- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Anti-Electronic Racketeering Act of 1995 (fwd)
by mclow＠coyote.csusm.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> "Sec. 1030A. Racketeering-related crimes involving computers > "(a) It shall be unlawful-- > . . . > "(2) to distribute computer software that encodes or encrypts > electronic or digital communications to computer networks that the > person distributing knows, or reasonably should know, is accessible to > foreign nationals and foreign governments, regardless of whether such > software has been designated nonexportable." > So much for compression software, too. :-( Pst! Anyone want a copy of gzip? PKZip? Drop*Stuff? -- Marshall Marshall Clow Aladdin Systems mclow(a)coyote.csusm.edu Warning: Objects in calendar are closer than they appear.

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Bubba
by tcmay＠sensemedia.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:19 PM 7/13/95, Robert A. Hayden wrote: >40,000,000 acts. Welcome to a 6x6 cell with a roommate named Bubba that >wants to make you his wife. Careful here, Robert! Bubba has not yet been tried and convicted. I admit that the allegations about Mena, drugs, Whitewater, S & Ls, and abuse of state office are fairly serious, but he has not yet even been formally charged. --Tim May .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)sensemedia.net | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Grassley's Anti-Ridiculous Act
by Tom Gillman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

OK...let's see... "shall be unlawful for any person to damage or threaten to damage electronically or digitally stored data..." Does that mean i can't erase my floppies anymore? :) Or, is it that I can't say, "I'm gonna format you!" and then not do it? Scratching your CDs would be illegal. When you get down to it, your brain is an electrochemical computer. You're no longer allowed to forget anything, either. "But storage in your brain is not digital!", you say.. Electronically _or_ digitally stored. Swapfiles are right out. Writeable memory is out in general. "unlawful to distribute unlicensed software..." There goes shareware. Freeware's still okay, I guess. Do many people treat shareware as anything more than freeware? The Steve JAckson clause at the end about work materials is cute, but the law doesn't seem to require giving the data back. And the clause about being able to enter evidence obtained electronically via 3rd party is interesting. Means an administrator can legally store email and turn it over... This bill is so monumentally stupid I can't believe it. Tom -- Tom Gillman, Unix/AIX Systems Weenie |"For a privacy advocate to determine Wells Computer Center-Ga. State Univ. |the best way to do key escrow is like (404) 651-4503 syshtg(a)gsusgi2.gsu.edu |a death penalty opponent choosing I'm not allowed to have an opinion. |between gas or electricity"-D.Banisar key to UNIX: echo '16i[q]sa[ln0=aln100%Pln100/snlbx]sbA0D4D465452snlbxq'|dc

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Re: SSL RC4 challenge
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Hal <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> > Here is a challenge to try breaking SSL using the default exportable > encryption mode, 40-bit RC4. > [...] It has been pointed out to me that I made a mistake in my analysis of the SSL packets. The MAC at the beginning of the encrypted packets is itself RC4 encrypted. That means that the 17 bytes of known plaintext start 16 bytes into the stream, not at the beginning as I thought. This just means that after key setup, RC4 has to be cycled 16 times before we start comparing its output with the XOR of the known plaintext and ciphertext. I'll produce a revision of my "challenge". If no other mistakes are found I'll post it to sci.crypt. Hal

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Re: Crisis Overload (re Electronic Racketeering)
by Connie Sadler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Re: Crisis Overload (re Electronic Racketeering) Date: Thu, 13 Jul 1995 12:27:18 PDT A1-type: DOCUMENT Importance: normal >On July 13, 1995, Robert Hayden said: >Unfortunately, a system of social engineering needs to be adopted to get >massive use of cryptography started. This means, and I advocated this >from the day I entered this forum, that programs such as PGP need to be >redesigned so that the a user friendly . . . so user friendly that any >Joe Moron can figure out not only how to use them, but also how it helps >them and how it is "good" for them. This means that we need simplified >key management easy enough for the point-and-click masses to utilize. >... >Unfortuately, all I can do is stand on the sidelines and cheer, because I >am not a programmer; I'm a user and a teacher. Well put! I agree wholeheartedly! I have friends who are mostly teachers and writers who are interested in encryption from what I've told them, but their computer knowledge is pretty much limited to their word processors. A good user interface would do wonders for spreading the use of PGP. Unfortunately I am not a programmer either, but I am being motivated to become one. If only there was more time... Connie

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Re: Anti-Electronic Racketeering Act of 1995 (fwd)
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199507132116.VAA149322(a)smtp-gw01.ny.us.ibm.net>, jfmesq(a)ibm.net (James F. Marshall) wrote: > I haven't read the whole >bill, but I read the "regardless" phrase with a different emphasis. >In short, that language appears to mean that one could be pounded with >RICO for uploading crypto software even if the crypto is EXPORTABLE. The government doesn't want us to use any crypto that takes them an appreciable ammount of time to crack. It seems inevitable to me that such crypto will soon be outlawed. The same goes for anonymous remailers. It is only a matter of (very little) time. Yes, Black Unicorn is right. We need stealth encryption. Unfortunately even that won't help as much as one might think, because it can only be used by tight conspirators who are willing the to take the risk to be locked up in a concentration camp, I mean jail, for the rest of their lives. Crypto for the masses is about to fade away into history, before it ever really caught on. - -- - -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMAWlEyoZzwIn1bdtAQFIYwF+JKboVVw7qm+Ejyj0ecTp1EbqWL2YCAlb tL3RLDWA5VLcKakMh2nI3oZns0SLknGw =+fvE -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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co-sponsors
by perry＠imsi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I searched Thomas and couldn't find any evidence of co-sponsors to the Senate bill. Am I wrong here? .pm

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HR361
by perry＠imsi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone previously noted that HR361, the omnibus export administration act, would require the administration to assess the impact of the current crypto export controls on the software industry? .pm

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def'n of "computer network"
by Jon Lasser 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bet you 10-1 that "Computer Network" as implemented in the new bill will refer to any computing system that could possibly defend /itself/ through common carrier status. IE including small non-networked fringe BBSs that attempt to claim "common carrier" status. And many networks that don't claim common carrier status, too. The real solution to the crypto-legalization problem is anonymity. Seeing as I've not checked the bill out yet, nor am I a lawyer, I can't say what the implications for that are. If there are anti-remailer implications, the solution may be to build tools with "security flaws" (ie remailing capability). I know that this has been discussed before, but this is the time to implement it. Obviously, the information about the "security holes" will have to be spread widely, but the flaws will have to be built so deep in the design as to not be removable. In addition, now is the time to deploy stego, on a massive scale. How many stego programs have been released for Unix? Can these be integrated with mailing programs in the same way that PGP has been? What would be the legal liability of the maintainer of a common-carrier status system that had a guest account which had been (or based on the current legislation) could be used for anonymity/crypto stuff? If he's liable, does this mean that system administrators are liable for any potential security hole in their system that a random evil internet hacker uses to abuse another system? Hmmm... Usenet alt.binaries.pictures.barney + stego software + unmaintained 'guest' account on a random system = ??? Any lawyers? Jon ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Jon Lasser <jlasser(a)rwd.goucher.edu> (410) 494-3253 Visit my home page at http://www.goucher.edu/~jlasser/ You have a friend at the NSA: Big Brother is watching. Finger for PGP key.

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mistake on my part
by aba＠dcs.exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry Metzger <perry(a)imsi.com> writes on cpunks: > I made a small mistake -- the new bill does *not* make it a crime to > make crypto software available at Egghead -- but it does more or > less make distribution of crypto software over the internet > impossible if it isn't an escrow based system. I thought there was some kind of "read my lips" type statement about not mandating key escrow a short while ago. Making it illegal to not use escrow on the internet (in the US and certain materials) sounds dangerously close to mandating key escrow. Also I remember one list member making a prediction, that as they'd said _definately no key escrow_, that you could bet your ass that meant exactly the opposite, and that it would rear it's head anytime soon. I think the poster even had a prediction in terms of months, but don't have the original post handy, looks like he was right. Anyway these things are in stages: 1. voluntary key escrow 2. mandatory key escrow for certain materials 3. mandatory key escrow across the board If they pull this off stage 2, I wonder how long till stage 3, I think it'll be time to leave the sinking ship while exit visas are still granted! Adam -- ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [025/713] ------------------- M83PL=@FR8ES%:6Q"(F9A#)K!&_;X4TXZ?(T]6(]`>$*.^]3K*K["(239)\@F MHA\"<%"5(%N->/2!'>X3XPU<0!Y,F``58RK(F;K#XD2,^`F[L09CT1>MH,7/ MC(a)FR+[`#J_`.6J`QW&"'YPZ4A[,XC10,0(a)\T1R.H\52,%3N1CI\TY('#M1)D ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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