- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Chained remails
by nobody＠alumni.cco.caltech.edu 25 Jun '93

25 Jun '93

M..Stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org (M. Stirner) sez: > > Gee, am I amazed. An anonymous post claims to have been routed via > SIXTEEN (presumably cypherpunks) remailers. Using the posted list of > "active" cypherpunks remailers & the revised remailer manual, I have > been unable to get simple > > To: remailer(a)wherever.doodah.edu > > :: > Request-Remailing-To: > > test messages to run through any but a couple (9, 10 & 12 I believe). I > have _never_ been able to get any of the "insects @ Berkeley" remailers > to go with the standard syntax...or otherwise. > > Are most remailers down on any given day? Could Mr. Sixteen Jumps do it > twice in a lifetime? Well, I really used only 5 different remailers, total of 16 hops. I Should haf made that clearer. The ones I used were: hh(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu hfinney(a)shell.portal.com This message will go through 24 hops, just for the heck of it. ....Mr. Funn

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Re: DH for email (re: email protection and privacy)
by karn＠qualcomm.com 25 Jun '93

25 Jun '93

Phil Karn asks: > >You're not required to go *beyond* what is specified in a subpoena. > >But the subpoena's specifications can be pretty broad. > > Are you talking civil, criminal, or both? Mike Godwin replies: I assume you're asking about civil versus criminal contempt. Me again: No, I was actually asking about the differences between subpoenas in civil and criminal cases. Since the 5th amendment specifically mentions criminal cases, I presume that means it can't shield you in a civil case (unless perhaps the same information could also implicate you in a crime.) Phil

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Re: Weak stenography.
by karn＠qualcomm.com 25 Jun '93

25 Jun '93

Tim May: >Some solutions: >1. Make programs like "readdat.exe" ubiquitous...distribute them on >shareware disks, CD-ROMs, etc. Thus, many households and offices will >have "readdat.exe"-like programs, whether they use them or not. Mere I like this idea, as long as the mere possession of such programs isn't also criminalized. Don't laugh -- the government actually seems to think that they can enforce laws banning the mere private possession of certain types of bit patterns, like child pornography. I have about two dozen CD-ROMs on my shelf, containing the usual oodles of gigabytes of stuff. Mostly mirrors of anonymous FTP archives and shareware BBSes. So far I have read only a tiny fraction of the bits on those disks, and I expect I'll never read much more. There's no reasonable way I could be expected to know if there isn't a contraband file or two buried in all those gigabytes. But consider the Akron BBS operator who got busted for a file that somebody had uploaded to his machine, transferred off to backup and forgotten. I wonder how many similar files have already made it to CD-ROM? Makes me kind of wish I had bought all my computer equipment and software anonymously, for cash... Phil

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Re: Triggerfish
by George A. Gleason 25 Jun '93

25 Jun '93

On-the-air interception *is* too labor intensive, relatively speaking, given that a cellular call originating or terminating at a given switch can pass through a number of individual cells, each of which would need to be monitored. However, that does not negate the potential usefulness of on-air interception as an *intelligence-gathering* tool from which the results can be fed into the process of getting a warrant to tap at the switch. The problem of maintaining privacy can be and in fact *is* effectively solved though. A couple of companies are making cellular to 2500-set adapters which basically allow any regular single-line device to be plugged in and transmit via cellular. This obviously includes standard modems, plus or minus the problems associated with variable transmission quality over the airwaves. So any regular cryptosystem that can work on analog lines should be applicable here. If anyone out there is further interested in these cellular-to-single-line-device adaptors, email me and I can get prices and specifications. -gg

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Thanks, anon
by rclark＠nyx.cs.du.edu 25 Jun '93

25 Jun '93

n12070(a)anon.penet.fi (Anonymous dude) writes: >I considered bringing up this little anecdote that happened to me in >`real time' but decided against it, but now can't resist while the >subject is in the list's psyche and nanosecond attention span: Thanks. I'm geographically and culturally isolated in Indiana. You warn that your article is tedious, but it is no such thing. Thanks for posting it. It is perversely pleasing to me to know someone else on the list went through this sort of cop crap. Of course, I was at least technically in violation of the law, but hey. They went after practically everyone I knew, for the vile crime of having me in their address books. I wrote an article about that experience which should appear in the next Phrack. So that you won't feel that your anecdote was tedious, which it certainly was not, you might want to check mine out (it clocks in at about five to six times as long as yours.) >Thanks for listening to all this, it is immensely therapeutic for me >and hopefully some insight is contained herein to minimize a burden for you. Thanks for sending it out; it was nicely written, and concise. Bet they never see the computer again, though. Either someone ripped it off for their personal use, or for quick cash, and in either case they would have got them by now. They may just have hassled you as a last resort when the trail went cold. Police are, indeed, ungrateful brutes of the worst dye. Well, good luck, and I hope all that nasty stuff is over for you. Cop betrayals and "investigations" usually leave a bitter taste in the mouths of their targets, especially since cops can get nasty when they're not finding anything. Ah well. ---- Robert W. Clark rclark(a)nyx.cs.du.edu PGP signature available by mail or finger

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Remailer at rebma.mn.org
by wmo＠rebma.rebma.mn.org 25 Jun '93

25 Jun '93

My apologies to anyone who has tried to use the anonymous remailer at rebma.mn.org in the past several weeks. I upgraded the system, and forgot, apparently, to test out the remailer. No one reported that the remailer wasn't working, and it didn't occur to me to test it until today. I imagine that people who weren't successful were experimenters who chalked up the failure to something they'd done wrong. It's working again, now. Here's the PGP key. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.2 mQCNAisUI2QAAAEEAKgm07Hsje5KpmXYd5azk0R6AES+qK7LcofnVGojUs7GBghD WbwrmW8oOEOhRorlShRALKeYspV4xYIw4WDkJcJxuf1B254scz1urF/Eem3zPW9b yPAx7W/cGwvs6SouZvFcSDq4v1zApvGE9hP4szPzHeGmVr0NVNeaDK0guoCpAAUR tCBSZW1haWxlciAocmVtYWlsZXJAcmVibWEubW4ub3JnKQ== =/qHx -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: Chained remails
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 25 Jun '93

25 Jun '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- M. Stirner, <M..Stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG>, writes: > Gee, am I amazed. An anonymous post claims to have been routed via > SIXTEEN (presumably cypherpunks) remailers. Using the posted list of > "active" cypherpunks remailers & the revised remailer manual, I have > been unable to get simple > > To: remailer(a)wherever.doodah.edu > > :: > Request-Remailing-To: > > test messages to run through any but a couple (9, 10 & 12 I believe). I > have _never_ been able to get any of the "insects @ Berkeley" remailers > to go with the standard syntax...or otherwise. The problem may be the Fidonet addressing. Many times I have tried to send mail to people with mailing addresses like M's, and not had the mail get through. I don't know what the rules are but perhaps some systems can get it and some can't. I'd suggest to M. that he take one of the systems that does respond to his remailing requests, and have that be the LAST one in a chain of two. So, he could send to, say, hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu, and follow that with elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu. Perhaps this would get through: To: hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu :: Request-Remailing-To: elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu :: Request-Remailing-To: M..Stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG Even if cicada can't mail to him, perhaps it can mail to rosebud which can then mail to Fido. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQCVAgUBLCpauqgTA69YIUw3AQEoYwP/TUiqRu8OHgA61WM6HVtrZ/CE37hXjVY7 WM7sN+RkUlO+1QTeZKi2r0gEy/CGKnZiMTbEHYHcWK486tIbDZIDXqdRoZigEemH 5jwComG9Vv6wPMFyhcLQkejgSX7nN0UU4TGzdOOq2kRyiplTysLd+1pqPyUzpsbU qR9lO8ZjVPY= -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Denning on Clipper review panel
by L. Detweiler 25 Jun '93

25 Jun '93

Denning says she is on the Clipper review panel which has just started. Also, noises about international Clipper cooperation from NIST. Finally the cypherpunk poster's earlier comment about the absurdity of French collaboration left to the imagination is brought to life... From: philip(a)charon.cto.citicorp.com (Philip Gladstone) Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy.clipper Date: 23 Jun 1993 17:53:19 -0400 >According to Lynn McNulty (of NIST) ... > >Also, the civilian review of the Skipjack algorithm has started (on Monday). >2 people are from academia, and 3 from private industry. One of the DOE >national labs is represented (but I don't know whether this counts as academia >or private industry). Dorothy Denning is one member (according to her). >McNulty wouldn't reveal any names. > >Also, McNulty beleives that escrowed keys would be made available to >foreign law enforcement organizations if requested. The following >scenario springs to mind: > > French LE to FBI: We have one suspect from the WTC bombing > under surveillance in Paris. He uses a > clipperphone to communicate. Can we have > the keys to chip ID 145632? > FBI to French LE: Are you working with the French Secret Service > who is trying to tap the phones of corporate > America? > French LE to FBI: NON! > FBI to French LE: Do you promise that the chip ID > 145632 really is in Paris and is not in the > phone of <fill in favourite US business leader>? > French LE to FBI: OUI! > FBI to French LE: OK - the key is 0b5e7f186ac85e5fb934. > >I'm not trying to pick on the french, but one of the purposes of the >Clipper (sorry Key Escrow) Chip is to protect against foreign >commercial espionage.

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Re: a new role for the NSA
by Peter Wayner 25 Jun '93

25 Jun '93

Many people have pointed out, perhaps correctly, that strong crypto could mean the end of the line for many of the workers at the NSA. If I was in charge of the NSA, I would argue to my budget-dispensing superiors that all of the strong crypto just meant that I needed a bigger budget to scan for data. So the terrorists get crypto terminals? Well, they probably won't have a Tempest class machine so there is plenty of SIGINT that can still be done. There are plenty of opportunities to target people and their communications links with localized bugs. It just requires some more money. I've often wondered whether the NSA's presumed approach of acting as a huge vacuum cleaner for data was the best way of gathering intelligence. It may have been in the 1960's and earlier when transmission rates were relatively expensive and people didn't call long distance unless their was a death in the family. Now, though, the sheer volume of data has exploded. Vaccuumming it all in and sorting it out in the buildings at Fort Meade must be much less cost effective-- no matter how many voice recognition computers that they have. Today, information is much, much cheaper than it used to be. Intelligence is just as expensive as ever. Incidentally, Bill Safire wrote a great piece on this a year or so ago. He argued that it was time for the Spy agencies to go back to Mata Hari type shenanigans because the magic window of SIGINT was about to be closed again. If anyone could dig it up, I would appreciate the reference. -Peter Wayner

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Re: Government fear of strong crypto
by Kelly Goen 25 Jun '93

25 Jun '93

From mail.netcom.com!toad.com!cypherpunks-request Wed Jun 23 23:23:59 1993 Return-Path: <mccoy(a)ccwf.cc.utexas.edu> Message-Id: <199306240625.AA19484(a)tigger.cc.utexas.edu> Subject: Re: Government fear of strong crypto To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Thu, 24 Jun 1993 01:25:13 -0500 (CDT) From: Jim McCoy <mccoy(a)ccwf.cc.utexas.edu> Cc: pfarrell(a)cs.gmu.edu In-Reply-To: <70188.pfarrell(a)cs.gmu.edu> from "Pat Farrell" at Jun 23, 93 07:29:41 pm X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL21] Content-Type: text Content-Length: 2400 > From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell(a)cs.gmu.edu> [...] > > The "government" as a whole is not against crypto. The NSA is _very > strongly_ against it. There are 60,000 or more bureaucrats in NSA that would > be effectively put out of work by widespread strong crypto. Hmmm..... actually I must disagree with this. The NSA may oppose strong crypto, but a few facts should be brought up: 1) The NSA is not chartered for domestic surveillance work. If you discover the NSA watching you within the US you can have them arrested. They are probably more interested in the systems being put in use around the world and less about systems internal to the U.S. According to the Bill of Rights Foundation Booklet "CIA OFF CAMPUS" Ex-President Reagan signed in 1981 Executive order # 12333 Which permits the CIA to operate domestically against US citizens if it is believed that said citizen is either an agent of a foreign power or acting on behalf of same. Since this definition has been used during COINTELPRO to allow one to have associates /friends that are foreign born to cause one to be subject to a whole range of unconstitutional activities performed by said agencies. BTW ANY federal intelligence agencie will act as a "cutout" for situations where the prime agency cannot operate legally but another can. I believe a FOIA is in order to find out if E.O. #12333 allows the entire national security apparatus to operate or only the CIA... Unhappily yours kelly > I believe that the FBI and other more public agencies are simply shills for > NSA. The many posting about real wiretap usage and costs simply can't > support taking all the heat last year of Digital Telophony and this year > over Clipper, esp. when they admit that smart crooks wouldn't bother to use > Clipper. Entirely True...!

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