- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: lp (134.222.35.2)?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by perry(a)piermont.com ("Perry E. Metzger") on Sun, 05 Nov 12:13 PM >Quit looking for the spooks where they aren't. You >should always assume your line is being tapped if you >are saying something you don't want heard, anway. True, it's not Smokey behind the billboard, blinked at you by oncoming headlights, it's the sensors in the roadbed that reads your tag -- when it leaves your home-ain, then at the remailer donkeystops, then at your recreational stash-house, at the pedo-filmery, at the Semtex-Pantex workhide, at the digi-wallet-copyfast, right into ananonymous Ken-Barbie's e-slot. TLA-Smokey is friendly, maybe intra-humanly let you off with a warning, not the anonymous high-techery, it responds only to its friend, the tag -- tracing, storing, mutating the whinefleshers, 0's by 1's. That's the how, maybe, but for who or what or why? Or is it just machines feeding machines incomprehensibles?

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Re: 800_ape
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:23 AM 11/4/95 -0500, you wrote: > 11-5-95. NYPaper Sunday Magazine: > > "Making Microsoft Safe For Capitalism. How do you restrain > an 800-pound gorilla?" Cover story. By James Gleick. > It's time to draw the line. But where? > > 'Anything not a direct lie or clearly illegal is O.K. to > do if it advances Microsoft's tribal cause,' Mitchell > Kapor says. 'This licenses the worst sort of > manipulations, lies, tortured self-justification and so > on.' So Gleick wants to unleash the Justice Department to protect his ISP from Microsoft's competition. Can't cut it without Big Brother's help, eh? All I've got to say about this piece of commie trash is GM, ATT, IBM, USSR, CIA, & KGB. It took me all of 10 seconds to figure out how to delete the icons for the MSN and MS' Internet Browser from my WIN95 desktop. The help message that popped up when I did this also told me how I could delete the actual programs from my hard drive. (Hint James try clicking the *right* mouse button.) DCF "Worrying about a large institution especially when it has computers is like worrying about a large gorilla especially when it's on fire." Bruce Serling. CFP95.

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IPO ALERT: Radcom Ltd. Available through Wit Capital
by dustin＠witcapital.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wit Capital Corporation is pleased to announce that we are able to provide first-come first-serve participation in the following initial public offering as described below: Issuer: Radcom Ltd., which develops, manufactures, markets and supports internetworking test and analysis equipment for data communications networks. Security: Ordinary Shares Expected Size of Offering: 2,250,000 shares Expected Price Range: $7.50 to $9.50 Lead Underwriter: Unterberg Harris If you think you may be interested in this Initial Public Offering available through Wit Capital, please visit http://www.witcapital.com or call (888) 4wit-cap. You can view, print or download the Preliminary Prospectus from the New Issues Section of our website. To purchase shares, you must first open an account, which you can do online. Investing in public offerings is speculative and may not be appropriate for every investor. As with all of your investments with Wit Capital, you must make your own determination of whether an investment in this offering is consistent with your investment objectives and risk tolerance. To learn more about the risks of investing in initial public offerings please visit the New Issues Section of our website. A REGISTRATION STATEMENT RELATING TO THESE SECURITIES HAS BEEN FILED WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION BUT HAS NOT YET BECOME EFFECTIVE. THESE SECURITIES MAY NOT BE SOLD NOR MAY OFFERS TO BUY BE ACCEPTED PRIOR TO THE TIME THE REGISTRATION STATEMENT BECOMES EFFECTIVE. THIS COMMUNICATION SHALL NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFER TO SELL OR THE SOLICITATION OF AN OFFER TO BUY, NOR SHALL THERE BE ANY SALE OF THESE SECURITIES IN ANY JURISDICTION IN WHICH SUCH OFFER, SOLICITATION OR SALE WOULD BE UNLAWFUL PRIOR TO REGISTRATION OR QUALIFICATION UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS OF SUCH JURISDICTION. Wit Capital Corporation Member NASD SIPC

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MOONLIGHTING BECOMES YOU.... Instan
by rewards＠t-1net.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Magic Money
by EWilhem＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Where do I get the software, Please E-mail me at roger12(a)cam.org. I'd like the evaluation software.

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Re: Kallstrom Calls All Calls Tappable
by koontz＠MasPar.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> James Kallstrom, assistant FBI director in charge of the > New York field division, argues that the proposal would in > fact reduce the FBI's surveillance authority. "Today ... we > could tap all the phones in the United States," he said, > referring to older, pre-digital technology. Under the plan, > the FBI's surveillance ability would shrink to a maximum of > 1 percent of simultaneous telephone calls from any one > telephone switch, he said. Doublespeak. 2 legs good 4 legs better.

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New Computer Security Act
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Computer Security Enhancement Act of 1997 (HR1903) is intended to replace the Computer Security Act of 1987. It redefines the role of NIST in meeting federal computer security and encryption requirements through cooperation of industry. Public use of encryption is also addressed in the bill. Two lengthy reports on the bill have been issued recently, both of which provide overviews of the current encryption debate. House Report 105-243, published on September 3, provides a detailed analysis of the bill, hearings held, floor remarks and mark-ups since introduction: http://jya.com/hr105-243.txt (115K) And one published today includes recent floor remarks on encryption, mostly supportive of public use: http://jya.com/hr1903-floor.htm (44K) One point of contention is the evaluation of foreign encryption. The original bill put that responsibility on NIST, but the latest version deleted that and leaves the task to BXA (and unnamed others). Moreover, there's dispute over committee jurisdiction for other provisions. Information security now attracts the swarm, with encryption the moths' beacon.

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SSL-encrypted apache web server available for beta-test
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I put together an SSL/Apache using mostly other people's work, but some of my own. It's available for beta-test to use non-commercial to US-persons. See http://www.c2.org/apachessl/ The README is attached. -- sameer Voice: 510-601-9777 Community ConneXion FAX: 510-601-9734 The Internet Privacy Provider Dialin: 510-658-6376 http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org "I don't want to get into the t-shirt business." The release of Apache supports SSL, using Eric Young's SSLeay package and RSADSI's RSAREF cryptography library. Ben Laurie <ben(a)algroup.co.uk> wrote the interfaces to SSL within the Apache server, which was developed by the Apache Group. This release of Apache-SSL is maintained by sameer <sameer(a)c2.org>. For more information on sameer's releases of Apache-SSL see http://www.c2.org/apachessl/. For more information on Apache see http://www.apache.org/ For more information on SSLeay see http://www.psy.uq.oz.au/~ftp/Crypto/ For more information on RSAREF see http://www.rsa.com/ Portions developed at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. This product includes software developed by Ben Laurie for use in the Apache-SSL HTTP server project. Use of this software is allowed for non-commercial use only, as described in the RSAREF license. For information on commercial use of this software, please see http://www.c2.org/apachessl/. This package is using Apache 0.8.14 -- not the most recent version of Apache. While every effort will be made to keep this package up to date with the most recent Apache version, that can not be guaranteed.

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Recovering lost coins in ecash
by szabo＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> One problem a number of people have reported in DigiCash is disappearing > money. Several people have reported that if a transfer is misconfigured > the cash can flow out of the wallet, be rejected at the other end and > disappear from the system - i.e. misprinted names on cheques mean lost cash! These users need to learn the features of the software. Backups of spent coins are retained in the payment history ledger. Select the payment from the ledger, and hit _Cancel_ to cancel the payment. This credits the lost coins to your account. The story behind this (which is, alas, not so apparent to the user) is that this essentially spends the coins at the bank, so that if they were lost, the amount will be credited to your account. If the coins were already cleared and credited to the payee then you ask the payee for your money back (or to properly deliver the purchased service), relying on their business reputation (ie, complain loud and publically if you don't get satisfaction). For the latter case an escrow service would be a useful third-party add-on to the basic ecash system, to allow exchanges in larger amounts without incurring this risk from the payee. This bit of electronic magic is one place where ecash is superior to physical cash -- but at the expense of not being obvious from the metaphor. It also illustrates the superior flexibility of online clearing -- double spending is used as an error recovery tool, to find out whether the payment was in fact lost, rather than as an indication of fraud. Nick Szabo szabo(a)netcom.com Internet commerce consultant

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Re: Java insecurity - long - argumentative - you are warned.
by goedel＠tezcat.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> > While all this checking appears excruciatingly detailed, by the time >> > the byte code verifier has done its work, the Java interpreter can >> > proceed knowing that the code will run securely. Knowing these >> > properties makes the Java interpreter much faster, because it doesn't >> > have to check anything. > >Yikes!! I'll leave this for someone else to address. This sounds to me >like a variation on virus scanning. I think that there are far more >reputable virus experts than I who can comment and expand on *flaws* with >that approach. This "checking," as any comp-sci undergrad will tell you, amounts to solving the halting problem for the java interpreter. While this is possible for a finite state automata like the java interpreter (made more difficult by the fact that it can use the "net" for additional state), it is not even remotely feasable. If you can write a checker that works in a reasonable amount of time, I'll write a turing machine simulator that'll do something nasty if the input machine halts. Then we'll split the fame and fortune for solving the 5 state Busy Beaver problem. Deal? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBgAwUBMJ8gtXIf3YegbdiBAQGqMQJXWzwuPYM2bNb96Fgfb1wGeDC83fNFOW5H 8PQHbnt8bDFsHxKv2L8kcBhtO/TWA0cugVYR9YFf2BOaGoA2UIoCBdwfABM1HAKU hd0H =TA2E -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Dietrich Kappe | Red Planet http://www.redweb.com Red Planet, LLC| "Chess Space" | "MS Access Products" | PGP Public Key 1-800-RED 0 WEB| /chess | /cobre | /goedel/key.txt Web Publishing | Key fingerprint: 8C2983E66AB723F9 A014A0417D268B84

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