December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Information you need
by JCousino＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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knapsack....
by Bernardo B. Terrado 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Where could I find the algorithm (per se) for Merkle-Hellman knapsack ? (if it is not for free just say so) :) I've read in Mr. Schneier's book that Chor-Rivest knapsack is secure (unless for some specializerd attack). Is it still as secure today as the latter years? Bernie

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Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls
by x 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This brings to mind again a method of distribution that I've thought for some time and has probably been discussed on this list before. In this distribution method, as long as there is the opportunity to cooperate ahead of time and out of band, there is the potential for retaining the ability to provide access any binary data that would be subject to unwanted control. The scheme is just a variation of secret sharing and all that is necessary is for several different entities to replicate portions of the desired software, which portions in and of themselves cannot be subject to any control. For (a trivial) example take the image of PGP zipped up for download. Three different sites create a unique portion of that image for themselves, for example, each site takes every third byte, and throw in some additional obfuscation by each site XORing their portion of the image by some additional data available at a fourth site such as a collection of cypherpunk list text. It then is trivial to reconstruct the desired image from the independent sources, while none of the sources themselves can be subject to controls without having to go down the rat hole of having to define what really constitutes the restricted material -- either in all possible forms, or in terms of all possible transforms applicable to the partitioned source material. Otherwise it could be argued that there is a function and that takes the image of an ASCII representation of Herman Melville's Moby Dick into the image of PGP.ZIP and therefore Moby Dick is an export controlled item. Or is the transform the export-controlled item? Or what? Eh? At 09:38 PM 12/7/98 -0500, Robert Hettinga wrote: > > >--- begin forwarded text > > >X-Authentication-Warning: toad.com: Host localhost [127.0.0.1] didn't use >HELO protocol >To: cryptography(a)c2.net, gnu(a)toad.com >Subject: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls >Date: Mon, 07 Dec 1998 15:23:54 -0800 >From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> >Sender: owner-cryptography(a)c2.net > >The US Wassenaar initiative is an attempt to deny the public not only >all future strong crypto developments, but all existing ones. As >today's message from Denmark makes clear, the freedom-hating >bureaucrats are threatening to prosecute a citizen merely for >publishing PGP on his web page. > >Let's at least ensure that they don't eliminate *today's* strong >crypto, by replicating crypto archives behind each Berlin Wall they >threaten to erect. Today we depend on a small number of archives (in >a small number of countries) containing source and binaries for PGP, >SSH, Kerberos, cryptoMozilla, IPSEC, and many other useful crypto >tools that we use daily. > >Let's replicate these archives in many countries. I call for >volunteers in each country, at each university or crypto-aware >organization, to download crypto tools while they can still be >exported from where they are, and then to offer them for export from >your own site and your own country as long as it's legal. (The >Wassenaar agreement is not a law; each country has merely agreed to >try to change its own laws, but that process has not yet started.) > >And if at some future moment your own government makes it illegal for >you to publish these tools, after all your appeals are denied, all the >pro-bono court cases rejected, and all the newspaper coverage you can >get has been printed, then restrict your web site so that only your >own citizens can get the tools. That'll still be better than the >citizens of your country having NO access to the tools of privacy! > >(I suggest putting these tools on a Web site on a machine that you >own, rather than on a web site where you buy space from someone else. >That way there'll be nobody for the freedom-squashers to threaten >except you.) > >I'm sure that John Young's excellent http://jya.com site will be happy >to provide an index of crypto archives around the world, if people >will send him notices at jya(a)pipeline.com as your sites come up. >(Each archive should locally mirror this list, so that we won't depend >on a single site.) > >Rather than having their desired effect of squelching crypto >distribution, perhaps their overbold move can inspire us to increase >strong crypto distribution tenfold, by making it clear to the public >that if you don't keep a copy on your own hard drive, the governments >of the world will be merciless in scheming to deny you access to it. >And if crypto developers have to publish on books, or rely on >smugglers to get crypto from country to country, then at least each >country will have its distribution arrangements already ready for when >the book is scanned or the smuggler arrives. > > John Gilmore > >--- end forwarded text > > >----------------- >Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> >Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> >44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA >"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, >[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to >experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' > > >

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Re: Wei Dei's "b-money" protocol
by x 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

there must be something here that I'm missing. At the core of this protocol seems to be the establishment not of crypto anarchy but of a crypto elite. in this scheme only the processors of computing power have economic power. Now I realize that our current economic system is based on economic power being invested in a closed community of powerful elites, and is by no means egalitarian, but this looks to be like simply substituting one group of "haves" for a different group of "haves" I have to admit not being familiar with the Orthodoxy of crypto anarchy, but if the premise is a centerless self organizing system of free agents this protocol seems to miss the mark. or what is it that I am missing here? At 07:37 PM 12/5/98 GMT, you wrote: > > >Wei Dei recently announced (on cypherpunks) his "b-money, a new >protocol for monetary exchange and contract enforcement for >pseudonyms". > >Below is the text of his proposal. > >Comments to follow. > >Adam > >====================================================================== >http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai/bmoney.txt >====================================================================== > >I am fascinated by Tim May's crypto-anarchy. Unlike the communities >traditionally associated with the word "anarchy", in a crypto-anarchy the >government is not temporarily destroyed but permanently forbidden and >permanently unnecessary. It's a community where the threat of violence is >impotent because violence is impossible, and violence is impossible >because its participants cannot be linked to their true names or physical >locations. > >Until now it's not clear, even theoretically, how such a community could >operate. A community is defined by the cooperation of its participants, >and efficient cooperation requires a medium of exchange (money) and a way >to enforce contracts. Traditionally these services have been provided by >the government or government sponsored institutions and only to legal >entities. In this article I describe a protocol by which these services >can be provided to and by untraceable entities. > >I will actually describe two protocols. The first one is impractical, >because it makes heavy use of a synchronous and unjammable anonymous >broadcast channel. However it will motivate the second, more practical >protocol. In both cases I will assume the existence of an untraceable >network, where senders and receivers are identified only by digital >pseudonyms (i.e. public keys) and every messages is signed by its sender >and encrypted to its receiver. > >In the first protocol, every participant maintains a (seperate) database >of how much money belongs to each pseudonym. These accounts collectively >define the ownership of money, and how these accounts are updated is the >subject of this protocol. > >1. The creation of money. Anyone can create money by broadcasting the >solution to a previously unsolved computational problem. The only >conditions are that it must be easy to determine how much computing effort >it took to solve the problem and the solution must otherwise have no >value, either practical or intellectual. The number of monetary units >created is equal to the cost of the computing effort in terms of a >standard basket of commodities. For example if a problem takes 100 hours >to solve on the computer that solves it most economically, and it takes 3 >standard baskets to purchase 100 hours of computing time on that computer >on the open market, then upon the broadcast of the solution to that >problem everyone credits the broadcaster's account by 3 units. > >2. The transfer of money. If Alice (owner of pseudonym K_A) wishes to >transfer X units of money to Bob (owner of pseudonym K_B), she broadcasts >the message "I give X units of money to K_B" signed by K_A. Upon the >broadcast of this message, everyone debits K_A's account by X units and >credits K_B's account by X units, unless this would create a negative >balance in K_A's account in which case the message is ignored. > >3. The effecting of contracts. A valid contract must include a maximum >reparation in case of default for each participant party to it. It should >also include a party who will perform arbitration should there be a >dispute. All parties to a contract including the arbitrator must broadcast >their signatures of it before it becomes effective. Upon the broadcast of >the contract and all signatures, every participant debits the account of >each party by the amount of his maximum reparation and credits a special >account identified by a secure hash of the contract by the sum the maximum >reparations. The contract becomes effective if the debits succeed for >every party without producing a negative balance, otherwise the contract >is ignored and the accounts are rolled back. A sample contract might look >like this: > >K_A agrees to send K_B the solution to problem P before 0:0:0 1/1/2000. >K_B agrees to pay K_A 100 MU (monetary units) before 0:0:0 1/1/2000. K_C >agrees to perform arbitration in case of dispute. K_A agrees to pay a >maximum of 1000 MU in case of default. K_B agrees to pay a maximum of 200 >MU in case of default. K_C agrees to pay a maximum of 500 MU in case of >default. > >4. The conclusion of contracts. If a contract concludes without dispute, >each party broadcasts a signed message "The contract with SHA-1 hash H >concludes without reparations." or possibly "The contract with SHA-1 hash >H concludes with the following reparations: ..." Upon the broadcast of all >signatures, every participant credits the account of each party by the >amount of his maximum reparation, removes the contract account, then >credits or debits the account of each party according to the reparation >schedule if there is one. > >5. The enforcement of contracts. If the parties to a contract cannot agree >on an appropriate conclusion even with the help of the arbitrator, each >party broadcasts a suggested reparation/fine schedule and any arguments or >evidence in his favor. Each participant makes a determination as to the >actual reparations and/or fines, and modifies his accounts accordingly. > >In the second protocol, the accounts of who has how much money are kept by >a subset of the participants (called servers from now on) instead of >everyone. These servers are linked by a Usenet-style broadcast channel. >The format of transaction messages broadcasted on this channel remain the >same as in the first protocol, but the affected participants of each >transaction should verify that the message has been received and >successfully processed by a randomly selected subset of the servers. > >Since the servers must be trusted to a degree, some mechanism is needed to >keep them honest. Each server is required to deposit a certain amount of >money in a special account to be used as potential fines or rewards for >proof of misconduct. Also, each server must periodically publish and >commit to its current money creation and money ownership databases. Each >participant should verify that his own account balances are correct and >that the sum of the account balances is not greater than the total amount >of money created. This prevents the servers, even in total collusion, from >permanently and costlessly expanding the money supply. New servers can >also use the published databases to synchronize with existing servers. > >The protocol proposed in this article allows untraceable pseudonymous >entities to cooperate with each other more efficiently, by providing them >with a medium of exchange and a method of enforcing contracts. The >protocol can probably be made more efficient and secure, but I hope this >is a step toward making crypto-anarchy a practical as well as theoretical >possibility. > >====================================================================== > > >

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WE RULE!
by wbclinic＠efn.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Quick ping about Surety Technologies
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Tue, 8 Dec 1998 00:17:17 -0500 (EST) From: <Somebody> To: rah(a)shipwright.com Subject: Re: Quick ping about Surety Technologies > *That*'s interesting. Haven't heard it before. If you want, I'll bounce it > around. If you would, that would be interesting. The patent info on their web site includes: Method for secure timestamping of digital documents. U.S. Patent No. 5,136,647, issued August 4, 1992. U.S. Patent Re. 34,954, reissued May 30, 1995. The initial patent issue covers a variety of fundamental technology and algorithmic components of digital timestamping. More specifically, the claims cover: * Any use of an outside party's digital signature to timestamp a document. * The "hash-and-sign" method in which the outside party receives the one-way hash of the document to be timestamped. I distrust software patents, but even that aside, these sound really broad to me. More info at <http://www.surety.com/patent_overview.html>. <snip> <Somebody's .sig> --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 8 Dec 1998 11:39:33 GMT > From: Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> > Subject: Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls (fwd) > > And this is different from yesterday how? > > What's different is that this is Denmark now. Before it was just the > US. And Canada, France, England, China, South Africa, etc., etc., etc. It was NEVER *just* the US. > > Are you offering to put up your monies to provide any and all legal and > > other support for any such site that participates? When is your site going > > up? > > John said that people should put up per country mirrors first globally > accessible, but if required by local laws / harrassment to stop doing > that make them accessible only in the country. And this reduces their footprint with their LEA's how? > As a fall back position as I understand it, so that all the useful > crypto apps are still available. Which doesn't change my original question one whit. What is Gilmore going to do with his may resources to protect those who participate? ____________________________________________________________________ If I can put in one word what has always infuriated me in any person, any group, any movement, or any nation, it is: bullying Howard Zinn The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 08 Dec 1998 12:53:51 +0100 > From: Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.shen(a)stud.uni-muenchen.de> > Subject: Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls > Tim Griffiths wrote: > > > However I 'export' PGP from the US, I'm exporting it, even if I have a > > web site for each bit, 0 or 1 being determined by whether Clinton has > > a cigar or not in a posted picture. > > Hence the best way, once there are strict export regulations, is not > to export. One moves rather knowledge (thought) across the country > boundaries and there build locally the desired software. That's why > I believe it will be increasingly more essential for the future to > have good crypto algorithms that are very simple to describe and > implement. Interesting aspect to a cypherpunks archive. Archive the software as well as the technical documentation required to write it from scratch. ____________________________________________________________________ If I can put in one word what has always infuriated me in any person, any group, any movement, or any nation, it is: bullying Howard Zinn The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls (fwd) > Date: Tue, 8 Dec 1998 14:11:14 +0100 (NFT) > From: ulf(a)fitug.de (Ulf =?iso-8859-1?Q?M=F6ller?=) > According to Jim Choate: > > > And this is different from yesterday how? > > It is different in that it has been legal to distribute PGP and any > other public domain and mass market crypto software from Denmark > up to now. Ah, so the call is for folks in Denmark to post the various pieces of currently available software then, not everyone on the planet as it appears. Don't think so. He's asking that people put PGP and other available software on their websites without the current export controls. If he's not then he's not doing anything except blowing empty bugles because people are already doing what he's asking for. In that situation he's after reputation capital, personal gain. > > Are you offering to put up your monies to provide any and all legal and > > other support for any such site that participates? When is your site going > > up? > > John Gilmore's RSAREF site went up about a year ago. Your point being what? Exactly what it states above. If you don't get it to bad. RSAREF is not quite what he is asking folks to do now is it. Bottem line, Gilmore is asking folks to run out and put their livelyhood and their life at risk. What's he going to do for those who comply with his request? Let me ask you this Ulf, when is YOUR site going up? When will YOU be the first European repeater for the CDR? Your address implies you're in Denmark. What are you going to do for YOUR liberty today? Has Gilmore agreed to help fund YOUR fight of the change in your courts? Bottem line, when will you get off your butt and put your neck in the noose like many of the rest of us? The reality is that the change in Denmark's law changes the global picture very little. Now when Denmark quites letting people IMPORT PGP *and* places like the US quite letting people export it in some media (currently paper & ink) then you'll have cause to really be indignent. ____________________________________________________________________ If I can put in one word what has always infuriated me in any person, any group, any movement, or any nation, it is: bullying Howard Zinn The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 08 Dec 1998 02:28:18 -0800 > From: x <x(a)x.com> > Subject: Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin > Walls > >1. What is the point of the obfuscation? If it's not legal to do it > >openly, then it's certainly not legal to hide the fact your doing it. > >"The accused did it in such a way as to demonstrate that he was aware > >of it's illegality". > > the point is not to hide anything; the point is to expand, arbitrarily (and > this was a trivial example), the f() that takes bits from a controllable > image to one that is not. In other words, hide it. A distributed stego hash algorithm. It quacks like a duck. It waddles like a duck. It swims like a duck. It would actualy be criminal collusion and would give the LEA's in the relevant areas the necessary reason (ie probable cause) to act in concert, creating a bigger big brother. Hardly a cpunks goal. ____________________________________________________________________ If I can put in one word what has always infuriated me in any person, any group, any movement, or any nation, it is: bullying Howard Zinn The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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