- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: more than spread spectrum
by doug＠netcom.com 15 Sep '93

15 Sep '93

cme(a)ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) said: >The benefit isn't just for Cypherpunks. It's a free network for the masses... >I'll volunteer to do the software for the node card. Does anyone have >hardware design/fab to donate to the effort? You might want to contact the Garden project, which I believe is operational in San Jose and in Santa Cruz. I'm not up on all the details, but it is far too similar to what you're talking about to ignore. Doug

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Re: Testing randomness of PGP-generated IDEA keys
by mjr＠TIS.COM 15 Sep '93

15 Sep '93

>Hi, you may remember a few weeks back I was going to take a look at >the randomness of PGP random number generation.... well, I finally >got round to it. Since the MD5 of the file being encrypted is used >as part of the random number generation process to prevent anyone >copying the randseed.bin file and generating all future keys from it, [...] I found myself embroiled in a similar exploration of random number generation as part of some other work, and it took me a while to realize that running statistics on the output of the PRNG is almost useless, if you're using a cryptosystem or cryptographic hash as the PRNG. With any decent cryptosystem, one bit change in the input to the PRNG will cause every bit of the output to have a 50% chance of being different - that's a desirable property in a cryptosystem. DES, and I assume IDEA, show this property. What you've got to look at is the predictability of the input to the PRNG. PGP is in really good shape here, because it bootstraps its PRNG with its input, which presumably is unknown to the attacker. An example of a weak PRNG would be: `date | md5` For example: otter-> cat foo #!/bin/sh date | /usr/local/bin/md5 date | /usr/local/bin/md5 sleep 1 date | /usr/local/bin/md5 otter-> foo f4a66f827a8e62ad9c419f7e2117abc6 f4a66f827a8e62ad9c419f7e2117abc6 bcfa24d319ccdcad56a99be2e203e787 As you expect the first two runs are exactly the same. The second run is completely different. The seed, however, is only very slightly changed (by one second). You could run statistical analyses on the output for a long time and never realize that your random number is really extremely easy to crack. If I knew roughly what day you generated the "random" number on, I could crack it in only 86,400 MD5 hashes, and it's an operation that parallelizes trivially. *MUCH* cheaper to attack the PRNG than the cryptosystem! And if you used a toy PRNG to generate your RSA key, then you're lunchmeat. Anyhow, I've been over-long winded. I think PGP is in good shape because of the aforementioned property of using the message as a seed. Messages that don't change much, or that change predictably, are subject to exhaustive searching. A means of analysing the unpredictability of the seed is more worthwhile. I made some basic starts at doing this by ad hoc measures (generating repeated seeds and running them through a program to count a minimum-bit edit similar to diff) but I wasn't sure enough of the validity of my approach to bother continuing it. My hat is off to the guy who came up with the idea of seeding the PRNG with the message. That was *clever*. mjr.

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No Subject
by remail＠tamsun.tamu.edu 15 Sep '93

15 Sep '93

> If people are willing to go to these measures to steal Intel > microprocessors, which are generally available, imagine what people > will do in order to steal unprogrammed Skipjack chips. In the volume > the Government would like to see them made, the physical security > which one might want to give to a classified production facility will > be difficult or impossible. They thought of this. The Skipjack algorithm is programmed into the chip at the same time the escrowed keys are. If you steal the unprogrammed chips you may learn the list of basic operations that are part of Skipjack. However there are also basic operations implemented on the chip which are *not* part of Skipjack but are there just to confuse someone who would disassemble a chip. Btw. This also means that the actual chip assembly line does not require cleared workers.

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A E-mail to Usenet kludge for cs.texas.edu
by Anonymous 15 Sep '93

15 Sep '93

> 1: group-name(a)cs.utexas.edu > 2: group.name.usenet(a)decwrl.dec.com > 3: group.name(a)news.demon.co.uk > 4: group.name(a)news.cs.indiana.edu > 5: group-name(a)pws.bull.com > 6: group-name(a)ucbvax.berkeley.edu > > NOTES: > > * This does not include ones that work for single groups, like > twwells.com. > #1 apparently blocks anonymous remailer posts > #6 blocks from non-berkeley sites (so use the berkeley remailers :-) > for further help and/or questions. The comment concerning #1 (group-name(a)cs.utexas.edu) does not exactly hold true. Apparantly, by simply pasting in the - :: Request-Remailing-To: group-name(a)cs.utexas.edu header does not suffice. As a general rule of thumb, you must add the minimum in the pasted header - :: Request-Remailing-To: group-name(a)cs.utexas.edu Subject: Organization: Thanks to Chael Hall for helping me "troubleshoot" this little feature.

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Testing randomness of PGP-generated IDEA keys
by an31185＠anon.penet.fi 14 Sep '93

14 Sep '93

Hi, you may remember a few weeks back I was going to take a look at the randomness of PGP random number generation.... well, I finally got round to it. Since the MD5 of the file being encrypted is used as part of the random number generation process to prevent anyone copying the randseed.bin file and generating all future keys from it, I wrote a program to read in /usr/dict/words, and loop around generating files containing a random number (using the unix random() call) of random sentences using the words in the dictionary, and encrypt them with a test 384-bit key. The copy of PGP I was using was modified to dumped the 24-byte key/random prefix combination into a file, which the main program read out and processed. Firstly, it maintained a table of counts for each byte value, and secondly (since I gave up statistics years ago), XOR-ed all the bytes in each 24-byte sample together and maintained a table of frequency of XOR values as a simple check for randomness in each 24-byte sample. After running for a few days, the results were: Total bytes generated : 3000504 (125021 runs) Frequency : High: 11960 Low : 11377 Mean: 11721 Spread: 584 (4 %, +2 %, -2 %) Within 50% of mean : 2505989 (83 %) XOR Freq : High: 553 Low : 432 Mean: 488 Spread: 122 (25 %, +13 %, -11 %) Within 50% of mean : 107652 (86 %) Since, as I said, I'm not a statistician, my definitions of the above categories are : Mean - expected frequency, i.e. total number of bytes generated/256, Spread - absolute difference between frequencies of rarest and most common byte values, plus difference as percentage of mean, and spread above and below the mean as a percentage of the mean (rounded to nearest) Lastly, the program summed the frequencies of the bytes whose frequency was between (mean-(mean-low)/2) and (mean+(high-mean)/2), giving the result as an absolute value and a percentage of the total number of bytes generated. >From this, it looks to me like the random number generation is, indeed, pretty random, and if you're trying to break an arbitrary PGP-encrypted file by a brute-force attack on the IDEA-encrypted section, then you don't have any shortcuts based on frequency of bytes in the key. If anyone with a better grasp of statistics wants the original data to look at (25k, containing 24 arrays of byte frequencies and one of XOR frequencies), let me know and I'll email it to you. So, if there is a 'fatal flaw' in PGP, it looks like it must be either the known plaintext, or it must be somewhere in the prime generation code. Since I know nothing about fast methods of testing primality, someone else is going to have to look into that.... (Unless I get bored enough to hunt out some books on the subject) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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REMAIL: new remailer
by nobody＠rosebud.ee.uh.edu 14 Sep '93

14 Sep '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hm... something weird happened since I didn't send out four copies of the remailer list. And a message I sent a while ago hasn't appeared yet...? First, I've been told that some people are concerned about my signature appearing on the remailer keys. I sign every remailer key I verify, hopefully in addition to the signature already present from the remailer operator... so if you run a remailer, sign the key if you haven't, and mail it to me, preferable with your public key because I don't like "unknown signator" messages. I will include it in the pubkeys.tar.gz distribution I put (with Eric's help) on soda. That way it won't look like I'm signing every remailer key all by myself :-) Anyway, this is a remailer I've been using for various testing purposes, but haven't announced (and you thought I was joking when I said people are running remailers they haven't announced :-) It is set up in a friend's account with his permission since he is away working in NH with no telnet priveleges. This may become the preferred remailer on rosebud. I have been told by a lawyer that running a remailer from an account I no longer have legitimate access to breaks about three laws in Texas. :( Maybe eventually I'll spring for a commercial setup where I have a little more say. My old account (elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu) has been locked since I am no longer in that graduate group (or at that university for that matter). However, the remailer still works, since my directory structure remains. So, I mailed to two people in charge on rosebud, and have asked them to get back to me if they want the remailer cancelled. I haven't heard back, so maybe they support it! Actually though, since the remailer doesn't take up much space nor does it eat much cpu, they may very well not care. But my friend's account is still going strong :-) I've retested the remailing functions, and here is the key (keyid BBC00D) - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAiyWMdIAAAEEAMjEKj+hSQa1pJlIdAo3DH0qhKIqiNIPiyiDoxXctXR/wix7 lapUizd/Kj1FeYvMgKe1/rYKwgC1oHrCzKXoZ44ipsmaVArj++d3nfjblp/mh0Rd fCnQDt0PZ8wcx0gE87N6vJ77K8iW/dS9D1z9bax77HGl3i3A0kbfRR3Gu8ANAAUR tChNci4gUmVtYWlsZXIgPGVsZWU2dWVAcm9zZWJ1ZC5lZS51aC5lZHU+iQCVAgUQ LJYx1oOA7OpLWtYzAQGUjgQAsimuSOXkjvQubyQc3jjjvgFnV+Vce7TQnlZtjd2P A2S8Yafk/3rcBnVKGQ3ZBmYHc2AcvXwjZEQsTQYiKOQJ8/qzqQsbq7Juwg/Op4Fu GwtCuGERq9qA7lFrKwvbowQWb9kos9Hdor8v/DZREz8IOTbWKYRb8uyjH0jGw57Q b/c= =DWkv - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- It isn't the original key since I zapped it when I was shuffling around directories to support caching (which I have not enabled). Sorry! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLJZOSoOA7OpLWtYzAQHkNQQAxdOIX3L+vKoo8OaC8mB5cyGfSEOKULdQ OdbcA4gYKllTea82VLXZxCyYTyYNzIcGJ4v/E3Hod2BKC8wkISuOS0/QG9TXz9hm bDBzmdLNxQApTTbMmVV78o8wX2ol42Tw3pvqvhws61Z8rxBVnoNaV47OsQLYlo77 UJNOzAJtMws= =ADxw -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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REMAIL: list
by nobody＠nyx.cs.du.edu 14 Sep '93

14 Sep '93

Here is an interim release of the list, which includes the elee9sf@menudo and elee6ue@rosebud remailer. (And you thought I was joking when I said that some people run remailers that aren't announced :-) I cleaned up the scripts at elee6ue@rosebud, and in the process of creating the proper directories for caching (which is NOT implemented just yet) I zapped the pgp directory and the keyrings... so now there is a new key for elee6ue(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu, keyid = BBC00D. Sorry about that! Also, my key klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu, keyid = 5AD633 has an A.K.A. on it for elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu. This is NOT the public key to the remailer, whose keyid is DC9EE9. I sign the public keys of remailers I have verified as working, so if you get the latest pubkeys.tar.gz file from soda or the keys from me, you will find a signature from 5AD633 on them. Lastly, thanks to folks who are contributing programs to help other use the remailers! I decided to keep my offerings as shell scripts or batch files, but there is only so much these languages can do, so I welcome "high" level help programs (source included :-). Nate's program is mentioned, but not Alex's (yet) since it isn't available via ftp (yet). I'll try to keep on top of this stuff. Cypherpunk anonymous remailers, 9/15/93 Q1: What are the anonymous remailers? A1: 1: nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu 2: hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu 3: hh(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu 4: hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu 5: 00x(a)uclink.berkeley.edu 6: cdodhner(a)indirect.com 7: hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu 8: cs60a-qu(a)cory.eecs.berkeley.edu 9: ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu 10: catalyst(a)netcom.com 11: sameer(a)netcom.com 12: remailer(a)rebma.mn.org 13: elee6ue(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu 14: elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu 15: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com 16: remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu 17: remail(a)tamaix.tamu.edu 18: remailer(a)utter.dis.org 19: remailer(a)entropy.linet.org 20: elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu 21: remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com NOTES: 1-6 no encryption of remailing requests 7-20 support encrypted remailing requests 21 special - header and message must be encrypted together 12,18,19,21 introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect) 12,18,21 running on privately owned machines 20 supports RIPEM encryption, caches all requests ====================================================================== Q2: What help is available? A2: Check out the pub/cypherpunks/remailer directory at soda.berkeley.edu (128.32.149.19). chain.zip - program that helps with using remailers dosbat.zip - MSDOS batch files that help with using remailers hal's.instructions.gz - in depth instruction on how to use hal's.remailer.gz - remailer code pubkeys.tar.gz - public keys of remailers which support encryption pubkeys.zip - MSDOS zip file of public keys scripts.tar.gz - scripts that help with using remailers Also, at 129.82.156.104 in /pub/pgpc/ are two files: pgp22.tar.gz, pgp22.tar.Z which assist in using the anonymous remailers, including anon.penet.fi. Mail to me (klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu) for further help and/or questions. ====================================================================== Q3. Email-to-Usenet gateways? A3. 1: group-name(a)cs.utexas.edu 2: group.name.usenet(a)decwrl.dec.com 3: group.name(a)news.demon.co.uk 4: group.name(a)news.cs.indiana.edu 5: group-name(a)pws.bull.com 6: group-name(a)ucbvax.berkeley.edu NOTES: * This does not include ones that work for single groups, like twwells.com. #1 apparently blocks anonymous remailer posts #6 blocks from non-berkeley sites (so use the berkeley remailers :-)

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REMAIL: list
by remailer＠netcom.com 14 Sep '93

14 Sep '93

Here is an interim release of the list, which includes the elee9sf@menudo and elee6ue@rosebud remailer. (And you thought I was joking when I said that some people run remailers that aren't announced :-) I cleaned up the scripts at elee6ue@rosebud, and in the process of creating the proper directories for caching (which is NOT implemented just yet) I zapped the pgp directory and the keyrings... so now there is a new key for elee6ue(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu, keyid = BBC00D. Sorry about that! Also, my key klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu, keyid = 5AD633 has an A.K.A. on it for elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu. This is NOT the public key to the remailer, whose keyid is DC9EE9. I sign the public keys of remailers I have verified as working, so if you get the latest pubkeys.tar.gz file from soda or the keys from me, you will find a signature from 5AD633 on them. Lastly, thanks to folks who are contributing programs to help other use the remailers! I decided to keep my offerings as shell scripts or batch files, but there is only so much these languages can do, so I welcome "high" level help programs (source included :-). Nate's program is mentioned, but not Alex's (yet) since it isn't available via ftp (yet). I'll try to keep on top of this stuff. Cypherpunk anonymous remailers, 9/15/93 Q1: What are the anonymous remailers? A1: 1: nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu 2: hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu 3: hh(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu 4: hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu 5: 00x(a)uclink.berkeley.edu 6: cdodhner(a)indirect.com 7: hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu 8: cs60a-qu(a)cory.eecs.berkeley.edu 9: ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu 10: catalyst(a)netcom.com 11: sameer(a)netcom.com 12: remailer(a)rebma.mn.org 13: elee6ue(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu 14: elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu 15: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com 16: remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu 17: remail(a)tamaix.tamu.edu 18: remailer(a)utter.dis.org 19: remailer(a)entropy.linet.org 20: elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu 21: remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com NOTES: 1-6 no encryption of remailing requests 7-20 support encrypted remailing requests 21 special - header and message must be encrypted together 12,18,19,21 introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect) 12,18,21 running on privately owned machines 20 supports RIPEM encryption, caches all requests ====================================================================== Q2: What help is available? A2: Check out the pub/cypherpunks/remailer directory at soda.berkeley.edu (128.32.149.19). chain.zip - program that helps with using remailers dosbat.zip - MSDOS batch files that help with using remailers hal's.instructions.gz - in depth instruction on how to use hal's.remailer.gz - remailer code pubkeys.tar.gz - public keys of remailers which support encryption pubkeys.zip - MSDOS zip file of public keys scripts.tar.gz - scripts that help with using remailers Also, at 129.82.156.104 in /pub/pgpc/ are two files: pgp22.tar.gz, pgp22.tar.Z which assist in using the anonymous remailers, including anon.penet.fi. Mail to me (klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu) for further help and/or questions. ====================================================================== Q3. Email-to-Usenet gateways? A3. 1: group-name(a)cs.utexas.edu 2: group.name.usenet(a)decwrl.dec.com 3: group.name(a)news.demon.co.uk 4: group.name(a)news.cs.indiana.edu 5: group-name(a)pws.bull.com 6: group-name(a)ucbvax.berkeley.edu NOTES: * This does not include ones that work for single groups, like twwells.com. #1 apparently blocks anonymous remailer posts #6 blocks from non-berkeley sites (so use the berkeley remailers :-)

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REMAIL: list
by nobody＠indirect.com 14 Sep '93

14 Sep '93

Here is an interim release of the list, which includes the elee9sf@menudo and elee6ue@rosebud remailer. (And you thought I was joking when I said that some people run remailers that aren't announced :-) I cleaned up the scripts at elee6ue@rosebud, and in the process of creating the proper directories for caching (which is NOT implemented just yet) I zapped the pgp directory and the keyrings... so now there is a new key for elee6ue(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu, keyid = BBC00D. Sorry about that! Also, my key klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu, keyid = 5AD633 has an A.K.A. on it for elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu. This is NOT the public key to the remailer, whose keyid is DC9EE9. I sign the public keys of remailers I have verified as working, so if you get the latest pubkeys.tar.gz file from soda or the keys from me, you will find a signature from 5AD633 on them. Lastly, thanks to folks who are contributing programs to help other use the remailers! I decided to keep my offerings as shell scripts or batch files, but there is only so much these languages can do, so I welcome "high" level help programs (source included :-). Nate's program is mentioned, but not Alex's (yet) since it isn't available via ftp (yet). I'll try to keep on top of this stuff. Cypherpunk anonymous remailers, 9/15/93 Q1: What are the anonymous remailers? A1: 1: nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu 2: hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu 3: hh(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu 4: hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu 5: 00x(a)uclink.berkeley.edu 6: cdodhner(a)indirect.com 7: hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu 8: cs60a-qu(a)cory.eecs.berkeley.edu 9: ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu 10: catalyst(a)netcom.com 11: sameer(a)netcom.com 12: remailer(a)rebma.mn.org 13: elee6ue(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu 14: elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu 15: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com 16: remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu 17: remail(a)tamaix.tamu.edu 18: remailer(a)utter.dis.org 19: remailer(a)entropy.linet.org 20: elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu 21: remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com NOTES: 1-6 no encryption of remailing requests 7-20 support encrypted remailing requests 21 special - header and message must be encrypted together 12,18,19,21 introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect) 12,18,21 running on privately owned machines 20 supports RIPEM encryption, caches all requests ====================================================================== Q2: What help is available? A2: Check out the pub/cypherpunks/remailer directory at soda.berkeley.edu (128.32.149.19). chain.zip - program that helps with using remailers dosbat.zip - MSDOS batch files that help with using remailers hal's.instructions.gz - in depth instruction on how to use hal's.remailer.gz - remailer code pubkeys.tar.gz - public keys of remailers which support encryption pubkeys.zip - MSDOS zip file of public keys scripts.tar.gz - scripts that help with using remailers Also, at 129.82.156.104 in /pub/pgpc/ are two files: pgp22.tar.gz, pgp22.tar.Z which assist in using the anonymous remailers, including anon.penet.fi. Mail to me (klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu) for further help and/or questions. ====================================================================== Q3. Email-to-Usenet gateways? A3. 1: group-name(a)cs.utexas.edu 2: group.name.usenet(a)decwrl.dec.com 3: group.name(a)news.demon.co.uk 4: group.name(a)news.cs.indiana.edu 5: group-name(a)pws.bull.com 6: group-name(a)ucbvax.berkeley.edu NOTES: * This does not include ones that work for single groups, like twwells.com. #1 apparently blocks anonymous remailer posts #6 blocks from non-berkeley sites (so use the berkeley remailers :-)

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REMAIL: list
by Karl Lui Barrus 14 Sep '93

14 Sep '93

:: Anon-To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Here is an interim release of the list, which includes the elee9sf@menudo and elee6ue@rosebud remailer. (And you thought I was joking when I said that some people run remailers that aren't announced :-) I cleaned up the scripts at elee6ue@rosebud, and in the process of creating the proper directories for caching (which is NOT implemented just yet) I zapped the pgp directory and the keyrings... so now there is a new key for elee6ue(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu, keyid = BBC00D. Sorry about that! Also, my key klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu, keyid = 5AD633 has an A.K.A. on it for elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu. This is NOT the public key to the remailer, whose keyid is DC9EE9. I sign the public keys of remailers I have verified as working, so if you get the latest pubkeys.tar.gz file from soda or the keys from me, you will find a signature from 5AD633 on them. Lastly, thanks to folks who are contributing programs to help other use the remailers! I decided to keep my offerings as shell scripts or batch files, but there is only so much these languages can do, so I welcome "high" level help programs (source included :-). Nate's program is mentioned, but not Alex's (yet) since it isn't available via ftp (yet). I'll try to keep on top of this stuff. Cypherpunk anonymous remailers, 9/15/93 Q1: What are the anonymous remailers? A1: 1: nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu 2: hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu 3: hh(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu 4: hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu 5: 00x(a)uclink.berkeley.edu 6: cdodhner(a)indirect.com 7: hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu 8: cs60a-qu(a)cory.eecs.berkeley.edu 9: ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu 10: catalyst(a)netcom.com 11: sameer(a)netcom.com 12: remailer(a)rebma.mn.org 13: elee6ue(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu 14: elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu 15: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com 16: remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu 17: remail(a)tamaix.tamu.edu 18: remailer(a)utter.dis.org 19: remailer(a)entropy.linet.org 20: elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu 21: remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com NOTES: 1-6 no encryption of remailing requests 7-20 support encrypted remailing requests 21 special - header and message must be encrypted together 12,18,19,21 introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect) 12,18,21 running on privately owned machines 20 supports RIPEM encryption, caches all requests ====================================================================== Q2: What help is available? A2: Check out the pub/cypherpunks/remailer directory at soda.berkeley.edu (128.32.149.19). chain.zip - program that helps with using remailers dosbat.zip - MSDOS batch files that help with using remailers hal's.instructions.gz - in depth instruction on how to use hal's.remailer.gz - remailer code pubkeys.tar.gz - public keys of remailers which support encryption pubkeys.zip - MSDOS zip file of public keys scripts.tar.gz - scripts that help with using remailers Also, at 129.82.156.104 in /pub/pgpc/ are two files: pgp22.tar.gz, pgp22.tar.Z which assist in using the anonymous remailers, including anon.penet.fi. Mail to me (klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu) for further help and/or questions. ====================================================================== Q3. Email-to-Usenet gateways? A3. 1: group-name(a)cs.utexas.edu 2: group.name.usenet(a)decwrl.dec.com 3: group.name(a)news.demon.co.uk 4: group.name(a)news.cs.indiana.edu 5: group-name(a)pws.bull.com 6: group-name(a)ucbvax.berkeley.edu NOTES: * This does not include ones that work for single groups, like twwells.com. #1 apparently blocks anonymous remailer posts #6 blocks from non-berkeley sites (so use the berkeley remailers :-)

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