- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

testing remailers, the keys for my remailers
by sameer＠netcom.com 14 Sep '93

14 Sep '93

Has anyone written or is someone writing a script which will take a list of remailers, and ping each of them to see if they are working, both encrypted and unencrypted? If no one has taken on that task, I'd be willing to do it.. I'll list here the remailers for whom I have the keys for... if another remailer exists which I don't know about please send me the key. (Also-- here's the keys for my remailers...) Type bits/keyID Date User ID pub 1024/69464F 1993/09/11 Sameer's Remailer <sameer(a)soda.berkeley.edu> pub 1024/9E3311 1993/09/02 Sameer's Remailer <sameer(a)netcom.com> pub 1024/567449 1993/09/01 Sameer's Remailer <cs60a-qu(a)cory.EECS.Berkeley.EDU> pub 512/64E8A7 1993/03/05 Remailing Service <remailer(a)dis.org> Anonymous Remailer <remailer(a)utter.dis.org> pub 1024/02C389 1993/06/07 Anonymous <remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu> Anonymous <remail(a)tamaix.tamu.edu> pub 1024/DB04AB 1993/05/05 Mr. Remailer <elee6ue(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu> pub 1024/BA80A9 1992/11/26 Remailer (remailer(a)rebma.mn.org) pub 1024/7B47C3 1993/01/20 Anonymous Remailer <phantom(a)mead.u.washington.edu> pub 1024/EBCC89 1993/04/27 Cypherpunk Remailer at <remailer(a)entropy.linet.org> pub 1024/B5A32F 1992/12/13 Remailer <remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> pub 510/0BB437 1992/11/12 Remailing Service <hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> pub 510/5620D5 1992/11/15 Remailing Service <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> pub 512/7D154B 1993/04/04 jarthur remailer c/o <ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu> 13 key(s) examined. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAiyRU70AAAEEALsLEv31NHZrNBsOYqsr064hT/SUtztIfGEkNxMS9KXo9Sil 3y8hY3r+mkeVPyvinmdjOPBIzHQmzezs9o9Tu/RAYQy8IdrWv/8KjIcZ0K3B+SVp 5d+fW14pOBm6MbcNpjK9RXVBpwAxjcYF2PXor8kT56J+2I9T4W08cWvcaUZPAAUR sAEAtCxTYW1lZXIncyBSZW1haWxlciA8c2FtZWVyQHNvZGEuYmVya2VsZXkuZWR1 PrABAIkAlQIFECyVO8EL8mtIoS4LrQEBDywD/0P2Zx2xWOxv076XsyDSYBYMh3jb iHbFisoaNwwJTcV8p6WwwBZNCsgGs3fEMuhrT2XHCN7f8CGkLvUivt6HvMgTl1EK lD1gaV6b4ZAZzo6PoFB6/8Bxa1K2aMnp0nNXuvRoIHs/jzFVF5YcM1nucUG85pL4 BgK2hOsAPkTK2Ru3sAEAmQCNAiyGXXoAAAEEAMDtjyzGpLKugc49+Na4GZcUZ1Q1 jyZYeofTdNwlTIbs4bGYOaeFCXaQluD4ANsLn9muMVae+q+3gZsIq14klQLO6Xe5 5pZ0Efx5shfFU24S9+xARUrDfMMqD5TtaoBXH9aQBV9mVo0h5Pxu6ng9B0A+GPJg /ygdVqW95EIJnjMRAAUTsAEAtCVTYW1lZXIncyBSZW1haWxlciA8c2FtZWVyQG5l dGNvbS5jb20+sAEAiQCVAgUQLJU79gvya0ihLgutAQGZBQQAgoctBIYxoaL3wIm7 7cKiZFOpXvkgD6ihV1c8La/udKw6MsVCts2ry2Dc8gm3mfEHEWTtZ8h3Wj9yPCma 9C39FiyikxK/JVMm2mOtPxhokY6YBOZSSMlCBdvm7Gtox9Cy65AOLCo0YZh+X9GV CPgyA5S3QyxPGRVSmxil7VHAHFKwAQCZAI0CLIToKAAAAQQAuoNVv3/OeG+gbSMy AW/V7MlY0rILldtec7oO9u5we+oWwsdJi5C3G2spWy6TbIa26sxVYUCacfzEKal/ TBRYhXPJ01BuDggHr8XMn9l3Bdaa+9QmLZHogokHQ8YOGJalHB8esu2Fy7NfDErR u5YZboEAUBwtXSKkTCGeeFJWdEkABRGwAQC0M1NhbWVlcidzIFJlbWFpbGVyIDxj czYwYS1xdUBjb3J5LkVFQ1MuQmVya2VsZXkuRURVPrABAIkAlQIFECyVPBcL8mtI oS4LrQEBKbgEAMSkfgm+PDdC2J6s+aq32TrO9iKmS3nZ1Q0/+eGznGcS6INys6qX MH7GCF3VDwhDBGf1l7/egd8dnNLn29zYSi2uX/H90YqzDlIRW3JMtq9ZIjCkSakZ SnSbEJOgJp/G1t9kZFPP/UDv9iMtqbJXxX7IP2r8Axzv1uXAmUI/WXEksAEA =BdhD -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -- Sameer sameer(a)netcom.com

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Re: A definitive definition of "crypto"
by futor＠llnl.gov 14 Sep '93

14 Sep '93

> [ The FAQ ]'s posted occasiuonally to sci.crypt, > but I can't think of a site (offhand) where you can FTP it. Try rtfm.mit.edu -- they tend to have most of the FAQs there. __ \/ -+- randy -+- all generalizations are flawed -+- futor(a)llnl.gov

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A definitive definition of "crypto"
by ferguson＠fiber.sprintlink.net 14 Sep '93

14 Sep '93

On Tue, 14 Sep 1993 12:44:45 PDT, <doug(a)netcom5.netcom.com> Doug Merritt writes - > Can anyone point me to (1) a reasonably authoritative legal definition > of what "cryptography" means, that can be used to help decide precisely > what does and does not fall under e.g. the export restrictions, and (2) a > similar definition from the technical literature, to use in conjunction > with #1? Doug, I'm not sure how much it will help you in distinguishing your objective, but one of the best general purpose references that I have seen is the sci.crypt Usenet newsgroup FAQ. It's posted occasiuonally to sci.crypt, but I can't think of a site (offhand) where you can FTP it. If you have access to a gopher or WAIS, give that a try. Cheers, _____________________________________________________________________________ Paul Ferguson Mindbank Consulting Group fergp(a)sytex.com Fairfax, Virginia USA ferguson(a)icp.net

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Re: authoritative definition of cryptography?
by peter honeyman 14 Sep '93

14 Sep '93

according to denning's book, "cryptography is the science and study of secret writing." webster's 7th says cryptography is "the enciphering and deciphering of messages in secret code." kahn says "the methods of cryptography ... render [a secret message] unintelligible to outsiders by various transformations of the plaintext." peter

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authoritative definition of cryptography?
by doug＠netcom5.netcom.com 14 Sep '93

14 Sep '93

Can anyone point me to (1) a reasonably authoritative legal definition of what "cryptography" means, that can be used to help decide precisely what does and does not fall under e.g. the export restrictions, and (2) a similar definition from the technical literature, to use in conjunction with #1? Hopefully I won't have to fall back on "I know it when I see it" standards. :-) Thanks, Doug

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Anarchy v. Privacy
by sameer＠netcom.com 14 Sep '93

14 Sep '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At the recent cypherpunks meeting, Tim, as he posted to the list, mentioned during his presentation conflicting political views, and how we don't plan on making that a big issue-- we will set aside the politics until *later*, when we have full privacy & high bandwidth people can decide what to do, splinter into their own groups, etc., but until then, as we have a common goal of personal privacy, we should work together to reach that goal. It makes a great deal of sense. It strikes me, however, that Tim only took into account the differences between the anarcho-capitalists and the anarcho-syndicalists (A new term-- I've always used anarcho-communist.. are they similar?) while not taking into account the people who don't seem to want an anarchic future. Remember, though, that the cypherpunks is *not* a group with a "party-line". Whether your vision of the future with crypto, I think that having an internal squabble is pointless and futile. Let's work for full privacy. Maybe for those who feel like debating the finer points of anarchy with crypto (on an "intellectual" level) can use a separate list? Peace, - -- Sameer sameer(a)netcom.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLJYDGgvya0ihLgutAQEzJgQA4E+qOPnCwVSkdZM+0BwySxiRXkYqrA87 fd3Dp3meShFto3L9f47p4jHLMR2aUDG0RIxK/BTeSdTZfVwxbgPDt6oSM/lLKwy8 gkmbzlwoL3cHRa7P+P/A7ylClOtjfTCMZ+bRTSFJa4zLFGsnCxdVbpiZUP8cWTFr 8G0EydS+r7Q= =gAA+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: The "Cypherpunk Melting Pot"
by msattler＠netcom.com 14 Sep '93

14 Sep '93

Anonymous <nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> said: > 5. Cypherpunks' mission is to evangelize the use of > privacy. Sell the sizzle, not the steak! Privacy > is the steak. The sizzle is the possibility of > GETTING AWAY WITH SOMETHING. I have a real problem with the attempted marriage of anarchy and the Bill of Rights. I'm interested in the issue of privacy not because I want to screw our government out of my taxes, but because I want to have the ability to communicate with any of you in private. At different times in our history certain opinions have been suspect for what we now consider no good reason. If I'm a homosexual, I want to be able to communicate with others without worrying that my employer will monitor my email and fire me for being homosexual. If I'm Jewish, and I work in the deep south... Privacy is the ability to keep and communicate thoughts without worrying about someone using them against you. I'm offended to be clumped in with anyone who advocates selling privacy to get away with something. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Michael S. Sattler msattler(a)netcom.com +1 (415) 358-3058 Digital Jungle Software Encrypt now; ask me how. (finger to get PGP key)

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Re: warez garbage cluttering the screen
by doug＠netcom4.netcom.com 14 Sep '93

14 Sep '93

thug(a)phantom.com (Murdering Thug) said: > 1) The fl0w of wArEz keeps the universe in perfect harmony. [...] > 3) I don't give a flying fuck if you pay for your DL time. [...] These two comments are *highly* inappropriate for this list, so it pains me to have to admit that he's got a point in #2: > wArEz _are_ digital gold coins, they have inherent value, I don't happen to be interested in software piracy, but discussions of software as digital gold coins, stolen or otherwise, are appropriate... but *only* discussions of how they are coins and how that relates to crypto schemes. I wish thug would make a sharper distinction...and keep his flames and generic non-cypherpunk "warez" crap to private email. Doug

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CSSPAB Questions Clipper
by Dave Banisar 14 Sep '93

14 Sep '93

CSSPAB Questions Clipper Govt. Panel Questions Clipper Chip Proposal By David Banisar, The Privacy Times After two days of sometimes tumultuous hearings, a government advisory board chartered to advise the administration and Congress on computer security and privacy issued two resolutions questioning many of the aspects of the Clinton Administration's controversial new encryption scheme, the Clipper Chip. The National Institute for Standards and Technology's Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board (CSSPAB) expressed continued concern over many aspects of the proposal including the lack of a convincing statement expressing the problems that the Clipper is supposed to solve, the need to look for possible alternatives to the proposal, the legal, economic, export controls issues, and software implementation of the proposal. In addition, the board also expressed concern that the Clipper proposal could negatively impact the availability of cost-effective security products to the US government and industry and that it may not be marketable or usable worldwide. In a second resolution, the board unanimously called for a public debate of the proposal and recommended that Congress take an active role in determining US cryptography policy. It also recommended that any new policy must address the interests of law enforcement and intelligence, US industry and citizens' privacy and security in the US and worldwide. At the hearings, Geoff Greiveldinger from the Department of Justice reported that the key escrow agents will be announced within a few weeks after briefing members of Congress. Sources inside the administration indicate that the administration may have decided to eliminate from consideration outside organizations holding the keys and are leaning towards the Department of the Treasury as one of the key holders. Doug Miller of the Software Publishers Association (SPA) also presented the latest survey of foreign software with cryptography finding that over 200 products from over 20 countries were available from overseas companies including many that use DES. He expressed concern that the Clipper chip would harm the US software industry while not providing any benefits to the intelligence community, since cryptography was available worldwide. He indicated that they were seeking a legislative solution to the issue. Last year, a renewal of the Export Administration Act t, which removed restrictions on off-the-shelf software with encryption, was vetoed by President Bush. NIST Deputy Director Ray Kammer announced that the Data Encryption Standard (DES) will be recertified for government, non-classified use for another five years. The paperwork has been sent to Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown, who is expected to sign it within two weeks. The Clipper proposal was introduced April 16, 1993 and has been strongly opposed by both civil liberties groups and industry. The proposal calls for use of a secret encryption chip designed by the National Security Agency for non-classified voice and data transmission. The keys for the chip would be split and held in escrow by two government agencies. NIST has submitted the Clipper proposal for public comment. The FIPS was published in the Federal Register at Volume 58, page 40791 (July 30, 1993) and is also available in electronic form from the CPSR Internet Library FTP/WAIS/Gopher cpsr.org /cpsr/crypto/clipper/call-for-comments. Comments are due to NIST by September 28, 1993 to the Director, Computer Systems Laboratory, ATTN: Proposed FIPS for Escrowed Encryption Standard, Technology Building, room B-154, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899. CPSR has created an archive of comments on the proposal and has asked people to electronically submit a copy of their comments to clipper(a)washofc.cpsr.org. -------------------------------- NON-CERTIFIED TEXT COMPUTER SYSTEM SECURITY AND PRIVACY ADVISORY BOARD RESOLUTION 93-5 SEPTEMBER 1-2, 1993 Subsequent to the June 2-4, 1993 meeting of the CSSPAB, the Board has held an addition 4 days of public hearings and has collected additional public input. The clear message is that the preliminary concerns stated in Resolution 1 of that date have been confirmed as serious concerns which need to be resolved. Public input has heightened the concerns of the Board to the following issues: - A convincing statement of the problem that Clipper attempts to solve has not been provided. - Export and import controls over cryptographic products must be reviewed. Based upon data compiled from US and international vendors, current controls are negatively impacting US competitiveness in the world market and are not inhibiting the foreign production and use of cryptography (DES and RSA). - The Clipper/Capstone proposal does not address the needs of the software industry, which is critical and significant component of the National Information Infrastructure and the US economy. - Additional DES encryption alternatives and key management alternatives should be considered since there is a significant installed base. - The individuals reviewing the Skipjack algorithm and key management system must be given an appropriate time period and environment in which to perform a thorough review. This review must address the escrow protocol and chip implementation as well as the algorithm itself. - Sufficient information must be provided on the proposed key escrow scheme to allow it to be fully understood by the general public. - Further development and consideration of alternatives to the key escrow scheme need to be considered, e.g., three "escrow" entities, one of which is a non-government agency, and a software based solution. - The economic implications for the Clipper/Capstone proposal have not been examined. These costs go beyond the vendor cost of the chip and include such factors as customer installation, maintenance, administration, chip replacement, integration and interfacing, government escrow system costs, etc. - Legal issues raised by the proposal must be reviewed. - Congress, as well as the administration, should play a role in the conduct and approval of the results of the review. Moreover, the following are additional concerns of the Board. - Implementation of the Clipper initiative may negatively impact the availability of cost-effective security products to the US government and the private sector; and - Clipper products may not be marketable or usable worldwide. FOR: Castro, Gangemi, Lambert, Lipner, Kuyers, Philcox, Rand, Walker, Whitehurst, and Zeitler. AGAINST: none ABSTAIN Gallagher [NSA] ABSENT: Colvin ----------------------------------------------------------------- NON-CERTIFIED TEXT COMPUTER SYSTEM SECURITY AND PRIVACY ADVISORY BOARD RESOLUTION 93-6 SEPTEMBER 1-2, 1993 The Board believes that in deciding cryptographic policies and standards in the US, there is a compelling need to consider and evaluate the concerns listed below. We, therefore, endorse the process being pursued by the administration in the form of an interagency review but believe the scope of that review needs to include adequate industry input. We reaffirm our recommendations (of March 1992) that the issues surrounding this policy be debated in a public forum. In view of the worldwide significance of these issues the Board believes that the Congress of the U.S. must be involved in the establishment of cryptographic policy. The board, furthermore, believes that there are a number of issues that must be resolved before any new or additional cryptographic solution is approved as a US government standard: 1. The protection of law enforcement and national security interests. 2. The protection of U.S. computer and telecommunications interests in the international marketplace. 3. The protection of U.S. person's interests both domestically and internationally. FOR: Castro, Gallagher, Gangemi, Lambert, Lipner, Kuyers, Philcox, Rand, Walker, Whitehurst, and Zeitler. AGAINST: none ABSTAIN: none ABSENT: Colvin

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Spread spectrum radio
by Hastings＠courier8.aero.org 14 Sep '93

14 Sep '93

It was encouraging to see messages about spread spectrum recently. Bypassing the telcos could be important in a crypto-hostile legal environment. And who wants to pay for message forwarding when we can do it ourselves efficiently, almost for free? A bit off topic, but I didn't start it: Someone posted a message that the Waco tank driver ID'd the tank in the Waco: The Big Lie video. But the Chrysler model equipped with a flame thrower claimed to be the tank didn't match Neil Schulman's military expert's opinion, that the model in question did not come equipped with a flame thrower, but could easily support one. Linda Thompson (W:TBL producer) then claimed it was the Chrysler flame thrower tank cleverly disguised to look like the others. As Neil told me, "First she says some animal on the tape is a squirrel. I say the zoologist says it's a chipmunk. Then she says it's a chipmunk disguised as a squirrel." For the complete detailed exchange from the Waco echo conference, e-mail me at jkhastings(a)aol.com or Neil at softserv(a)genie.geis.com. Sorry for being off topic, but government atrocities DO undermine the argument that law enforcement needs to take away your right to privacy for your own safety. And we're talking about DECIPHERING what's on the video. Yeah, that's it. "Beat the system before the system beats you." Kent - <jkhastings(a)aol.com>

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