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(fwd) Russians Break RSA?
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Friends, I just grabbed this of the ClariNet news feed on Netcom...I'm not supposed to forward anything from this service (so don't tell Brad Templeton!), but this appeared to be too important not to pass on as quickly as possible. Apparently those rumors that the Russians, always topnotch mathematicians, had developed public key crypto in the 1950s or early 60s are true--my hero Kolmogorov developed this when he was technical director at Kryptogorodok, the secret city of Soviet cryptographers hidden in the Urals (and first visited by an outsider, Stephen Wolfram, only a couple of years ago). Here's the report on a news conference announcing the cracking of their Kolmogorov system, which is equivalent to our own RSA. I haven't had a chance to talk to John Markoff, who was at the press conference, to get his comments. --Tim > Xref: netcom.com clari.world.europe.eastern:2783 > clari.news.hot.ussr:3792 > clari. > news.trouble:3258 clari.science.crypto > Path: netcom.com!bass!clarinews > Approved: doug(a)clarinet.com > From: clarinews(a)clarinet.com (AP) > Newsgroups: > clari.world.europe.eastern,clari.news.hot.ussr,clari.news.trouble,clari.sc > ience.crypto > Distribution: clari.apo > Subject: Russian Mathematicians Announce Breakthrough > Keywords: Europe Cryptography RSA > Copyright: 1994 by The Associated Press, R > Message-ID: <russia-cryptoUR7f0_4ME(a)clarinet.com> > Date: Fri, 1 Apr 94 10:40:19 PST > Expires: Mon, 18 Apr 94 12:40:19 PDT > ACategory: international > Slugword: Russia-Crypto > Priority: regular > ANPA: Wc: 116/0; Id: V0255; Src: ap; Sel: -----; Adate: 03-14-N/A > Codes: APO-1103 > > > MOSCOW (AP) -- At a press conference held minutes ago in a > crowded hall, Russian mathematicians announced that a breakthrough had > been made nearly a decade ago in the arcane branch of mathematics > known as "cryptography," the science of making messages that are > unreadable to others. > Leonid Vladwylski, Director of the prestigious Moscow Academy > of Sciences, called the press conference yesterday, after rumors began > circulating that noted Russian-American reporter John Markoff was in > Russia to interview academicians at the previously secret city of > Soviet cryptographers, Kryptogorodok. The existence of Kryptogorodok, > sister city to Akademogorodok, Magnetogorsk, and to the rocket cities > of Kazhakstan, had been shrouded in secrecy since its establishment in > 1954 by Chief of Secret Police L. Beria. Its first scientific > director, A. Kolmogorov, developed in 1960 what is called in the West > "public key cryptography." The existence of Kryptogorodok was unknown > to the West until 1991, when Stephen Wolfram disclosed its existence. > American cryptographers initially scoffed at the rumors that > the Russians had developed public-key cryptography as early as 1960, > some 15 years prior to the first American discovery. After interviews > last year at Kryptogorodok, noted American cryptographers Professor > D. Denning and D. Bowdark admitted that it did seem to be > confirmed. Professor Denning was quoted at the time saying that she > did not think this meant the Russians could actually break the > Kolmogorov system, known in the West as RSA, because she had spent > more than a full weekend trying to do this and had not > succeeded. "Believe me, RSA is still unbreakable," she said in her > evaluation report. > Russia's top mathematicians set out to break Kolmogorov's new > coding system. This required them to determine that "P = NP" (see > accompanying article). Details are to be published next month in the > journal "Doklady.Krypto," but a few details are emerging. > The Kolmogorov system is broken by computing the prime numbers > which form what is called the modulus. This is done by randomly > guessing the constituent primes and then detonating all of the > stockpiled nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union for each "wrong > guess." In the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics, > invented in 1949 by Lev Landau (and later, independently by Everett > and Wheeler in the U.S.), all possible outcomes of a quantum > experiment are realized. > As Academician Leonid Vladwylski explained, "In all the > universes in which we guessed the wrong factors, we were destroyed > completely. But since we are obviously here, talking to you at this > press conference, in this universe we have an unbroken record of > successfully factoring even the largest of imaginable numbers. Since > we are so optimistic about this method, we say the computation runs in > "Nondeterministic Pollyanna Time." Allow me to demonstrate..." > > [Press Conference will be continued if the experiment is a success.] > > MOSCOW (AP), ITAR-Tass, 1 April 1994 > > > -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: anon-mail article in LA Times
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Los Angeles Times Thursday, March 31, 1994, p.B1, Business Innovation Pros and Cons of Anonymous Corporate E-Mail By Michael Schrage XYZ Corp. (not its real name) has a problem that's driving top management crazy. A rogue piece of software has appeared that lets employees send electronic mail messages anonymously. There's been a rash of sexually suggestive -- and even obscene -- e-mail sent to several female employees. Unpopular managers have received insulting e-mail appraisals of their style and performance. More ominously, several messages have been broadcast detailing serious problems with several of XYZ's key projects. These were setbacks that had previously been the secret of top management but, thanks to XYZ's global network, have now been instantly distributed worldwide to launch hundreds of e-mail queries and thousands of water- cooler conversations. Like kerosene poured on a fire, this act of e-mail anonymity has ignited once-smoldering resentments into openly burning issues. While half the company is thrilled that anonymity has caused these problems to surface for corporate-wide discussion, the other half is furious that the leakers can't be found and punished. Ultimately, XYZ's top management pulled the plug on its global e- mail system, rewrote the network software to assure that all messages can be tracked at least two ways and issued an edict that absolutely forbids anonymous messages. The traffic that now flows on XYZ's network is excruciatingly polite. This XYZ Corp. example is hardly fictitious; it's an unhappy composite of real-world confrontations that recently occurred in several Fortune 1,000 companies. More than any other e-mail issue, the anonymity option provokes the most heated debate in organizational network design. The right to e-mail anonymity strikes at the very heart of values that organizations either cherish or try to suppress. Some organizations see anonymity as a healthy, essential part of their internal dialogue, a mechanism that promotes free and unfettered comment. Others see anonymity as a sleazy virtual mask that lets corporate mischief makers and malcontents get away with cheap shots at people who have the guts to sign their names to their messages. At one giant aerospace manufacturer, for example, managers are positively grateful that their brainstorming software encourages anonymous contributions. "If we had to attach our names to our suggestions, I think people would be less forthcoming," insists one engineer there who, yes, asks no to be identified. The culture of the company, he argues, makes it difficult for younger engineers to publicly make comments critical of senior engineering decisions. The fact that software anonymity effectively subsidizes the existing culture rather than encouraging a more open and honest exchange of ideas is dismissed as politically unrealistic. "Have you lost your mind?" the engineer asks. The anonymity issue becomes even more intense when one considers the speed at which organizations are linking their e-mail networks together in hopes of creating "virtual" corporations and accelerating the flow of vital data. Companies are hooking up with key customers and suppliers. Suppose at the customer network, anonymous messages are permitted and even encouraged; at the supplier, they're strictly forbidden. When these two companies collaborate on a project, whose e-mail protocol should win? Ironically, the ability to communicate via e- mail may lead more to a hostile clash of values than to the desired goal of better communications. Privacy is relative; anonymity is an absolute. So how does the Internet, the world's biggest and best e-mail network, handle this thorny issue? In fact, it is "illegal" and technically impossible to send an Internet message without a "return address," i.e., without some sort of identifying header. Nevertheless, the Internet has become a hotbed of detailed, intimate and absolutely anonymous communications. Indeed, there is a whistle-blowers Usenet group on the Internet -- a kind of forum -- as well as a support group for victims of sexual abuse. Is it in the best interests of these participants to be readily identifiable? These groups depend on anonymous communications. Market forces have created innovations for anonymity. Because there is a demand for anonymity on the Internet, there is now a supply of anonymity on the Internet. Individuals can send their messages to "remailers" that can strip out the headers containing the authentic return address. These remailers, in turn, can send the messages on to other remailers. In other words, Internet remailers can "launder" messages on the road to their intended destinations in ways that completely obliterate their origins. A company that's on the Internet could use remailers to send e- mail or post messages anonymously, but there are no known Fortune 500 companies that provide such remailers internally. Essentially, the rise of e-mail is forcing companies to decide explicitly what kind of values they want their networks to embody. Should employees be allowed or encouraged to send anonymous e-mail? Or should it be strictly forbidden? Or is there a middle way that creates bulletin boards or other e-mail "Democracy Walls" where individuals can safely post their comments? Whatever the answer to these questions, more and more organizations are painfully becoming aware that their new networks can raise cultural tensions just as easily as they create economic efficiencies. +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Michael Schrage is a writer, consultant and research associate at the | | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He writes this column | | independently for The Times. He can be reached at schrage(a)latimes.com | | by electronic mail via the Internet. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

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anon-mail article in LA Times
by Eli Brandt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Today's L.A. Times had an article, on the front page of the Business section, on the hazards and benefits of anonymous e-mail. It opened with a narrative concerning a fictional ("composite") company whose internal cover-up of project failures was blown by anonymous mail. There are some quotes saying that it bypasses hierarchical stupidity, and some saying that it's for gutless harassers. The article mentions the situation on the Internet, including the basics of remailer mechanics (no addresses, though). Pretty good article, with less than the usual amount of confusion. Is the author on the list? Eli ebrandt(a)hmc.edu

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RE: Our Tax dollars at work! (NOT a sick joke)
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

:Get real! Lirpa Sloof spelled backwards is April Fools. You're right, :it's not a sick joke, it's an April Fools joke. :> Trust Congress? Not With This Unbelieveable Lair of Slop |||||||||||| :> The moniker -- Information Highway -- itself seems to be responsible for SB :> #040194. Introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy, it's designed to prohibit ||||||| :> to Kevin Avril of the ACLU, "This activity doesn't even qualify as ||||| :> register your protests with your congressperson or Ms. Lirpa Sloof in ||||||||||| Gosh, we're slow today kids... G

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FW: Our Tax dollars at work! (NOT a sick joke)
by Ophir Ronen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- From: Setheni Davidson (CompuCom) Trust Congress? Not With This Unbelieveable Lair of Slop PC Computing, April 1994, page 88. By John C. Dvorak When Vice President Gore began talking about the Information Highway, we all knew the bureaucrats would get involved more than we might like. In fact, it may already be too late to stop a horrible Senate bill from becoming law. The moniker -- Information Highway -- itself seems to be responsible for SB #040194. Introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy, it's designed to prohibit anyone from using a public computer network (Information Highway) while the computer user is intoxicated. I know how silly this sounds, but Congress apparently thinks that being drunk on a highway is bad no matter what kind of highway it is. The bill is expected to pass this month. There already are rampant arguments as to how this proposed law can possibly be enforced. The FBI hopes to use it as an excuse to do routine wiretaps on any computer if there is any evidence that the owner "uses or abuses alcohol and has access to a modem." Note how it slips in the word 'uses'. This means if you've been seen drinking one lone beer, you can have your line tapped. Because this law would be so difficult to enforce, police officials are drooling over the prospect of easily obtaining permits to do wiretaps. Ask enforcement officials in Washington and they'll tell you the proposed law is idiotic, but none will oppose it. Check the classified ads in the "Washington Post" and you'll find the FBI, National Security Agency, and something called the Online Enforcement Agency (when did they set that up?) all soliciting experts in phone technology, specifically wiretapping. It gets worse. The Congressional Record of February 19, 1994, has a report that outlines the use of computerized BBSes, Internet, Inter-Relay Chat, and CompuServe CB as "propagating illicit sexual encounters and meetings between couples -- any of whom are underage... Even people purporting to routinely have sex with animals are present on these systems to foster their odd beliefs on the public-at-large." A rider on SB #040194 makes it a felony to discuss sexual matters on any public-access network, including the Internet, America Online, and CompuServe. I wondered how private companies such as America Online can be considered public-access networks, so I called Senator Barbara Boxer's office and talked to an aide, a woman named Felicia. She said the use of promotional cards that give away a free hour or two of service constitues public access. You know, like the ones found in the back of books or in modem boxes. She also told me most BBS systems fall under this proposed statute. When asked how they propose to enforce this law, she said it's not Congress's problem. "Enforcement works itself out over time," she said. The group fighting this moronic law is led by Jerome Bernstein of the Washington law firm of Bernstein, Bernstein and Knowles (the firm that first took Ollie North as a client). I couldn't get in touch with any of the co-sponsors of the bill (including Senator Ted Kennedy, if you can believe it!), but Bernstein was glad to talk. "These people have no clue about the Information Highway or what it does. The whole thing got started last Christmas during an antidrinking campaign in the Washington D.C., metro area," Bernstein said, "I'm convinced someone jokingly told Leahy's office about drunk driving on the Information High and the idea snowballed. These senators actually think there is a physical highway. Seriously, Senator Pat Moynihan asked me if you needed a driving permit to 'drive' a modem on the Information Highway! He has no clue what a modem is, and neither does the rest of Congress." According to Bernstein, the antisexual wording in the bill was attributed to Kennedy's office. "Kennedy thought that technology was leaving him behind, and he wanted to be perceived as more up-to-date technologically. He also though this would make amends for his alleged philandering." Unfortunately, the public is not much better informed than the Senate. The Gallup Organization, at the behest of Congress, is polling the public regarding intoxication while using a computer and online "hot chatting." The results are chilling. More than half of the public thinks that using a computer while intoxicated should be illegal! The results of the sexuality poll are not available. But one question, "Should a teenage boy be encouraged to pretend he is a girl while chatting with another person online?" has civil rights activists alarmed. According to Kevin Avril of the ACLU, "This activity doesn't even qualify as virtual cross-dressing. Who cares about this stuff? What are we going to do? Legislate an anti-boys-will-be-boys law? It sets a bad precedent." I could go on and on with quotes and complaints from people regarding this bill. But most of the complaints are getting nowhere. Pressure groups, such as one led by Baptist ministers from De Kalb County, Georgia, are supporting the law with such vehemence that they've managed to derail an effort by modem manufacturers (the biggest being Georgia-based Hayes) to lobby against the law. "Who wants to come out and support drunkenness and computer sex?" asked a congressman who requested anonymity. So, except for Bernstein, Bernstein, and Knowles, and a few members of the ACLU, there is nothing to stop this bill from becoming law. You can register your protests with your congressperson or Ms. Lirpa Sloof in the Senate Legislative Analysts Office. Her name spelled backward says it all.

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Re: Quantum Physics
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

So, Jim, I figured the whole thing out and just had to share with you the fact that apparently, This doesn't have anything to do with That Here doesn't have anything to do with There and neither does These with Those I think it's a Principle of some kind. :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) Blanc

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Day-One trailer
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Monday the 11th on Day One: Have we taken a wrong turn on the information superhighway? Looks like they are going to look into porn on the nets with a real bias media eye. I don't give day one much credit either.... -uni- (Dark)

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Clipper/Capstone/Skipjack excerpts from Cud 6.28
by paul＠hawksbill.sprintmrn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A couple of interesting articles on Clipper/Capstone/Skipjack which were included in the latest CuD, for those who haven't already seen it... - paul 8<-------------------- cut here ------------------------------- Date: Wed, 30 Mar 1994 22:03:00 CST Sender: CU-DIGEST list <CUDIGEST(a)vmd.cso.uiuc.edu> From: "(Jim Thomas)" <TK0JUT2(a)NIU.BITNET> Subject: Cu Digest, #6.28 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 27 Mar 94 17:35:00 -0700 From: walter.scott(a)HOTLINE.COM(Walter Scott) Subject: File 1--Downs Down On Clipper The Clipper Chip proposal from the Clinton Administration -- which would essentially have government broker individual electronic privacy rights -- is collecting still more opposition. One of the most recent opponents to Clipper is media icon Hugh Downs. Downs is well known for his days as a co-host of the Today Show, host of the game show Concentration, and his current position as co-host of ABC-TV's 20/20. Downs is also a respected advocate for "mature" adults. Downs delivered his "perspective" as to Clipper on the 03-27-94 edition of ABC radio's "PERSPECTIVES." In Downs' segment, much cryptography history -- as it relates to radio -- was explained while Downs laid the foundation for expression of his opinion on Clipper. The following text is a direct transcript of Downs' summation: ------------- TRANSCRIPT BEGINS ------------------------ It's not designed to stop criminals from sending encrypted messages because criminals will always be able to do that. If the NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY puts a spy chip on American computers, then the criminals will simply avoid the chip and use other computers that don't spy on them. But, it wouldn't be just criminals who would buy foreign made computers. Anyone who wants a private life would have to buy foreign, too. According to John Perry Barlow, who's co-founder and Vice-chair of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Vice President Gore says he wants the Clipper Chip installed in all American-made computers designed for export. Now, you don't have to be a computer whiz to realize that -- if American computers were forced to have a spy chip built into them -- then fewer people would buy American computers. The computer owes an enormous debt to cryptologists because cryptologists needed machines to disguise radio messages. The information highway is certainly as wide open as radio. Indeed, much of it is already radio. Cellular phones and cellular FAX will quickly expand to cellular modem and satellite communications. As it is, most of this information goes out unprotected. The time has arrived for individuals to have high levels of security. The information superhighway will eventually contain every scrap of information we could possibly imagine. And that means there will be all sorts of unscrupulous people out there trying to hack into our lives. Information-highwaymen are bad enough when they're fourteen years old. But now, adults -- who work for the government -- want to play hacker, too. The Clipper spy chip is bad business for everyone. Information-highway-safety should be a top priority for all of us. ------------ TRANSCRIPT ENDS -------------------- The Hotline/Seattle ~ (206) 450-0948 ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 15:47:00 GMT From: chris.hind(a)MAVERICKBBS.COM(Chris Hind) Subject: File 2--Reply to "Clipper Paranoia" (CuD #6.26) This is my reply to: shadow(a)VORTEX.ITHACA.NY.US(bruce edwards) Subject--Opposing Clipper is "paranoia" with good Reason (Cu Digest, #6.26) >Its existence will make no difference at all. The very smart ones >may use PGP or something else, and again, clipper will be meaningless. We could easily build it into the net, making it impossible for the government to stop us. Sound like a good plan? >Because it will probably prove constitutionally impossible >to outlaw widespread private encryption -- something big brother finds >hard to swallow -- the clipper/encryption push seems to me to be about >another kettle of sharks. Completely true, encryption cannot be outlawed. The government is ripping itself off by giving us powerful encryption for personal use. But for the dark personal secrets, are we really gonna use the clip chip? Not me! I'll use PGP or something else. Criminals aren't going to use the chip unless they're really ignorant or blatantly idiotic. So the government is really spending lots of money to making our lines more secure from illegal phone tappers and such but not doing a thing for them. I believe we're getting the better part of the deal! Do they really want to listen in on phone calls to our relatives? I don't think so. I promote the Clipper Chip! Thanks for the free gift! T> In my opinion (and this I am sure is obvious to most everyone) the >encryption, bugging-port, e-mail reading agenda pursued by government >is no more than the first icy finger of the Empire, encircling the >throat of cyberspace. A little dramatic here? They might win the battle but they haven't won the war. The final battle will be when we establish a global Interactive Television system. Then it will pit the public against the US government and the allies it has in this dispute (if any). Nobody wants a video camera normally used for video conferencing to be watching them in their own living room without them even knowing it. By this time, people will know a lot more about this scheme and most likely the public will win this battle unless the majority of the population is as ignorant as a two year old child to the world around them. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 30 Mar 94 13:24:38 PST From: dave(a)PCE1.HAC.COM(Dave Fandel) Subject: File 9--How Clipper Actually Works In all the anti-Clipper flaming that has been occuring I haven't seen anything about how Clipper actually works. I generated the following based on a lecture in a secure computer systems class I am taking. +---------------------------------------------------- Clipper Operations: Chip +----------------+ | | Message (M) -->| Algorithm (E) |--> Encrypted Message (B) = E [M] | Chip ID (ID) | K | Chip Key (U) | User Key (K) -->| Family Key (F) |--> Encrypted ID and Key (A) = | | E [ID | E [K]] +----------------+ F U Note: E [Q] means Encrypt Q with key R R +----------------------------------------------------------- The User Key is a session key that is generated by the two ends in the following manner: Side A Side B Generate a, X Generate Y a, X and Y are random # Send a and a^X ------> Receive a and a^X <------ Send a^Y Receive a^Y Generate K=(a^Y)^X Generate K=(a^X)^Y ie key K=a^(XY) So a, a^X, and a^Y can all be intercepted without giving away key. +---------------------------------------------------------------- So where does the government and the Key Escrow come into it? Note the 2nd output from the clipper chip - it is the ID of the chip and an encrypted version of the session key. The government will know the family key and can extract the ID. Then they go to the two escrow agencies (NIST and the Treasury Dept.) and get the two components of the chip key U. This allows the session key to be extracted and the message to be decrypted. Agency 1: ID and U(A) U(A) --+ OR --> U Agency 2: ID and U(B) U(B) --+ +------------------------------------------------------ General comments: 1. The Algorithm for the clipper chip is an NSA Type II algorithm called Skipjack. Type II is for unclassified, but sensitive. 2. If you could reprogram the Chip Key (U) or block the transmission of the encrypted ID and key this concept wouldn't be to bad. 3. The other point of vulnerability is at the manufacturing location where the Chip Key is originally generated. All 3 pieces of info (ID, U(A), and U(B)) have to be in the same place to generate the key. Dave Fandel dave(a)pce2.hac.com 3/30/94 If there is anything incorrect in this document please let me know. ------------------------------ 8<--------------------------- cut here ------------------------------ Cheers, _______________________________________________________________________________ Paul Ferguson US Sprint Enterprise Internet Engineering tel: 703.904.2437 Herndon, Virginia USA internet: paul(a)hawk.sprintmrn.com

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Re: crypto software/papers/docs CD -- is there any interest?
by GERSTEIN＠SCSUD.CTSTATEU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May writes: >Mark Henderson writes: > >> Forgive the somewhat commercial nature of this message, but I think >> it is well within the lines of the cypherpunks mission of getting >> code out to people. >> >> I'm considering the possibility of producing a CD (for distribution >> in North America only) of crypto source code, information/papers and >> binaries for common platforms. >>...[BUNCH OF STUFF DELETED]...... > >You'll have to be real careful here, as charging money means >copyrights have to be more scrupulously watched than when sites just >"informally" contain copyrighted material. (I'm not arguing for these >laws, just noting them.) ...[ANOTHER BUNCH OF STUFF DELETED]...... >(There are lots of issues here, which get debated over and over again >in various forums. All I'm saying is that charging $50 for a >compilation of articles, FAQs, scanned items, etc. is likely to >trigger a lot of things. Just a heads up.) > ...[STILL MORE DELETED]...... >--Tim May -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Wouldn't doing something like this be like distributing shareware on a CD-Rom? Most of the Rom's I've seen have programs and the like, but a few have had source code, papers, hypercard stacks, etc. that were all copyrighted but still pushed out on the Rom. I think the only problem would be if you were charging more money than a "reasonable duplication fee". Most people will agree that this would be the cost of the media and maybe a little something for your time. Just another of my 0.02¢... Adam Gerstein "After this, nothing will shock me." ---------- "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 4, 1994 -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- To sign on to the letter, send a message to: Clipper.petition(a)cpsr.org with the message "I oppose Clipper" (no quotes). You will receive a return message confirming your vote.

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Re: Collapse of the Wave Function Predicted, Timing Uncertain
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> - Writing software while on drugs, apparently a longstanding practice > amongst some segments of the hacker community, is banned. As Professor > Denning puts it: "Drugs and code don't mix. This is what got us into > this whole crypto mess in the first place." Wait - they're not including *caffeine* are they? No way! It's a Commie Plot to decaffeinate our Precious Bodily Fluids, and down-right Un-American! (Or un-Colombian, or un-something!) Mr. Coffee

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