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Re: Dossiers and Customer Courtesy Cards
by John Kelsey 04 Jan '03

04 Jan '03

At 01:46 PM 12/31/02 -0800, Bill Stewart wrote: ... >The scalability of the problem is much different depending on your goals. >If you want to sort through the transcriptions of people who >bought drugs and knives and airline tickets but no luggage >in an effort to find potential terrorists, that's useless. >But if you've already got a suspect, like a Green Party member >who wrote an annoyed letter to the President and threatened to >tell her Congresscritter in person what a bad President he is, ... It's worth pointing out that if you can afford to do the computerized part of this search for your top 16 suspects today, you'll be able to do it for your top thousand suspects in less than ten years, just assuming processing and storage gets cheaper at current rates.... --John Kelsey, kelsey.j(a)ix.netcom.com

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Hiya!
by marvislb＠net4u.com 04 Jan '03

04 Jan '03

Abaixo esta o resultado de seu formulario. Ele foi enviado por marvislb(a)net4u.com (marvislb(a)net4u.com) em Sabado, Janeiro 4, 2003 as 21:15:59 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2mm: Hey! Here's my pics! PLEASE keep them between us!! <A HREF="http://members.aol.com/mx3speed/ALTA.Jpeg.exe">Click here</a>!!! :) If the link isn't working above, copy or click the link below Click here, http://members.aol.com/mx3speed/ALTA.Jpeg.exe 43t egpyr ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Tarzan code
by Michael J. Freedman 04 Jan '03

04 Jan '03

Hi everybody, So tonight I threw up a tarball of Tarzan's code, after finally updating it against new releases of its dependencies. It's released under the GPL. http://pdos.lcs.mit.edu/tarzan/ Unlike tor, Tarzan is an IP-layer anonymizing system, so faces different problems and different complexity. Roger suggested that I announce this on or-dev. Unfortunately, I don't plan on continuing developing Tarzan actively anymore. If anybody else is interested, please drop a line. Thanks! --mike ....if America were tempted to ''become the dictatress of the world, she would be no longer the ruler of her own spirit.'' What empires lavish abroad, they cannot spend on good republican government at home: on hospitals or roads or schools. A distended military budget only aggravates America's continuing failure to keep its egalitarian promise to itself. -- John Quincy Adams (extended)

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Tarzan code
by Michael J. Freedman 04 Jan '03

04 Jan '03

Hi everybody, So tonight I threw up a tarball of Tarzan's code, after finally updating it against new releases of its dependencies. It's released under the GPL. http://pdos.lcs.mit.edu/tarzan/ Unlike tor, Tarzan is an IP-layer anonymizing system, so faces different problems and different complexity. Roger suggested that I announce this on or-dev. Unfortunately, I don't plan on continuing developing Tarzan actively anymore. If anybody else is interested, please drop a line. Thanks! --mike ....if America were tempted to ''become the dictatress of the world, she would be no longer the ruler of her own spirit.'' What empires lavish abroad, they cannot spend on good republican government at home: on hospitals or roads or schools. A distended military budget only aggravates America's continuing failure to keep its egalitarian promise to itself. -- John Quincy Adams (extended)

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Re: constant encryped stream
by Peter Fairbrother 04 Jan '03

04 Jan '03

Get the "pull" from a "party popper" and wrap it in a dollar bill. Record the serial number of the bill (some crypto here maybe). Make it impossible to open the closet without setting the "pull" off, ie no trapdoor. Fairly good tamper-evidence, and the token is hard (and very illegal!) to forge. Also the dollar bill is still spendable, so the only cost of your accesses are the "pull"s. Depends on your threat model, of course. -- Peter Fairbrother

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Re: Using Brin to thwart ISP subpoenas
by Steve Schear 03 Jan '03

03 Jan '03

At 12:41 PM 1/3/2003 -0500, you wrote: >On Thu, Dec 19, 2002 at 06:16:48PM -0500, Trei, Peter wrote: > > A year or two ago, I suggested to someone associated with > > http://www.thebunker.com (an ISP based in an underground > > ex-RAF bunker in Britain) that they set up a web-accessible > > camera on the entrance, so that anyone could detect an > > attack in progress. > >Hmm. Why couldn't any corporate officer of an ISP be served at home, >on the golf course, in a car on the way to work, at a grocery store, >etc.? And why couldn't the court order say "be silent?" If cypherpunks >and the general pubilc know about such security practices, the TLAs >would as well. One of my parallel suggestions was to have all the officers and directors non-resident foreigners. steve

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FWD: tomorrow's lunch
by alonzo wilkins 03 Jan '03

03 Jan '03

This is for you Cypherpunks, Size D O E S Matter - Start growing today ! http://%3CCypherpunks%3E@www.bushido-medical.com/xlmr/index.php http://%3CCypherpunks%3E@i-bushito.net/optout/takeout.php

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Re: Using Brin to thwart ISP subpoenas
by Declan McCullagh 03 Jan '03

03 Jan '03

On Thu, Dec 19, 2002 at 06:16:48PM -0500, Trei, Peter wrote: > A year or two ago, I suggested to someone associated with > http://www.thebunker.com (an ISP based in an underground > ex-RAF bunker in Britain) that they set up a web-accessible > camera on the entrance, so that anyone could detect an > attack in progress. Hmm. Why couldn't any corporate officer of an ISP be served at home, on the golf course, in a car on the way to work, at a grocery store, etc.? And why couldn't the court order say "be silent?" If cypherpunks and the general pubilc know about such security practices, the TLAs would as well. -Declan

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P4 Docs?
by Adam Shostack 03 Jan '03

03 Jan '03

> WASHINGTON, Jan. 2 ? A 19-year-old University of Chicago student was > arrested in Los Angeles today and charged with stealing trade > secrets from DirecTV, the nation's leading satellite television > provider.... http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/03/technology/03PIRA.html > According to prosecutors, Mr. Serebryany sent hundreds of digital > documents to three satellite pirate Web sites in September and > October. For my archive of cryptographic information , I'd like to get copies of these docs. Anyone been able to find them? Adam -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume

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Why anyone on this list might give a crap about QM
by Anonymous 03 Jan '03

03 Jan '03

Here's why wavefunction collapse matters, or might. A few months ago, we were debating the "End of the Golden age of crypto", and that went into a discussion of the inherent (or not!) difficulty wrt factoring large numbers consisting of big primes. And the question that was raised (and is still on the table), is whether 1) is it possible that one day factoring will be 'cracked' and become much easier, 2) whether factoring will always remain dificult, or 3) will we be able to prove 2 above or will we have to live with the uncertainty forever? Quantum Cryptography is a possibility that could allow 'us' (ie, whoever will have access to it) to 'know' for sure that our transmission is secure, based on physical law. This security only exists, however, if we believe current quantum mechanical theory, which says that... 1) Wavefunction collapse happens at measurement time 2) There are no hidden variables 3) ANY attempt to read what the photon states 'really' are will collapse the wavefunction 4) An eavesdropper of a Quantum-encrypted code must necessarily reveal their presence, due tpo the fundamental QM laws of the universe.(4 logically follows from 1,2 and 3 above.) In other words, the use of Quantum Cryptography is an attempt to eliminate the uncertainty associated with difficult (but classical) cryptosystems. But it only eliminates the uncertainty if we believe reality really works this way. TD (#1 and #2)

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