- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

INFO: Photos, testimony, and audio transcripts of 6/26 crypto hearing, get it now!
by Voters Telecommunications Watch 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

============================================================================= ____ _ _ _ / ___|_ __ _ _ _ __ | |_ ___ | \ | | _____ _____ | | | '__| | | | '_ \| __/ _ \ _____| \| |/ _ \ \ /\ / / __| | |___| | | |_| | |_) | || (_) |_____| |\ | __/\ V V /\__ \ \____|_| \__, | .__/ \__\___/ |_| \_|\___| \_/\_/ |___/ |___/|_| MISSED THE CRYPTO HEARINGS? HEAR THE TRANSCRIPT WITH REALAUDIO, READ THE TESTIMONY WITH ANY BROWSER, VIEW THE FUZZY PHOTOS Date: June 28, 1996 URL:http://www.crypto.com/ crypto-news(a)panix.com If you redistribute this, please do so in its entirety, with the banner intact. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of Contents News Security And Freedom through Encryption forum: July 1, 1996 (that's MONDAY!) How to receive crypto-news Press contacts ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- NEWS The second hearing on the Burns/Leahy Pro-CODE bill (S.1726) brought down the house in the Senate this past Wednesday. With a number of firsts (first cyber-simulcast of a Senate hearing, first time testimony was submitted purely through a WWW page) this is a monumental event. But wait! If you missed this standing room only event, you can still attend virtually by visiting the hearing wrapup page at http://www.crypto.com/ There you will find the two hour RealAudio transcripts of the audio portion of the day, links to online copies of many witnesses written testimony, and some photos taken at the hearing. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ATTEND THE SAFE FORUM - JULY 1, 1996 STANFORD CALIFORNIA On July 1, 1996, in the heart of California's Silicon Valley at Stanford University, members of Congress, prominent computer industry leaders and privacy advocates will meet to discuss the need to reform U.S. encryption policy. The event is FREE and open to the public, but space is limited and is going fast. To find out more, and to reserve your free ticket, visit the SAFE Forum Web Page at: http://www.crypto.com/safe CONFIRMED SPEAKERS INCLUDE: Among other prominent industry leaders, cryptographers, privacy advocates and members of Congress, confirmed speakers include" Industry Leaders and Cryptographers Members of Congress * Marc Andreeson, Netscape * Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA) * Jim Bidzos, RSA * Rep. Tom Campbell (R-CA) * Eric Schmidt, Sun Microsystems * Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) * Brad Silverberg, Microsoft * Sen. Conrad Burns (R-MT) * Phil Zimmermann, PGP Inc * Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) * Matt Blaze, AT&T * Sen. Larry Pressler (R-SD) * Bruce Schneier, Counterpane Systems Privacy Advocates and Legal Experts: * Michael Froomkin, U. of Miami Law School * Jerry Berman, Center for Democracy and Technology * Grover Norquist, Americans for Tax Reform (invited) * Ken Dam, U. of Chicago Law School (invited) This event will be "cybercast", with full audio and still video clips, live online with the help of MediaCast. Details on the cybercast are available at http://www.crypto.com/safe/ SAFE FORUM SPONSORS This important discussion on the need for an alterative policy to protect privacy and security and promote commerce on the Global Information Infrastructure is being made possible by the generous support of the following companies and public interest organizations: America Online Americans for Tax Reform AT&T Business Software Alliance Center for Democracy and Technology Center for National Security Studies Commercial Internet eXchange CompuServe Incorporated Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility Cylink Corporation EDS Electronic Frontier Foundation Electronic Messaging Association Electronic Privacy Information Center Information Technology Association of America IEEE - USA MediaCast Media Institute Microsoft Corporation Netcom Online Communication Services Netscape Communications Corporation Novell, Inc. Oracle Corporation Pacific Telesis PGP Inc. Prodigy, Inc. Progress and Freedom Foundation Securities Industry Association Software Publishers Association Sybase, Inc. Voters Telecommunications Watch Wired Magazine Please visit the SAFE Forum Home Page for more information (http://www.crypto.com/safe/) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- HOW TO RECEIVE CRYPTO-NEWS To subscribe to crypto-news, sign up from our WWW page (http://www.crypto.com) or send mail to majordomo(a)panix.com with "subscribe crypto-news" in the body of the message. To unsubscribe, send a letter to majordomo(a)panix.com with "unsubscribe crypto-news" in the body. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- PRESS CONTACT INFORMATION Press inquiries on Crypto-News should be directed to Shabbir J. Safdar (VTW) at +1.718.596.2851 or shabbir(a)vtw.org Jonah Seiger (CDT) at +1.202.637.9800 or jseiger(a)cdt.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- End crypto-news =============================================================================

1 0

CIA Fears Hackers, Anonymity
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CIA Director Deutch's comments in the Defense Daily article below about hacker surveillance and the national security threat of anonymity: "Tools are readily available on the Internet, and hackers [computer experts] are a source for any foreign nation or terrorist organization," he said. The personal anonymity provided by cyberspace also aids foreign agents, Deutch said, adding that "hackers, with or without their full knowledge, may be supplying advice and expertise to rogue states such as Iran and Libya." The CIA and other agencies are working to collect information about hackers and their activities from both informants and from other advanced means, including signals intelligence, Deutch said. The CIA is working closely with the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and the Department of Justice to collect and analyze information about hackers and their relationships with organized crime and foreign agents, he said. ------ Defense Daily, 26 June 1996 Deutch Orders Information Warfare Estimate The nation's top intelligence official said Tuesday that he has ordered a major review of foreign threats to the U.S. information, banking, and telecommunications networks. "The treat of information warfare and the damage it could cause to the U.S. is so significant that it warrants an National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)," John Deutch, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), told the Senate Government Affairs committee yesterday. He added that disruption of the information infrastructure could give terrorists or foreign governments the ability to weaken U.S. national security. "Information attacks could not only disrupt our daily lives, but also seriously jeopardize our national or economic security," he added. Deutch said he ordered the NIE to focus attention on how vulnerable the nation's computer-based telecommunications and information networks are to foreign governments and terrorist groups, which are both, despite their relative differences in personnel and funding, potential threats to U.S. information networks. Information warfare is neither manpower intensive nor an expensive form of terrorism, Deutch said, adding that even the smallest radical group can exploit the unregulated and undefended expanse of cyberspace. For example, the Islamic militant group Hezboullah has been using the Internet and other modern means of communications for their daily operations, Deutch said. Such technology could also be used to launch a terrorist act on the U.S., he added. This NIE will determine the damage terrorists or foreign governments could inflict were they to combine information warfare techniques with conventional military tactics to attack the U.S. An NIE, which details potential security threats to the U.S., is usually crafted by the National Intelligence Council (NIC), a senior panel of career intelligence officers and academics. This NIE, however, will also include comments from the U.S. law enforcement community, the Defense Information Security Agency, the armed services, and representatives from the major telecommunications providers, Deutch said. The threat estimate is expected to be complete by December 1, 1996, he added. Preliminary evaluations conducted by the U.S. intelligence community suggest that such a coordinated information attack could seriously disrupt electric power grids, air traffic control centers, banks and the stock market, or even the operational effectiveness of deployed U.S. military forces. Deutch is concerned about the ease with which enemy agents can obtain the hardware and software required to attack the information infrastructure. "Tools are readily available on the Internet, and hackers [computer experts] are a source for any foreign nation or terrorist organization," he said. The personal anonymity provided by cyberspace also aids foreign agents, Deutch said, adding that "hackers, with or without their full knowledge, may be supplying advice and expertise to rogue states such as Iran and Libya." In addition to the high technology, computer-based threat to the U.S. information infrastructure, foreign agents could use conventional explosives to destroy key information facilities and data processing centers. Previous studies conducted by the U.S. intelligence community suggests that numerous foreign nations are creating "cyber-warfare" techniques for application on the modern battlefield, Deutch said. Those programs are geared towards crippling an enemy's command and control centers or disabling air defense networks, he added. Based upon the progress made by these military programs, disrupting U.S. civilian and commercial information networks would be easy, Deutch said. The U.S. intelligence community has begun several activities in response to the emerging cyber-threat, he said. The CIA and other agencies are working to collect information about hackers and their activities from both informants and from other advanced means, including signals intelligence, Deutch said. The CIA is working closely with the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and the Department of Justice to collect and analyze information about hackers and their relationships with organized crime and foreign agents, he said. Both the intelligence and law enforcement communities are trying to work with private industry and academia in this cyber-warfare campaign, he said. The Pentagon and the CIA may reorganize existing personnel and efforts to create a new information warfare center at the National Security Agency, he added. -----

1 0

Re: MS-Mail Security
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Leo WONG Wing-yan <wywong2(a)cs.cuhk.hk> > In> I would like to gather informations of whether the MS-Mail server > In> is secure or not, is anyone heard of somebody, say, disguise > In> as other user or read other user e-mail? You have to look at the whole environment. MSMail typically runs on MS-DOS / Windows PCs, on a network using Microsoft file server protocols over TCP/IP, so it has all the vulnerabilities of that environment. (It can run over Novell Netware instead, which has a somewhat more secure file server, but the system is still vulnerable.) The easy attack is to use a sniffer or other ethernet eavesdropping software to listen for MSMail messages on the LAN - they're not sent encrypted. It also runs over dialup, and the dialup and LAN versions rely on a user-typed login name and password for security, but don't require that the password meet any minimum standards for length (empty passwords work just fine.) MSMail is typically used for two different kinds of business applications - a purely internal mail system that doesn't connect to the outside world, or gatewayed to SMTP or UUCP to connect to other locations. I don't know how secure the gateways are, but the places I've seen them used they certainly haven't been reliable, and generally have been heavily hacked on by the users to make them do what the users want, which probably doesn't add to either the reliability or the security. The mail client has its own set of problems, such as choking on messages with more than 30KB of message body. My purely personal non-official opinion is that it's the third worst mail system I've ever used. (IBM PROFS is the worst, and I watched someone use the original Prodigy 1200-baud 24x40 lines with advertising on every page nonsense as well.) harka(a)nycmetro.com >I'd also like to know how secure the MS-Mail files are (*.mmf). >They are password protected and should be encrypted but >does anybody know how secure? For those of you who aren't familiar with MSMail, the .mmf file is the big hulking file that MSMail keeps all your mail in, including new mail and mail filed in folders (you _can_ split it so your Inbox resides in one .mmf on a mail server and all your other mail folders are in one file on your PC.) The main effects are - if the file gets corrupted (perhaps by a bad disk block, or because the "operating system" crashed while you were using MSMail), you can't read the undamaged pieces, - if you received a message that the MSMail client can't handle, like a large text message, you can't read it directly from the mail file using a text editor like Emacs. I haven't tried to crack it, but the experience of people who've cracked other Microsoft Office encryption (e.g. Word, Excel) has been that it's been pretty wimpy. It does prevent casual users of your PC or server from reading your email by looking at the file with an editor or by using the MSMail client without the password, but I'd be very surprised if it kept out a professional who wanted to take the time to attack it carefully. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs # Distract Authority!

1 0

News: NEC has encrypted networks ...
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Japanese companies catching up and passing American companies should scare those Congressional critters into action: Ern -------- 06/27/96 VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKING ADVANCES PAGE: 1C NEC Technologies' Internet Business Unit has successfully demonstrated country-to-country virtual private networking during several tests performed in early June between the San Jose unit and its counterpart in Tokyo. Virtual private networking promises a secure and cost-effective alternative to privately leased lines. Most connections across the Internet are not encrypted and information exchanged is vulnerable to snoopers. In a virtual private network, encryption is used to scramble the data. (From SJ Mercury NewsLibrary)

2 1

No Subject
by nobody＠flame.alias.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would appreciate any information members may have regarding the security/safety of the new nym server nym.alias.net (in "alpha" state) who posted here about 3 weeks ago. Nym.alias.net reportedly is the same machine as anon.lcs.mit.edu. Specifically, is the individual running the nym _known_ to cypherpunks, or is this an unknown about whom I should have serious doubts. The admin states that nym.alias.net is the same machine as anon.lcs.mit.edu. Any information or insight regarding the wisdom of using ths nym would be welcome. Information concerning the nym I obtained by sending a message to help(a)nym.alias.net; the administrator can be reached at admin(a)nym.alias.net.

2 1

UK Crypto regs?
by Simon Spero 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anybody got a trip report for the IEE meeting yesterday? I phoned the IEE press office, but no-one there seemed to have any briefings, and there didn't seem to be any coverage Simon --- Cause maybe (maybe) | In my mind I'm going to Carolina you're gonna be the one that saves me | - back in Chapel Hill May 16th. And after all | Email address remains unchanged You're my firewall - | ........First in Usenet.........

3 2

mocking paranoia
by nelson＠crynwr.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Earlier, someone mocked someone else for being paranoid. Sorry, but this is a mistake. By definition, you have a non-empty threat model when you set out to encrypt; therefore you must be paranoid to use encryption. Or else they really *could* be out to get you, but sometimes it's not possible to tell, and you have to assume that they are. -russ <nelson(a)crynwr.com> http://www.crynwr.com/~nelson Crynwr Software sells packet driver support | PGP ok 521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315 268 1925 voice | Corporations persuade; Potsdam, NY 13676 | +1 315 268 9201 FAX | governments coerce.

1 0

John Grubor and you
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucifer Remailer Operator wrote: >Just for the record, I am NOT John Grubor and had never even heard of him >before I did an Altavista search on his name earlier today. The concept that >some net.loon like Grubor would get another account with DHP to run an >anonymous remailer for whatever reason is LAUGHABLE. From what I have read, >Grubor spams newsgroups quite often, something I have not done nor plan on >doing. I was expecting people to be posting paranoid rantings about how I >am obviously a SPOOK... Why you were expecting people to be posting paranoid rantings if you did not even know who Dr. John Grubor, undercover police agent, was?

2 1

anonymous mailing lists
by JMKELSEY＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [ To: Cypherpunks ## 06/28/96 04:34 pm ## Subject: anonymous mailing lists ] >Date: Fri, 14 Jun 1996 02:15:03 +0000 (GMT) >From: Ecafe Mixmaster Remailer <mixmaster(a)remail.ecafe.org> >Subject: Hackerpunks and C2 >The proposal for a Hackerpunks nym based mailing list is >interesting, however, there are some concerns regarding the >susceptibility of the list to traffic analysis. I was thinking about attacks that can be carried out on remailers in general, and came up with something that is potentially pretty nasty, especially for anonymous mailing lists and people who post a lot of stuff anonymously using ``nyms.'' Let's imagine an anonymous remailer network as a ``black box'' which functions perfectly. Messages (broken into equal-sized packets and strongly encrypted) are sent into the network by the sender, and at some later time, they come out at the receiver. Let's assume there is no possible way for an attacker to trace a message through this network. Now, we still have to deal with two more issues--mail goes into the network, and comes out of the network. At those two points, there is trafic analysis available. Specifically, we can see how much data goes over the line. (Naturally, if it's encrypted, we can't tell how much of it is real data and how much is padding.) Generally, when we're attacking this system, we're trying to figure out either the sender or the receiver of a message (or a sequence of messages), based on what we can observe coming into and going out of the network of remailers. There are basically five scenarios: 1. The sender wants to know who the receiver of his message is. 2. The receiver wants to know who the sender of his message is. 3. An outsider wants to identify the sender of a message. 4. An outsider wants to identify the receiver of a message. 5. One receiver of a message wants to know who the other receivers of the message are. (This is the case for anonymous lists.) Now, there are a couple of different ways these attacks can be carried out. Usually, I've seen people talk about ``tracing'' attacks, in which a message is traced from one side of the network to another, without any clear idea of who might be on the other side. However, I think a more realistic situation is to imagine the attacker trying to test the hypothesis that some person is on the other end of the anonymous transmission. If relatively few people regularly send or receiver anonymous e-mail, then this is practical for many kinds of test. It's even more practical when we're dealing with relatively small populations of interested people in some technical subject. (This is conceptually similar to the ``dictionary attack'' on passphrases.) Basically, what we're looking at, in that case, is some test which (with some reasonably high probability) determines whether some person is the sender or receiver of a given message or stream of messages. This leads to some interesting insights. 1. In reasonably large text messages, it's probably easy to test hypotheses about senders. There are metrics that can more-or-less identify the writer of a piece of prose. While it's no doubt possible to defeat this kind of analysis for some things (i.e., blackmail notes or rigidly-defined messages in a cryptographic protocol), I suspect that this is very hard to defeat for a mailing list where the objective is to discuss serious technical issues. (This kind of analysis also causes headaches for people trying to do strong steganography in text.) 2. If an attacker (i.e., the NSA) logs the total volume of all traffic in and out of the remailer network, and to whom each message came from or went to, then that attacker can probably mount some very powerful hypothesis-testing attacks. It's these attacks I want to discuss. If Alice sends a message to Bob through the remailer network, two things must happen to prevent it from being trivially traceable. 1. The message has to change size. If the message is already encrypted, then compression isn't much of an option--so what's left is padding it out by a random amount. The amount of padding per message is probably a uniformly distributed random variable. 2. The message has to be delayed somewhat. The delay is probably also a uniformly distributed random variable, or possibly the result of adding N such variables, where N is the number of chained remailers. For a single mailing, this is probably not much of a threat. There will be enough ``noise'' in the delay and padding that most transmissions will be masked. However, consider the situation of a mailing-list. Alice and Bob are both recipients of the list. Alice wants to decide whether Bob is receiving the list. Let D be a delay such that, if Alice received her copy at time T, 90% of the other list members received their copy between T-D and T+D. Now, Alice looks at Bob's anonymous e-mail volume during that time span vs. at all other times. If he's receiving the same stuff she is, then there should be an increase within that span of time, on average. The random distribution of the arrival time will mask individual transmissions, but with many messages, it probably will not. (This is conceptually similar to the situation in Paul Kocher's timing attacks--adding some random pauses doesn't hurt the attack as much as most people expect it to, because those random pauses, summed up over many messages, become a normally distributed random variable.) The average amount of anonymous e-mail Bob gets per day doesn't have much effect, nor do occasional worst-cases. The only ways I can see to prevent this attack are either to ensure that Bob gets a constant rate of information from the anonymous remailer network, or to make the arrival time span so large that other randomness in the sample makes the change in volume undetectable. In general, I don't think this second one will work without accepting incredible delays on messages. This can also be adapted to tracing back anonymous posters to newsgroups and mailing lists, when they use a consistent nym. (They could also be traced by textual analysis.) In this case, the attacker starts by posting some anonymous messages (not using a nym--he doesn't need one), to get some statistics on what the average delay is, and also what the average amount of padding is. He may do this for several different ways of putting things together--he's got almost unlimited time to gather acceptable data. At this point, he observes in/out traffic logs for each hypothesized sender during a wide timespan before the arrival of the post at its destination. He compares activity inside that span with activity outside, over a large number of posts. If there is a correlation, then he's got the e-mail address of the nym. There are ways to get around this second attack, at least to some extent. However, I don't think it's wise to count on even very good remailer networks (i.e., the Mixmaster stuff) to protect your anonymity in this situation. (However, note that I'm thinking in terms of a very well funded, determined adversary. It's probably not too bad to count on it to protect your anonymity from technically unsophisticated attackers--but I wouldn't recommend using it for things that (say) the FBI or NSA might get very interested in.) I think the best defense against this will be something like this: Each user sets a quota of how much trafic he will take in and send out per day. Once per day, he goes through an interaction in which he downloads and uploads that much stuff, whether there's any of it for him or not. (Naturally, this won't be detectable from looking at the transmission, timing the interaction, etc.) This makes any volume variations per day disappear. Unfortunately, it also limits the user's total inflow and outflow, which means he'll have to set it to something larger than the maximum he ever expects to get. (It would be possible to have occasional overflow onto the next day's downloads, but not too often, or the user would fall further behind, on average, each day.) The size of these quotas will still leak some information, though not enough for the kinds of attacks I discussed above. Note: Please respond via e-mail as well as or instead of posting, as I get CP-LITE instead of the whole list. --John Kelsey, jmkelsey(a)delphi.com / kelsey(a)counterpane.com PGP 2.6 fingerprint = 4FE2 F421 100F BB0A 03D1 FE06 A435 7E36 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMdRWR0Hx57Ag8goBAQHCowQA71WBKkx1yonS0dEpy3pe7lgvSJPkpLUk zLjm0KeFoP+HGQBep48iILRYBlbGy5czcxNCU4zhE6+c4PWwvD+BpaGGccWWkyRi 0l/rdo5L5/1KgnpCAQJ/HNyRH0fO2NNOHvGB3m7I0H3lfmfOlNed8oIIjPFDVB23 60wpMZ9S93w= =HC1g -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

5 5

www hacking?
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I havent seen much in lines of this being a problem yet..although I was reading through practical unix security (newest edition) and it made mention of the danger of hacking WWW. Forgive my ignorance on this.. but what dangers are there? I could see someone attacking the main server and do damage in that sense..but Im a little outdated in this as far as what is attacked. The only thing Ive ever had to worry about was unix, now theres oh-so much more. If someone could tell me the dangers of someone attacking someones site..etc..on the WWW, I would much appreciate it! Thanks Adam

2 1