December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

tyranny of corporations
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message Date: Sun, 06 Dec 1998 16:11:08 -0700 From: Robert Weissman <rob(a)essential.org> To: Multiple recipients of list CORP-FOCUS <corp-focus(a)essential.org> Subject: corporation nation Exxon merges with Mobil. Citicorp marries Travelers. Daimler Benz gobbles up Chrysler. BankAmerica takes over NationsBank. WorldCom eats MCI. Corporations are getting bigger and bigger, and their influence over our lives continues to grow. America is in an era of corporate ascendancy, the likes of which we haven't seen since the Gilded Age. Charles Derber, a professor of sociology at Boston College, believes that, contrary to the lessons our civics teacher taught us, it is undemocratic corporations, not governments, that are dominating and controlling society. In his most recent book, Corporation Nation (St. Martin's Press, 1998), Derber argues that the consequence of the growing power of giant corporate multinationals is increased disparity in wealth, rampant downsizing and million dollar CEOs making billion dollar decisions with little regard for average American. A couple of years ago, Derber wrote The Wilding of America (St. Martin's Press, 1996) in which he argued that the American Dream had transmuted into a semi-criminal, semi-violent virus that is afflicting large parts of the elites of the country. That book tried to call attention to the extent to which violent behavior could be understood as a product of oversocialization. "The problem was not that they had been underexposed to American values, but that they could not buffer themselves from those values," Derber told us. "They had lost the ability to constrain any kind of anti-social behavior -- because of obsessions with success -- the American Dream." By anti-social behavior, Derber means the epitome of Reaganism -- "a kind of warping of the more healthy forms of individualism in our culture into a hyperindividualism in which people asserted their own interests without regard to its impact on others." At the time, Derber was interviewed on a Geraldo show about paid assassins - - -- people who killed for money. "It was scary to be around young people who confessed to killing for relatively small amounts of money -- a few thousand dollars," Derber said. "They said things like -- 'you have to understand, this is just a business, everybody has to make money.' I pointed out on the show that this was the language that business usually uses." At the same time, Newsweek ran a cover story titled "Corporate Killers." On the cover, Newsweek ran the mug shots of four CEOs who had downsized in profitable periods and upped their own salaries. "These corporate executives tended to use the same language as the paid assassins on the Geraldo show, 'I feel fine about this because I'm just doing what the market requires,'" Derber explains. "I develop an analogy between paid assassins on the street and those in the suites. In the most general sense, these corporate executives are paid hitmen who use very much the same language and rationalization. I argue that corporations are exemplifying a form of anti-social behavior which is undermining a great deal of the social fabric and civilized values that we would hope to sustain." With the hitmen parallel fresh in his mind, Derber began writing Corporation Nation. In it, Derber points to the parallels between today and the age of the robber barons 100 years ago -- the wave of corporate mergers, the widening gulf between rich and poor (Bill Gates' net worth (well over $50 billion) is more than that of the bottom 100 million Americans), the enormous influence of corporations over democratic institutions, both major parties bought off by big business, and a Democratic President closely aligned with big business (Grover Cleveland then, Bill Clinton today). One big difference between then and now: back then, a real grassroots populist movement rose up to challenge corporate power, though it did not succeed in attaining its core goals. Today, while there are many isolated movements challenging individual corporate crimes, there is no mass movement attacking the corporation as the cause of the wealth disparity, destruction of the environment, and all the many other corporate driven ills afflicting society. Derber, a professor of sociology at Boston College, says that when he asks his students, "Have you ever thought about the question of whether corporations in general have too much power," they uniformly say they have never had that question raised. Derber says that one good way to again build a populist movement to attack corporate power is to study the language and tactics of the populists of 100 years ago. He has, and he makes clear in his book that the original conception of the corporation was one of a public -- not private -- entity. We the people created the corporation to build roads, and bridges, and deliver the goods. If the corporation didn't do as we said, we yanked their charter. The corporate lawyers quickly got their hands around that idea, smashed it, and replaced it with the current conception of the corporation, a private person under the law, with the rights and privileges of any other living and breathing citizen. Thus, a quick transformation from "we decide" to "they decide." Derber is a bit too modest to say it, so we will: perhaps the best way to rebuild a strong, vibrant and populist movement is to get this book into the hands of people who care about democracy. The corporations have us on the run, but we should pause for a moment or two, find a quiet place, and read this book. Russell Mokhiber is editor of the Washington, D.C.-based Corporate Crime Reporter. Robert Weissman is editor of the Washington, D.C.-based Multinational Monitor. (c) Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman Focus on the Corporation is a weekly column written by Russell Mokhiber and Robert Weissman. Please feel free to forward the column to friends or repost the column on other lists. If you would like to post the column on a web site or publish it in print format, we ask that you first contact us (russell(a)essential.org or rob(a)essential.org) Focus on the Corporation is distributed to individuals on the listserve corp-focus(a)essential.org. To subscribe to corp-focus, send an e-mail message to listproc(a)essential.org with the following all in one line: subscribe corp-focus <your name> (no period). Focus on the Corporation columns are posted on the Multinational Monitor web site <www.essential.org/monitor>. Postings on corp-focus are limited to the columns. If you would like to comment on the columns, send a message to russell(a)essential.org or rob(a)essential.org. - - ------=_NextPart_000_0027_01BE20F3.6E8982C0-- - - --------------81265CC28DD038A0DC2CB928-- - ------- End of Forwarded Message ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Re: What was the quid pro quo for Wassenaar countries?
by Joel O'Connor 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As Karl Marx said also, "Democracy is a slow form of communism." That's why the forfathers decided to make us a republic, something many have forgotten. ---HyperReal-Anon <nobody(a)sind.hyperreal.art.pl> wrote: > > "Phillip Hallam-Baker" <hallam(a)ai.mit.edu> writes > > John Gilmore may be right, but remember folks that in Europe we > have this thing the Greeks invented called democracy. One of the > ideas of democracy is that decisions are not made in secret closed > meetings. > > Yes, and people democratically demand government enforcement of the > majority will, something made more difficult if the subjects have > strong cryptography. > > As Donn Parker observed several years ago, strong cryptography is > inconsistent with democracy. (Published in Scientific American --- > reference on request.) > > John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> writes > > Some countries actually seem to care what their citizens think > about their crypto laws, unlike the shining example of democracy, > the USSA. And when we educate the citizens, they tend to make the > right choices. Let's keep trying. > > But don't educate them too much, or they will understand that > cryptography can set people free, and if people were free there would > be no political government, and if there were no political government > their social security checks would stop coming, along with all their > other government ``benefits''. > > == Ogre bounces like sonar. . .Peace. Ogre _________________________________________________________ DO YOU YAHOO!? Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com

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DCSB: Ira Heffan and Mike Schmelzer; "Software Patents" and Digital Commerce
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: rah(a)pop.sneaker.net Date: Mon, 7 Dec 1998 13:02:59 -0500 To: dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu, dcsb-announce(a)ai.mit.edu From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: DCSB: Ira Heffan and Mike Schmelzer; "Software Patents" and Digital Commerce Cc: Ira Heffan <heffan(a)tht.com>, Mike Schmelzer <schmelze(a)tht.com>, Roland Mueller <roland(a)secunet.com>, "Jonathan J. Rusch" <rusch1(a)erols.com> Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Digital Commerce Society of Boston Presents Ira Heffan and Mike Schmelzer Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault, LLP "Software Patents" and Digital Commerce Tuesday, January 5th, 1999 12 - 2 PM The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston One Federal Street, Boston, MA Although the very idea of patenting software seems to be an anathema to much of the programming community, patents on software continue to stream out of the U.S. Patent Office. Everyone involved in digital commerce applications, which are by definition software-based, probably has heard about recent events: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided "State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group," which explicitly ratified patenting methods of doing business, and a spate of well-publicized patents have issued claiming to cover such concepts as the virtual shopping cart and the reverse auction. As a prerequisite to discussing these recent developments, the first part of our talk will provide an introduction to patents. We will explain what patents are and what they are not, and describe the business goals that a patent can serve. Then we will talk about current events, and attempt to put the _State Street_ case in context. We will present a survey of recently-issued patents (suggestions welcome) related to digital commerce, and conclude with some speculation about current trends, including a novel form of software patent with potentially huge implications. Ira Heffan (heffan(a)tht.com) and Mike Schmelzer (schmelze(a)tht.com) are patent attorneys at Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault, LLP (http://www.tht.com) We will be presenting our own personal views on this topic, and not the views of Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault, LLP or its clients. This meeting of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston will be held on Tuesday, January 5, 1999, from 12pm - 2pm at the Downtown Branch of the Harvard Club of Boston, on One Federal Street. The price for lunch is $32.50. This price includes lunch, room rental, various A/V hardware, and the speakers' lunch. The Harvard Club *does* have dress code: jackets and ties for men (and no sneakers or jeans), and "appropriate business attire" (whatever that means), for women. Fair warning: since we purchase these luncheons in advance, we will be unable to refund the price of your lunch if the Club finds you in violation of the dress code. We need to receive a company check, or money order, (or, if we *really* know you, a personal check) payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", by Saturday, January 2nd, or you won't be on the list for lunch. Checks payable to anyone else but The Harvard Club of Boston will have to be sent back. Checks should be sent to Robert Hettinga, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02131. Again, they *must* be made payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", in the amount of $32.50. Please include your e-mail address, so that we can send you a confirmation If anyone has questions, or has a problem with these arrangements (We've had to work with glacial A/P departments more than once, for instance), please let us know via e-mail, and we'll see if we can work something out. Upcoming speakers for DCSB are: February Roland Mueller European Privacy Directive March Jonathan Rusch Internet Fraud We are actively searching for future speakers. If you are in Boston on the first Tuesday of the month, and you would like to make a presentation to the Society, please send e-mail to the DCSB Program Commmittee, care of Robert Hettinga, <mailto: rah(a)shipwright.com>. For more information about the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, send "info dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto: majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu> . If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto: majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu> . We look forward to seeing you there! Cheers, Robert Hettinga Moderator, The Digital Commerce Society of Boston -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.5.5 iQEVAwUBNmwX/8UCGwxmWcHhAQFfjgf+IBe01g9XCldZYT+GRDI5ho1sOPgL6W7q zLDQToz0GGM/NZzv44SMTSGpDFx80R1yautvy4xHMnYQy2UnvO2WGsfrjuwSdQte 8qxoRAFkihyP/mi/83As2TwWdp6QhwbjI02hyP6elsdSzsspflwwonOB4I+8E/xX UDsGdQH4AHaWrK1S5XYfJSHSRGOBpk2+cqboiGvbcbC1z0vDRGrnztf8GADoPVC3 6vw4M00f+cgIuoaqqO4ol62Os6D+WPVw2NMop20OD62EGzYO2pyQjboPvBLxyRD7 smLz/4S598uLZF0GX+GO/8rCjAORask/Qt3SFIU2HMMPj9nKIvVtJw== =gz6w -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' For help on using this list (especially unsubscribing), send a message to "dcsb-request(a)ai.mit.edu" with one line of text: "help". --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: tyranny of corporations (was: Corporate Nations)
by Steve Schear 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The hitman image certainly rings true for some top execs I've met. I recall a session with a corporate sociologist many years ago (the company was going through one of those team-building bullshit affairs). I had completed a psychological profile tests and we were reviewing the results. She was given to occasional black humor and on this particular occasion told me she has some good news and some bad news, asking which I prefered hearing first. I selected the good news, whereupon she said that my profile was an exact match with those who reach the highest levels of the corporate world. Then the bad news, its also the profile of a master criminal. I kid you not. As to hyperindividualism, Robert Bork covered this topic in his recent book Slouching Toward Gamorah. In it he identified two idiological diseases infecting America: radical equality and radical egalitarianism (i.e., hyperindividualism). Both, in his opinion, are a result of a warped evolution of 20th Century liberalism. Since many in our society seek to emulate these hitmen (i.e., get a piece of the rock at any cost) and have no more scruples themselves than those to whom they aspire, anonymous betting pools could harness the more extreme members in a populist fashion to counterbalance our new age robber barrons and politicians. The solution to hyperindividualism isn't regulation (which can be blunted or co-opted by those with the bucks) but allowing those below to profitably advance at the expense of those at the top. Dynamic equilibrium in a new marketplace. Sort of like the way Klingons get field rank advancements. --Steve

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At a Comic Shop near you...
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This may or may not be of interest... Spy v.s. Spy action figures are now available! There is a black spy and a white spy (sorry, no grey spy). Each comes with lots of gadgets (knives, blackjacks, saws and a bomb). Each spy has "bomb throwing action". They are distributed through comic shops at the moment. They sold out pretty quick where I got mine, so you will not want to wait if you want one. --- | Bill Clinton - Bringing back the Sixties one Nixon at a time! | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | | | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/ |alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com|

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DSA for encryption
by Bennett Haselton 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I'm working on an enhancement to a Web-based program that allows you to circumvent proxy server censorship by sending a request for a Web page to a computer in the outside world that is not blocked by the proxy, and having that computer re-send a copy of the banned page back to you. The current version of the software, written by Brian Ristuccia this past summer, is at http://ians.ml.org:8801 where you type a URL into the form, submit it, and the resulting page has a URL like: http://ians.ml.org:8801/aHR0cDovL3d3dy55YWhvby5jb20= instead of http://anon.free.anonymizer.com/http://www.yahoo.com/ which is what Anonymizer gives you, which makes it obvious what you were looking at to anyone who looks through the proxy server logs. Of course, any manufacturer of Internet censorship proxy server software could easily add ians.ml.org to their list of blocked sites (as they have all already done with Anonymizer), so the idea would be for people to get their friends to set up port-forwarding programs on computers that were not blocked by the censoring proxy, and those could be set up to relay requests between the IANS server and the computer behind the proxy server. The general outline for this scheme is at http://www.peacefire.org/bypass/Proxy/ and the current version of IANS ("Internet Alternate Name Space") is part of the way towards implementing this (theoretically) bulletproof solution. The major pending improvements to the IANS software are (1) the URL is not truly encrypted; the garbled characters in the URL above just represent some basic scrambling to evade detection by people who sweep their proxy server log files for keywords, (2) even if the URL were really encrypted, when you first fill out the form, the URL is submitted to IANS in the clear, so it could be detected by any censoring proxy server that logs data submitted by GET or POST. One Internet censorship proxy server called SmartFilter already does this and blocks you from submitting *any* banned URL's using GET or POST, so IANS does not work with SmartFilter, for example. I am working on a JavaScript form that could be used on the client side to solve this problem. We would like to use DSA to encrypt the requests sent using IANS, since I've heard DSA can be used for encryption without royalties, unlike, for example, RSA. Does anybody know of a Web page that explains how the DSA algorithm can be used for encryption, as opposed to message signing and authentication? I found a page at http://www1.shore.net/~ws/Extras/Security-Notes/lectures/authent.html that describes the DSA algorithm for signature verification. I have looked very hard but have been unable to find a page about how to use DSA for encryption. Can anyone help? I know there is software like GNU Privacy Guard that implements DSA for encryption, but the source code is 3 megabytes and I was hoping there was a page that explains the process more simply than that. -Bennett bennett(a)peacefire.org (615) 421 5432 http://www.peacefire.org

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Re: What was the quid pro quo for Wassenaar countries?
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One thing which came to me recently when I was trying to figure out what sort of gun the US held to the rest of the world's head to get them to agree to this: Could the Wassenaar outcome have been a sign of Echelon in action? Consider this: Delegates from each country have been travelling to Vienna for some months now to negotiate their countries position. During the negotiations, they'll be contacting their governments via phonecalls carried over microwave trunks, satellite links, or undersea cables to discuss the progress of the negotiations and what position they should take. Just like the negotiations which lead to the Five-Power Treaty in 1921, if one country had the ability to intercept all the other countries communications it would know how far they could be pushed, and where the most resistance was likely to come from, allowing greater amounts of "persuasion" to be concentrated on them. I can't think of a more appropriate application of Echelon (use worldwide surveillance technology to perpetuate the usefulness of worldwide surveillance technology), and it would go some way towards explaining the very peculiar agreement which was reached. Peter.

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FWD: Read this. Now. And *act* on it. (was re: Building cryptoarchives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls)
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It's time, folks. They can't win if we do anything at all, but they *will* win if we do nothing. Robert Hettinga --- begin forwarded text X-Authentication-Warning: toad.com: Host localhost [127.0.0.1] didn't use HELO protocol To: cryptography(a)c2.net, gnu(a)toad.com Subject: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls Date: Mon, 07 Dec 1998 15:23:54 -0800 From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> Sender: owner-cryptography(a)c2.net The US Wassenaar initiative is an attempt to deny the public not only all future strong crypto developments, but all existing ones. As today's message from Denmark makes clear, the freedom-hating bureaucrats are threatening to prosecute a citizen merely for publishing PGP on his web page. Let's at least ensure that they don't eliminate *today's* strong crypto, by replicating crypto archives behind each Berlin Wall they threaten to erect. Today we depend on a small number of archives (in a small number of countries) containing source and binaries for PGP, SSH, Kerberos, cryptoMozilla, IPSEC, and many other useful crypto tools that we use daily. Let's replicate these archives in many countries. I call for volunteers in each country, at each university or crypto-aware organization, to download crypto tools while they can still be exported from where they are, and then to offer them for export from your own site and your own country as long as it's legal. (The Wassenaar agreement is not a law; each country has merely agreed to try to change its own laws, but that process has not yet started.) And if at some future moment your own government makes it illegal for you to publish these tools, after all your appeals are denied, all the pro-bono court cases rejected, and all the newspaper coverage you can get has been printed, then restrict your web site so that only your own citizens can get the tools. That'll still be better than the citizens of your country having NO access to the tools of privacy! (I suggest putting these tools on a Web site on a machine that you own, rather than on a web site where you buy space from someone else. That way there'll be nobody for the freedom-squashers to threaten except you.) I'm sure that John Young's excellent http://jya.com site will be happy to provide an index of crypto archives around the world, if people will send him notices at jya(a)pipeline.com as your sites come up. (Each archive should locally mirror this list, so that we won't depend on a single site.) Rather than having their desired effect of squelching crypto distribution, perhaps their overbold move can inspire us to increase strong crypto distribution tenfold, by making it clear to the public that if you don't keep a copy on your own hard drive, the governments of the world will be merciless in scheming to deny you access to it. And if crypto developers have to publish on books, or rely on smugglers to get crypto from country to country, then at least each country will have its distribution arrangements already ready for when the book is scanned or the smuggler arrives. John Gilmore --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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NEW Reuters story (fwd)
by Jukka E Isosaari 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sat, 5 Dec 1998 23:50:55 +0000 From: Dave Bird <dave(a)xemu.demon.co.uk> Reply-To: ukcrypto(a)maillist.ox.ac.uk To: ukcrypto(a)maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: NEW Reuters story In article <896C7C3540C3D111AB9F00805FA78CE2013F85F3@MSX11002>, Brown, R Ken <brownrk1(a)texaco.com> writes >r [sent to crytpo list, and to CIV LIBS DISCUSS] Yahoo! News http://dailynews.yahoo.com/headlines/wr/story.html?s=v/nm/19981203/wr/ privacy_1.html Thursday 3 December 1998 12:38 PM ET Europe readies police techno-surveillance law By Niall McKay SAN FRANCISCO (Wired) - The European Union is quietly getting ready to approve legislation that will allow the police to eavesdrop both on Internet conversations and Iridium satellite telephone calls without obtaining court authorization. The legislation is part of a much wider memorandum of understanding between the EU, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Norway, a nonmember European nation. That agreement allows authorities to conduct telecom surveillance across international borders, according to a Europol document leaked to members of the European Parliament. ``Security measures are often necessary in the cases of terrorism or organized crime,'' said Glyn Ford, a member of the European Parliament for the British Labour Party and a director of the EU's Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs Committee. ''But what we need is some sort of democratic control. It seems to me that many security services are a law unto themselves.'' That will presumably be a topic of discussion when the European Council of Ministers meets behind closed doors Thursday to update a 1995 wiretap agreement known as the Legal Interception of Telecommunications Resolution. If approved, it would permit real-time, remote monitoring of email, as well as of calls placed on satellite telephone networks such as those maintained by Iridium and Globalstar. Unlike most laws in Europe, the agreement will allow law enforcement to listen in without a court order. ``This is a US export,'' said Marc Rotenberg, director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center. ``It's a European version of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act.'' The act, passed in 1984, was intended to allow law enforcers to tap the digital lines of tomorrow, just as they tap analog phone lines now. Ironically, in September, the European Parliament called for account- ability of Echelon, the US National Security Agency's spying network that is reportedly able to intercept, record, and translate any electronic communication-telephone, data, cellular, fax, email, or telex. Under European law, representatives of each member nation can pass legally binding resolutions. Further, the resolutions don't require the approval of either the European Parliament or the individual parliaments of EU members. Many European Parliament members are outraged that the Council of Ministers has been acting in secret. They are especially concerned about the inclusion of non-EU nations in the agreement. Patricia McKenna, a representative for Britain's Green Party, will raise the issue in Parliament this week. She also intends to ask Europe's Justice and Internal Affairs Council to ''justify the secrecy and lack of consultation surrounding these initiatives.'' McKenna is requesting what she described as an ``open debate on the crucial and far-reaching measures, with enormous potential impact in the realm of privacy.'' Another member of the European Parliament believes that the so-called ``update resolutions'' will have staggering implications for personal privacy. ``This legislation is not just a technical update,'' said Johannes Voggenhuber, an Austrian representative for the European Parliament. ``It places the onus on the telecommunications carrier to provide a watertight back door to police.'' The European Council for General Security prepared the amendment with technical assistance from the FBI, according to the Europol document leaked. The four major satellite telephone operators-Iridium, Globalstar, Odyssey, and ICO-will be required by the law to provide access to European law enforcement through ground stations in France, Italy, England, and Germany. Iridium officials could not be reached for comment. It is unclear how the memorandum of understanding will affect US citizens. ``I find it very hard to believe that a foreign nation-any foreign nation-could eavesdrop on US citizens,'' said John Pike, a security analyst with the Federation of American Scientists. ``It's one thing for the FBI to try and track terrorists across international borders, but it's entirely another to let Europeans tap US citizens' telephones.'' The FBI would neither confirm nor deny any relationship between the United States and the other nations involved in the memorandum of understanding. However, Rotenberg said such provisions are already in place under the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act. While the new European law is being sold to EU member states as a means of combating what the legislation calls ``serious and organized'' crime, there is no clear definition of this phrase. ``It simply concerns any punishable offense,'' said Tony Bunyan, director of Statewatch, a European civil liberties group. (Reuters/Wired) |~/ |~/ ~~|;'^';-._.-;'^';-._.-;'^';-._.-;'^';-._.-;||';-._.-;'^';||_.-;'^'0-|~~ P | Woof Woof, Glug Glug ||____________|| 0 | P O | Who Drowned the Judge's Dog? | . . . . . . . '----. 0 | O O | answers on *---|_______________ @__o0 | O L |{a href="news:alt.religion.scientology"}{/a}_____________|/_______| L and{a href="http://www.xemu.demon.co.uk/clam/lynx/q0.html"}{/a}XemuSP4(:)

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AU Wassenaar Wassenaar changes
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[OK to repost to crypto lists and Cryptome - dant] I spoke this afternoon with one of the Australian delegates at the Wassenaar meeting, an official from the Dept of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). Speaking off the record, they confirmed the changes at Wassenaar are pretty much as we know already: - NEW CONTROLS on mass market crypto products (hardware and software); - DEREGULATING all weak encryption products using key lengths up to 56 bits; - EXEMPTING mass market software where the key length is 64 bits or less; - EXTENDING the same mass market exemption to hardware for the first time; - EXCLUDING encryption products that protect intellectual property, such as digital watermarking; - NO DECISION was made about regulating 'intangible' distribution of technology, including Internet downloads. Apparently in the short term the intangibles issue is being considered in other fora (including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which includes Australia thanks to Filthy Jabilucre et al). It is still not clear whether the new restrictions are intended to stop public domain software such as PGP*. The DFAT contact said there was no discussion about an intention to stop public domain packages like PGP. They did not think public domain was being restricted. Yet apparently the Australian DoD has expressed the David Aaron view that public domain is subject to the same restrictions as mass market. * PGP is "in the public domain" for the purposes of Wassenaar/DSGL, since the definition states: "in the public domain" (GTN NTN GSN), as it applies herein, means "technology" or "software" which has been made available without restrictions upon its further dissemination (copyright restrictions do not remove "technology" or "software" from being "in the public domain") Note: there is no equivalent definition for "mass market", but the General Software Note (GSN) states it thus: Generally available to the public by being: 1. Sold from stock at retail selling points, without restriction, by means of: a. Over-the-counter transactions; b. Mail order transactions; or c. Telephone order transactions; and 2. Designed for installation by the user without substantial support by the supplier; Dan ===== Dan Tebbutt, Technology Journalist, Melbourne Australia Australian Personal Computer (http://www.apcmag.com) LAN Corporate IT (http://www.lanlive.com) The Australian (http://www.newsit.com.au) Ph: +61-3-9347-8893 Fax:+61-2-9264-6320 Email: dant(a)acp.com.au "The revolution will be televised ... on pay-per-view."

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