December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: Programmer faces grand jury for posting encryption
by Brown, R Ken 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mok-Kong Shen wrote: > It would be interesting to know how the grand jury > determines the 'three' in 'three times stronger'. Obviously the key was 1.5 bits longer :-) Ken

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.itd.nrl.navy.mil/ITD/5540/ieee/cipher/news-items/980713.LISTWATCH .html My online review of this list and others. Mary Ellen Zurko "We will be obliged to take action ourselves" -Gore on privacy

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Re: Programmer faces grand jury for posting encryption
by Mok-Kong Shen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Martin Minow wrote: > > <http://www.sjmercury.com/breaking/headline2/072738.htm> > > Posted at 12:26 a.m. PDT Wednesday, August 26, 1998 > > Programmer on hot seat for posting encryption software > BY K. OANH HAMercury News Staff > > ''Writer A Sunnyvale software programmer who posted strong encryption > software on the Internet faces a grand jury hearing today to determine > whether he should stand trial for violating federal export laws.Charles > Booher, 39, said he's within his constitutional rights to ``express > himself'' by posting the data-scrambling software, which is three times > stronger than a current government standard. If indicted, Booher's case > would represent the fourth legal challenge in seven years to the federal > government's curb on exporting encryption technology. The case is It would be interesting to know how the grand jury determines the 'three' in 'three times stronger'. M. K. Shen

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RE: LACC: Re: Is hate code speech?
by Francis, Catherine 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I worry that, in the process of laying all this flame-bait, y'all are hoping that naive people might think that a job where there's racial and sexual hate-speech isn't a hostile work environment. Putting this sort of language in code does not shelter it from co-workers. It doesn't matter that the offensive names weren't directed at her. It's much worse that they were directed towards an entire group. Or maybe you just admire ethnic slander in terms of cost-efficiency, a sort of more-bang-for-the-buck maximization of intolerance where it's a question of offending the greatest number with the least amount of effort, and simply admire the mechanism by which it's been accomplished? This isn't an issue of free speech. Well, maybe. The coder is free to name her/his/its variables what they like, all ethical issues aside, and equally free to live with the consequences of those actions, which should have been the company not using something so vastly unprofessional and guaranteed to eventually open them up to a suit like this. There are standards of behavior in a workplace that are slightly more restrictive than standing on a soapbox on the quad. A software company's code is an internal company document. The code that you write at home is your document. You may find this distinction instructive. I'm sorry to digress, since this isn't why the article was originally posted, but I was forced to succumb to the troll. Free speech is essential in an open society. Freedom from discrimination is essential in a democracy. Carry on. > ---------- > From: William H. Geiger III[SMTP:whgiii@openpgp.net] > Reply To: lacc(a)suburbia.net > Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 1998 6:24 PM > To: lacc(a)suburbia.net > Cc: proff(a)suburbia.net; aucrypto(a)suburbia.net; cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: LACC: Re: Is hate code speech? > > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > In <Pine.SUN.3.91.980825155854.3483A-100000@baker>, on 08/25/98 > at 04:19 PM, Xcott Craver <caj(a)math.niu.edu> said: > > >On Tue, 25 Aug 1998, William H. Geiger III wrote: > > >> <sigh> Now we have to worry about PC variable and function names. What > a > >> crock. > > > Oh, yeah, you really have to worry about *accidentally* > > calling your variables getwatermelons and somefriedchicken. > > Reminds me of this one guy in our neighborhood who was just > > jogging by our house, bent down to tie a shoelace, lost > > his balance and accidentally planted a huge burning cross > > in our front lawn. Woops! Those damn PC-mongers are > > making it a crime to jog! > > Yes and if I want to name my variables getwatermelons and somefiredchicken > who are you to tell me I can't? > > > One note: I don't see why this lawsuit would be hard to win > > on the grounds that source code isn't necessarily "speech." > > If co-workers left a big wooden swastika on her desk it > > wouldn't be speech either, but I'd call that actionable. > > But they didn't. There is no proof that any of theses variable names were > written to be directed at her and the majority of them were written > *before* she ever started working there!! > > - -- > - --------------------------------------------------------------- > William H. Geiger III http://www.openpgp.net > Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 > > Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice > PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. > OS/2 PGP 5.0 at: http://www.openpgp.net/pgp.html > - --------------------------------------------------------------- > > Tag-O-Matic: OS/2: Not just another pretty program loader! > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.6.3a-sha1 > Charset: cp850 > Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000 > > iQCVAwUBNeM6Qo9Co1n+aLhhAQEHMAP+OdR38utDHJd4s8r3/fTVedI+xH9A+lNX > CU/yeqOx2Y9P8K/ol1wdLf4U3Dzv3VZ+CvRUmVB4juRdFBTnor7wrS3CQiQ1krut > K3nLi7HtUqb92VD55eCM4W61c67lqLTD7TTXW2p6sHm8ti3NgK1fGfRPTSk5Ay9S > j2tEl6HI5P8= > =jRNy > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >

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RE:
by Brown, R Ken 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Ray Arachelian[SMTP:sunder@brainlink.com] wrote: > > Anonymous wrote: > >> > >> > http://www.itd.nrl.navy.mil/ITD/5540/ieee/cipher/news-items/980713.LIS > TWATCH > >> .html > [...snip...] >Sorry Anon, but that url 404's... Perhaps you could try again? It works if you put the ".html" on the next line in the URL New nifty way to foil the hackers - put line-breaks in your code! They'll never suss it! Actually I didn't notice at first either - I just sropped the last directory name of the URL and looked at the level above - it's been a sort of reflex action of mine on the web for years. Nice to see a navy site allowing us to browse their directories though :-) The "listwatch" is a very short summary of some of the less wibblish threads in cypherpunks, risks et.c - it is about 6 weeks out of date, nothing new there since it was last mentioned here. So I don't know why it was brought up again. Ken

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Store music CDs in CD-quality RealAudio!
by RealNetworks News 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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dow jones
by bill payne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Friday 8/28/98 10:07 AM J Orlin Grabbe You may have gotten it TOO RIGHT http://www.aci.net/kalliste/apocalyp.htm Morales and I met. We got a response from a deputy clerk to our attached letter. No form for 54(b) certification and no examples. We have a plan of what to include in our response to http://www.jya.com/chrysler98.htm AND 54(b) certification. We see that we can respond by e-mail. e-mail: vhardy(a)detroit.bozell.com But we'll use certified snail mail too. Reporter Spohn of the ABQ Trib 1990 Lawrence Spohn, Albuquerque Tribune http://www.aaas.org/AAAS/awards.html http://www.atiin.com/atiin/tribune.htm http://www.abqtrib.com told me he is going to make FOIA requests for the invoices NSA spent or wasted funding public key cryptography chips TOO. Morales and I also discussed our up-coming NSA fee waiver lawsuit. NSA deputy director Barbara McNamara's wrote me a letter dated 19 August 1998. http://www.nsa.gov:8080/mission.html McNamara wrote, The key issue I considered in my review is whether disclosure of the information is likely to contribute to the public understanding of the operations or activities of the government. ... This response may be construed as a denial of your appeal. Accordingly, you are hereby advised to your right to seek judicial review of my decision pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (B) in the United States District Court in the district in which you reside, in which you have your principal place of business, in which the Agency's records are situated (U.S. District Court of Maryland), or in the District of Columbia. We've learned a lot with our current NSA lawsuit. So the NEXT lawsuit should be more devastating for the government. But let's hope we get this UNFORTUNATE matter settled so that we can move on to other projects. I miss the economic articles you post from throughout the world. http://www.aci.net/kalliste/ Whats happening is not your fault. You are merely a message-deliverer. Later bill Tuesday 8/18/98 7:33 AM Certified Return receipt requested Robert M. March, Clerk United States District Court Office of the Clerk POB 2384 US Courthouse Santa Fe, NM 87504-2384 Dear clerk March: Purposes of this letter are to 1 request a copy of a UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO Rule 54(b) certification form if such form exists 2 request an example of a Rule 54(b) certification if such certification is submitted in non-standard form 3 ask for you to provide us with DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO case citations for others required by the Tenth circuit to seek Rule 54(b) certification. We could not find form referenced in 1 in LOCAL CIVIL RULES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO or at http://www.nmcourt.fed.us/dcdocs/ specifically http://www.nmcourt.fed.us/dcdocs/files/lcvrules.txt We ask that you respond to this letter by September 1, 1998. Nonresponse must be interpreted as 4 there is no Rule 54(b)form 5 there is no example of a Rule 54(b) non-standard form certification 6 there are no examples of Rule 54(b) certifications in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO. Sincerely William H. Payne Arthur R. Morales 13015 Calle de Sandias NE 1024 Los Arboles NW Albuquerque, NM 87111 Albuquerque, NM 87107 Friday February 27, 1998 11:18 AM By e-mail and US mail Lieutenant General Kenneth A Minihan, USAF Director, National Security Agency National Security Agency 9800 Savage Road Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000 Dear General Minihan: Purposes of the letter are to 1 request information under the Freedom of Information Act 2 explore settlement possibilities of our current lawsuit. In about 1986 Sandia National Laboratories assigned me the task of design and construction of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty seismic data authenticator. In the initial stages of the project, Sandia cryptographer Gustavus Simmons attempted to convince both Sandia management and NSA employees Tom White, Mark Unkenholtz, and Ed Georgio that a form of public key authentication should replace NSA employee Ronald Benincasa's National Seismic Station/Unmaned Seismic Observatory 11-bit data authentication algorithm. My Sandia supervisor John Holovka and project leader H B [Jim] Durham ordered me to write a paper explaining public key cryptography. This paper, RSA ENCRYPTION, along with my SAND report describing my implementation of Benincasa's algorithm and filings in our lawsuit, now appear on Internet at http://www.jya.com/index.htm, click CRYPTOME, then OpEd, then http://www.jya.com/whprsa.htm. Sandia explored the merits of switching from Benincasa's algorithm to a public key-based authentication method suggested by Simmons. For Sandia's evaluation of the merits of public key, electronic tagging, and Bureau of Engraving and Printing projects , I bought for Sandia samples both the Cylink CY1024 and AT&T A & B two chip sets for modulo m arithmetic computations. NSA employee Tom White sent me a copy of the SECRET classified NSA report on IBM's hardware public key chip FIREFLY. I wrote in my tutorial paper RSA hardware computations The slow speed of software RSA computations plus the potential wide use prompted several companies to build chips which compute modular arithmetic to at least several hundred bits. Most of these chips "cascade" to compute with a larger number of bits. Corporations involved in building these chips are 1 IBM Firefly 2 AT&T 3 Motorola (apparently a three chip set) 4 Cylink Pittway-First alert 5 Sandia Labs (Algorithm M and predecessor chip) Details of the IBM chip is classified. AT&T as of July 1987 has not released details of their chip. Little information is available on the Motorola chip set. The Cylink chip is commercially available. Its price dropped from $1,500 to $600 each in June 1987. Data is transferred to and from the chip with serial shift register communication. The early Sandia chip was limited in speed. The replacement chip is cascadeable, communicates with 8 or 16 bits parallel, matches the speed of the Cylink chip, but is not out of fabrication. Rumors circulate that there is about an order of magnitude performance difference between some of these chips. These hardware chips improve exponentiation speed about 3 orders of magnitude over software implementation benchmarked on an Intel 8086 family microcomputer. Whitfield Diffie writes about both the Cylink and Sandia chips. And is quoted at http://www.aci.net/kalliste/nukearse.htm. Sandia had terrible luck with its public key chips. I reported SOME of the troubles to Electronic Engineering Times editor Loring Wirbel [http://techweb.cmp.com/eet/823/] on March 23, 1994. Dr. John Wisniewski was a supervisor at Sandia's Center for Radiation-hardened Microelectronics. Wisniewski was a graduate student at Washington State University in about 1975. I was a professor at WSU. Wisniewski knows all about the failing Sandia chips in the nuclear arsenal. I took notes on February 13, 1993. Wisniewski reviewed the problems again for me. 1 No quality initiative. Each chip lot had a different process. 2 Overall yield - 40-50%. Down to 10% after packaging. 3 Metalization problems. No planarization. No flow of glass. Couldn't use high temperature. Step coverage problems. Layed down over tension. 100% field returns over several years. 4 Sandia would store lots of parts for replacements. Sandia management made the decision to place low yield parts in the nuclear arsenal. Sandia must meet DOD schedules management reasoned. Hundreds of millions spent on CRM. Sandia must show productivity. Wisniewski told me that low yield chip test survivors are those which the tests failed to detect failures. Wisniewski will talk. 503-625- 6408. Wisniewski now works for Intel in Oregon. Have Wisniewski tell you about the fire in the CRM clean room! Sandia supervisor Jerry Allen later told me it cost $300,000 each to remove Sandia's failing chips at Pantex from a nuclear bomb. NSA apparently is biased toward hardware implementations of cryptographic and authentication algorithms. As opposed to software implementation. NSA representatives and Sandia management decided not to use a public key authentication scheme for its CTBT seismic data authenticator because of all of the problems with implementing public key algorithms. But NSA surely has spent MUCH MONEY on public key chip implementations. NSA is promoting its Clipper crypto chips as described at http://cpsr.org/dox/clipper.html. And we get some information about technical specifications of NSA's Clipper chip at http://www.us.net/softwar/http://www.us.net/softwar/clip.html Clipper Chip Information MYK-78 CLIPPER CHIP ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION ON A CHIP 1 micron double level metal CMOS technology 0.35 watts power 28 pin plastic leaded chip carrier (PLCC) package Transistor to transistor logic (TTL) interface Chip ID, family key and device unique key are installed at programming. Chip ID, family key and device unique key are installed at programming facility and are completely transparent to the user. Therefore, Under the provision of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC 552, I am requesting access to: 1 Copies of all invoices from A AT&T B Motorola C IBM D Sandia National Laboratories to NSA for payments for developing ANY public key-related chips between January 1, 1980 and February 27, 1998. 2 Copies of all invoices to NSA from ANY corporation involved in development of ANY Clipper chip-related hardware between January 1, 1980 and February 27, 1998. The public has a right to know how much NSA spent on TRYING monoploize the crypto business. If there are any fees for searching for, or copying, the records I have requested, please inform me before you fill the request. As you know, the Act permits you to reduce or waive the fees when the release of the information is considered as "primarily benefiting the public." I believe that this requests fits that category and I therefore ask that you waive any fees. If all or any part of this request is denied, please cite the specific exemption(s) which you think justifies your refusal to release the information and inform me of your agency's administrative appeal procedures available to me under the law. I would appreciate your handling this request as quickly as possible, and I look forward to hearing from you within 20 working days, as the law stipulates. With respect to our current FOIA lawsuit, I feel that we should settle this unfortunate matter. I see from your biography at http://www.nsa.gov:8080/ and http://www.nsa.gov:8080/dirnsa/dirnsa.html that you are 1979 Distinguished Graduate Master of Arts degree in National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California One of my former M.S. and Ph.D students in Computer Science, Ted Lewis, is currently the chairman of Computer Science at Naval Postgraduate School [http://www.friction-free-economy.com/] Small world. But I think that this emphasizes that WE SHOULD all be on the same side. Not engaged in a conflict in US federal court. Or on Internet. NSA attempts to withhold requested information are possibly unwise. In our wired world the aggrieved know what happened to them. http://www.wpiran.org/,http://www.netlink.co.uk/users/impact/namir/namirm.h… And moderates in Iran, http://persia.org/khatami/biography.html, appear want settlement too. My family and I have been damaged by these crypto wars. I ask you that consider fair settlement of damages caused by the National Security Agency. I cannot find your e-mail address on Internet. Therefore I will forward the e-mail copy of this FOIA/settlement letter to Ray Kammer of NIST [http://www.nist.gov/] who along with the FBI [http://www.fbi.gov/, http://www.fbi.gov/fo/nyfo/nytwa.htmand] and NSA are trying to control the crypto business so that Kammer can possibly forward an e-mail copy of the FOIA/Settlement letter to you. Sincerely, bill William Payne 13015 Calle de Sandias Albuquerque, NM 87111 505-292-7037 [I am not reading e-mail] http://www.cylink.com/ http://www.jya.com/tis-p-bckrs.htm Date: Wed, 25 Feb 1998 13:53:33 -0500 From: nospam(a)synernet.com (Ed Stone) Subject: Re: Another Network Associates U-Turn on Key Recovery To: jy(a)jya.com PGP Inc's new owner, Network Associates, has announced it is acquiring Trusted Informations Systems, Inc. On the TIS web site, the following project is detailed, in which Dr. Dorothy Denning was a subcontractor, and in which policy-based crypto key release systems were explored, in collaboration with the NSA, FBI, etc.: Source: http://www.tis.com/research/crypto/crypt_krp_projsum.html Policy-Based Cryptographic Key Release Systems Cryptographic Key Release Language Design and Specification View the quad chart graphic for the Policy-Based Cryptographic Key Release System Project Summary ARPA Order Number: 8685 Contractor: Trusted Information Systems, Inc. 3060 Washington Road Glenwood, Maryland 21738 Phone: (301) 854-6889 FAX: (301) 854-5363 Subcontractors: Dr. Dorothy Denning Dr. Burton Kaliski Dr. Warwick Ford Russel Housley http://www.nsa.gov:8080/ http://www.nsa.gov:8080/dirnsa/dirnsa.html 1979 Distinguished Graduate Master of Arts degree in National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California http://www.friction-free-economy.com/ http://www.nist.gov/ CPSR Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility http://cpsr.org/dox/home.html Clipper Clipper Chip Information http://cpsr.org/dox/clipper.html MYK-78 CLIPPER CHIP ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION ON A CHIP http://www.us.net/softwar/http://www.us.net/softwar/clip.html 1 micron double level metal CMOS technology 0.35 watts power 28 pin plastic leaded chip carrier (PLCC) package Transistor to transistor logic (TTL) interface Chip ID, family key and device unique key are installed at programming. Chip ID, family key and device unique key are installed at programming facility and are completely transparent to the user. Dear General Minihan: Sincerely, William H. Payne 13015 Calle de Sandias NE Albuquerque, NM 87111 Books 1.Bamford, James. The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency. 2.Hafner, Katie and John Markoff. Cyberpunk: Outlaws and Hackers on the Computer Frontier 3.Lapidus, Edith. Eavesdropping on Trial.. 4.Schneier, Bruce. Applied Cryptography 5.Sterling, Bruce. The Hacker Crackdown. General Periodicals 6.Slatalla, Michelle and Joshua Quittner. "Gangwars in Cyberspace. " Wired. 7.Baker, Stewart A. "Don't Worry, Be Happy." Wired. 8.Denning, Dorothy. "The Clipper Chip Will Block Crime." Newsday. 9.Dewitt, Philip Elmer. "Who Should Keep the Keys?" Time. 10.Lewis, Peter. "Now Congress gets to weigh in on Clinton's high-tech plan for wiretapping." New York Times. 11.Markoff, John. "Big Brother and the Computer Age." New York Times. 12.Markoff, John. "Flaw Discovered in Federal Plan for Wiretapping." New York Times. 13.Markoff, John. "Industry Defies U.S. on Data Encryption."New York Times. Specialized Journals 14.--. "Cylink Offers Triple-DES ICs for Civil Service Encryption." Electronic News. 15.Banisar, David and Ken Robinson. "Security and Privacy on the Information Highway." Educom Review. 16.Blackmon, Ric. "Data-Tapping Made Easy" Phrack. 17.Peterson, A. Padgett. "Clipper chip won't clip your wings, it will just protect the unprotected." Infoworld. 18.*Steal, Agent. "Tapping Telephone Lines Voice or Data for Phun, Money, and Passwords." Phrack. * Pseudonym Government Documents 19.Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. Wiretap Report. 20.Department of Justice. "Attorney General Makes Key Escrow Encryption Announcements." 21.House Subcommitte on Technology, Environment and Aviation. "Communications and Computer Surveillance, Privacy, and Security." 22.House Subcommitte on Telecommunications and Commerce. "Telecommunications Network Security." 23.Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 24.U.S. Bureau of the Census. "Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1993". 25.White House Press Secretary. "Clipper Press Release." Institutional Sources 26.Association for Computing Machinery, U.S. Public Policy Committee. "Computer Policy Committee Calls for Complete Withdrawl of Clipper." 27.Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association. "CBEMA Recommendations on Encryption Policy." 28.Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. "Clipper Fact Sheet." 29.Hanson, Robin. "Can Wiretaps Remain Cost-Effective?"Communications of the ACM 30.Hoffman, Lance, et al. "Cryptography Policy." Communications of the ACM. 31.Hoffman, Lance. "Clipping Clipper." Communications of the ACM. 32.Landau, Susan, et al. "Crypto Policy Perspecitves." Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery. 33.Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. "Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Is There Cause for Concern?" Interviews 34.Lo, Virginia. Personal interview. 35.Schuman, David. Personal interview. 36.McClandish, Stanton. E-mail interview. Exclusive Internet Soucres 37.Rivest, Ron. "Re: Newsday Editorial." 38.Meeks, Brock. "Jacking in from the 'Sooner or Later' Port." CyberWire Dispatch 39.Gore, Al. "Letter to Representative Cantwell" Other 40.Delaney, Donald, et al. "Wiretap Laws and Procedures: What Happens When the U.S. Government Taps a Line." Purposes of this http://www.ihrwg.org/CP/ai82.htm During 1981 Amnesty' International received hundreds of allegations of torture of political prisoners, in particular in Evin Prison in Tehran. Some were supported by photographs and medical reports. The methods of torture described in these reports included beating, kicking, whipping with cables, banging heads against walls, burning with cigarettes, burning with an iron and mock executions. One report described a special room at Evin Prison called autog-e autoo (ironing room) in which prisoners were tied to a bed and their backs, buttocks and the soles of their feet were burned with an iron. In another place in Evin Prison called zire zamin-e haqiqat (basement of truth) it was alleged that prisoners were burned with cigarettes during interrogation.

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Re: Is Hate Code Speech?
by Wilhelm Klink 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

caj(a)math.niu.edu said: > Now, something not tangibly damaging, like harassment, is not so > clear cut. But that's why a judge or jury of your peers has to agree > before you're forced to pay damages. You should ask Judge Wright about this one. She threw out Paula Jones' case because Paula hadn't even PRESENTED any damages done to her. She may well have been "harassed" and Bubba may have done exactly what she said, but she was not harmed in any tangible way. -- Yours, Col. Willhelm Klink _________________________________________________________ DO YOU YAHOO!? Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com

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McCarthy return under new clothes
by Dutra de Lacerda 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<Forwarded Message> In article <MPG.103e19f09c6044c1989680(a)reading.news.pipex.net>, LA(a)capital.demon.co.uk said... > From the BBC's online network > Thursday, August 13, 1998 Published at 18:12 GMT 19:12 UK > http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_150000/150465.stm > > By Internet Correspondent Chris Nuttall > > IT journalist Kenneth Neil Cukier found his laptop the target of a > Customs and Excise swoop when he stepped off the Eurostar shuttle > from Paris at London's Waterloo station last Friday. I now have the text of the original posting. Not all of you may have seen it. Although it contains some repition, there is additional remarks which some may find of interest - Ian. From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> Subject: FC: Searched at UK Border for Net Porn Posted to Declan McCullagh's Politech mailing list Politech is at http://www.well.com/~declan/politech/ [from dave farber's ip list] ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 11 Aug 1998 14:18:12 -0400 From: "K. N. Cukier" <100736.3602(a)compuserve.com> Subject: Searched at UK Border for Net Porn Sender: "K. N. Cukier" <100736.3602(a)compuserve.com> Dave, Some days its a bad hair day, other days you see the suite of Western values since the Enlightenment quashed in an instant by a single, soulless, civil servant. Here's what happened to me last Friday when I arrived in London from Paris on the channel tunnel train: As I walked through UK immigration, two guys pulled me aside, flashed badges, and said: "UK Customs. Come with us." They walked me behind a wall where they handed me off to one of a fleet of waiting agents. A customs officer told me to lay my computer bag on the table, and inspected my ticket and passport. After learning I was a reporter, she demanded to see my press card (issued by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and asked about where I was going in London, why, and for how long. "Do you know there are things that are illegal to bring into the UK?" she asked. "Uh, yeah.... There are *many* things that are illegal to bring across borders -- do you have in mind any thing in particular?," I said. "Illegal drugs, fire arms, bomb making materials, lewd and obscene pornographic material...." I felt a rush of relief. I was late and now was assured I could get on with my journey. "I am carrying none of that," I replied, staring directly at her, with a tone of earnest seriousness. "Is that a computer in your bag?" "Yes." "Does it have Internet on in?" Here, I confess, I really didn't know how to answer. What does one say to a question like that?? I was struck dumb. "I use the computer to access the Internet, yes," I said, rather proud of myself for my accuracy. "Is there any pornography on it?" she said, stoically. Here, I figured out what's going on. But I'm mentally paralyzed from all the synapses sparkling all at once in my head: Does she not understand that Internet content is distributed around the world? That I'm just dialing a local number, be it in France or the UK, and that whether I cross a border is moot to what I'm able to access? "There is no pornography stored on the hard drive," I stated. "Do you mind if I check." she says rather than asks, and begins to take the computer out of the bag. "I'm just going to hook it up over there and scan the hard drive..." she continues. And then her face turns dour. "Oh! It's an Apple," she says, dejectedly. "Our scanner doesn't work on Apples." At this point, it's all a little bit too much, too fast, for me to handle. >From seeing my personal privacy ripped out from under me with a computer-enema to an immediate about-face and witnessing my oppressors flounder in the pap of their own incompetence was just too much to bear. Then, of course, I sort of relished the irony of it all. I swung into naive-mode: "Oh. Oh well," I said and began packing up. "Why not?" "I dunno -- it just doesn't," she said. "Is this a common thing that you do? Scan PCs?" "It happens quite often," she said. (Note: I wrote this entire dialogue immediately after the incident, but that particular quote I wrote the moment we parted, to have it exactly right.) "Do you catch a lot?" "Sometimes," she says, cautiously. What's the fine? The penalty?" I asked. She started to become uncomfortable and tried to move me along. "It depends. Every case is different. It depends what they have." "What about if I had encryption -- do you check for that too?" I said, disdaining the risk that she might want to check the computer "by hand" since I'd mentioned the dreaded C-word.... "Huh?! I don't know about that...." "You don't know what cryptography is?" I asked. "No. Thank you, you can go now," she said. And thus ended my experience with inspector "K. PARE_," whose name tag was partially torn at the final one or two letters of her last name. Of course I was burning up. Lots of thoughts raced through me. For example, would I have really let her inspect my hard drive, even knowing I was "innocent." That, of course, was entirely irrelevant to me -- it's about a principle. I thought of my editor -- or ex-editor -- if I didn't make the day-long meeting. And I immediately thought of John Gilmore, and how much I respected him when he refused to board a flight a few years ago when the airline demanded he present a form of identification. Had I acquiesced to their mental thuggery? As soon as I realized I was "safe" from being scanned, I was tempted to pull out my notepad, go into reporter-mode, and make a small scene getting names and superiors and formal writs of whatever.... but suspected it would only get me locked in a room for a full day. Then I thought of how, despite in their kafakain zeal to abuse my privacy, they couldn't even get that right. Not only did they not have a clue what the Internet is, they confirmed their ignorance by not even being able to digitally pat me down. Insult to injury! It brought back something John Perry Barlow once told me about why he doesn't fear US intelligence agencies. "I've seen them from the inside," he said (as I recall), "they will suffer under the weight of their own ineptitude." What's at the heart of this is "thought crime"; and scanning one's computer is paramount to search and seizure of one's intellectual activity. What if they found subversive literature about the proper role of government authority in civil society? Would that have gotten me busted? And do they store what they scan? Are business executives with marketing plans willing to have their data inspected under the umbrella of public safety from porn? Just the night before I read in the memoirs of William Shirer, who wrote The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, about how he was blacklisted for a decade after his name was cited in Red Currents, a magazine that destroyed hundreds of careers during the McCarthy era. He was powerless to defend himself. I see parallels: We are approaching the point were we are incapable of reasonable discourse on Internet content. Refuse to boot up for inspection means you've got something to hide. Defend civil liberties of the accused means you condone guilty acts. Question the nature of the censorious policies in the first place means you are filthy, and as unhealthy as the wily-eyed porn devourer.... State the obvious: That a large part of the drive for Net content regulation is driven by hucksters seeking recognition, and that it is taken to idiotic extremes by a mass movement of simpletons ignorant of the history of hysteria in the US, and, well, you're just a typical lawless cyberlibertian. Finally, it dawned in me. This wasn't an aberration at all, but part of a much deeper trend. It's a British thing, really. "As might be supposed I have not had the time, not may I add the inclination to read through this book," wrote Sir Archibald Bodkin, the director of public prosecutions, on 29 December 1922. "I have, however, read pages 690 to 732 ... written as they are, as it composed by a more or less illiterate vulgar woman ... there is a great deal of unmitigated filth and obscenity." And so James Joyce's Ulysses was banned in Britain for 15 years. Interesting, that. The policy was made by a chap who didn't actually read the work he felt justified to prohibit others from reading. Wonder if the fellows who implemented Britain's scan-for-skin policy actually use the Net themselves...? Kenneth Neil Cukier <100736.3602(a)compuserve.com> Singapore, 11 August 1998 (No, I was not stopped by customs officials here. But this e-mail was sent out via government-mandated proxy servers) -- - - - Antonio Manuel Melo de Carvalho Dutra de Lacerda Morada : Rua Rodrigues Cabrilho, 5 - 5 Esq. 1400 Lisboa, PORTUGAL Telefone : +351-(1)-3013579 FAX & BBS : +351-(1)-3021098

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Re: Man Sex
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Interstate 95 wrote: > SEX(1) EUNUCH Programmer's Manual SEX(1) > > NAME > sex -- have sex > > SYNOPSIS > sex [options] ... [username] ... > > DESCRIPTION > sex allows the invoker to have sex with the user(s) speci- > fied in the command line. If no users are specified, they > are taken from the LOVERS environment variable. Options > to make things more interesting are as follows: > > -a external stimulus (aphrodisiac) option > etc, Lets see ... # sex -monica processing ... -m masochism ... -o oral ... -n necrophilia ... -i coitus interruptus ... -c chocolate sauce option -a external stimulus (aphrodisiac) option Close, but no cigar.

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