- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Detweiler clone at WSJ
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The drumbeat against all those anonymous pedophiles continues.... _Wall Street Journal_, 6/30/94 PERSONAL TECHNOLOGY by Walter S. Mossberg "Keeping Your Kids Away From Creeps As They Play Online" (...Talk about striking up electronic friendships online ...) But there's a dark side to this exciting phenomenon, one that's too rarely understood by computer novices. Because they offer instant access to others, and considerable anonymity to participants, the services make it possible for people - especially computer-literate kids - to find themselves in unpleasant, sexually explicit social situations (Sex-ed sessions led by Joycelyn Elders?) The online services all have rules banning bad conduct and, fearing possible government-imposed restrictions, have stepped up the policing of online abuse. But parents could do more to protect kids from these disturbing situations. And I've gradually come to adopt the view, which will be controversial among many online users (!), that the use of nicknames and other forms of anonymity must be eliminated or severly curbed to force people online into at least as much accountability for their words and actions as exists in real social encounters. (.. More talk about how your kid might [gasp!] download a "hardcore pornographic photo" [This guy should see the stuff on the newstands in Amsterdam!]...) Beyond that, I think it's time now for the services to jettison the long tradition of allowing members to hide behind "handles" or nicknames. In general people should conduct themselves online under their real names, or not at all. IN THE SAME VEIN, I THINK THE SERVICES SHOULD DELAY GRANTING NEW MEMBERS ACCESS FOR 24 OR 48 HOURS ...WHILE THEY VERIFY THAT THE APPLICANTS ARE REALLY WHO THEY SAY THEY ARE ... (emphasis mine). (And some folks thought that Brady-style fascism would only be applied to "gun-nuts"! Won't be long before you have to have a license to drive on the information superhighway.) (Article continues with more of same. Lambasts AOL. Talks about "the most dangerous forms of communication," etc.) ------------------------------------------------------------------- I didn't comment on NSA threatening Bidzos because dog bites man is not news. If you annoy the Nazis in power and they can get away with it they will kill you. BTW: The current _New Republic_ contains a story about an Oxford student being threatened by the Secret Service over a much more trivial matter.

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Re: Question: Key Distr. in realtimeo applications?
by kentborg＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

adam(a)bwh.harvard.edu writes: >Sending your otp by RSA reduces the security of your OTP to that of RSA Who said anything about sending a one time pad under RSA? I was talking about a session key. Sorry not to use the buzz word "session key", but neither did I use the buzz word "otp", I just said "random"... -kb -- Kent Borg +1 (617) 776-6899 kentborg(a)world.std.com kentborg(a)aol.com Proud to claim 31:15 hours of TV viewing so far in 1994!

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(FWD) WHAT MOTIVATES CRYP
by bmorris＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com JJ> anathema to the libertarian and I'm curious to know if there JJ> are other crypto users (I would NEVER call myself a cypherpunk JJ> :-) who's interest stems from a left-wing rather than JJ> right-wing viewpoint. I'm a leftie and was also a bit bemused by the idea of using crypto to avoid paying taxes. Hopefully we can find a bit more exalted use of crypto than that. However, I assume all here are agreed that strong private crypto is a good thing. "Politics makes strange bedfellows", indeed. This wouldn't be the first time that those on the fringes of the left and the right saw a common enemy - encroaching government with control in their hearts. * RM 1.4 B0037 *

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Re: Detweiler clone at WS
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

R.>The down side was that licensing was mentioned as the first recourse R.>from the state. When we complained of the financial hit, the talk R.>turned to registration. But the sense was clearly toward proactive R.>state control. Are these people mentally retarded or what. A BBS is a publication. The 1st Amendment was specifically written to outlaw the British licensing of publications. No risk. DCF --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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The 800 number requested
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The outfit was called "Full Disclosure" and was at 800 235 1414. I haven't tried it for a long time so, no guarantee its still active.

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(Fwd) What motivates Cryp
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

J >I got PGP running on my machine a few weeks ago because I liked J >the idea of being able to communicate privately if I wanted, The major motivation. Crypto gives you the power to carve out a "zone of privacy" at will and say to the whole world, "This part of my life is mine alone." J >It may seem that I am being particularly naive in being J >surprised by this but I am from the UK where libertarian views J >of this kind are not so widely held. Though they *were* largely invented there... J >Similarly my motivations for J >using cryptography come simply from a desire for privacy from J >Govt. and other snooping but NOT from the 'cyber-survivalist' J >inclinations that seem to motivate some in the US at least. Distinguish "desire for privacy from Govt." and "'cyber-survivalist' inclinations" -- seems like the identical motive. It *is* government that digital volunteerists (a friendlier term) seek privacy from. J >I read some stuff on Vince Cate's WWW site by Tim May about how J >crypto was going to bring down governments due to (legal?) tax J >evasion by those who are computer literate . I have to say that J >I think this is highly unlikely I think Tim uses the term "collapse of governments." Most of us are just making predictions about the sort of institutional changes that will occur as people discover that they have more choices. Since controlling people by threatening to kill them if they disobey (the Political Means) only works if you can carry out your threat, if people can erect "unbreakable" barriers against States, their power is reduced. One doesn't have to overthrow them. They are overthrown by a change in their tactical capabilities. J >general herald an age of 'survival of the fittest' where those J >clued up about computers will be able to take advantage and do J >better due to paying less taxes etc. J >Personally I have no desire to evade tax since I quite like J >being able to drive on tarmac without holes, and having J >schooling and health care provided for all with the richer J >folk subsidising the poorer folk. And here I thought "lefties" were opposed to coercive monopolies. J >I'd never come across a right-wing anarchist before reading the J >crypto groups - weird! We're everywhere! DCF "Libertarian anarchist since Steve B. gave him a copy of Lysander Spooner's 'No Treason -- the Constitution of No Authority' in 1970." --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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(FWD) WHAT MOTIVATES FORWARDERS?
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Actually, no, it's not really a forward of anything at all. It's just that this forwarding business is *really* getting out of hand. For Christ's sake guys, if *you* can read stuff on other groups, credit us with the intelligence of being able to find it too. If this keeps up we'll have the who 20Mb/day of usenet funnelling through cypherpunks. How about in future just saying "Hey, anyone who doesn't know about talk.politics.crypto, go have a look at it on usenet. By the way there's an interesting thread going on just now about blah blah blah."? G

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someone clue me in about USACM..
by sommerfeld＠orchard.medford.ma.us 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone explain to me the difference, if any, between the "USACM" and the panel of luminaries who put out the "Codes, Keys, and Conflicts" paper? The paper was downright bland in tone, while the one-page USACM position in the press release is clearly hostile towards the EES. Who is the USACM? How big is it, who can join, and who has? - Bill

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What was the House Rules Committee vote?
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The House Rules Committee was supposed to vote on the General Export Administration Act HR 3937 yesterday. Anybody know the result of the vote? Did they mark the bill "open"? Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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USACM Calls for Clipper Withdrawal (fwd)
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 30 Jun 1994 16:35:37 +0000 From: "US ACM, DC Office" <usacm_dc(a)acm.org> To: "usacm_dc(a)acm.org" <distribution.list(a)acm.org> Subject: USACM Calls for Clipper Withdrawal U S A C M Association for Computing Machinery, U.S. Public Policy Committee * PRESS RELEASE * Thursday, June 30, 1994 Contact: Barbara Simons (408) 463-5661, simons(a)acm.org (e-mail) Jim Horning (415) 853-2216, horning(a)src.dec.com (e-mail) Rob Kling (714) 856-5955, kling(a)ics.uci.edu (e-mail) COMPUTER POLICY COMMITTEE CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF CLIPPER COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY "TOO IMPORTANT" FOR SECRET DECISION-MAKING WASHINGTON, DC The public policy arm of the oldest and largest international computing society today urged the White House to withdraw the controversial "Clipper Chip" encryption proposal. Noting that the "security and privacy of electronic communications are vital to the development of national and international information infrastructures," the Association for Computing Machinery's U.S. Public Policy Committee (USACM) added its voice to the growing debate over encryption and privacy policy. In a position statement released at a press conference on Capitol Hill, the USACM said that "communications security is too important to be left to secret processes and classified algorithms." The Clipper technology was developed by the National Security Agency, which classified the cryptographic algorithm that underlies the encryption device. The USACM believes that Clipper "will put U.S. manufacturers at a disadvantage in the global market and will adversely affect technological development within the United States." The technology has been championed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the NSA, which claim that "non-escrowed" encryption technology threatens law enforcement and national security. "As a body concerned with the development of government technology policy, USACM is troubled by the process that gave rise to the Clipper initiative," said Dr. Barbara Simons, a computer scientist with IBM who chairs the USACM. "It is vitally important that privacy protections for our communications networks be developed openly and with full public participation." The USACM position statement was issued after completion of a comprehensive study of cryptography policy sponsored by the ACM (see companion release). The study, "Codes, Keys and Conflicts: Issues in U.S Crypto Policy," was prepared by a panel of experts representing various constituencies involved in the debate over encryption. The ACM, founded in 1947, is a 85,000 member non-profit educational and scientific society dedicated to the development and use of information technology, and to addressing the impact of that technology on the world's major social challenges. USACM was created by ACM to provide a means for presenting and discussing technological issues to and with U.S. policymakers and the general public. For further information on USACM, please call (202) 298- 0842. ============================================================= USACM Position on the Escrowed Encryption Standard The ACM study "Codes, Keys and Conflicts: Issues in U.S Crypto Policy" sets forth the complex technical and social issues underlying the current debate over widespread use of encryption. The importance of encryption, and the need for appropriate policies, will increase as networked communication grows. Security and privacy of electronic communications are vital to the development of national and international information infrastructures. The Clipper Chip, or "Escrowed Encryption Standard" (EES) Initiative, raises fundamental policy issues that must be fully addressed and publicly debated. After reviewing the ACM study, which provides a balanced discussion of the issues, the U.S. Public Policy Committee of ACM (USACM) makes the following recommendations. 1. The USACM supports the development of public policies and technical standards for communications security in open forums in which all stakeholders -- government, industry, and the public -- participate. Because we are moving rapidly to open networks, a prerequisite for the success of those networks must be standards for which there is widespread consensus, including international acceptance. The USACM believes that communications security is too important to be left to secret processes and classified algorithms. We support the principles underlying the Computer Security Act of 1987, in which Congress expressed its preference for the development of open and unclassified security standards. 2. The USACM recommends that any encryption standard adopted by the U.S. government not place U.S. manufacturers at a disadvantage in the global market or adversely affect technological development within the United States. Few other nations are likely to adopt a standard that includes a classified algorithm and keys escrowed with the U.S. government. 3. The USACM supports changes in the process of developing Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) employed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. This process is currently predicated on the use of such standards solely to support Federal procurement. Increasingly, the standards set through the FIPS process directly affect non-federal organizations and the public at large. In the case of the EES, the vast majority of comments solicited by NIST opposed the standard, but were openly ignored. The USACM recommends that the standards process be placed under the Administrative Procedures Act so that citizens may have the same opportunity to challenge government actions in the area of information processing standards as they do in other important aspects of Federal agency policy making. 4. The USACM urges the Administration at this point to withdraw the Clipper Chip proposal and to begin an open and public review of encryption policy. The escrowed encryption initiative raises vital issues of privacy, law enforcement, competitiveness and scientific innovation that must be openly discussed. 5. The USACM reaffirms its support for privacy protection and urges the administration to encourage the development of technologies and institutional practices that will provide real privacy for future users of the National Information Infrastructure.

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