December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Fascist censorship
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

I notice that both my highly crypto-relevant, flame-free article and Igor Chudov's response to it were rejected by the fascist moderator Sandfart and showed up immediately on the cypherpunks-flames address. Apparently Sandfart automatically rejects any submissions with my name in them. Or he's already dead from AIDS and has been replaced by a 'bot. I also notice that John Gilmore's employees from Cygnus Support are flaming me on sci.crypt and accusing me of homophobia. Please help expose Cygnus Support as a homosexual fraud. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

1 0

Re: David Kahn advocates GAK
by Declan McCullagh 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

It is indeed a shame, and Carl's response was (of course) excellent. The last chapter of the revised edition of the Codebreakers is reasonably pro-government in the way it lays out the issue of key escrow, so perhaps we shouldn't be surprised. (I'm told that David's sojourn at the NSA museum was unexciting; they wouldn't tell him much.) :) -Declan On Wed, 22 Jan 1997, Carl Ellison wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > It might also be that David's year long sabatical at NSA's crypto museum > which recently ended put him in touch with people who believe in GAK. > > I found it interesting that he noted the argument that each additional > day of government access is a good thing. This is the kind of belief > we know that NSA holds -- a.k.a. "not on my watch" -- but I haven't seen > it publicly admitted before. > > - Carl > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.6.2 > > iQCVAwUBMuZ35lQXJENzYr45AQEcfwQAqMftG0DXn1nr6faA6IHeAtqSXYanwnZb > DiwqppU4nJqPtIvtFw8eOVVwyYCzIv046dFtwR2mk8HeL1v8I3R2sWm7waknFjlm > TM84+vLamlVnBNPUAXRYOrFiEhPQm/iitR4GVrcga9mHJ+vrI38XQGzi0lxdg310 > pWjq5Fxahag= > =xhF7 > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > > +------------------------------------------------------------------+ > |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)acm.org http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | > | PGP 2.6.2: 61 E2 DE 7F CB 9D 79 84 E9 C8 04 8B A6 32 21 A2 | > +-Officer, officer, arrest that man. He's whistling a dirty song.--+ > > >

1 0

P.S. David Kahn's editorial today
by Carl Ellison 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I just sent the following P.S. to newsday.com ---------------------- There is another reason to have cellular phones which encrypt only the over-the-air portion of a call, besides the fact that we can leave normal wiretap access procedures in place and not surrender civilian crypto keys to the government. If I have a cellular phone which encrypts over the air (between the phone and the base station) and I call you, while you have a normal wired phone, our call is protected by cryptography from interception off the air. If I use an AT&T Clipper-style cellular phone, as David suggested, and I call you on a normal wired phone, we can't encrypt the conversation and it is vulnerable to interception. The protection works *only* if both parties have encrypting phones while interoperate. - Carl -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMubl6lQXJENzYr45AQEYagQAmVL47KGCHUyee8246VjGqr7+uubTBhHA s/TtgFiMW7a9W5jbni5ov+kjTDeGpRULfrbyEwYR2fd1E1laNeu+EAQkE56KuU9g iiB0S7TBd290MSHJZ6wQUWsDVgCzOi9gHbCQwY+GMQMXKfphuC4kDavwdSxjAXAM MeZsitFRM1w= =TzsP -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- +------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)acm.org http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | | PGP 2.6.2: 61 E2 DE 7F CB 9D 79 84 E9 C8 04 8B A6 32 21 A2 | +-Officer, officer, arrest that man. He's whistling a dirty song.--+

1 0

Re: Fighting the cybercensor. (fwd)
by Mark M. 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Wed, 22 Jan 1997, Jim Choate wrote: > 'We' shouldn't, it is their own country and it is up to their populace to > stop it. Do you really want Singapore or China having a say in how we run > our web? I certainly don't, and won't support any move to force any > particular view on them. I don't want China or Singapore to have a say in how the web is run which is exactly why I would support any effort to make their filtering systems useless. What I put on my web page is my business and I can change the location of the URL as many times as I want and try to make it as difficult as possible to filter it. These countries have no say in whether or not I can do this. If they want to censor their Internet feed, that's their problem and I'm under no obligation to make it easy for them. > Bull, the web was conceived so physicist and other researchers could share > data in a easily digestible format. The web and technology in general have > no more ethics or morality intrinsicly in them than a 5/8" open end > wrench. Blocking and filtering are an expression of human choice and the > implimentation thereof. If it's forced upon the people, it's not a choice. Ultimately, the people can abolish the government if it becomes tyrannical, but not without a lot of lives being lost. I'd much rather try to make sure that people in these countries have free access to information than watch people getting crushed by tanks. > You don't like it, don't live there and don't try to > call there. You or I have no more right to be on a Chinese or Singapore > Internet than they have in coming into yours or my home without an > invitation. These countries want the benefits of being connected to the Internet without the burdens of the citizens having free access to information. It just doesn't work that way. They can pull the plug if they want. If they don't, then they have no right to complain about how people are smuggling subversive information into their respective countries. If the information was "uninvited", then nobody would be downloading it or accessing it anyway. Countries that want to censor their internet connections have the choice of either facing extreme economic difficulties as a result of not being connected to the Internet, or giving their people access to information that the government doesn't want these people to access. Either way, it will force these countries to change in some way. I think most of them will eventually settle for the latter choice. Allowing these countries to censor their connections will result in violence that could otherwise be avoided. Mark -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMubkGSzIPc7jvyFpAQGAjAf8D5rdpWYSde9wAcMYvwIqVBQ1+O1692AN x8BOCzv8SYAA+4fA/zHZ4uEetxCikPP7ZF1Nr/K8Tmq5iK7Ed78jvHNj+FXZUB4q oRKolBTmmgkivO1NAKiNtV/NbSFlW+IV88VGZBPx7dwKjJ4JnpR/1HmwtScuQE14 O32NoQTO+6ujmALROdLTr3cGZo6iLl9pC4ZyFZtgTNSzQswT53usXnYkJ8bKlWC6 oj6XY18Jopyx0d2WAmN5pFX2goTnfQSH/Bw6XzDxDGdZNyIY5VxSPynd3018Slgs KH61gRRQ7ilPF4SyKiu+eH0Bvr6NbKonj60NFX0LzbYBDc1OWMYT2Q== =u+Ou -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: Encrypting ZIP drives?
by Vin McLellan 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> who is usually answering questions, wrote: >>>I am looking for a transparent (strong) encryption of ZIP drives. >>>Any advice would be appreciated. <snip> >Parallel on Win95. Hi Lucky, RSA has got their Win95 version of SecurPC. That's 128-bit RC4 encryption; maybe 10X the speed of DES. You could encrypt your zip data from Explorer either on demand, or automatically upon exiting WIN95. (It auto-decrypts on startup.) SecurPC doesn't yet have transparent (fully background) crypto, but given the market pressures, it obviously won't be long in coming. SecurPC does have a number of other unusual features that might offset the lack of transparency. My favorite: At least until the next version of ERA;-) RSA's SecurPC permits you to ship data over the US borders encrypted with 128-bit RC4 in a self-extracting file which can be opened by anyone, anywhere -- with the same OS as the sender, and the right (one-time?) password -- even if they don't have a copy of SecurPC. The key, passed out of band, is certainly not up to PKC standards... but for occasional connections, if you duck the dictionary attack, it looks pretty damn sturdy. One-way symmetric-- kinda neat! (Anyone know how it really works? I got a copy of the v1 user's manual from SDTI, where I do a lot of contract work -- but it doesn't really explain the split of functions. I'll have to ask.) Suerte, _Vin

1 0

Re: Fighting the cybercensor. (fwd)
by Jim Choate 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Wed, 22 Jan 1997 23:08:41 -0500 (EST) > From: "Mark M." <markm(a)voicenet.com> > Subject: Re: Fighting the cybercensor. (fwd) > > On Wed, 22 Jan 1997, Jim Choate wrote: > > > 'We' shouldn't, it is their own country and it is up to their populace to > > stop it. Do you really want Singapore or China having a say in how we run > > our web? I certainly don't, and won't support any move to force any > > particular view on them. > > I don't want China or Singapore to have a say in how the web is run which is There is no 'the web'. I run a Internet site which is connected 24 hours a day at my expence which contains a web site. If you think that is 'your' web then drag your ass to Austin, TX. and start paying the $600 of bills each month for 'your' web. Quit thinking that what you have and want is what everyone else has or wants. Grow up. The goal is to keep THEM from bothering YOU, not the otherway around, they will take care of that using the same tools and techniques you do. > exactly why I would support any effort to make their filtering systems useless. > What I put on my web page is my business and I can change the location of the And you don't have a right to tell them what to do with their computers or their citizens. > URL as many times as I want and try to make it as difficult as possible to > filter it. These countries have no say in whether or not I can do this. If And you should have no say in what they do with their resources. > they want to censor their Internet feed, that's their problem and I'm under no > obligation to make it easy for them. And their under no obligation to let you run around and force your views on them anymore than you would accept that sort of behaviour from them. Wake up, what goes around, comes around. > If it's forced upon the people, it's not a choice. Which people? Who is doing the forcing? If Singapore citizens are content to let Singapore officials filter their newsfeeds or whatever that is Singapores business, not yours. It acts as a concrete real-world object model on how NOT to do it here, nothing else. Whether you like it or not both people and governments have a fundamental right to make mistakes. It comes with the territory. Loose this fantasy you have that there is one way to run the world, there isn't. People are entirely too diverse for any single view to rule for any length of appreciable time irrespective of how much force might be used to promulgate it. > Ultimately, the people can > abolish the government if it becomes tyrannical, but not without a lot of lives > being lost. I'd much rather try to make sure that people in these countries > have free access to information than watch people getting crushed by tanks. Who made you responsible for them? If you are responsible for them then you are responsible for me? Not in your wildest wet dream junior. You simply aren't that important in the scheme of things. You can't have one without the other. The tree of liberty has to be watered with blood. Your position is that as long as it isn't your blood then it is ok. Other people have the same right. Personaly, I don't like the idea of other people deciding that it is time to spill my blood to water their tree. The point of the exercise, left up to the student to resolve, is to avoid this entire scenario, not shift the blame to some other entity. > > You don't like it, don't live there and don't try to > > call there. You or I have no more right to be on a Chinese or Singapore > > Internet than they have in coming into yours or my home without an > > invitation. > > These countries want the benefits of being connected to the Internet without > the burdens of the citizens having free access to information. It just doesn't > work that way. It works whatever way the people doing it want it to run. Let me say it again, GOVERNMENTS ARE PEOPLE MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT PEOPLE, INCLUDING THEMSELVES, WHICH THEY BELIEVE ARE IN THEIR BEST INTEREST. IF IT DOESN'T FIT WITH YOUR PARTICULAR IMAGE OF WHAT 'BEST INTEREST' IS, TOUGH SHIT. > They can pull the plug if they want. If they don't, then they > have no right to complain about how people are smuggling subversive information > into their respective countries. Then we have no right to complain about Columbian drug cartels, Russian contraband nuclear weapons, sarin nerve gas promulaged by Japanese religious zealots, etc. Let me say this again, A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF ALL LIVING BEINGS IS TO PROTECT THEMSELVES THE BEST WAY THEY SEE FIT AGAINST A PERCEIVED THREAT TO THEIR CONTINUED EXISTANCE. IT MAKES NO DIFFERENCE IN THE SHORT TERM IF THAT THREAT IS REAL OR NOT. > If the information was "uninvited", then > nobody would be downloading it or accessing it anyway. This is silly and completely misleading. > Countries that want to censor their internet connections have the choice of > either facing extreme economic difficulties as a result of not being connected > to the Internet, or giving their people access to information that the > government doesn't want these people to access. Either way, it will force > these countries to change in some way. I think most of them will eventually > settle for the latter choice. Allowing these countries to censor their > connections will result in violence that could otherwise be avoided. Really? Where is your object model? Seems like we get in a situation where we are using violence against people with the reason being we are protecting them against violence. Now THAT sounds like some sort of neo-Nazi bullshit. You should apply for work at the DEA, you would pass their psych screens with flying colors. I have three quotes you might do well to ponder while you plan your next over-throw... "Study nature, not books" Louis Agassiz "The best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity." Yeats "You are What you do When it counts" The Masao Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

1 0

Furniture Catalog
by afc＠furnituredirect.com 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

http://www.furnituredirect.com - Advanced Furnishing Concepts We are the Internets largest furniture retailer. With thousands of items to choose from, you're sure to find just what your looking for in a short time. Our on-line catalogs are designed to be very simple to browse. No complicated menus, frames or other complexities, just a simple format to get you right to where you want to go. Secure Ordering for your protection, or call us at 1-800-407-8273 to order. REGISTER FOR MONTHLY CONTEST ! WIN $100 ! Reply Remove if you wish.

1 0

P.S. David Kahn's editorial today
by Carl Ellison 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I just sent the following P.S. to newsday.com ---------------------- There is another reason to have cellular phones which encrypt only the over-the-air portion of a call, besides the fact that we can leave normal wiretap access procedures in place and not surrender civilian crypto keys to the government. If I have a cellular phone which encrypts over the air (between the phone and the base station) and I call you, while you have a normal wired phone, our call is protected by cryptography from interception off the air. If I use an AT&T Clipper-style cellular phone, as David suggested, and I call you on a normal wired phone, we can't encrypt the conversation and it is vulnerable to interception. The protection works *only* if both parties have encrypting phones while interoperate. - Carl -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMubl6lQXJENzYr45AQEYagQAmVL47KGCHUyee8246VjGqr7+uubTBhHA s/TtgFiMW7a9W5jbni5ov+kjTDeGpRULfrbyEwYR2fd1E1laNeu+EAQkE56KuU9g iiB0S7TBd290MSHJZ6wQUWsDVgCzOi9gHbCQwY+GMQMXKfphuC4kDavwdSxjAXAM MeZsitFRM1w= =TzsP -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- +------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)acm.org http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | | PGP 2.6.2: 61 E2 DE 7F CB 9D 79 84 E9 C8 04 8B A6 32 21 A2 | +-Officer, officer, arrest that man. He's whistling a dirty song.--+

2 1

Re: Encrypting ZIP drives?
by Vin McLellan 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> who is usually answering questions, wrote: >>>I am looking for a transparent (strong) encryption of ZIP drives. >>>Any advice would be appreciated. <snip> >Parallel on Win95. Hi Lucky, RSA has got their Win95 version of SecurPC. That's 128-bit RC4 encryption; maybe 10X the speed of DES. You could encrypt your zip data from Explorer either on demand, or automatically upon exiting WIN95. (It auto-decrypts on startup.) SecurPC doesn't yet have transparent (fully background) crypto, but given the market pressures, it obviously won't be long in coming. SecurPC does have a number of other unusual features that might offset the lack of transparency. My favorite: At least until the next version of ERA;-) RSA's SecurPC permits you to ship data over the US borders encrypted with 128-bit RC4 in a self-extracting file which can be opened by anyone, anywhere -- with the same OS as the sender, and the right (one-time?) password -- even if they don't have a copy of SecurPC. The key, passed out of band, is certainly not up to PKC standards... but for occasional connections, if you duck the dictionary attack, it looks pretty damn sturdy. One-way symmetric-- kinda neat! (Anyone know how it really works? I got a copy of the v1 user's manual from SDTI, where I do a lot of contract work -- but it doesn't really explain the split of functions. I'll have to ask.) Suerte, _Vin

1 0

Re: Decision in Karn Case
by Anonymous 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

> http://www.epic.org/crypto/export_controls/karn_decision_1_97.html > [...] > In light of the recent Executive Order transferring > regulatory authority of non-military cryptographic computer > source code to the Commerce Department, and the Commerce > Department's promulgation of a new regulation under the authority > of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. secs. > 1701 et seq., we remand this case to the district court to > consider the reviewability of and, if appropriate, the merits of > appellant's claim under the Administrative Procedure Act. And when that review finally reaches the appeals court, the administration can move the regulations to the state department. The uniqueness of the anti-crypto regulations is that it is a law against intellectuals and academics. These people will not be willing to break the law and then challenge its constitutionality in the courts, or engage in any kind of civil disobedience demonstration. The author of premail, for example, is doing a weird kind of civil *obedience* demonstration to protect the laws. As long as that continues the government can get away with playing their shell game. By the way, what exactly happend to D.J. Bernstein's and the EFF's threat to seek an injunction from Judge Patel if the new regulations were not put on hold subject to constitutional review by January 2? No updates at www.eff.org. Did EFF strike another deal with the government?

1 0