- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: FBI on BBS operator liability (fwd)
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(just utilizing resources is not prosecutable). It's worth mentioning that that's true of Federal law, but isn't necessarily true of state law. For example, California Penal Code section 502 provides for the conviction of anyone who ``knowingly and without permission accesses or causes to be accessed any computer, computer system, or computer network''. Some other states have similar provisions. --Steve Bellovin

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Another application for stego (was POISON PILL)
by remail＠tamsun.tamu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Matthew Gream: > ....if you have something > you _don't_ want found, then simply encrypting it leaving it sitting on > your system is probably not going to work. You may decide not to answer > any questions about it, you may refuse and so on, but they are going to > want the magic little key and keep pressing (maybe while you are under > oath). To prevent any of this occuring, the best approach (in my mind) is > to encrypt it into a form that will never be suspect as anything more than > harmless, trivial, information. Interesting: an application of steganography that is quite useful even where crypto is legal.

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Re: PGP in Fidonet
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I know of no case in which a >sysop has been "arrested" merely because of allowing so-called "illegal >traffic" that he or she didn't know about. Some time back (maybe quite a long time ago, I forget) I heard rumors that a BBS that someone had uploaded child porn or some such to, without the sysop's knowledge, resulted in the sysop's arrest. Was that merely a rumor? Or is that a different category than the mail traffic you're commenting on? Doug

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Re: Single Value Pseudonyms
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Karl Barrus posted this, and I've been meaning to respond to it. > Basically Karl's scheme doesn't work. With any cut-and-choose > protocol, there must be some assurance that the two things offered What? It doesn't work? Care to elaborate? I mean, a person can satisfy to any degree desired that the last unblinded document is of a particular value. I agree that it becomes real expensive to do so, and for digital banking purposes, there are several alternatives: 1) all cash is of same denomination, 2) different exponents for different denominations, 3) different keys for different denominations. I think I mentioned the application towards digital cash is a bit forced because of the above. The real point is in avoiding signing a blinded document that is later unblinded to reveal something undesirable, in which case the signature and the document signed have value. The application of cut-and-choose I described applies best when for some reason (poor choices of the bank?) the document itself contains value, like the denomination it represents. -- Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5 3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 "One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories

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Re: NPR?
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

DON_HENSON(a)delphi.com said: >I'm in favor of getting the word out on the Clipper/Skipjack problem but >I don't think sending a note to NPR is going to do it. They have a long >history of extremely biased (toward the government view) reporting. So phrase it in a slick way that gets past their bias. For instance, lie and say that "other government agencies are concerned that..." Anyone biased towards the govt will be willing to believe that some part of it is a benevolent avuncular sort. It's part of that mind set. Doug

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Re: NPR?
by DON_HENSON＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

cvoid wirtes: --> Has anyone considered forwarding and/or send NPR an information packet to help bring the encryption/clipper issues to the general public, or is that looked upon as a bad idea? <-- I'm in favor of getting the word out on the Clipper/Skipjack problem but I don't think sending a note to NPR is going to do it. They have a long history of extremely biased (toward the government view) reporting. Don Henson PGP key on server or on request

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CuD forward
by fergp＠sytex.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

excerpted from: >Date: Sun, 3 Oct 1993 16:49:01 CDT >From: Cu-Digest <uunet!CMUVM.CSV.CMICH.EDU!tk0jut2%mvs.cso.niu.edu> >Subject: Cu Digest, #5.77 - --- Date: Fri, 1 Oct 93 06:55:38 -0700 From: grady(a)NETCOM.COM(Grady Ward) Subject: File 1--Grady Ward DOES NOT Encourage Illegality Jerry Leichter's <leichter(a)LRW.COM> comments about me in CuD, Volume 5, Issue 76 are flatly wrong. I do not and never have encouraged people to copy or use PGP illegally whatever their jurisdiction. In this country they ought not to "make, use, or sell" RSA without a license from PK Partners of Sunnyvale, CA. Similarly, the IDEA cipher ought not to be used commercially without a specific commercial license from Ascom-Tech AG of Switzerland. If they are non North American nationals then they need to obtain a copy of PGP from one of several foreign sites such as: black.ox.ac.uk (129.67.1.165) ghost.dsi.unimi.it (149.132.2.1) nic.funet.fi (128.214.6.100) Depending, of course, on their local laws. I have been assured by two attorneys that source is NOT an infringing "device" and can be copied or studied as long as its distribution is not simply a ploy to evade patent law. The whole constitutional idea of a patent centers on the wide dissemination of the underlying ideas that can be reduced to practice by a "person of ordinary skill" in the field. Disseminating the ideas underlying a patent is explicitly a patriotic act in the United States. In any event individuals become moral creatures by actively making their own personal choices and not having the ideas that could lead to an informed choice restricted by the State. I support the widespread use of strong crypto in the world for two reasons: It assists physically separate individuals to freely exchange ideas in greater safety from State interference. And it preferentially helps less powerful people since the more powerful dominating group can simply use the raw force of its state apparatus to advance its program. It is an equalizer in the quest for coalition and social justice. Strong crypto creates communities, not conspiracies. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 30 Sep 93 17:49:12 -0600 From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782(a)LONGS.LANCE.COLOSTATE.EDU> Subject: File 2--Response to Jerry Leichter in re Moby Crypto Editor: I strongly object to comments by Jerry Leichter <leichter(a)LRW.COM> on the PGP subpoenas in CuD, Volume 5 : Issue 76. Mr. Leichter appears to be making contradictory points: even though the ITAR may be casting FUD and chilling people's actions based on `poorly drafted regulations whose coverage no one can determine, by threats and insinuations from government spokesmen that some action is illegal', he on the other hand admonishes G. Ward for his actions to date in challenging the law. "Ward is deliberately flaunting it. Stupid, dangerous idea. Being a revolutionary, putting yourself in direct opposition to the power of the state, isn't fun and games. People get hurt that way." Mr. Leichter does not appear to realize that the most egregious laws created tend only to be overturned by the most dramatic challenges. Our own American Revolution is a dramatic instance of this fact. I have praised G. Ward in email previously as a compelling cyberspatial hero for his actions in publicizing over Usenet the NSA and State Department molestations he has been subject to over the past weeks. Very dramatic constitutional issues are at stake. Another major reality lapse in Mr. Leichter's somewhat desultory argument (that appears to have the fundamental message of minimizing the significance of the Zimmermann-Ward affair) is the following. Citizens in a society do not live by the laws -- they live by the *effect* of those laws on their everyday life. Some laws are widely ignored, such as speed limits. Some are revered with the utmost respect, such as the rulings of the Supreme Court and the directives of the President. Even if no case had ever been brought to court on the ITAR, the fundamental issue is that the law has an extraordinary dampening force on certain aspects of current cyberspatial development and enterprise -- in particular, cryptographic technology intrinsic to a wide variety of transforming technologies such as digital cash and signatures -- all critical to future progress. An analogy might be this: even though our judicial system has evolved an elaborate protocol for granting search warrants, that system is meaningless if people voluntarily allow police to search their homes. We do *not* live in a world described by government laws, we live in one that interacts with them in sometimes unpredictable ways. Now, let me abandon these vague platitudes immediately for some cutting specifics relevant to this case. What is the effect on the ITAR on *domestic* cryptographic development? The ITAR supposedly only deals with import and export and in fact that is all the authority granted by its enabling law, the Arms Export Control Act, to cover. But the use of the ITAR in practice by government bureaucrats is apparently to stifle free speech and free press rights of domestic U.S. citizens. This situation is transparently clear from Grady Ward's wretched predicament and other noxious affairs that have escaped the focused attention of many. In particular, I would like to draw attention to an outstanding effort by D. Bernstein to demonstrate the sheer oppressive force of the ITAR as interpreted by the relevant U.S. agencies. In the anonymous FTP file ripem.msu.edu:/pub/crypt/docs/shuffle-export-hassles. is an extraordinary compilation of letters sent between D. Bernstein and the Bureau of Politico-Military affairs regarding the ITAR rules. Mr. Bernstein sought permission to *post* a simple message to the Usenet group sci.crypt describing a cryptographic technique. The sheer obstruction he encountered is absolutely appalling. It approaches the grotesque torture of a totalitarian society in suppressing information. He required the intervention of his California state representative merely to get simple mail responses from the asphyxiating bureaucracy! Moreover, the exchange demonstrates very clearly that the government *applies* the ITAR not as a law regarding import and export of material (as the *law* constrains it) but *in practice* as an instrument to stifle otherwise lawful 1st Amendment scientific publication. From a letter of 14 July 1993 to A. A. Henderson: >Please note that the State Department is engaging in >unconstitutional censorship of material which I privately >developed and which I wish to publish. What you are >witnessing is a battle over the First Amendment. I believe >that the [Office of Defense Trade Controls, Bureau of >Politico-Military Affairs] is acting in violation of the >Bill of Rights. [They] failed to answer this question: >"Does ITAR exert prior restraint on otherwise lawful >publication"? In these paragraphs I seek to emphasize that the debate goes far deeper than the mere obnoxious classification of widespread, public-domain cryptgraphic algorithms and techniques as `munitions'. The debate surrounding the ITAR cuts to the core of many democratic issues. The ITAR is updated with alarming frequency and changed with disturbing ease. Its revision seems to occur in complete defiance of a regular and open legislative process. Even top *experts* on the law cannot keep up with all the modifications. As a frightening example of this, take the case of U.S. vs. Martinez, where Elizabeth Martinez and her fiance were convicted of violating the Arms Export Control Act by exporting `cryptographic hardware' -- a satellite TV video descrambling device, `Videocipher II'. Apparently, by some magic bureaucratic whim, it is now *legal* to export such equipment under the ITAR! I doubt Mrs. Martinez is consoled by this news, after being consumed and rebuffed even on appeal. I consider the ITAR one of the most totalitarian documents our government has ever produced. G. Ward and P. Zimmerman are modern cyberspatial heroes for their bold, direct challenges of it. In classifying `disclosure of information to foreign nationals' as *export* we find the same institutional paranoia and cyberspatial ignorance seen in the Cold-War era Soviet Union in e.g. restricting Xerox machines. The irony is that in both cases, the paranoia is entirely justified, even necessary, within the context of preserving the illegitimate status quo. This oppression forms the basic foundation of support for the two most totalitarian systems of the 20th century -- one defunct, the other with the initials N.S.A. ------------------------------ Paul Ferguson | privacy \'pri-va-see\ n, pl, -cies; Mindbank Consulting Group | 1: the quality or state of being apart Fairfax, Virginia USA | from others 2: secrecy fergp(a)sytex.com | ferguson(a)icp.net | Privacy -- Use it or lose it.

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How do I subscribe to the cypherpunks list, or join the group?
by christophe m johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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a2 test
by a2＠ah.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This message is steganographically encrypted to look like a test. -a2

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Austin Cypherpunks organizational meeting
by mccoy＠binky.cc.utexas.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Digital Freedom: By any means necessary. Austin Cypherpunks Meeting October 9, 1993 1:00 pm Taylor Hall 2.006 -- UT Campus (24th and Speedway) The Austin Cypherpunks chapter will be holding its first local meeting on Saturday the 9th of October at 1:00 pm in room 2.006 of Taylor Hall (UT Campus). This will be an organizational meeting for the local chapter and will give you an opportunity to meet other cypherpunks from the Austin area. For the first time, information technology is giving people the opportunity for more privacy instead of less. For instance, we will have digital money soon; will it be used to track you every time you spend, or will it give you more security and convenience than a credit card with the anonymity of cash? Both are possible outcomes, but you will only keep your privacy if people get together and take action. Please join us, either in person or through our mailing lists, and help work towards a future where your privacy is guaranteed, not just legally, but by the best encryption and authentication tools available. Some of the items on the agenda for this first meeting include: -Education Hands-on demonstration of encryption tools and anonymous remailers; we will be distributing PGP (bring your disks!) and handing out information about the infamous "Clipper Chip". We should also have the latest information on the subpoenas served on various distributors of cryptographic software. -Political action Strong tools for privacy are perceived by most governments as a threat; cypherpunks have joined the fight against government attempts to restrict or ban encrypted communications, as well as the now-useless export ban on effective cryptographic software. -Public Key Exchange. Swap public keys with other members. We will have Macs and PCs on hand for you to sign and exchange public keys with other cypherpunks members. -Digital Credit Union Project Local cypherpunks are already working on forming a new credit union which will provide secure banking and commerce across the net using strong cryptography. [Location Instructions: Go to Taylor Hall on the UT campus. This building is at 24th and Speedway. The directions to room 2.006 are a little complicated for words, but a map will be posted on all of the doors to Taylor hall.] To subscribe to our full mailing list, send mail to: austin-cypherpunks-request(a)bongo.cc.utexas.edu To subscribe to our announcement-only mailing list, send mail to: austin-cypherpunks-announce-request(a)bongo.cc.utexas.edu Put the word 'subscribe' in the subject of your mail. Our file archives are available in /pub/cypherpunks via anonymous ftp at: ftp.cc.utexas.edu The Austin Cypherpunks chapter will continue to meet on the second saturday of each month in conjunction with local cypherpunk chapters across the country. The location of future meetings will be announced on local newsgroups and the local cypherpunks mailing list. Cypherpunks: There is safety in numbers... large primes. Local contacts for your questions...: Jim McCoy <mccoy(a)bongo.cc.utexas.edu> Doug Barnes <barnes(a)io.com>

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