December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

IP: Navy investigating GSU computer hacker
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: Navy investigating GSU computer hacker Date: Wed, 30 Sep 1998 12:42:56 -0500 To: believer(a)telepath.com Source: Savannah Morning News http://www.savannahmorningnews.com/smn/stories/093098/LOCgsuhacker.html U.S. Navy investigating GSU computer hacker University computer was used to break into a government computer. By Jenel Williams Few Savannah Morning News Someone used a Georgia Southern University writing and linguistics department classroom computer to break into government files and the U.S. Navy wants to know why. The Naval Criminal Investigation Office is looking into a computer hacking case at Georgia Southern University, according to Bryan Stamper, special agent in charge at the Jacksonville, Fla., office. John Glacier, assistant director for technical support at Georgia Southern, said the school was recently asked to find out which of its computers was used to access computer files from a government agency. "We believe it was from our model classroom during a scheduled classtime," Glacier said. He tracked the school's computer records and discovered that someone used a computer in the writing and linguistics department's model classroom to hack into a government computer while a class was in session. "They ran a file transfer protocol program, which allows you to download files and gain access to someone else's computer," Glacier said. Details about the Navy's investigation will be made available at a later date. Computer hacking can carry serious federal penalties, according to Federal Bureau of Investigations Special Agent William Kirkconnell. An innocent infiltration may not merit any punishment, but using a computer to steal classified government information could be considered espionage, he said. "It depends on what agency was affected, whether it was done maliciously and whether the information was used for criminal purposes," he said. Glacier said he does not know who used the campus computer to break into government files or how much information was accessed. "They wouldn't say if files were downloaded or uploaded," Glacier said, referring to bringing information into the GSU computer or taking information from the GSU computer and sending it to another one. "They haven't questioned any students." Although he doesn't know the culprit's motivation, Glacier said these types of incidents often occur among bright, curious students. "College-age students want to apply the knowledge they have gained about computers," he said. "What they've learned in high school and college intuitively generates curiosity and they want a challenge." Last year, in a similar incident, Glacier said a hacker tried to hide some computer mischief by calling a Georgia Southern computer and linking up to computers from the Philippines to the Midwest before breaking into government files. "It alarms me that we would be used that way, but it occurs around the world and it's not too hard to use computers this way," Glacier said. Higher education reporter Jenel Williams Few can be reached at 652-0325. Web posted Wednesday, September 30, 1998 ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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IP: Chinese Govt Bans Controversial Clinton Book
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: Chinese Govt Bans Controversial Clinton Book Date: Wed, 30 Sep 1998 09:16:35 -0500 To: believer(a)telepath.com Source: US Newswire http://www.usnewswire.com/topnews/Current_Releases/0929-126.txt PRIMA: Chinese Government Bans Controversial Clinton Book U.S. Newswire 29 Sep 15:06 PRIMA Publishing: Chinese Government Bans Controversial Clinton Book To: National Desk Contact: Diana Banister of Craig Shirley & Associates, 800-536-5920, pager: 703-816-9368 WASHINGTON, Sept. 29 /U.S. Newswire/ -- The following was released today by Prima Publishing: Chinese authorities have refused to allow three publishing houses to translate a new book -- "The Clinton Syndrome, The President and the Self-Destructive Nature of Sexual Addiction" by California-based Prima Publishing. The book takes a clinical look at the life and behavior of Bill Clinton and explains why the president would risk his presidency for a sexual relationship with an intern. "We have been told that the Chinese government does not want to make a book of this kind available in China because they consider it unfavorable to President Clinton," says Robin Taylor, rights associate at Prima Publishing. "The Chinese authorities apparently don't understand why Americans treat their president just like any other person and allow citizens to write about their government leaders." In "The Clinton Syndrome," Jerome D. Levin, Ph.D., a psychotherapist, addictions specialist and professor, assesses the character of a man so driven by a sexual addiction that he would risk his presidency to fulfill a desperate need for reassurance and validation of his worth. Prima does not consider the Clinton Syndrome an "anti-Clinton" book. In fact, Dr. Levin voted for President Clinton twice and agrees with his policies. But he still believes the president is in serious need of help for a classic case of sexual addiction. "We work with foreign publishers around the world on numerous books," says Taylor. "Never have we had the subject matter of a book impede its publication in a foreign country. But I guess it's understandable when you consider the relationship between the Clinton administration and the current Chinese government." "The Clinton Syndrome," published by Prima Publishing of Rocklin, Calif., is available in bookstores nationwide. For more information or to schedule an interview with Dr. Jerome D. Levin or a Prima spokesman, please call Ciana Banister at 800-536-5920. -0- /U.S. Newswire 202-347-2770/ 09/29 15:06 Copyright 1998, U.S. Newswire ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ----------------------- ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer **********************************************

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by emailking.associates＠cwix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Flowers for Alger Anon - FPP#3 The two youths ducked quickly behind a tree to avoid being spotted by the senile old fart who had finally given up on finding his shoes and climbed barefoot up the step-ladder to begin drilling out the cannon muzzle on the War Surplus Army Tank he had recently acquired. As he labored he mumbled grouchily to himself about how he was going to "show that Commie Bastard, Igor", and all of the other former residents of The Home(TM) what he thought of their efforts to take over "his" CypherPunks Mailing List. "Distributed, my ass!" the old fart scowled as he climbed down the ladder, then grinned madly as he patted the stack of shells sitting next to the tank. "I'll distribute those bastards...They should'a Checked The Archives", he said, pausing to scratch his head and add, "TradeMark". Then continuing, "before they fucked with me. Then they'da seen how I ChopChopped them Torah- Torah Bastards when they tried to muscle in on my list." "It's 'mine'!" the grouchy, paranoid old fart shouted, turning his head around quickly in all directions, as if challenging, and half-expecting, Unseen Beings to dispute his claim. The two youngsters ducked and tried not to giggle as they ran down the hill, finally collapsing on the dirt road near the bottom and venting their laughter. Tim C. May was the most hilarious of the Cypher Punks they'd investigated so far, but 'all' of the CPUNX were "more than suitable", as Carol Anne Cypherpunk had declared while they were evaluating Jim Choate, "for slicing and buttering, and placing on a tray of Christmas snacks." Blanc Weber had agreed heartily with the new coconspirator (sometimes spelled with a hyphen), in their 'Quest to Question Anonymity', as the Army o' Dog-Bitch Battallion Warrior Godesses, as they had proclaimed them- selves, had Code Named their Chosen Mission From Dog. Carol Anne, choosing Androgyny over Anonymity, changed her name to Carroll for The Mission, vowing to balance the Tao by taking on any tasks requiring "male energy", which, on a CypherPunks Mission From Dog(TM), Carroll stated with a straight face, might include "blowing Dimitri". The Girls(Maybe) split a gut laughing over Blanc's reply that, being of a more peaceful nature than the 'Nuke DC Clique', they might have to "blow" their way out of dangerous situations by the use of Soft Targets rather than with Heavy Weaponry. Then they decided to get serious, before they, too, became candidates for The Home. Blanc Weber, a veteran Cypher Punk Cult of One Neophyte(TM) had felt slighted when the Author, a relative newcomer to the CPUNX list (at least under his 'TOTO' persona), had chosen to initiate two male Cypher Punks, Back and McCrackin, into his 3-Entity Circle of Eunuchs Gorilla Cell, instead of including Blanc, who had established a fairly close rapport with TOTO in their private email exchanges. Even more to Blanc's surprise, disappointment, and suspicion, TOTO failed to respond even to her offer to engage in joint Army of Dog Maneuvers with him across various Electronic Boundaries of the InterNet. She had begun to suspect that TOTO's lack of response to her Digital Warrior overtures were the result of something more sinister than simple male chauvinism. Her suspicions were confirmed when she caught up with TOTO, using his CJ Parker alias, at Defcon 6.0, as he was Pontificating, under the guise of 'Chief Cypher Punks Spokes Person', on the 'Anonymizer', for a guillible group of young hackers. "It is run by a HedgeHog riding Lance's Coat Tails, since Lance invented that thing that hangs on the back of toilet bowls, and the Anonymizer is the Blue Thing that hangs on the back of the hard drive. Blanc, stunned that TOTO, who claimed to be the Author, was a Total Fucking Moron (TM), listened as he continued . "The Anonymizer prevents Peeping TOMS from being able to tell whose hairy dick is making a bad smell on the carpet of the recipient's computer, after No Mail from NoBody comes out of the Email Chutechute. Blanc realized that CJ Parker was also a Total Fucking Lunatic(TM) as he glanced furtively around to whisper a dire warning to the spellbound young hackers hanging on his everyword. "And the Peeping Toms are everywhere. "As a matter of fact", he added glancing quickly over both shoulders, "when you can't see them at all..." he paused for effect, "...then you know that they're 'good'". "Real good", he added, turning to direct his wild-eyed stare at Blanc, who had just finished going through his knapsack while he was distracted. Blanc had hurried away, deeply disturbed by what she had found in TOTO's bag. It wasn't just stationery from The Home--it was 'personalized' stationery from The Home for the Criminally Insane. Blanc Weber's confusion and suspicions deepened when her attempts to warn other CPUNKS about TOTO were ignored by all except the few apparent females on the list, such as Carol Anne Cypherpunk and World Renowned Bottle Collector Lynn Harrison (who was long rumored to have joined the male-dominated mailing list only as a forum to trade her panties to young CPUNX in the throbbing throes of puberty, in return for the Standard Issue Klien Bottles, they received upon joining the Digital Anarchist Union, Local 01, rumored to be headquartered in Bienfait, Saskatchewan). When The Girls(Maybe) of the Bitch Battallion took to the road to investigate the remaining CypherPunks, they quickly discovered that 'all' of the verifiable Meat Space Personalities they positively linked to the various Cyperpunks Consistent Net Personas (TM) were, in fact, certifiably Cuckoo Cock Suckers(TM) in MeatSpace Reality. With the only readily apparent link between them being their connection to the Home for the Criminally Insane. Some of the MeatSpace Personalities behind the Digital Personas on the CPUNX Mailing List--Ian Goldberg, Alec de Jeune, Ulf Moeller, Peter Trei and Jim Choate--were Highly Social Sociopaths, capable of putting ona suit and tie, if need be, and glad-handing business people and purchasing agents (all the while slitting their sleeping throats, in the Dark Corners of their mind). John Gilmore, Declan McCullagh, Robert Hettinga, Vin McClellan, even Froomkin--all of the Mainstream Dream/Actively Connected To Society/Cypherpunks MeatSpace Verifiable Identities, without fail, shared the same connection to The Home as id the Lithium Dream/Social Outcast CPUNX Meatballs such as T.C. May, A.T. Hun, Wm Geiger III, S. Sequencr, JYA, and the late Dale Thorn (whose mysterious death was rumored to be the work of the Shadowy Figures(TM) lurking behind the ctrl-alt-delete.com website). Blanc and Carroll watched in total amazement as Jim Choate's ludicrous/inane computer and business theories seemed to be somehow transformed, by unseen hands working behind the scenes, into fully functional and viable RealWorld(TM) concepts, in Choate's work with the Armadillo Group. The Unseen Hands made The Girls(Maybe) very, very nervous. What pushed the Army of Dog-Bitch Battalion Warrior Godesses beyond nervousness, toward Paranoia & Fear, was the fact that the MeatSpace Personalities behind the Digital Personas of the CypherPunks inevitably appeared to be verifiable outside of The Home 'only after the CPUNKS PERSONA'S original appearance on the mailing list'. A Cloaked Anonymous Random Source(TM) that The Girls(Maybe) knew only as Digital Throat, speaking to Larynx in an UnderGround Reptilian Nazi Parking Garage in DC (after having been fooled into believing she was talking to Defcon McCullagh Chain Saw). told them, "I was the head of the Personelle Department at Intel, at the time Tim May claims to have been there. "Even though we couldn't spell the name of our Department right, let alone the names of the employees, I never forget a face, and Tim C. May definitely was never employed at Intel. "As a matter of fact", Digital Throat revealed, "when Intel's Legall Department sent Mr. May a letter that warned him to Cease & Decist with his claims, he showed up on our doorstep, barefoot, in a MailMan's Uniform, with a Veritable ShitLoad(TM) of heavy weapons and arms, and, after that, as far as most of us were concerned, if Tim c. May said he was the goddam 'President' of Intel, then he was the goddam President--end of story." Blanc Weber and Carol Anne Cypherpunk found the same patterns repeated time and again in their investiga- tions of CypherPunks MeatSpace Ident Histories. Records, Information and Data-- such as birth certificates, school records, credit and employment histories-- were not only 'existant', but were inevitably 'consistent' with claims made in posts to the CPUNKS mailing list, in regard to the MeatSpace Ident Histories behind the Digital Personas. However, once The Girls(Maybe) had begun researching the Human Historical Records of the MeatSpace Ident Histories--speaking to alleged friends, family, coworkers, and the like--the paper Trails quickly unravelled, and the Physical Ident Histories of ALL of the male subscribers to the CypherPunks Disturbed Male LISP were, in the end, traceable 'only' back to the Home... <EOF>

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FW: I thought of an initialy regulated industry!... (fwd)
by Trei, Peter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> -----Original Message----- > From: Blanc [SMTP:blancw@cnw.com] > Sent: Monday, October 05, 1998 12:10 AM > To: 'Cypherpunks Distributed Remailer' > Subject: RE: I thought of an initialy regulated industry!... (fwd) > [...] > > Free market economices don't "work", simply because they are run by > humans, who regularly suffer > psychological breakdowns, envy, and mistakes of judgement, not to mention > disreputable marketing > departments. Regulated economies, however, are run by government drones, > and are therefore perfect > vehicles which, with unfailing success, make all of their captive > customers happy. > [four paragraphs of well written irony removed] For those interested in a thoughtful (though slightly one sided) look at this issue, I strongly reccomend PJ O'Rourke's new book 'Eat the Rich'. He examines several locations (US, Sweden, Albania, Cuba, Russia, Hong Kong, Shanghai) in an attempt to figure out why (economically) "some places suck and others don't" His bottom line is that the rule of law (especially contract law) is critical, as well as democratic government. He's much more interested in on-the-ground economic experience than in government figures, and is the only economics writer who can make me laugh out loud. He does have his blind spots - I would have liked to see what he makes of Singapore. Peter Trei [Excuse the lousy formatting - I'm using a Microsoft product]

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Review of TriStrata Public Information
by Bruce Schneier 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Review of TriStrata Public Information 1 Introduction Over the past several months, a new company called TriStrata has been getting substantial press for a new "one-time pad" cryptography system. Most of these press reports took at face value the company's claims about their technology and product, and did not try to analyze whether or not they were true. Counterpane Systems believes it is important to dig under the hype and figure out what the real story is behind their technology. We reviewed the publicly available documentation on TriStrata, and found a system whose architecture is that of an early-1970s pre-public-key cryptography security system. Central servers, upon which the security of every message rests, must be kept absolutely secure; yet they run on Windows NT. These servers are all powerful, in that they can forge messages, rewrite audit logs, fake authentication, and lie about anything else in the system. Users cannot access their files unless they are connected to this server. TriStrata does not use a one-time pad at all, and none of the security proofs about a one-time pad apply to their system. Their reliance on this encryption technology forces them to use security protocols long abandoned by the rest of the security industry. Even their performance enhancements bely the fact that encryption is rarely the bottleneck in any communications system. Note: For a less-technical summary of this review, please see sections 4.0, 4.1, and 5.0. 2.0 The TriStrata System 2.1 Structure The TriStrata system uses a centralized server, called the TESS (TriStrata Enterprise Security Server). The documentation is not very clear, but document reference 3 suggests that each company would have its own TESS. Every encryption or decryption operation requires a "permit" from the TESS. To encrypt a file or message: 1. The user contacts the TESS over the network. This can be any type of network, such as the Internet or a local area network. 2. The user and the TESS authenticate each other using a proprietary protocol called Private Access Line (PAL). 3. The TESS sends a permit to the user machine, which is used to encrypt the file or message. The TESS also sends a "seal" to the user. This seal is only readable by the TESS. 4. The user simply stores the seal with the file (if it is encrypted locally), or sends the seal along with the encrypted message (if it is to be transmitted to another user). To decrypt a file or message: 1. The user retrieves the seal and sends the seal to the TESS (along with the authentication data from the PAL protocol). 2. The TESS opens the seal, and determines whether the user is allowed to decrypt the data. 3. If the user is allowed to decrypt the data, the TESS sends a decryption permit to the user. 4. The user's local machine uses this permit to decrypt the file or message. The TESS keeps full audit logs of all operations, and includes procedures that allow designated recovery agents within the company to recover the keys to any file. The system is claimed to provide identification (who is using the system), authentication (who sent a message), access control (restriction of access to authorized users), integrity (assurance message is unaltered), and non-repudiation (sender cannot deny having sent it). They have received an export license for their system. 2.2 Authentication The authentication method used to authenticate the user to the TESS and vice versa is a crucial part of the security architecture. The TriStrata documentation contains no further information than that this is handled by the Private Access Line protocol. 2.3 Encryption Algorithm The Random KeyStream (RKS) encryption algorithm used by TriStrata is hailed as "a new fundamental technology." It is claimed to be very fast, but the documentation only contains raw speeds, without documenting which platform these speeds were achieved on. The encryption technology is also claimed to be unconditionally secure. To quote the web site: "No matter how much mathematical analysis or computing power is applied to the cryptanalysis of RKS, there is simply no algorithm and no underlying pattern to break. As Herbert Yardley foresaw in 1931, cryptography as a profession is dead." 3.0 Our Comments 3.1 The Central Server Structure Cryptographic systems that use a central access control server are nothing new. The Kerberos protocol uses a central server for similar tasks. Using such a central server as the TESS has several advantages and disadvantages. The main advantages are: - There is a central place that administrates all the access rights. This makes various administrative tasks easier. - Revocation of access is automatically supported by the system. No separate revocation mechanism is necessary. - The central server can keep comprehensive auditing logs of security-related operations. The main disadvantages are: - The central server contains confidential information, namely the master keys that can decrypt any file. It is thus a very tempting target for attack. The central server must be very well protected. At the same time, the server must be reachable from across the network, and must be reliable, as nothing can work without a functioning server. The end result is a server that is expensive (due to all the requirements) and that still is an obvious point of attack. - The central server is a single point of failure. TriStrata uses a redundant server structure with fail-over, so that a second server takes over when the first fails. A fail-over structure protects against technical errors, but does not necessarily protect against denial-of-service attacks. The TESS is based on a "security hardened" version of Windows NT, an operating system that is not known for its resistance to malicious attacks. - The system is effectively a closed system. Only users who are registered at the server can partake in the system. It is not clear how two users that belong to different servers would communicate. The TriStrata documentation mentions electronic commerce extensively, but it does not discuss how two users at two different companies can use the TriStrata system to communicate with each other. - Since the server contains crucial confidential information, every company must run its own server. A failure of the server, such as a leak of the master keys from the server, can reveal all of the company's information. This is the kind of task that should not be outsourced. In contrast, the key server of a public-key-based system is much easier to outsource as it can be designed so as not to be critical for security. - The TriStrata solution does not allow a user that is off-line to access any encrypted files. A salesman that keeps his data encrypted on his portable computer cannot access the data without contacting the TESS. If he cannot get network access for some reason (e.g., on an airplane, mismatched phone plug, etc.), he cannot access his own files. The TriStrata solution is a return to a very old style of centralized key management. For some applications this is a good solution, but there are many situations in which a centralized server is not appropriate. For example, one function that a central server cannot do well is non-repudiation between adversarial parties (one of the critical functions in electronic commerce). The TESS system seems to provide non-repudiation through inspection of the logs of the TESS. But if a message is sent between two companies, which TESS do they use? The company that owns the TESS that is used can manipulate the logs in their own favor. The end result is that there is no watertight proof that the message was sent or received. In effect, this solution takes us back to the days before public-key cryptography. Since its invention in the late 1970s, the ideas of certificates, public key infrastructure, decentralized key management, separation of encryption and digital signature functions, etc., have all been implemented in response to insecurities in centralized systems. For example, public-key infrastructures use trusted third parties like the TESS, but in a public-key system, compromise of the trusted third party only allows an attacker to issue false certificates, not to decrypt and read messages. 3.2 Authentication We have no further information on the PAL protocol. The documentation does state that the communication with the TESS consists of a single message from the user to the TESS, and a single reply back. Elsewhere it says that the TESS is stateless, which makes it easy to do a fail-over should one TESS fail. It is not clear to the reviewers how the PAL protocol works, if we assume it consists of two messages and is stateless for the TESS. These two properties together would suggest that an attacker can replay requests to the TESS. If nothing else, this introduces fake entries in the audit log. Some of these attacks can be hindered by the use of local clocks, but every solution along these lines we have ever seen is always troubled by clock synchronization problems. We note that the PAL protocol is critical for the security of the overall system. If an attacker can impersonate another user, then he can request the proper permit from the TESS to decrypt a file, and will get access regardless of the security of the actual encryption algorithm. The PAL protocol deserves careful scrutiny before the TriStrata system is put to use. The most straightforward attack against the TriStrata system is to introduce some hostile code into the client's PC (for example, a virus or Trojan horse). This hostile code can then steal the necessary authentication information and send it back to the attacker. This type of attack is a generic attack against any security system, not just the TriStrata system, but it shows that the "provable security" is at best limited to a small part of the system and does not extend to the whole system. 3.3 Encryption To put it bluntly: the TriStrata system does not use the one-time pad system (Vernam cipher) for encryption. A true one-time pad uses a random key that is distributed through a separate secure channel. While a one-time pad is, in fact, theoretically unbreakable when used properly, the details of using it properly make it entirely unusable in any modern commercial or military setting. A true one-time pad gains its unbreakable security from the fact that the key is as long as the message. Since all keys are equally likely, and a particular ciphertext could represent any message, given a particular key, the ciphertext reveals nothing about the plaintext message without the correct key. These random keys must be entirely random; this usually requires generating them from some external random source (such as thermal noise or radioactive decay). And both the sender and the receiver must have this secret key, which must be exchanged in some fashion which the attacker cannot penetrate. The requirement that the keys be as long as the data to be exchanged and that the key needs to be transported via some secure mechanism makes the one-time pad system entirely impractical. In order to send a 1 MB message, the sender and receiver must exchange a 1 MB-long key. Then the sender could send the message and the receiver could use the key to decrypt it. The key would then have to be thrown away and never used again. If the sender wanted to exchange messages with a hundred people, he would have to pre-agree on different keys between each recipient. For a company with a thousand employees, this means that there are 499,500 different key sets, which need to be replenished any time they are exhausted by message exchange. Because the key has to be as long as the message, there is no way to use an established system to exchange more keys, since in order to securely send as 1 MB key a user needs 1 MB of additional pre-agreed key. (And if users can exchange these keys, why can't they just exchange the messages?) This means that all keys have to be exchanged via some other mechanism (such as a courier). This kind of system was used for the U.S.-Soviet teletype "hot line" and it is occasionally used for paper ciphers and spies, but that's it. There is no way in which a true one-time pad can be implemented over a computer network. From the information provided by TriStrata, we believe that the encryption method used is a keystream method where an algorithm generates a key stream which is then XORed with the plaintext to generate the ciphertext. This is known as a pseudo one-time pad, and is also called an OFB stream cipher. One of the modes of DES works in this manner, as does the RC4 encryption algorithm. This is not new technology. A pseudo one-time pad encryption algorithm can be secure, but claiming that it is secure because it is based on the one-time pad is ridiculous. The strength of the cipher algorithm depends on the method used to generate the key stream. The speed given for the encryption method is fairly fast, but without knowing what platform was used to achieve these speeds, no sensible comparison can be made. To give some comparison material: the leading candidates for the AES block cipher encryption standard can encrypt data in about 18 clock-cycles per byte on a Pentium II. A standard 350 MHz desktop machine thus achieves nearly 20 Mbytes per second. This compares to the TriStrata claimed speed of 36 Mbytes per second for a standard desktop machine. The TriStrata figures are faster, but only by a factor of two. This would be a nice speedup, but it does not present a fundamental breakthrough in speed. Reference 4 is a magazine article report that contains more information about the encryption algorithm. As with any magazine article, the accuracy of the information is hard to judge. Nevertheless, the information it provides fits well with the information we have from TriStrata. The TESS generates a single 1 Mbyte block of random data using a hardware random number generator. This block is distributed to all clients. (A second block is used for authentication, but we have no further information on the algorithm.) The encryption algorithm keeps several pointers into this random block and derives the random key stream from the data the pointers point to. This is a known technique, first used by Maurer in his randomized cipher [Reference 5]. The TriStrata documentation talks about a virtual keystream of over 10^30 bytes, which would correspond to 5 pointers into a 1 Mbyte block. This suggests an effective key size of at most 100 bits. On the other hand, the website also claims that it would take 3.5 x 10^33 years to defeat one TriStrata-encrypted message, which would suggest either a larger key space or a fundamental misunderstanding of the mathematical properties of Maurer's system. The random block is the same for all the clients. It has to be, as the client that does the decryption needs the same random block as the client that does the encryption (and sending 1 Mbyte blocks around in the permit is too slow). Therefore, we cannot view this random block as a secret. After all, a secret shared amongst thousands of users is not a secret any more. If we want a more conventional representation of the encryption algorithm, we can represent the random block as a randomly generated 20 by 8-bit S-box. We have no knowledge about the details of this encryption algorithm, but the most straightforward variants of this type are susceptible to a meet-in-the-middle attack on the pointer space. This could reduce the effective key size to as little as 60 bits. The journalist did a speed test of TriStrata's file encryption utility. On a 200 MHz Pentium Pro, 128 MB RAM and PCI Ultra-SCSI disk subsystem it encrypted a 58 MB file in 18 seconds. This corresponds to a speed of 3.2 Mbytes per second. Presumably this speed is limited by the speed of the disk I/O. On this platform a traditional encryption algorithm such as Blowfish can encrypt at 10 Mbytes per second; the super-fast RKS encryption is presumably faster than this. Although this test does not give us any real speed data, it does show that encryption speed is not the bottleneck in most situations. In this situation, the disk I/O is much slower than the cryptography, making the encryption speed irrelevant. 3.5 Proprietary Encryption Algorithms The nature of cryptography is such that there is no way to prove that a cipher is secure, since this amounts to proving a negative assertion: that there is no way to break it easily. Anyone, from the most unsophisticated amateur to the best cryptographer, can create an algorithm that he himself can't break. What is hard is creating an algorithm that no one else can break, even after years of analysis. And the only way to prove that is to subject an algorithm to years of analysis by the best cryptographers around. Because of this situation, the only recognized criterion for secure cryptographic systems is peer review: having other cryptographers examine a cipher and attack it. Even cryptographic organizations which operate in secret, such as the NSA, have an extensive internal peer review system. >From past experience we know that systems that are kept secret and presented as "provably secure," "unbreakable," "a new fundamental technology," or "one-time pad" are usually not very good at all. Those who say these things generally do not understand the current state-of-the-art of mathematical cryptography, and make fundamental mistakes in their system design. Encryption algorithms that are unpublished have a dismal record. The literature is littered with the corpses of encryption algorithms that were broken once they were published. Until TriStrata publishes its algorithm and it is open to peer review there is no professional reason to presume it is secure. 4.0 The Real Problem in Security Systems It is interesting to note that TriStrata gives a lot of attention to the encryption algorithm. From all the problems that security systems face at the moment, the encryption algorithm is probably the least important one. There are many good encryption algorithms available in the published literature that can be used for free. TriStrata chose to develop their own algorithm. Although this can be a lot of fun, it is a decision that is hard to justify, as new algorithms can only be considered secure after an ample time of peer review. Cryptographic systems are broken constantly, but the attacks are almost never against the algorithms. The really difficult problems in security systems are key distribution, management, reliability, robustness, etc. TriStrata uses the solution of having a central server, as necessitated by its choice of encryption technology. This solution is suitable in some situations, but there are many problems that cannot be handled by this approach. In fact, the problems associated with central servers and centralized key distribution have been driving the development of public-key--based systems for the last two decades. TriStrata, by implementing a Maurer-style randomized stream cipher and the centralized key management it requires, has taken the one piece of the cryptographic puzzle that we can solve--symmetric encryption--and made what they perceive to be security improvements. However, they did this at the expense of the really hard problems in cryptography...ones that their system does not seem to adequately solve. 4.1 Trust and Security Systems Whenever someone buys a commercial product, he is trusting that the manufacturer did a good job designing and building the product. This is especially important with security products. If someone buys a word processor and it does not perform as advertised (e.g., the print function does not work), he will eventually notice (he won't be able to print his documents). If someone buys an encryption product, it can function normally (encrypting and decrypting documents successfully), but that is no indication that it is secure. Security is completely separate from functionality, and no amount of beta testing can ever uncover a security flaw. In the commercial world, we rely on the public review process to evalute the security of systems. Internet security infrastructures, such as IPSec, PKIX, and SSL, have been discussed and debated for years. Versions have been proposed, security flaws have been found, fixes have been implemented, and so on. Cryptographic algorithms in these protocols are ones that have been around for years, and have had extensive cryptographic review by the best in the field. Even this is no guarantee of security--implementation flaws are found (and fixed) in the code that implements these protocols, but it establishes a certain degree of confidence. TriStrata has chosen to ignore all public standards in favor of their own proprietary technology, while at the same time refusing to make technical details of their technology public. In order to use their system, the purchaser must trust that their cryptographers are better than the collective wisdom of the world's academic cryptographers, that their protocol designers are better than everyone who has worked on the open Internet protocols over the last few years, that their implementers are better than everyone who has made and evaluated the public implementations of those protocols. The purchaser must trust that TriStrata's misuse of the academic terminology does not reflect a misunderstanding of that technology, and that their technology is so much better than what everyone else has agreed upon that it makes sense to make that leap of faith. In the end, a star-studded board of directors and upper management does not obviate the need for good science, open systems, and peer review. It's simply foolish to trust a system that has not been evaluated. 5.0 Conclusions A system like TriStrata's can be made to work within its limitations. It is certainly not the universal solution to the world's security problems. However, there is a huge amount of hype and very little substance to the documentation. Many of the statements made are incomplete, vague, or suggest facts which cannot be true. The cryptographic claims are wild and unsubstantiated. Parts are clearly written by someone who does not understand modern cryptography, and who is not well versed in the cryptographic literature. Certain areas of the documentation give the impression that they were written with the intent to deceive the reader, but ignorance is probably a better explanation. Based on past experience with systems that made similar unsupported security claims, we are very skeptical about the security of the TriStrata system. We reviewed the system as we have reconstructed it from various hints in the text, as well as conversations with people who have been involved with the system. Until TriStrata releases technical information about its product, it is not possible to give a complete evaluation of their technology. References: [1] TriStrata web site, http://www.tristrata.com, on Sept. 22nd, 1998. [2] Walter Hamscher, Alastair MacWillson, and Paul Turner, "Electronic Business Without Fear: The TriStrata Security Architecture," Price Waterhouse. [3] "Building a Secure Future with CTR Business Systems and TriStrata Security," leaflet. [4] Dan Backman, "TriStrata: A Giant Step In Enterprise Security," Network Computing Magazine, 15 September 1998. Online, http://www.nwc.com/915/915sp1.html [5] Ueli M. Maurer, "A Provably-Secure Strongly-Randomized Cipher," Advances in Cryptology -- Eurocrypt '90 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1990, pp. 361--373. ********************************************************************** Bruce Schneier, President, Counterpane Systems Phone: 612-823-1098 101 E Minnehaha Parkway, Minneapolis, MN 55419 Fax: 612-823-1590 Free crypto newsletter. See: http://www.counterpane.com

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Re: Another potential flaw in current economic theory... (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 6 Oct 1998 11:19:54 -0600 (MDT) > From: Jim Burnes <jvb(a)ssds.com> > Subject: Re: Another potential flaw in current economic theory... (fwd) > Hmmm. You imply that the employees and employers interests are not > the same. Obviously this so. > The whole idea is to make a profit. There is MUCH more involved than simply making a profit. [irrelevant material deleted] > Any other sort of interest would simply induce a market distortion > in the cost of investment capital. Demonstrate please. > The market detects socialism as damage and routes around it. Whoa horsey. I didn't say a damn thing about any third party regulatory agency getting invovled here. Don't start trying to change the rules in the middle of the game. > The entire market would never do this voluntarily, so by definition any > distortion would have to be induced in a centrally managed economy. Demonstrate. > By definition socialism. Wrong. Socialism is the belief that property is best managed and owned by the government. This is within the context of a free market. This means that the *ONLY* two parties involved are the producers and consumers. I am discussing an alternative approach to business management. Fascism is the belief that property should be owned by private individuals but managed by governments. Capitalism is the belief that property should be owned and managed by the individual. Note that this definition doesn't prevent 3rd party regulatory bodies, but they neither own or manage the activity, only limit its' scope. ____________________________________________________________________ The seeker is a finder. Ancient Persian Proverb The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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RE: GPL & commercial software, the critical distinction (fwd)
by Brown, R Ken 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> James A. Donald wrote > > [oddly irrelevant stuff about Satan skipped] > > > A big company has no monetary advantage over a small company. > > > Suppose Firm A controls 90% of the market and firm B > > controls 10% of the market. Artificially low prices cost the > > big firm nine times as much as the small firm. Under > > capitalism, the small company can duke it out on equal > > terms with the big firm, and with great regularity, > > that is exactly what they do. > > Sometimes. And sometimes they don't. Sometimes half-a-dozen big boys just > gang up on the smallest. > > Anyway, your example ignores cross-subsidy whcih is the usal way to do > this. > > And bigger companies precisely *do* have a financial advantage over small > - they can borrow money at lower rates and they have more ways of hedging. > When they operate in more than one part of the world a certain amount of > hedging is built in. In general economies of scale aren't, but finance is > one area where they do work. > > There are more forms of competition than a price war Also if it comes to a > *legal* slugging match the total amount > > > >> Garbage (what we call rubbish over here) collection is > >> different again. It's not at all a nutural monopoly and > >> there is nothing stopping anyone offering to do it as a > >> business. But it is a natural for social ownership, > > > You mistake the political adventures of your local elite for > > universal laws. > > Just like you Americans do when you drivel on about guns in ways that most > other people either don't care about or find repulsive? > Anyway, I wasn't talking abou the elite but the majority. > > > In some parts of the world rubbish collection is private. > > Yes, I know that. In some parts of this coutnry also. Anywere genuinly > rural for a start. What's that got to do with what I said? > > > There is no "natural monopoly" that is not somewhere > > a private industry, and often it is a private industry in a > > place that is otherwise quite socialist. Public and private > > ownership reflect the accidents of politics and history more > > than they reflect the natural characteristics of the industry > > in dispute. > > I agree with this completely, but I don't think it invalidates anything we > said. You are confusing 3 quite different questions: > > - social ownership versus private ownership > - competition versus monopoly > - free trade versus protection > > Ken Brown > >

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Web TV with 128b exported
by David Honig 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/981005/ca_microso_1.html MOUNTAIN VIEW, Calif., Oct. 5 /PRNewswire/ -- Microsoft Corp.'s (Nasdaq: MSFT - news) WebTV Networks today announced it is the first U.S. company to obtain government approval to export nonkey recovery-based 128-bit-strength encryption for general commercial use. WebTV Networks pioneered low-cost access to the Internet, e-mail, financial services and electronic shopping through a television set and a standard phone line. The WebTV(TM) Network service, combined with the WebTV-based Internet terminals and receivers, is the first communications system permitted by the U.S. government to provide strong encryption for general use by non-U.S. citizens in Japan and the United Kingdom. Such strong encryption allows Japanese and United Kingdom subscribers of WebTV to communicate through the WebTV Network (both within national borders and internationally) without fear of interception by unauthorized parties. etc...

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the camel
by Richard.Bragg＠ssa.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Camels eat first and carry afterwards so stuff a thousand bananas down its neck and get it to carry 1000 across. The remaining 1000 are to be left to ferment to make a delicious drink for the camel handler who has just persuaded a camel to eat 1000 bananas. ___________________________________________________ The information contained in this electronic mail message is confidential. It is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom it is addressed and others authorised to receive it. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, copying, dissemination or disclosure of this information is strictly prohibited. ___________________________________________________

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