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TCMay on KFJC Tonight at 6
by weaver＠avtc.sel.sony.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tonight on a Very Special "Thoughtline" I'll have Tim May, discussing coming social changes due to crypto-technology, including things such as anonymity, e-cash and dreaded national ID cards. 6 PM on 89.7 in the Bay basin, or check your cable listings.

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TCMay on KFJC Tonight at 6
by weaver＠avtc.sel.sony.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tonight on a Very Special "Thoughtline" I'll have Tim May, discussing coming social changes due to crypto-technology, including things such as anonymity, e-cash and dreaded national ID cards. 6 PM on 89.7 in the Bay basin, or check your cable listings. And no jokes about my air name, please. Gotta have it; union rules.

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Re: PGP bug *NOT* yet fixed
by Ben.Goren＠asu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:58 PM 7/17/94, Jeffrey I. Schiller wrote: >Chill out friend. We are working on a bugfix release to PGP which will >fix several important bugs. The bug you mention is fixed in our >development sources and will be fixed in the next release. Read Colin's >note carefully. If you do you will realize that this problem is not >a disaster [. . . .] It might not be a disaster, but if it was bad enough for Colin to write that message--it couldn't have been comfortable to admit to such a mistake--it seems more than worthwhile to fix it at the same time, especially considering that the fix could be as simple as putting his message in the release directory. I certainly thank Colin for having the courage to publicly announce the mistake; my complaint is that there wasn't any follow-through. The point is that this is damaging to PGP's reputation--it makes the programmers look amateurish. You might be amatuers, but you sure haven't acted like it until this. Any security-related bug serious enough to announce is serious enough to fix immediately; otherwise, we should take "Pretty Good" much more literally than most of us do now. Heck, it would have taken a fraction of the time to fix the code than it must have for Colin to write the letter. b& -- Ben.Goren(a)asu.edu, Arizona State University School of Music net.proselytizing (write for info): Protect your privacy; oppose Clipper. Voice concern over proposed Internet pricing schemes. Stamp out spamming. Finger ben(a)tux.music.asu.edu for PGP 2.3a public key.

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Re: PROTOCOLS: Re: Hashed Hash
by Ben.Goren＠asu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:54 PM 7/17/94, wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510 wrote: >> I'm planning on implementing the "cryptographic protection of databases" >> on page 61 of Schneier, to create a directory of a professional >> organization that would be useless to telemarketers. >> [hash last name to get DES key and location of encrypted data in list.] Not quite; the last name would at least be the foundation of the key--otherwise, just use the first field to decrypt the second. Location is either 132 or 160 bytes from the start of the hash; all else is obscurity that wouldn't be all that effective. Remeber, anybody can do individual lookups, or else I'd just use some secure method to get it into people's hands. If you can do individual lookups, you can do a lot (all) of them; the best I can hope for is to slow that down, preferably in a cryptographically secure way. >> [ problems of brute-force and popular-last-names attacks ] > >If you're only concerned about telemarketers, this amount of obscurity >may be enough - anybody competent enough to hash a list of, say, >10000 last names x 1000 first names into your database is at >least an *interesting* telemarketer :-) All it takes is some ambitious employee with connections to somebody with a medium-sized workstation with a fair amount of idle time, like overnight. A cheapie Alpha would do very nicely. Let it work--at no cost other than initial setup and electricity--for a month or three, and you've got an awful lot of names, even if you don't have the whole database. There's not much obscurity here. Just write a minimal wrapper to the existing (supplied) decryption code, unless my "security" relies on non-cryptographic stalling, like counting to a million before doing anything. I sure don't want to rely on that. And a company such as Microsoft wouldn't even notice the effort. Think about it: a database of musicians (the group I'm doing this for is the Phi Mu Alpha Sinfonia, the men's professional fraternity in music) known to be technically inclined--after all, their database is cryptographically protected. Who better to target for their musical instrument CD? >If you're concerned about telemarkers from the NSA/FBI/KGB, >then the algorithm isn't enough anyway [. . .] If any TLA wants the unencrypted database, they can have it from me for the price of a warrant--and that's just to be sure that they're not imposters. Our membership rolls are alerady public. >An intermediate variant is to use a password as part of the hash; >if everybody has their own password, the table size is N**2, or you can >give everyone the same password without increasing the table size, >and still be able to distribute the list on FTP. >[. . .] Nice idea. If there is demand for a program such as this after I've written the basic version for Sinfonia, I'll code that, as well. >On the question of whether there are functions I(m) = H(H(m)) for popular >hashes, by definition there are, since H(H(m)) is one. Well, by that definition, DES is a group.... >For most of >the cryptographically useful functions, though, there aren't any that >are faster than running the hash function twice. Some exceptions are >hashes like a**x mod p, x**a mod p, and obviously (a*x+c) mod p. >But DES is known not to be a group, and MD5 is ugly enough it probably >isn't group-like either. Any chance you (or anybody else) can point me in the direction of sources that would state this definitively? I'd much rather do multiple hashes than use some sort of kludge with multiple DES encryptions, but I won't unless I can find something in the literature. "A job worth doing...." > Bill Thanks for your help. b& -- Ben.Goren(a)asu.edu, Arizona State University School of Music net.proselytizing (write for info): Protect your privacy; oppose Clipper. Voice concern over proposed Internet pricing schemes. Stamp out spamming. Finger ben(a)tux.music.asu.edu for PGP 2.3a public key.

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JUST GO AWAY Sue D nym!
by kelly＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey detweiler... I am not as gentle as perry is... just go away... you DONT have any votes here... p.s. I WIll be notifying netcom management again of your activities...

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Big Brother comes to Campus
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I wanted to forward this to everyone to show ya what the school is trying to spring on us over the summer when nobody is around. --------------------------- Acting for: XXXXX XXXXX Mankato State's new ID card is fast becoming a reality. We are calling the new ID the MavCard and have begun taking pictures of the summer orientation students. Attached is a brief summary of the features of the MavCard we have given to parents and students who were here for orientation. Soon we will be taking pictures of other students, faculty and staff. I will inform you of the time and location. If you have any questions or concerns about Mankato State's MavCard, please let me know. Mankato State University MavCard As part of our mission to improve campus services, Mankato State University is introducing the new MavCard, a more efficient identification card (ID) that can also act like cash to pay for many on-campus services. The MavCard is more efficient because it will become the only ID card you need for access to university facilities, services and events including the Memorial Library, athletic and student activities. The MavCard will also eliminate the hassle of carrying cash. It can be used like cash for library charges, vending machine products, photocopying, laundry services and more! Mankato State University's goal is to provide one convenient card that does it all! It all begins with your new MavCard for the 1994-95 academic year. Where to Get Your MavCard The Office of Business Affairs will start processing MavCards during Freshman Orientation, the first two weeks of Fall Quarter, and until the entire campus community has been issued new ID cards. Hours and convenient processing locations will be posted at the Office of Business Affairs, Administration Building. It's Quick and Easy Getting a MavCard is quick and easy. A new photo imaging process will use a video camera and computer to create and store all of your card information in seconds. Your picture, along with all other card information, will be directly transferred to one durable plastic card (the same size as a credit card). One process, one card does it all! The First Phase Beginning Fall Quarter 1994, you will be able to use your MavCard in the Memorial Library, food and vending machines, laundry machines, photocopying services, the University Bookstore and Residence Hall meal plans. How the MavCard Works The MavCard will carry three primary information identifiers, along with your name and picture. The first identifier is your library and Residence Hall meal plan Barcode on the front of the card. The second identifier is a small black magnetic Cash Stripe on the back of the card. This Cash Stripe will retain information on the amount of funds you apply to the card through one of the many CASH-TO-CARD or $10, or $20 on your Cash Stripe, you will activate your the card through one of the many CASH-TO-CARD or ACCOUNT-TO-CARD machines on campus. By placing $1, $5, $10, or $20 on your Cash Stripe, you will activate your new MavCard. For safety purposes, there will be a $20 limit on the funds that can be placed on the Cash Stripe at any time. Once your Cash Stripe is activated, you can use your MavCard like cash to pay for campus services such as photocopying, vending and laundry. The third identifier is a large magnetic Bank Stripe on the back of the card, similar to the bank stripe on a credit card. The Bank Stripe is like an electronic check! Once money is deposited to your MavCard account, the card can be used instead of a check to purchase goods and services. The amount of the purchase is deducted directly from your on-line bank account so there is no possibility of overdrawing your account. This Bank Stripe is also used to obtain cash from the automatic teller machines which will be available on campus. A Personal Identification Number (PIN) is used with this stripe so that your account is protected in the event the card is lost or stolen. The Bank Stripe will save you time, reduce the need to carry cash, and help eliminate the hassle of writing checks. Calling Card Option The MavCard can be used as a personal long distance calling card. Information on this feature will be available from MCI during Welcome Week. Future Phases In the future the MavCard will expand to include building access, voting, campus food services and direct deposit of financial aid, refunds and student payroll. Questions & Answers Will I have to get a MavCard or can I just use my old ID? Your old ID will still be valid when classes start in the Fall of 1994 and until all students can get their new ID. The process to get your new MavCard is quick and easy. What will the benefits of using the MavCard really be to non-campus residents? The MavCard will do much more than just consolidate your ID with meal plan information. Even if you do not those offered through the library, vending machines, your ID with meal plan information. Even if you do not use a meal plan on campus, other services including those offered through the library, vending machines, photocopiers, food services...will be easier to use than ever before. What if I lose my MavCard? Contact the Office of Business Affairs at XXX-XXXX. Since your information, including your photo, is stored in the computer, replacement cards can be processed immediately. Who do I contact with any questions about the MavCard? The Office of Business Affairs at XXX-XXXX, with any questions or suggestions on how to make the MavCard work... and save...for you! ===================================================== Basically, they can now track you whenover you enter a building, get financial aid, or even purchase a soda or make a photocopy. I feel used. -- ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)vorlon.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> I do not necessarily speak for the \/ Finger for PGP Public Key <=> City of Mankato or anyone else, dammit -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 2.1) GJ/CM d- H-- s-:++>s-:+ g+ p? au+ a- w++ v* C++(++++) UL++++$ P+>++ L++$ 3- E---- N+++ K+++ W M+ V-- -po+(---)>$ Y++ t+ 5+++ j R+++$ G- tv+ b+ D+ B--- e+>++(*) u** h* f r-->+++ !n y++**

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Re: Why triple encryption instead of split+encrypt?
by John Douceur 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >From: <solman(a)MIT.EDU> >Date: Monday, July 18, 1994 4:18PM >Clearly, if you have access to P0, P1; C0 and C1 this attack crushes the >algorithm. In most books I've seen, it is assumed that you do not have >access to this. The assumptions about the information available to the cryptanalyst vary with the type of attack. The essence of a known-plaintext attack is that both plaintext and cyphertext of several messages are known, and the task is to deduce the key. This is more practical than it may sound, since there may be (for example) header information that has small or no variability among messages. >Nonetheless, your cryptanalytic algorithm makes clear an additional >constraints that must be placed on the system which I had not realized: >From the algorithm, the plaintext, and the cypher text, in must not be >possible to reconstruct both the plaintext, and the cyphertext for either >half of the message. >To that end I would suggest the improvement of making the splitting >operation dependent on the keys. For that matter, one could have a third key which is used by the splitting algorithm. If one chooses to make this splitting key a function of the two DES keys, then this approach reduces to your suggestion, at the expense of a smaller keyspace. It could be said that, in the code fragment of my previous message, the splitting key is fixed at 0x55555555. So now the meet-in-the-middle attack regains its earlier applicability: A known-plaintext attack would encrypt P with the splitter, decrypt C0 with DES, and attempt to meet in the middle to discover key K0; similarly, decrypting with C1 to get K1. If you can design a splitter that is as cryptographically secure as DES (good luck), then the resulting algorithm is as secure as double DES. Actually, the computational complexity of a cryptanalysis would be somewhere between one and two times that of double DES, since it requires one encryption analysis and two decryption analyses. In your previous message, you commented: >I have a hunch that if I'm wrong, its because the time required to do secure >non-redundant secret splitting is as large as the time I'm saving. If your secret-splitting algorithm is as secure as DES, then it probably runs as slowly as DES does, making your hunch correct. However, even if this were not the case, the security of this scheme is significantly less than that of triple DES. JD -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLisjcEGHwsdH+oN9AQHwDgQAualDZ4kcq15Cs/oIufau4f23x11gVmEY nAkWt7teczUa+ZUHIRrsY1x3D6FDgzQLdBeajMpz3W8XHzO9HjAykbx3Rg8eTeQf ZjGtysnNhSqJwtQLypGhZV+kSv8n4UY5lYkhGHVhTbnn/2ynyjKmqZMkmoN66Klt GcbayT4Jhzw= =qfay -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Card Playing Protocol?
by kentborg＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>There's no need for a central server per game I am presuming this is true--I am just trying to phrase things carefully. I don't yet understand all I need to know (I think I need to read crypto someone said). I like distributed stuff...I am just too ignorant to know how purely it can be adhered to. -kb, the Kent who is trying not to get too far ahead of himself -- Kent Borg +1 (617) 776-6899 kentborg(a)world.std.com kentborg(a)aol.com Proud to claim 35:30 hours of TV viewing so far in 1994!

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Re: Card Playing Protocol
by kentborg＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>No. Schneier is a start, but the source papers... So I should wonder about how to find the sources mentioned in his bibliography? Yup. I haven't gotten that far yet. -kb, the Kent who is only human -- Kent Borg +1 (617) 776-6899 kentborg(a)world.std.com kentborg(a)aol.com Proud to claim 35:30 hours of TV viewing so far in 1994!

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Federal Control of Financial Transactions
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As regular readers will be aware, Tim May and I have been sparring with each other about the risks of various control strategies that the world's governments may deploy. I thought it might be helpful to make one of his fears concrete so that we can analyze it. I trust that I am not putting words in Tim's mouth. The major concern is the same one mentioned in the Book of Revelations: "REV 13:16 And he causeth all, both small and great, rich and poor, free and bond, to receive a mark in their right hand, or in their foreheads: REV 13:17 And that no man might buy or sell, save he that had the mark, or the name of the beast, or the number of his name." So the Feds deploy a card (smart or dumb) that has to be used for most transactions and lets them track everything we do. Tourists are brought into the system through the use of temporary cards (or the machine-readable strip on their passports which already includes a space for a national ID number.) How is this most likely to come about? I consider force majeure to be unlikely. It would be rough to get Congress to impose a burden like this on businesses (who would have to completely wire themselves) in a formal vote. It is not necessary to do this in any case since they know they can't snag everyone into the system. They just want to capture most of the transaction data. If they can do it administratively without involving Congress in controversy, they will use that approach. Clipper and the Post Office agitprop on the US Card give us a possible scenario. The P.O., desperate to find a reason to exist as its core business drains away to the wires and private carriers, would like to become the primary digital signature authorizers for the U.S. It claims to be able to put millions of "US Cards" in the hands of happy shoppers within months of the go-ahead. (Assuming they use FedEx for the actual *shipments* of course). The recently attempted "Clipper maneuver" of game strategy (government preemption by standard setting rather than by direct application of force) shows us how the US Card system might be actually deployed. The government adopts the standard it likes and tries to make it the de facto standard by requiring it for most official business. An instant market is thereby created. No congressional action required. Similarly, the government might try to preempt the market for digital signature and commercial encryption technology by deciding to make anyone who wants to use a digital signature system in dealings with the government use the Post Office or some such agency as the signature authenticator. Thus bids, purchasing, benefits, and taxes could all require your "US Card" registered at your local post office. The government would then hope that commercial users who would need to use the government's system for tax filings anyway would also use it for its ordinary dealings with the public. Then if a health care bill drafting you into a "universal coverage" army is ever passed, the "US Card" also becomes the Health Security Card you will have to show to get a job in the US. Thus, all sorts of authentication transactions would pass through the powerful and efficient post office data network and the ex-countercultural/born-again control freaks Inside the Beltway could get their jollies tracking your employment and purchases. What's the big hole in this frightening scenario? Ask yourself one question. Why is the Post Office looking around for some useful work these days? Didn't they have a monopoly guaranteed by the Federal Government for more than 100 years? If they couldn't make a go of it with a pure coercive monopoly during a time of slower commercial activity, what makes them think that they can compete *without* a genuine coercive monopoly in a time of constant change. Governments have proved over and over again that they can go broke running "guaranteed" money spinners like state lotteries and such. They don't stand a chance in a marketplace that will break the hearts of the brightest people this planet has ever produced. What has recent history established? Governments are weaker. Why didn't the Amin mandate Clipper? No political ability to do so. Why are banks and telecoms being deregulated in nearly every country on earth (in spite of propaganda about "risks" and "public needs"? Why have exchange controls (a common feature of life a generation ago) become impossible almost everywhere on earth? Is it "free market ideology" that has triumphed or did the *reality* of markets rather than the *idea* of markets hit governments on the head. To those who romanticize the power of the State in the modern world I ask, why doesn't Clinton impose wage and price controls, exchange controls, tariffs, and a full-blown industrial policy? Why doesn't he nationalize the steel industry, guarantee jobs for all, confiscate all estates above $100,000, impose 95% income taxes on those making more than $40,000/year, and all of the other proposals that were popular earlier in this century? I doubt that he is restrained because of his deep commitment to human liberty. He doesn't do it because he can't. Markets wouldn't put up with it. His government would be destroyed (by capital flight.) In this connection, I invite everyone to read the excellent profile of Japan in last week's Economist. It discusses the current and growing Japanese commitment to deregulation and what is driving it. That issue is a keeper anyway because of an article on commerce on the Internet and (as has been mentioned before) the use of the word "anarcho-capitalism" in an article comparing Thailand and Singapore. Assuming that the government were to attempt to establish a Post Office mediated digital authentication system, there is no guarantee that it would work. Foreign users would presumably use foreign systems to authenticate their transactions. Some of these systems might be run by privatized foreign PTTs or by others. Note that since banks and credit agencies will still have to approve the transactions anyway (to make sure you've got the dough), they may decide to use other systems for signature authentication. It would not really cost them any more. Since information is cheap, setting up a system to use several authentication systems is almost as easy as setting up a system to use one. (Particularly since you have to do it anyway.) It is difficult to imagine the P.O. being able to compete in the cutthroat world of credit processing. Recall that even today, there are companies that pick up and deliver your mail to the P.O. to speed the process along. Similarly, expediters may interpose themselves between the customer and the P.O. to speed authentication in the even that the P.O. network is slow or inefficient (likely). Here again, Clipper gives us some hints as to how the attempted market cornering might work out in practice: The Admin is currently floating stories about perhaps withdrawing Clipper in favor of "wider discussions" with the industry. Clipper is already painfully obsolete and it isn't even shipping in quantity. Inefficient government monopolies create marvelous profit opportunities for markets to arbitrage the gap between cost and price. In a highly efficient networked world, it will be very difficult for governments to compete. DCF Why Pizza Hut should hire *me* as their spokesman: "Why does Pizza Hut oppose mandatory, employer-paid health insurance in the US even though we are forced to pay it in Japan and Germany? We support the principle of cultural diversity under which different societies experiment with different methods of social organization. Germany and Japan have chosen one road, we have chosen another. Pizza Hut would not voluntarily impose on our US customers the burden of the very high food costs that the agricultural policies of Germany and Japan impose on their citizens. Similarly, we would not choose to impose on our US employees the burden of bureaucratically designed employment contracts. Pizza Hut supports the right of our customers to enjoy the least expensive and best pizza on earth and the right of our employees to bargain with us collectively and individually concerning the conditions of their employment."

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