- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

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by None 19 Jan '94

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LPC for speech
by Jeffrey Wayne Porter 10 Dec '93

10 Dec '93

Did you know that using LPC (linear predictive coding) on speech can near-telephone quality at only 8 k BITs/second? With a signficant decrease in quality (but still very understandable... probably better than radio) you can get the rate down to 2kbps. If you don't mind sounding like a speak&spell, you can go to 600bps or less. Using LPC, you could send real-time voice over the internet. It would even work (maybe just barely) over a SLIP connection. According to my professor, LPC can be implemented in a simple DSP chip, so I figure a 486 ought to be able to handle it, too. Sound like an interesting (granted maybe not too useful) project? It would be a way of providing secure voice communications -- LPC code the speech, encrypt the data stream, transmit via v.32bis modem, etc. -- -------------------------------------------------------------------- Jeff Porter jporter(a)uiuc.edu TA: ECE 290..."ph Jeff Porter" for office hours -- Jeremy Porter ------------- Systems Engineering -------- Dell Computer Corp. ------ jerry(a)terminus.us.dell.com ---- --- 70 4F BD AE 6D E9 D2 66 48 18 8B E7 64 7F 59 8F --- Support your Second Amendment rights to encryption technology.

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Majordomo results
by Majordomo＠Lists.EUnet.fi 07 Dec '93

07 Dec '93

>>>> Hey. I never subscribed. This is coercion. **** Command 'hey.' not recognized. >>>> **** No valid commands found. **** Commands must be in message BODY, not in HEADER. **** Help for Majordomo(a)Lists.EUnet.fi: This is Brent Chapman's "Majordomo" mailing list manager, Revision 1.46. It understands the following commands: subscribe <list> [<address>] Subscribe yourself (or <address> if specified) to the named <list>. unsubscribe <list> [<address>] Unsubscribe yourself (or <address> if specified) from the named <list>. which [<address>] Find out which lists you (or <address> if specified) are on. who <list> Find out who is on the named <list>. info <list> Retrieve the general introductory information for the named <list>. lists Show the lists served by this Majordomo server. help Retrieve this message. end Stop processing commands (useful if your mailer adds a signature). Commands should be sent in the body of an email message to "Majordomo(a)Lists.EUnet.fi". Commands in the "Subject:" line NOT processed. If you have any questions or problems, please contact "Majordomo-Owner(a)Lists.EUnet.fi".

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None
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 06 Dec '93

06 Dec '93

>Date: Mon, 6 Dec 93 20:44:56 -0500 >From: "Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex(a)media.mit.edu> >I tried "unsubscribe cypherwonks Alan Wexelblat" and got back a barf message >saying that I had to "unsubscribe <listname> <address>" so I tried >"unsubscribe cypherwonks wex(a)media.mit.edu" and got back a barf message >saying "No matches found for 'wex(a)media.mit.edu' >Help! Is there a human being associated with this annoying piece of crap? >I suppose I can just add a new formula to my .procmailrc, but I'd rather >kill it at the source... I was considering modifying my mail sorting software to forward anything from "cypherwonks" to ld231782(a)longs.lance.colostate.edu, as a gift. Maybe if we all do this, he'll get the hint....

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GAO's "Comm. Privacy: Federal Policy & Actions" now online!
by Stanton McCandlish 06 Dec '93

06 Dec '93

The US General Accounting Office's report, "COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY: Federal Policy and Actions" is now online at both the GAO and EFF ftp sites. >From EFF, you can get the document via anonymous ftp to ftp.eff.org. The document is ~pub/eff/papers/osi-94-2.txt. The file is ~143K. Here's some info on the report from the latest EFFector Online (6.06): ____ begin fwd _____ Subject: Government Accounting Office Report on Communications Privacy A few days ago, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) -- an important internal government investigative organization that's about a lot more than accounting -- issued a report on communications privacy. The report makes four very important findings: 1. Privacy-protecting technology (crytopgraphy) is increasingly important for protecting the security of business communications and personal information. But federal policy is getting in the way of this technology. "Increased use of computer and communications networks, computer literacy, and dependence on information technology heighten US industries risk of losing proprietary information to economic espionage. In part to reduce the risk, industry is more frequently using hardware and software with encryption capabilities. However, federal policies and actions stemming from national security and law enforcement concerns hinder the use and the export of U.S. commercial encryption technology and may hinder its development." 2. The NSA's role in this area is has been extensive, and possibly beyond the spirit of the Computer Security Act. "Although the Computer Security Act of 1987 reaffirmed NIST's reponsibility for developing federal information-processing standards for security of sensitive, unclassified information, NIST follows NSA's lead in developing certain cryptographic standards" 3. Opportunity for public input in the standards process has been insufficient, leading to proposals like Clipper which lack public support. "These policy issues are formulated and announced to the public, however, with very little input from directly affected business interests, academia, and others." The report draws no specific policy conclusions, but provides excellent ammunition for those of us who are trying to open up the standards process and get export controls lifted. Full text of the report (GAO/OSI-94-2 Communications Privacy: Federal Policy and Actions) has been made available by ftp from GAO. The document can be obtained from EFF's FTP site as ~pub/eff/papers/osi-94-2.txt -- Stanton McCandlish mech(a)eff.org 1:109/1103 EFF Online Activist & SysOp O P E N P L A T F O R M C R Y P T O P O L I C Y O N L I N E R I G H T S N E T W O R K I N G V I R T U A L C U L T U R E I N F O : M E M B E R S H I P @ E F F . O R G

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Digicash question
by bdolan 06 Dec '93

06 Dec '93

TO: >internet: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Forgive me for a newbie question. Why wouldn't the following inelegant idea work? X gives $101 to First Digital Bank, which gives X a PGP-signed password representing a claim on $100 (or maybe they would do this just for the "float"). X gives the $100 password to Y, in exchange for a narco-terrorism decoder ring. Y, being a cautious soul, calls First DigiBank immediately and gives it the password. DigiBank pockets $1 and issues Y a new signed password good for $99. Note that DigiBank (1) doesn't need to know who Y is and (2) ensures that a given money-password is only spent once. By the same method, Y can pay Z and Z can deposit the credit in BillnHill's S&L for settlement. Or the money can keep floating around until DigiBank gets it all, which is what usually happens now ;-) Of course, you have to trust the bank - but you have to now, also. Don't abuse me too much. Just point me to the right FAQ (...cowering...) bdolan(a)well.sf.ca.us

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