December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Forwarded mail...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 4 Dec 1997 20:59:08 +0100 (MET) > From: nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) > Subject: Re: words have value, for good or ill > The speech I am talking about is the kind of things which Tim May has > been writing. To keep things simple, let's consider the statement > "McVeigh did the right thing." It is not a contract. It is not a > threat. It is not copyrighted. Actualy it is copyrighted the moment he hits the keystrokes and they appear in the buffer. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Get out of town Freeh!
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A cute cartoon from my friends down the hall: http://www.allpolitics.com/1997/12/05/mitchell/

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Microsoft and DoJ attorneys battle in Federal court today
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

************ http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/afternoon/0,1012,1616,00.html Microsoft vs. DOJ Update Microsoft finally had its day (or at least two hours) in court this afternoon. Its team of lawyers tried to fend off accusations that Microsoft unfairly used its operating system's popularity to force-feed Internet Explorer to computer makers. Federal judge Thomas Penfield Jackson zeroed in on whether or not the browser is, in fact, part of Windows 95. "Are you not selling Windows 95 and Internet Explorer separately?" he asked. Not to computer manufacturers, carefully replied Microsoft's attorney, who said that the evidence proves the two products "obviously are" integrated. (For the judge to rule that Microsoft is violating a 1995 agreement, Justice Department lawyers first have to convince him that Internet Explorer and Windows 95 are two seperate products, which they tried to do today by waving around a shrinkwrapped copy of Internet Explorer 4.0.) The hearing in Washington, D.C., federal district court highlighted two wildly different views: Microsoft claims the Justice Department is picking a fight where none really should exist. But the government's antitrust lawyers said today they're fighting to stop the world's largest software company from "misusing its Windows power" to squash its competitors. Both sides are going to have to wait a while: Judge Jackson left the courtroom today without ruling on the case. --By Declan McCullagh/Washington

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Singapore & Freedom
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>On Thu, 4 Dec 1997, J. Lasser wrote: >And Singapore survives quite well being a totalitarian >capitalist society. Sure, you can pick nits and claim that >Singapore's not entirely capitalist, but it's more capitalist >than this country and certainly less free, too. > http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,266,00.html >In some ways, Singaporeans are more free than U.S. citizens. >Income taxes and sales taxes are lower. Prostitution is legal. >The government does not impose rules on whom private landlords >can and can't rent to. Unlike some cities in the states, >Singapore has no curfews. Being able to walk outside safely at >night in any area of the city, even the poor excuse for the >city's red light district, has its attractions. > -Declan I lived and worked in Singapore for 8 years. Singapore is not what I call a free society. Their system has many advantages, you are pretty much free to make money providing you are doing so in an area where the government has no interest. The Singapore government runs many enterprises and if you happen to be their competition they will tear you apart to get rid of the competition. The Singaporean government tends to cater to the multinational corporations, who were their earlier ticket to economic prosperity, and don't do a lot to encourage local grown business other than to provide a suitable environment for business, which is good enough on its own. Singapore is a great place to do business, yours costs are predictable, something you can not say about the surrounding countries where corruption makes costs unpredictable. Singapore labor is reasonably priced, well-educated, reasonably trained, and well-disciplined - or at least they don't talk back or complain unless you try something really stupid. Singapore management is expensive, well-educated, but not quite as versatile as westerners. Singapore is a social experiment, a group (read PAP) has gained control and decided to mold the society into something different than it was. This is probably a good thing as in the 50s Singapore was a cesspool, in many ways. The story goes that you could smell Singapore 200 miles out, in an airplane. Everything that Singapore is today is what it was not in the 50s. The educational system has been engineered to produce the maximum number of worker units. Being a small country with limited resources (with labor being the main exportable resource) they could not afford to have an educational system which allowed some potential worker units to drop-out. Compare this against the American system where you are free to succeed, or free to fail, the choice is basically given to the citizen. In Singapore this is not how it works, the blinders are installed early, you are not permitted to fail to become a good productive member of the society. In Singapore you are free, as long as you are a good productive member of the society. Try talking back and complaining about the system and see where that gets you? I think they call it Woodbridge. This social engineering may be a good thing. Look at the benefits obtained by Singapore. In the current economic meltdown in SE Asia Singapore is only threatened with lower growth. The people are happy and they love their country and government, to the average Singaporean the government can do no wrong. Most Western governments would love to be in the same position. There are costs associated with an engineered society of this type. Elder Statesman Lee, he went by Harry Lee before he learned Mandarin, is always ranting about all the good genetics being wasted as there is a large number of educated women who have not married and therefore are not able to reproduce. Harry has been ranting about this for more than 10 years. In a nutshell certain segments of the population have lost their ability to mate. The Singapore government has initiated a program to help educated Singaporeans find mates. Great system, economic prosperity, but what am I supposed to do with this thing... Don't forget the other good points, no guns or bullets, color copiers are (were?) restricted, all media controlled by the government (even Time magazine was banned), mandatory savings program (CPF), National Service, and the government attitude of those that are not with us are against us. Also, don't forget that the Singaporean government has brought the Big Brother concept to reality. SingMonger

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Forwarded mail...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: >From INFO-RUSS-request(a)smarty.ece.jhu.edu Fri Dec 5 18:35:23 1997 From: INFO-RUSS-request(a)smarty.ece.jhu.edu Date: Fri, 5 Dec 97 14:33:28 -0500 Message-Id: <9712051933.AA02486(a)smarty.ece.jhu.edu> To: info-russ(a)smarty.ece.jhu.edu >From INFO-RUSS-request(a)smarty.ece.jhu.edu Fri Dec 5 14:04:00 EST 1997 Errors-To: INFO-RUSS-request(a)smarty.ece.jhu.edu Sender: INFO-RUSS-request(a)smarty.ece.jhu.edu Precedence: bulk Date: Sat, Dec 5 97 14:15:59 EST From: info-russ(a)smarty.ece.jhu.edu To: info-russ(a)smarty.ece.jhu.edu Subject: INFO-RUSS: Chem-to schelkal, v chem byl spryatan infrakrasnyi ob'ektiv... --------------------------------------------------------------------- This is INFO-RUSS broadcast (1200+ subscribers). Home page, information, and archives: http://psi.ece.jhu.edu/~kaplan/IRUSS/inforuss.html To post, subscribe, or unsubscribe mail to info-russ(a)smarty.ece.jhu.edu ======================================================================== Folks, this is to follow up our previous story on arrested "spy" in Rostov, Russia. Looks like the old Sov-Russ-paranoia about spies is back. BTW, note a correction to the previous info: Mr. Bliss is not New Zealander, he is our fellow American who works for a New Zealand company. Alex Kaplan, info-russ owner/coordinator sasha(a)super.ece.jhu.edu http://psi.ece.jhu.edu/~kaplan ======================================================================== Reuters, Friday December 5 9:06 AM EST American Charged In Rare Russian Spy Case By Adam Tanner MOSCOW (Reuters) - A 29-year-old U.S. telephone technician was charged with espionage against Russia Friday in what officials say is the first such case involving an American since the end of the Cold War. A spokesman for the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) said Richard Bliss, who was arrested in the southern city of Rostov-on-Don Nov. 25, had been formally charged with spying. The text of the criminal charges was to be read to Bliss in English translation as he does not speak Russian, Russian television reported. But the exact wording of the charges was not made public as it was a state security matter, the report said. Bliss had been in Rostov for two months working to install a wireless telephone system when he was detained. He worked for San Diego-based telecommunications company Qualcomm. The U.S. Embassy has said Bliss was not a spy and Qualcomm also denied he was involved in espionage, saying he was performing routine tests to help install a wireless telephone system. U.S. officials earlier said they were continuing to press for his release and expected Vice-President Al Gore to telephone Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin later in the day to appeal for his release. "At the highest levels of government exchanges of information are flowing back and forth quite rapidly," said Qualcomm's head of government relations, Bill Bold. The FSB earlier said Bliss had carried out long-distance topographical surveys with what it called illegally-imported satellite receivers and obtained secret information about unspecified "restricted" buildings in the Rostov area. Dan Pegg, a Qualcomm senior vice-president, said Bliss was using global positioning system (GPS) equipment to measure the strength of radio signals from a central communications transmitter. Asked if Bliss could have worked as a spy without Qualcomm's knowledge, Pegg said: "They say never say never, but I'd say absolutely not." A resident of San Diego, Bliss had been in Russia about two months when he was detained, Pegg said. A high-school graduate who never went to college, Bliss worked for several communications companies before Qualcomm hired him six months ago to help install telephone systems worldwide. REUTERS@ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Ron Brown Died From A .45 In The Head
by Jonathan Wienke 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I heard an interview with Chris Ruddy (of Vincent Foster fame) on KSFO 560 AM in San Francisco. In the interview, Chris disclosed that an Army pathologist, LtCol Steve Cogswell, was one of the doctors who processed the bodies from the plane crash which supposedly killed fromer Commerce secretary Ron Brown. LtCol Cogswell took an X-ray of Ron Brown's skull, and found a circular hole .45 inches in diameter in the skull, as well as some metal fragments inside the cranial cavity, consistent with a gunshot wound. The original X-rays were destroyed, and no autopsy was performed to determine the cause of death; but a photographer took some pictures of the x-rays while they were on display, and these pictures were NOT destroyed. LtCol Cogswell provided copies of the photos of the x-rays to Ruddy, and they were printed in a newspaper out east somewhere (I missed a few minutes of the interview). Today, I heard that LtCol Cogswell has been placed under a gag order and his his house was searched by MP's. Something is rotten in Denmark... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Business Security 5.5 iQA/AwUBNIjCvcJF0kXqpw3MEQIaWwCglmjV6vIPR8w/lnwdgxRRdbzskVoAn0eE cQ3mGJYckbJ06DXqF1dmNozJ =VbVp -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Jonathan Wienke PGP Key Fingerprints: 7484 2FB7 7588 ACD1 3A8F 778A 7407 2928 3312 6597 8258 9A9E D9FA 4878 C245 D245 EAA7 0DCC "If ye love wealth greater than liberty, the tranquility of servitude greater than the animating contest for freedom, go home from us in peace. We seek not your counsel, nor your arms. Crouch down and lick the hand that feeds you. May your chains set lightly upon you; and may posterity forget that ye were our countrymen." -- Samuel Adams "Stupidity is the one arena of of human achievement where most people fulfill their potential." -- Jonathan Wienke Never sign a contract that contains the phrase "first-born child." RSA export-o-matic: print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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Re: Singapore & Freedom
by Blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

SingMonger wrote: >Don't forget the other good points, no guns or bullets, color >copiers are (were?) restricted, all media controlled by the >government (even Time magazine was banned), mandatory savings >program (CPF), National Service, and the government attitude of >those that are not with us are against us. Also, don't forget >that the Singaporean government has brought the Big Brother >concept to reality. .............................................................. Sounds like the kind of place suitable for people who don't have a Mind of Their Own, nor a personal vision of, or mission in, life (besides maintaining an active DNA pool). .. Blanc

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Re: IP: U.N. Hate-Radio Jamming Would Send Wrong Signal
by William Reichenbach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Notice the Double Speak in the LA Times article below? What is taking place in Bosnia is Exactly the same thing (Censorship) as the writer of the article is expressing concern about. It is exactly the same conduct that the two NWO Stooges Metzl and Rep Royce so enthusiastically endorse. It is only a question of whose ox is being gored. William "Indeed, the United States and its allies are conducting a somewhat similar operation in Bosnia. Two months ago, NATO troops seized and effectively shut down a station run by hard-line Bosnian Serb forces after the station broadcast inflammatory attacks on NATO forces trying to keep the peace there. But it's a long step to go from these situations to the creation of a permanent, formal unit run by the United Nations and scouring the world in search of radio broadcasts to jam. " believer(a)telepath.com wrote: > >From the Los Angeles Times: > > Wednesday, December 3, 1997 > > INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK > U.N. Hate-Radio Jamming Would Send Wrong Signal > By JIM MANN > > WASHINGTON--In foreign policy, sometimes the noblest of intentions > leads to > lousy ideas. > > That's certainly the case with the recent curious proposal for a > special > United Nations "jam squad"--a special U.N. team that could be > hurriedly > dispatched to crisis points around the world carrying equipment to > jam, or > block, harmful radio and TV broadcasts. > > Writing in the current issue of "Foreign Affairs" magazine, Jamie M. > Metzl, > a former United Nations human rights officer, proposes the creation of > what > would officially be called an "independent information intervention > unit" at > the U.N. > > Its goal, he writes, would be "countering dangerous messages that > incite > people to violence." A U.N. unit could monitor local news media to see > where > crises might erupt, air its own messages of peace and, where > necessary, > prevent other radio or TV broadcasts from being heard. > > The idea for the U.N. jam squad originated in the genocidal horrors of > > Rwanda. In 1994, the country's main radio station, the > Radio-Television > Libre des Milles Collines, then controlled by Hutu extremists, began > broadcasting hate messages targeting members of the rival tribe, the > Tutsis, > and moderate Hutus. > > The Rwanda station even broadcast lists of enemies to be hunted down. > "Take > your spears, clubs, guns, swords, stones, everything, sharpen them, > jack > them, those enemies, those cockroaches," the station urged listeners. > The > result was one of the world's worst blood baths, in which more than > 500,000 > unarmed Tutsis and moderate Hutus were slaughtered. > > This was, certainly, as compelling a case for jamming as you can get. > And > Metzl has one cogent argument on behalf of his proposal: When there's > an > ethnic conflict in a place like Rwanda, sending in a United Nations > jamming > team would be considerably easier and less costly than sending in > troops. > > "I think it's a worthy idea," says Rep. Edward R. Royce (R-Fullerton), > > chairman of the House International Relations subcommittee on Africa. > "I'm > sure we would try to go out and jam [in Rwanda] if those circumstances > came > up again." > > Indeed, the United States and its allies are conducting a somewhat > similar > operation in Bosnia. Two months ago, NATO troops seized and > effectively shut > down a station run by hard-line Bosnian Serb forces after the station > broadcast inflammatory attacks on NATO forces trying to keep the peace > there. > > But it's a long step to go from these situations to the creation of a > permanent, formal unit run by the United Nations and scouring the > world in > search of radio broadcasts to jam. > > Who would determine exactly what kinds of radio programs should be > blocked > and which programs could be aired? What would ensure that the jamming > decisions were not motivated by politics? Wouldn't the creation of > such a > United Nations operation strengthen the hand of governments that want > to jam > radio transmissions for much less noble reasons? > > "This opens up a Pandora's box, really," says Richard Richter, the > director > of Radio Free Asia, the federally funded station that broadcasts into > Asian > countries with repressive governments. "You'd have China claiming that > we > [American broadcasts] should be jammed by the United Nations." > > Ultimately, a U.N. jamming squad would give official sanction to > restrictions on the free flow of information. Metzl's article has a > response > to this problem, but it's a weak one. > > "During the Cold War, when the United States faced a Soviet adversary > intent > on jamming the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe . . . , it made > sense > for the United States to promote an absolute standard for the free > flow of > information," he wrote. "Now, a more nuanced view should be possible." > > But that's precisely backward: The free flow of information wasn't > merely a > temporary means to winning the Cold War, but one of the goals of the > endeavor. > > Although the problem of hate-filled radio broadcasts is a serious one, > there > are ways of dealing with it that don't involve creating some huge, > supranational censorship unit. > > One alternative is simply to provide other, competing radio > broadcasts. In > Rwanda, for example, the United Nations set up its own radio stations, > both > in the capital of Kigali and in radio camps. > > Royce's subcommittee has been exploring the possibility of creating a > Radio > Free Africa, similar to Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Asia and Radio > Marti, > which broadcasts to Cuba. > > There are serious questions about whether such a new organization is > necessary, when VOA, the official U.S. government station, already > broadcasts intensively into Africa. But the underlying idea makes > sense: to > transmit better, more accurate information to Africa, rather than > focusing > on jamming or censorship. > > There are other ways of combating hate radio too. Those who directly > incite > violence over the airwaves can be brought to justice. At the moment, a > > war-crimes tribunal, set up under U.N. auspices, is prosecuting those > responsible for the massacres in Rwanda. Among the suspects in custody > are > some of those responsible for the Milles Collines radio broadcasts. > > But a worldwide, U.N.-run jamming team? As a Hollywood script, maybe > the > idea has possibilities. As foreign policy, it's a loser. > > Jim Mann's column appears in this space every Wednesday. > > Copyright Los Angeles Times > > > > ********************************************** > To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: > majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com > with the message: > subscribe ignition-point email@address > or > unsubscribe ignition-point email@address > ********************************************** > http://www.telepath.com/believer > **********************************************

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FW: GSM hack -- operator flunks the challenge
by Stewart_William_C＠bns.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded from RISKS ______________________ Date: Wed, 26 Nov 1997 17:36:36 +0000 From: Ross Anderson <Ross.Anderson(a)cl.cam.ac.uk> Subject: GSM hack -- operator flunks the challenge On Friday 13th September 1996, I read in comp.risks that: > MobilCom, a subsidiary of German TeleKom (since 100 years monopolist on > telephone communication in Germany, with its monopoly ending in 1998) > publicly offers 100,000 DM to a telephone hacker who is able to communicate > at the expense of the (national) number 0171-3289966. The related chipcard > is said to be safely stored in lawyer`s office. In an attempt to paint this > dubious offer somewhat "politically correct", the successful hacker will > have to donate his earnings to a social institution of his(her) choice. This caught our attention - Cambridge University, being a registered charity, surely qualifies as a `social institution', and 100,000 DM would buy us a state-of-the-art triple-wavelength laser microprobe workstation for chipcard breaking. So we had a look at GSM and found a way to hack it. We worked out what equipment we'd need and where we could borrow it, assembled the team, checked that the attack would work in principle, and then started trying to find the right person in Deutsche Telekom to speak to. We needed to know the IMSI (international mobile subscriber identification) and get written confirmation of the challenge; otherwise the attack might have been interpreted as an offence under Britain's Wireless Telegraphy Act. After some chasing around, unanswered e-mails and so on, we went to a mobile phone fraud conference in June and made contacts there which suggested some names, leading to further unanswered correspondence, and finally a faxed reply. Here is a translation of the original German, online at <<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/roesner.gif>http://www.cl.cam. ac. uk/ftp/users/rja14/roesner.gif>: Dear Dr Anderson Many thanks for your fax of the 6th October 1997. Please excuse the late reply to your fax. The matter that you mentioned did not originate from T-Mobil but from one of our service providers, the firm Mobilcom in Schleswig. We understand that the offer has since also been withdrawn by them. Yours etc. How does our attack work? Well, when a GSM phone is turned on, its identity (the IMSI) is relayed to the authentication centre of the company that issued it, and this centre sends back to the base station a set of five `triples'. Each triple consists of a random challenge, a response that the handset must return to authenticate itself, and a content key for encrypting subsequent traffic between the mobile and the base station. The base station then relays the random challenge to the handset. The SIMcard which personalises the handset holds a secret issued by the authentication centre, and it computes both the response and the content key from the random challenge using this secret. The vulnerability we planned to exploit is that, although there is provision in the standard for encrypting the traffic between the base station and the authentication centre, in practice operators leave the transmissions in clear. This is supposedly `for simplicity' (but see below). To break GSM, we transmit the target IMSI from a handset and intercept the five triples as they come back on the microwave link to the base station. Now we can give the correct response to the authentication challenge, and encrypt the traffic with the correct key. We can do this online with a smartcard emulator hooked up through a PC to a microwave protocol analyser; in a less sophisticated implementation, you could load the handset offline with the responses and content keys corresponding to challenges 2 through 5 which will be used on the next four occasions that you call. The necessary microwave test set costs about $20,000 to buy, but could be home built: it's more than an undergraduate project but much less than a PhD, and any 23cm radio ham should be able to put one together. We would have borrowed this, and reckoned on at most 3 person months for SIM-handset protocol implementation, system integration, debugging and operational testing. Given such an apparatus, you can charge calls to essentially any GSM phone whose IMSI you know. IMSIs can be harvested by eavesdropping, both passive and active; `IMSI-catchers' are commercially available. The fix for our attack is to turn on traffic encryption between the GSM base stations. But that will not be politically acceptable, since the spooks listen to GSM traffic by monitoring the microwave links between base stations: these links contain not only clear keys but also clear telephony traffic. Such monitoring was reported in the UK press last year, and now the necessary equipment is advertised openly on the net. See for example <http://www.gcomtech.com/>. The RISK for intelligence agencies? Making systems like GSM give government access to keys can have horrendous side effects (especially where this access is via channels that aren't properly documented and evaluated). These side effects can get you into serious conflict with powerful commercial interests. The RISKS for phone companies? Firstly, letting spook agencies bully you into a bad security design with the assurance that it will only compromise your customers' privacy, has as a likely side-effect the compromise of your signalling and thus your revenue. (David Wagner, Bruce Schneier and John Kelsey made this point for the US cellular system: see <http://www.counterpane.com/cmea.html>.) Secondly, most phone companies have no crypto expertise. Their security managers are largely ex-policemen or accountants, and so are unable to evaluate the security claims made by equipment manufacturers and intelligence agency representatives. Thirdly, by restricting parts of the security specification to people who signed a non-disclosure agreement, the GSM consortium deprived itself of the benefit of open scrutiny by the research community. It is this scrutiny that has led to protocols such as SSL and SET having their holes found and fixed. However, the global deployment of GSM ensured that many people would be cleared to know the design, most of which can be got anyway by observing traffic or by reverse engineering unprotected equipment. So public scrutiny was inevitable - but only after billions of dollars' worth of equipment had been deployed and the system could not changed. So the GSM security-by-obscurity strategy gave them the worst of all possible worlds. The consumer electronics industry should take note. The specific RISK for Deutsche Telekom: responding to cynicism about GSM security claims by putting up a reckless challenge and thus motivating an attack. The RISK for GSM users: that crooks running a call-sell operation will book a very expensive phone call on your account. An established modus operandi is to set up a conference call which their clients and counterparties join in succession. As the bill isn't forwarded to the service provider until the phone goes on-hook, you can end up with a five-figure bill for a call that lasted several days and involved hundreds of overseas telephone numbers. Some GSM operators (such as Vodafone) limit this exposure by terminating all calls after six hours; but your IMSI can be used on a network that doesn't do this. And of course, as with `phantom withdrawals' from cash machines, the use of cryptography will `prove' that you're liable for the bill. Ross Anderson, Cambridge University Computer Laboratory <www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14> Acknowledgement: our research students Stefan Hild, Abida Khattak, Markus Kuhn and Frank Stajano contributed in various ways to researching and planning this attack. An academic paper on the subject will appear in due course. +==============================================

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17 Dec '03

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