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Mondex vs. Digicash (was: Godzilla vs. Mothra)
by cman＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I disagree with Michael's assertion that Mondex will necessarily win over Digicash. Here's why: o The availability of Digicash in the US, for real, with spender anonymity, will be announced very soon; reporter activity on this subject is consistent with an embargoed press release for Monday or Tuesday. From posts to the list it's clear that a fully working system, ready for customers, will be announced. o When doing market research on this subject, it became clear that low-value payments are largely going to be used for impulse purchases. If the Digicash system allows people to set up their accounts without getting out of their chairs (which I suspect will be the case, if they do it right), it will initially get more adopters. o One or both systems could be found to have serious security problems; who knows what the outcome of their discovery & exploitation would be? I know at least one group of people who believe they have a good line on a serious security problem in Mondex. o Even if the Mondex hardware were given away for free, think how much fun it is for the average user to add a new piece of hardware to their machines... ever install a sound card and CD-ROM drive on a PC? I remember reading something like 20% of all "multimedia" kits were returned, largely due to user install problems. If there is a competing method that costs the same and _doesn't_ require the hardware, people will tend go with this. o In my conversations with state and federal regulators, it is clear that it _is_ possible to issue spender-anonymous e-cash. If you ask them, "Hey, can I create fully anonymous digital cash?", they go apeshit, but if you explain that the money uses existing (auditable) channels going in, and existing (auditable) channels going out, and that only spenders are anonymous, they relax considerably. They may change their minds later, but we're about to get an existence proof. o It's not clear that _either_ system is going to win completely in the next 10+ years. Although there's been considerable shakeout in the last ten years, there is still a huge variety of non-electronic payment methods -- how can you be so sure that Mondex will win over Digicash, and that they won't co-exist like, say, money orders, currency and cashier's checks (three instruments with both similar and dissimilar attirbutes)? Douglas Barnes Electric Communities

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Remailer-in-a-Box, Everyone a Remailer
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:02 PM 10/22/95, Lance Cottrell wrote: >I think one solution to this problem is to encourage (require) the use of >pseudonym servers. Having a server like alpha as the entity on the from >line has several advantages. > >1) Less Spam since it takes some effort to set up the nym and it will be taken >away as soon as the spam starts. > >2) The operator can take firm action. When people complain they want you to >punish the abuser. Typically they want you to pull the offenders account. >With a remailer there is no account to pull, but with a nym server it is >easy to kill the account, making the complainer happy. I fully agree with this point, and have argued for this approach before. There is no logical or other reason why "physical machine site = a remailer," even though that has until recently been the norm. ("I have a machine--I'll run a remailer.") Rather, a single physical machine site can and should be able to run many remailers, out of user accounts. (Accounts on systems like Sameer's C2. Or Hal's remailer running on Portal. Or maybe some of the Mixmaster clients.) This has a couple of salutory effects: 1. It separates the logical function, and responsibilities, of running a remailer from the function of maintaining a site. 2. It puts the "risk" on the account holder, not the site owner. (The site owner can plausibly deny knowing the account was remailing messages.) 3. A proliferation of nyms can be used, as Lance notes, with the "offending nym" cancelled when trouble arises. (I'm not especially keen on seeing sysops bow to pressure to kill accounts, but if it happens, better it happens to a "disposable nym.") 4. Multiplication. Having remailer accounts instead of remailer sites means an N-fold increase in the number of remailers. 5. A single person could have multiple remailer nym accounts, perhaps having differing policies. 6. Search warrants and legal speed bumps. If the cops have to get separate search warrants for N accounts, on M different sites, this will slow things down. (Hint: The remailer "Ralph" can choose to route messages through N extra steps, perhaps on several of his own accounts on _distant_ machines. Faced with a search warrant on "his" account, a la the visits to Penet, he doesn't have to implicate himself by saying he also owns the N other hops. Of course, he can do the same thing with remailers operated by others....I'm just noting that having N remailers under one's own control has certain elegant advantages.) >3) The nym server could have a policy of only accepting messages encrypted >to it, and logging the address the message came from. If confronted, the >nym server could point to the last remailer in the chain. But that remailer >could not have known the contents of the message since it was encrypted to >the nym server. 7. Competition. Picking up on Lance's point, having multiple remailer accounts under one's own control allows one to experiment with various policies and operational modes, and to see which are most popular. Great for evolutionary purposes. 8. Finally, and most importantly, the "remailer in a box" idea, for turn-key remailers, allows even the timid to operate a remailer FOR THEIR OWN USE! That is, they don't have to publicize the public key, or the existence at all of the remailer. But they can use it in their own chain of hops, for their own messages or for whatever. This facillitates the "everyone a remailer" idea. It also increases protection ("always include a remailer under your own control"). I'll stop for now. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal
by loki＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- If you simply do not want to be a final hop, it is trivial to distinguish final hops from intermediate hops in the chain. With cypherpunk remailers you can scan for the remailer headers. With Mixmaster there is a completely different format to the encrypted header (inside the encryption) for final hops as opposed to intermediate hops. I think one solution to this problem is to encourage (require) the use of pseudonym servers. Having a server like alpha as the entity on the from line has several advantages. 1) Less Spam since it takes some effort to set up the nym and it will be taken away as soon as the spam starts. 2) The operator can take firm action. When people complain they want you to punish the abuser. Typically they want you to pull the offenders account. With a remailer there is no account to pull, but with a nym server it is easy to kill the account, making the complainer happy. 3) The nym server could have a policy of only accepting messages encrypted to it, and logging the address the message came from. If confronted, the nym server could point to the last remailer in the chain. But that remailer could not have known the contents of the message since it was encrypted to the nym server. If all nym servers were standardized to run from the same account name (nymserve for example) the remailers could be configured to only deliver final hops to addresses with that username. -Lance >At 12:59 PM 10/19/95 -0400, Thomas Grant Edwards wrote: >>This would require the remailer to examine entropy of messages passing >>through. Anything not random enough gets tossed. > > >A simple entropy measuring algorithm: > <SNIP> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMIp4yfPzr81BVjMVAQGjjAf+JWEiompiWc0VUnrwBPf8D6PYBi17aCFi 7h+zHiyoA2WXAT3Y/rDdBAKq4MI+Gg+7xs2YqmXKQPSd35UBL4UJAzNHtOEA2uo5 5XN83+9oZ6AJm6oVLmmm/vvv49Ts1VEOc4ANmqdQ0k5lHsNqFAte7eFk4aUlsiIi +UUtUHc4zeXvr/T25TAEjGhB5b9DfwESYXPh1XkHBHiYCYIAsbadxGwAutVSUTWA zPOiSRVSWZ+BY4H1FvnnDdoAMYE+AwpgR1iVinbNFcrjjEm+pYiWyS2FzMoQMv6N 2mZuuFQVGRJc6sSsdSsn35kz3sJg44s/mUnyq48uyJBOblv961SYZA== =bo2F -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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request for binary: ec211u16.exe
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm wondering if anyone has the following binary from digicash: ec211u16.exe . If so please contat me. Thanks. -- sameer Voice: 510-601-9777 Community ConneXion FAX: 510-601-9734 The Internet Privacy Provider Dialin: 510-658-6376 http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org

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Re: airport security
by farber＠central.cis.upenn.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ever think that the one real payoff for the ID at airports is to kill the market for re-sold frequent flyer certificates and partially used tichets that then get sold to others (like at most schools)

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How can e-cash, even on-line cleared, protect payee identity?
by Bryce 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Well I've decided that the best way to learn is to stick my neck out and say something probably stupid in public. So here I go again: In an on-line clearing e-cash scheme, Chaum's "double-spender identifier" fields are unnecessary, but a "serial number" type field to uniquely identify the e-coin is still necessary. Using blinding, this serial number may be unknown to the bank, but it will be known to the payer. If the payer and the bank are collaborating to identify the payee, then they can simply use this serial number to identify the recipient of the coin. Is there a scheme which will prevent this collusive payee identification, and if so where can I read about it? (On-line is preferable of course, but I don't expect to be that fortunate.) Now even if it were the case that the payee is always identifiable by a collusion of the bank and the payer (such as is the case in DigiCash Ecash), all this means is that you shouldn't accept a coin using one nym, and deposit it in the bank using another. You need one bank account per nym, as well as one bank account per anonymous transaction, and then you have complete control over revelation of your identit(y/ies). I can imagine a future in which this requirement is not difficult to meet. Perhaps it will be the case that you can accept a coin, open up a new ("anonymous") account with the bank, deposit the coin, withdraw a new coin of the same amount, close the account, and now have an untraceable coin all in a fraction of a second. Bryce signatures follow "To strive, to seek, to find and not to yield." <a href="http://ugrad-www.cs.colorado.edu/~wilcoxb/Niche.html"> bryce(a)colorado.edu </a> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Auto-signed under Unix with 'BAP' Easy-PGP v1.01 iQCVAwUBMIrRpvWZSllhfG25AQFWTQQAgxDWvYrBpoM5D0Idn7ZeCHbZSxMGFr50 Ut40sE83Yfctb6nJdrA+trpynEcu1wJkBbZ7zKDw/TFEUHZy1v4lhZPe+yxmYZcD w9fPC5HaJQqcTp/hhiw9L4iMswdbrmJu/SkUz85ZVosy8blasdOgFwcoZTIFpZHk tyATeEGYygo= =xqJ6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: airport security
by jgrubs＠left.webcasters.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Alan Horowitz <alanh(a)infi.net> writes: > measures, etc, etc. The other side *has already won* the terror war, > merely by virtue of having set the agenda, and making us spin in tighter > and tighter circles - reacting, not initiating. What, then? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: LIBERTY!! Use it or lose it!! iQCVAwUBMIrYyN74r4kaz3mVAQFI4AP/ZDZnldBk7lG3lgIScGIlWJIK8LjiYB7R OXo0gm4zHfQ610puxnBcfq/BQdDJ7DvDW6RegZXonZedNJbvMVWwpttvZW608Rve v9+pUgrjsbQ7QC8RbyKSKAqyjTo7fjjoNVt5NvcL27OVs9ORC5yKEeeWaPtRoQ6V 3MjZqThCmHI= =JS0t -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- WebCasters(tm) James C. Grubs jgrubs(a)webcasters.com 6817 Maplewood Avenue Tel.: 419-882-2697 Sylvania, Oh 43560 Fax: 419-885-2814 Internet consulting, HTML programming, Information brokering

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Re: Mondex vs. Digicash (was: Godzilla vs. Mothra)
by Stephan Somogyi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:35 22.10.95, Douglas Barnes wrote: > If the Digicash system allows people to set up their > accounts without getting out of their chairs (which I suspect will > be the case, if they do it right), it will initially get more > adopters. Agreed, especially since it's going to be a while until Mondex, NetBill et al are accessible by consumers outside of the trial areas. I wonder whether this DigiCash announcement will be a limited trial or a full-blown deployment. > I know at least one group of people who believe they have a good line > on a serious security problem in Mondex. Mondex is definitely practicing security by obscurity. Tim Jones, Mondex's CEO, was very cagey last week at the e-commerce conference about how transaction mechanics and where various public and private keys reside. I have serious questions about some aspects of Mondex's security. > o Even if the Mondex hardware were given away for free, think how > much fun it is for the average user to add a new piece of hardware > to their machines... ever install a sound card and CD-ROM drive on > a PC? I remember reading something like 20% of all "multimedia" > kits were returned, largely due to user install problems. If there > is a competing method that costs the same and _doesn't_ require > the hardware, people will tend go with this. Depends on the hardware. I recently saw a pamphlet for a mag-stripe + smart card reader with a numeric keyboard for PIN entry that plugs into a PC as a bump in the wire between the keyboard and the CPU. The company is in Arizona; I can't recall the name offhand. Adding smart card capability to a PC is not in the same league of user hassle as a multimedia upgrade. It's also much cheaper. > but if you explain that the money uses existing (auditable) > channels going in, and existing (auditable) channels going out, and > that only spenders are anonymous, they relax considerably. They may > change their minds later, but we're about to get an existence proof. The problem is with peer-to-peer transactions that don't go through a bank. Mondex claims that such transactions are anonymous and unaudited. What would stop someone from moving a 500 pound per-card maximum from one card to the next and then back up into the system elsewhere? I'm under the impression that Mondex's value isn't serialized the way DigiCash's is, so you can't track the value itself. And if the cards themselves keep no records of transactions made with peer devices, tracking seems rather tricky. > how can you be so sure that Mondex will win over > Digicash, and that they won't co-exist like, say, money orders, > currency and cashier's checks (three instruments with both similar > and dissimilar attirbutes)? The different schemes have enough overlap that it's not clear to me that a single bank will want to support multiple as yet untried systems. Admittedly, we haven't yet seen which bank is working with DigiCash, but Mondex has some pretty heavy hitters behind it already. Since DigiCash is Internet-focused and Mondex is a non-net-specific system that can be adapted for use over the Net, it seems to me that a bank adopting Mondex would get more out of its investment than if it bought into DigiCash. Banks are going to get into some kind of e-cash system sooner than later, and Mondex seems to be the farthest along. _______________________________________________________________________ Stephan Somogyi Senior Editor Digital Media

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(Fwd) DIGITAL CASH IN AN ELECTRONIC WORLD
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I saw this on the Cyberia list. Those of you near Washington, D.C. may find this worth attending. By the way, one of the speakers, Kawika Daguio, was once on this list (and may still be, though I haven't seen posts from him in a while). --Tim May >Date: Sun, 22 Oct 1995 17:04:32 -0400 >Errors-To: thardy(a)mail.wm.edu >Reply-To: cyberia-l(a)warthog.cc.wm.edu >Originator: cyberia-l(a)listserv.cc.wm.edu >Sender: cyberia-l(a)warthog.cc.wm.edu >Precedence: bulk >From: "Cleveland Thornton" <thornton(a)legalbits.com> >To: Multiple recipients of list <cyberia-l(a)warthog.cc.wm.edu> >Subject: (Fwd) DIGITAL CASH IN AN ELECTRONIC WORLD >X-Listserver-Version: 6.0 -- UNIX ListServer by Anastasios Kotsikonas > > >For those in the Washington, DC area, you may find the following >meeting of interest, > > > >------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- >Date: Sat, 21 Oct 1995 21:54:36 -0400 (EDT) >From: Andrew Grosso <agrosso(a)access.digex.net> >To: Cleveland Thornton <cthornto> >Subject: Please Post > > THE FUTURE OF MONEY: > DIGITAL CASH IN AN ELECTRONIC WORLD > > The evolution of money has now completed >a one hundred eighty degree turn from the point >where our economy began: from a barter marketplace; >to paper currency; and, today, to pure information >exchanged globally over telecommunications lines. >Money is digital, and can be created, utilized, >and transmitted by individuals and companies, as >well as by governments. > > On Thursday, November 2, at noon, the >Computer Crime Subcommittee of the ABA will host >a luncheon program which will examine the birth >and promise of digital cash. The speakers repre- >sent all three of the important organizations >participating in this venture: designers, bankers, >and governments: > >Steve Crocker, Vice President in Charge of Develop- >ment, CyberCash, Inc. CyberCash is a Reston, >Virginia, based company which was established in >1994. It is in the forefront of the development >and implementation of digital cash in the global >marketplace. Dr. Crocker is himself involved in >both the technical and regulatory aspects of this >field. His talk will include a description of just >what digital cash is, and how we can expect it will >be used in the future. > >Kawika Daguio, Federal Representative for Operations, >Retail Banking, and Risk Management, American >Bankers Association: Mr. Daguio represents the >banking industry, and will discussed its concerns >and hopes for the new currency, and how it expects >that digital cash will change the industry. > >Stephen Kroll, Chief Counsel, Financial Crimes >Enforcement Network: Mr. Kroll's agency is primarily >concerned with the identification of money laundering >and other violations of federal laws concerning the >flow of money. He will discuss the government's >concerns over the effects digital cash will have on >those laws, and how governments may seek to protect >their currencies and their sovereignty. > > The program will be in the form of a brown >bag luncheon, and will take place at the ABA Criminal >Justice Section's Washington offices, at 740 15th >Street, N.W., Tenth Floor. The program is free. >For those who wish to order a brown bag lunch to be >provided by the ABA, the cost is $11.50, which must >be ordered beforehand and paid for at the time it is >picked up. (No cash accepted; make check payable >to ABA Criminal Justice Section.) > > For reservations, please contact Mable >Muldrow, at (202) 662-1520. For more information, >contact the program's co-moderators, Andrew Grosso, >Chair of the ABA Computer Crime Subcommittee, at >(202) 663-9041 [E-Mail: agrosso(a)acm.org] and >Daryl Jackson, Vice Chair of the ABA White Collar >Crime Committee, at (202) 942-5000. >__________________________________________________________ >Cleveland Thornton 202-543-9673 (Office) >Attorney at Law 202-543-3482 (Fax) >15 Second Street, N.E. 74746.1422(a)compuserve.com >Washington, D.C. 20002-7301 thornton(a)legalbits.com > >HomePage http://www.clark.net/pub/cthornto/home.html >__________________________________________________________ > > >__________________________________________________________ >Cleveland Thornton 202-543-9673 (Office) >Attorney at Law 202-543-3482 (Fax) >15 Second Street, N.E. 74746.1422(a)compuserve.com >Washington, D.C. 20002-7301 thornton(a)legalbits.com > >HomePage http://www.clark.net/pub/cthornto/home.html >__________________________________________________________ >

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Mark Twain Bank Launches Ecash
by Marcel van der Peijl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------------------------PRESS RELEASE------------------------ Release date: Contact DigiCash New York: Monday, October 23, 1995 Mr. Daniel M. Eldridge Amsterdam, The Netherlands Tel: +1 212 909 2955 (direct) +1 212 909 4092 (main) Fax: +1 212 318 1222 email: eldridge(a)digicash.com Contact DigiCash Amsterdam: Contact Mark Twain Bank St. Louis: Mr. Paul Dinnissen Mr. Frank O. Trotter, III Tel: +31 20 665 2611 Tel: +1 314 997 9213 Fax: +31 20 668 5486 Fax: +1 314 569 4906 email: press(a)digicash.com email: ftrotter(a)marktwain.com http://www.digicash.com/ http://www.marktwain.com/ Mark Twain Bank Launches Ecash ============================== ----------------------------------------------------- Mark Twain Bank begins operating DigiCash's ecash(TM) on the Internet with U.S. Dollars ----------------------------------------------------- Mark Twain Bank of St. Louis Missouri starts accepting applications Monday October 23, 1995 for accounts that can be used to withdraw and deposit ecash over the Internet. DigiCash(TM) bv, of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, developer of ecash, is supplying the technology to Mark Twain Bank under non-exclusive license. The technology has been tested with a 'monopoly(TM) money' currency called CyberBucks(TM), but this U.S. dollar denominated system is the first time electronic cash is actually being offered using real currency. "This launch marks the beginning of a new era, one in which the digital equivalent of paper money and coins will become even more important than their physical precursors are today," according to Dr. David Chaum, Managing Director of DigiCash bv and inventor of electronic cash. "It will catalyze enormous growth in electronic commerce on the Internet, and prove of enduring value through its improved protection of consumers and society at large." Sweden Post, another ecash licensee, owns the retail bank that is responsible for more than 50% of value transfers in Sweden and has direct access to accounts of over 75% of Swedish households. Sweden Post has not yet announced its launch date. How does it work ---------------- Using ecash is like using a virtual ATM (Automatic Teller Machine). When connecting to it over the Internet, you authenticate ownership of your account and request the amount of ecash you want to withdraw, much like in person. But instead of putting paper cash in your wallet, your software stores the digital cash it obtains onto the hard disk of your PC. When you are asked to make a payment on the net, you confirm the amount, purpose and payee and then your ecash software transfers the correct value in coins from your disk. Sellers, ranging from casual participants in the global Internet bazaar to mega-retailers, deposit the digital coins they receive into their accounts. Behind the user interface, your computer actually chooses the serial numbers of the electronic coins based on a random seed. Then it hides them in special encryption envelopes, provides them to the virtual ATM for signing, and removes the envelopes from what is returned--leaving the bank's validating digital signature on the serial numbers. This way, when the bank receives from the shop the coins you spend, it cannot recognize them as coming from any particular withdrawal, because they were hidden in envelopes during withdrawal. And thus the bank cannot know when or where you shop or what you buy. The serial number of each signed coin is unique, allowing the bank to be sure it never accepts the same coin twice. In case you wish to identify the recipient of any of your payments, you can also reveal the serial number and prove that you formed it. And, in case your computer were ever to break down, if you had written down the secret random seed number you chose initially when opening your account, future versions would let you use it to re-create the coins in envelopes and thereby obtain a free re-issue of the signed coins that were lost. How safe is it -------------- Security is fundamental to electronic cash. The cryptographic coding protecting every 5 cent ecash payment is the same as that routinely relied upon for authenticating requests to move huge sums between banks and even for national security. But in principle ecash goes beyond such communications security to achieve true multiparty security: no one (buyer, seller, bank) can cheat anyone else, no matter how they might modify their own software; even if two parties collude, they cannot cheat the third. Replacing paper and coins with ecash would make life much harder for criminals. Because the payer's computer chooses the serial numbers of the coins, he or she can later irrefutably identify blackmarketeers, extortionists, and acceptors of bribes--were they to take ecash. Paper notes, briefcases full of which can be received without leaving any record, allow money laundering and tax evasion today. With ecash, however, all the amounts each person receives are known to their bank. Significant criminal activity could thus be thwarted by completely replacing paper money; moreover, the privacy of ecash would be essential to widespread acceptance of any electronic payment system that in effect becomes mandatory. Early, competing, and future systems ------------------------------------ Customers of Mark Twain Bank will have to fill out an application form that is available over the Internet, mail or fax it in, and receive a password by mail. The bank's unique multi-currency facilities will allow use from many countries. In the future, the ability to withdraw funds from ordinary checking accounts will be as ubiquitous as making withdrawals at physical ATMs today. Frequent visits to digital branches will give banks the opportunity to offer a full range of financial services to their customers. The over 60,000 people who registered for the CyberBucks experiment--more than all the other cyber-payment schemes combined--suggests a high level of support and interest in ecash. DigiCash plans to keep the experiment going for those who wish to continue using it. After CyberBucks went live almost exactly one year ago, and became the first cryptographically protected Internet payment scheme, a plethora of "me-too" schemes have been announced. Most are simply account-based, accepting requests from users to move money from their account to a specified other account, thereby revealing to the central system exactly when, how much, and to whom they pay, and putting users at the mercy of system errors that may result in loss of money or unexpected lock out. Only ecash works with digital coins, empowering people with full control over their side of financial transactions and full control over when and to whom identifying information is released. Ecash is currently software only: once you've opened an account you just download the software over the net and you're ready to run. DigiCash is developing chip cards and simple readers which will give provide even more security and portability of ecash between machines. DigiCash does not aim to operate ecash systems itself, but rather to continue developing new versions and licensing to financial institutions. (The following are trademarks and should always be referred to as such: CyberBucks, DigiCash, ecash, Mark Twain Bank and Monopoly.) * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * DigiCash Backgrounder ===================== History and Mission ------------------- Since beginning operation in April 1990, DigiCash's mission and primary activity has been: to develop and license payment technology products--chip card, software only, and hybrid--that both show the true capability of technology to protect the interests of all participants and are competitive in the market. Founder ------- Dr. David Chaum, managing director of DigiCash, received his Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of California at Berkeley, then taught at New York University Graduate School of Business Administration and at the University of California, and headed the Cryptography Group at CWI, the Dutch nationally funded center for research in mathematics and computer science, before taking his current position. He has published over 45 original technical articles on cryptography and also founded the International Association for Cryptologic Research. DigiCash Products ----------------- Blue: smart card technology for EMV & prepaid with dynamic public key Conforms to joint Europay, MasterCard, Visa specifications; multiple applications including loyalty and closed systems; superior data integrity in case of malicious/accidental interference/interruption; requires only the smallest and most proven chips, e.g. SC-24 or ST601; mask technology licensing. CAFE: smart card and card-accepting electronic wallet project Consortium of 12 other members founded and chaired by Dr. Chaum of DigiCash; simulation, mask and first readers developed by DigiCash; trial in November 1995 at the European Commission headquarters building; technology trial in participation with related open special interest group and partially funded by the EC. DyniCash: highway-speed road-toll collection system using smart cards Chip card inserts into battery-powered dashboard unit; reflected backscatter microwave technology by industry leader Amtech; prepaid mode has user privacy; open and/or closed pricing schemes; tested extensively in Japan; non-exclusive licensing of the payment technology. Ecash(TM): software only electronic cash system for internet/email Users download software that can make and receive payments; protects users' money like travellers checks and privacy like coins; world-wide experiment with tens of thousands of users; Macintosh, MS-Windows and X-Windows; any WWW browser; user software free with issuer licensing. Facility Card: complete facility management smart-card/reader system Cash replacement, access control, and time/attendance system; now in schools, hospitals, industry, offices, recreation; interfaces to vending, point-of-sale, access control, copiers, phones, gaming; downloadable & upgradeable readers work on-line and/or off-line; sold through VAR's. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Early Adopter Companies ======================= AdOne Classified Network (Steve Brotman, +1 212 431 5842, http://www.adone.com/) BizNet Technologies (Doug Mauer, +1 540 231 7715, http://www.bnt.com/) Consensus Development Corporation (Christopher Allen, +1 510 559 1500, http://www.consensus.com/) Delorie Software (http://www.delorie.com/) Global-X-Change Communications (Elliot Burdett, +1 613 235 6865, http://www.globalx.net/) PULVER.COM (Jeff Pulver, +1 917 336 8240, http://www.pulver.com/) Sun Microsystems (Humphrey Polanen, +1 415 336 0022, http://www.sun.com/) The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) (Stanton McCandlish, +1 415 668 7171, http://www.eff.org/) The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) (Marc Rotenberg, +1 202 546 6520, http://www.epic.org/) The New Sun Newspaper (Lese Dunton, +1 212 799 7402, http://shebute.com/newsun/today/) The Well (Bruce Katz, +1 415 332 4335, http://www.well.com/) Walter Shelby Group (John Buckman, http://www.shelby.com/pub/shelby/) These companies offering their clients ecash(TM) ------------------------------------------------ Husky Labs (David Levine, +1 410 889 3409, http://www.butterfly.net/) (Clients: National Public Radio, The National Geographic Society, PoliticsUSA, Penguin Books, E-Z Communications, Pentagon Cds and Tapes, AfroAmerican Newpapers, Ellicott Machine Corp., The Greater Baltimore Committee Technology Council, National Petroleum Council, Netv, Review.Net, Robert Rytter & Associates, and United States Holocaust Memorial Museum) Organic Online (Brian Behlendorf, +1 415 284 6888, http://www.organic.com/) (Clients: Advertising Age, Saturn Cars, Rubin Postaer Agency, Sybase, Inc., Volvo Cars of North America, Xircom, 1-800-Collect, Conari Press Books, Great Amercian Music Hall, City of Tribes Communications, Octel, Montgomery Securities, Macromedia) Poppe Tyson Advertising (Fergus O'Daly, +1 212 727 5600, http://www.poppe.com/) (Clients: American Express Travel Agency, PSINet Inc., Intercon Systems Corp., Fordham University, New York Cruise Lines Inc., Osram Sylvania, Pfizer, Food Service Group, Ridgewood Savings Bank, Warner Lambert, Drew, EUA COGENEX, New Jersey Travel and Tourism, AT&T, American Isuzu Motors, DataProducts, Magellan, Toshiba America, Computer Systems Division, Toshiba Computer Systems, Toshiba Disk Products, Applied Medical Informatics, Cascade Design Automation, Chrysler Corp. Cirrus Logic, Cypress Semiconductor, Escalade, Hewlett-Packard, Hyundai Electronics America, Intel Corp., International Network Services, Internet Profiles Corp., LANNET, Logic Modeling, Measurex, MIPS Tchnologies, Netscape Communications Corporation, Network Equipment Technologies, Network General, Nokia, North Mountain Software, Premisys Radiomail, Red Herring Magazine, Robert Half International, Sony Electronics Inc., Broadcast Product Group, Sync Research, Synopsys, Synopsys Logic Modeling Group, Touche, Valvoline) * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Further Documents Available =========================== 1. "The Ease of Using ecash", tutorial, October 1995, 10 pages. (Text with diagrams.) 2. Congressional Testimony: text of testimony delivered by Dr. David Chaum to Committee Hearing of the U.S. House of Representatives:"The Future of Money", Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy; Committee on Banking and Financial Services, July 1995, 3 pages. (Text only.) 3. "Achieving Electronic Privacy", by Dr. David Chaum, Scientific American, August 1992, 6 pages. (Text with diagrams.) 4. European Union - Project CAFE: Conditional Access For Europe, brochure, 1994, 2 pages. (Text only online, diagrams and text only by post.) How to obtain documents ----------------------- Items 1-4 are available on our World Wide Web Server at: 1) http://www.digicash.com/publish/ecash_intro/ecash_intro.html 2) http://www.digicash.com/publish/testimony.html 3) http://www.digicash.com/publish/sciam.html 4) http://www.digicash.com/products/projects/cafe.html Please let us know, if you would like to receive any of Items 1-4 in one of the following other formats: a) via electronic mail in plain text (ascii) format, (Item 1 and 4 unavailable) b) via facsimile c) via post ---------------------------PRESS RELEASE------------------------

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