, we are concerned about the implications of the "Public Encryption Management" initiative, and of its possible chilling effect on development, availability, and use of cryptographic technology. The initiative raises many issues, including: o If the Government mandates enclosing cryptography in hardware modules, this will surely delay the vital process of enhancing the security of today's distributed computing base--it could even prevent some systems from being secured at all. We want to avoid the prospect of our clients being forced to choose between systems that satisfy their operational needs and other systems containing Government-provided hardware encryption components. o Introducing a requirement for procurement, integration, and use of special-purpose components (which manufacturers must separately handle and program on a per-unit basis) will increase the cost of security integration. o If flaws in the hardware-implemented Clipper/Capstone cryptographic algorithms ever come to light, users of the chips will have been subjected to a data compromise from which no clear recovery path exists. o It appears that gaining access to a Clipper/Capstone chip's escrowed keys, through whatever means (authorized or unauthorized), may reveal the contents of all its encrypted traffic (past, present, and future). Effectively, this is analogous to binding an unchangeable password into hardware, an undesirable characteristic. o It appears unlikely that international telecommunications users and providers will reach uniform agreement on an encryption technology whose algorithms are known only to the US Government. As a result, the initiative may force companies engaging in international commerce to use and support different encryption systems, depending on the parties involved in the communication. Such a course of action will lead to increased costs in hardware, software, user training, and systems management. We invite and encourage you to consider the Government initiative, including its impact on your organizations and distributed system security plans, and that you submit comments to your representatives. If your business plans rely on open cryptographic systems, based on publicly documented algorithms and available in hardware or software form, we encourage you to make this clear to your representatives. If you wish to share any of your comments or observations with us, we would welcome them. Further, we are happy to serve as an organizer for assembling and coordinating such information. Please indicate whether we may identify your organization (specifically or generically) as the information's source. John Linn & Dan Geer ------- End of Forwarded Message this is forwarded to the cypherpunks mailing list with dan geer's permission. peter

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1st Amendment vs. ITAR: bibliography
by gnu 28 Jun '93

28 Jun '93

We sent this off to the State Dept. today. law office of Lee Tien 1452 Curtis Street Berkeley, California 94702 _______________ tien(a)well.sf.ca.us voice: (510) 525-0817 fax: (510) 525-3015 June 28, 1993 Clyde Bryant Foreign Affairs Officer Compliance Division Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Office of Defense Trade Controls U.S. Department of State PM/ODTC SA-6 Rm. 200 Washington, DC 20522 Dear Mr. Bryant: Mr. Dan Cook told my client, Mr. John Gilmore, that you and the Compliance Division of the Office of Defense Trade Controls are presently reviewing aspects of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) with respect to First Amendment questions. My client volunteered to send some law review articles in order that all relevant materials be available to you in this review. I am pleased to provide you with some materials which you may find useful in your review. They address First Amendment and other constitutional issues raised by the Arms Export Control Act, the ITAR, and the Export Administration Act. We believe that information about cryptography, including research papers, discussion of cryptographic algorithms, and implementations in source-code form, is protected speech within the meaning of the First Amendment. We also believe that the export controls of the ITAR violate the First Amendment because they infringe the rights of cryptographers to speak and publish freely. The licensing procedure amounts to prior restraint. The laws and regulations are vague and overbroad. I have enclosed the following materials: 1. Ferguson, Scientific Inquiry and the First Amendment, 64 CORNELL L.REV. 639 (1979) 2. Note, National Security Controls on the Dissemination of Privately Generated Scientific Information, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 405 (1982) 3. Cheh, Government Control of Private Ideas -- Striking a Balance Between Scientific Freedom and National Security, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1982) 4. Greenstein, National Security Controls on Scientific Information, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 50 (1982) 5. Alexander, Preserving High-Tech Secrets: National Security Controls on University Research and Teaching, 15 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L BUS. 173 (1983) 6. Wilson, National Security Control of Technological Information, 25 JURIMETRICS J. 109 (1985) 7. John Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Memorandum to Dr. Frank Press, Science Advisor to the President, Re: Constitutionality Under the First Amendment of ITAR Restrictions on Public Cryptography (May 11, 1978). This memorandum was reprinted in The Government's Classification of Private Ideas: Hearings before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 268-84 (1980). These hearing transcripts were accompanied by a House Report. House Comm. on Gov't Operations, The Government's Classification of Private Ideas, H.R. REP. NO. 1540, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS. (1980). We strongly recommend that you read both the hearing transcripts and the summary report. We hope that these materials will assist you in formulating a constitutional export control policy for scientific research in general and for cryptography in particular. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you wish to engage in further exchanges. Sincerely, Lee Tien Attorney at Law On behalf of Mr. John Gilmore cc: Mr. Daniel Cook Mr. John Gilmore

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Remailer ping test
by nobody＠rosebud.ee.uh.edu 28 Jun '93

28 Jun '93

I tried pinging all the remailers on the latest copy I have of Karl's remailer list (except extropia, which I know only accepts encrypted messages). I sent to each: :: Request-Remailing-To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com then a short test message. I only heard back from 8 of them, to wit: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com Sun Jun 27 08:48:08 1993 hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu Sun Jun 27 08:48:15 1993 remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu Sun Jun 27 08:48:38 1993 nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu Sun Jun 27 08:48:43 1993 phantom(a)u.washington.edu Sun Jun 27 08:48:40 1993 elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu Sun Jun 27 08:48:56 1993 hal(a)alumni.cco.caltech.edu Sun Jun 27 08:48:59 1993 dis.org!remailer(a)merde.dis.org Sun Jun 27 09:17:24 1993 I did not hear back from the following remailers. Perhaps their operators could check on them, or notify Karl if they are no longer operating. 1: hh(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu 2: hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu 6: remail(a)tamaix.tamu.edu 7: ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu 9: remailer(a)rebma.mn.org 14: 00x(a)uclink.berkeley.edu Hal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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Re: triggerfish
by hkhenson＠cup.portal.com 28 Jun '93

28 Jun '93

Brian D Williams <talon57(a)well.sf.ca.us> wrote (re TRIGGERFISH): > It would be child's play for the NSA to accomplish this from >orbit.....hmmmmm I wonder what they call it? My guess would be that it can't be done. Just getting up in a light aircraft with a cell phone is instructive. With every cell site in 50 miles being about the same distance (even from LEO) I don't think you could pick out a single conversation. On the other hand, with enough directionality . . . . nah, the antenna would be a monster. Keith

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Re: Remailer ping test
by nobody＠alumni.cco.caltech.edu 28 Jun '93

28 Jun '93

> I did not hear back from the following remailers. Perhaps their operators > could check on them, or notify Karl if they are no longer operating. > > 1: hh(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu > 2: hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu > 6: remail(a)tamaix.tamu.edu > 7: ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu > 9: remailer(a)rebma.mn.org > 14: 00x(a)uclink.berkeley.edu > > Hal > hfinney(a)shell.portal.com From: dmandl(a)lehman.com This is distressing. I just used some of these (1, 2, and 9, which has just been brought back up) with no problems. Have any of these remailers been going up and down? I've found service to be a bit unpredictable in the past. It's a pain to have to test remailers first before each use, and I can't ping from my site, which makes things even more inconvenient. Has anyone else experienced intermittent problems with these reamailers? Is there any reason why they should work from some sites and not others? --Dave.

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Re: Remailer at rebma.mn.org
by nobody＠pmantis.berkeley.edu 28 Jun '93

28 Jun '93

> * Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS > > Uu> My apologies to anyone who has tried to use the anonymous remailer at > Uu> rebma.mn.org in the past several weeks. > > Uu> I imagine that people who weren't successful were > Uu> experimenters who chalked up the failure to something they'd done > Uu> wrong. > > I did, indeed! > > Uu> It's working again, now. > > Uu> Here's the PGP key. > > > Does this remailer _require_ an encrypted header, or will it take the > | > | :: > | Request-Remailing-To: > | > plaintext command? >From dmandl(a)lehman.com: It is indeed working OK now. Encryption is not required. Good to see this remailer back up, especially because it introduces a long delay, making traffic analysis more difficult. FYI, sending a message to myself (in NYC) through this remailer, it took about 15 hours for it to come back. This is either very good or very bad depending on your purposes. Bad for urgent messages, good for more...er...sensitive applications. --Dave.

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