December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

BXA Encryption Export Seminar - San Jose, April 28
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think some cypherpunk representatives should attend this seminar. It's often useful to hear what the BXA is saying when they talk to exporters instead of a court or the press. You will probably learn something about crypto export law, too. If you have a portable cassette recorder, see if you can record it for future reference "and for others at my company". I'd go, but I have a bunch of committments on that date. Let me know how it turns out! John Bureau of Export Administration - U.S. Department of Commerce presents ENCRYPTION CONTROLS SAN JOSE, CA April 28, 1998 * 8:30 AM - 5:00 PM Hyatt San Jose * San Jose, CA ENCRYPTION CONTROLS - As a result of the release of new rules governing the export of encryption items previously controlled on the U.S. Munitions List, the export licensing responsibilities were transferred to the Department of Commerce (except those specially designed, developed, configured, adapted, or modified for military applications). This full-day program is being held to instruct and assist the exporting community with this change in jurisdiction. Representatives from BXA and the National Security Agency (NSA) will explain: the background and current U.S. policy, the main elements of the controls, License Exception KMI and the licensing process for encryption cases, and legislative initiatives and other issues to watch in the future. WHO SHOULD ATTEND? - This seminar is designed for exporters, freight forwarders, carriers, international trade consultants, attorneys, and others who support and advise exporters. If your organization is involved in a technology-related industry, especially computers, electronics, defense goods/services, etc., this seminar is a must. ENCRYPTION AGENDA 8:30-8:35 Opening 8:35-8:45 Overview of morning 8:45-9:00 Encryption Policy * What is it? * How does it affect your company? 9:00-9:15 Encryption Regulations * What's new? * What's different * How to classify an encryption product 9:15-10:15 Encryption Licenses and the inter-agency review process * Validated * Encryption Licensing Arrangements * Foreign Nationals 10:15-10:30 BREAK 10:30-11:00 Mass Market Encryption Software * Helpful Hints 11:00-12:00 License Exceptions: TMP - GOV - BAG for encryption items 12:00-1:00 LUNCH 1:00-1:45 License Exception Key Management Infrastructure (KMI) * Recoverable encryption items * Non-recoverable 56-bit DES with a plan 1:45-2:15 Key Recovery Agents 2:15-2:45 Exports over the Internet 2:45-3:00 BREAK 3:00-3:30 Next Steps 3:30-4:00 License practice/policy 4:00-4:45 Questions & Answers ABOUT THE INSTRUCTORS - The instructors are experienced export administration specialists and licensing officers from BXA's Washington, DC headquarters and Western Regional Office. The instructors - who played a major role in drafting the new encryption regulations - are available throughout the seminar to answer your questions. ACCOMMODATIONS - Special conference rates have been arranged with the Hyatt San Jose for those who need rooms. Please make your reservations directly with the hotel by calling (408) 993- 1234 or toll free (800) 233-1234. Mention the "BXA Seminar." Note: The hotel is conveniently located minutes from San Jose Airport and is also easily accessible by automobile. The Hyatt offers free parking. QUESTIONS?- For more information on the Encryption Controls topics, please call BXA's Western Regional Office at (714) 660-0144. For information about registration, contact the Federation of International Trade Associations at (800) 969-FITA or (703) 620-9098. REGISTRATION Note: Space is limited and will be accepted on a space availability basis . The Registration Fee for the Seminar is $125/person and includes continental breakfast, AM & PM breaks, luncheon and seminar materials. The registration fee is not refundable after April 22, 1998. Cancellation prior to that date is subject to a $25 administrative charge. To guarantee placement for the Encryption Controls Seminar in San Jose, FAX your registration to (703) 391-0159, and charge the fee on a MC, VISA or American Express, or mail your registration with your check payable to FITA-BXA to FITA, 1851 Alexander Bell Drive, Suite 400, Reston, VA 20191. Attendee Name(s): ____________________________________________________________ Company Name: ____________________________________________________________ Street Address: ____________________________________________________________ City, State, Zip: ____________________________________________________________ Phone: _______________________ Fax: _________________________ [ ] Enclosed is my check for $___________ ($125/person) [ ] We prefer to pay by credit card: ____ MC, ____ Visa, ____ AMEX Amount $_________ Acct #_______________________________ Expiry date:__________ Cardholder Name: ___________________________________________________ Cardholder Signature:________________________________________________ Sponsored by The Federation of International Trade Associations (FITA) (For information about FITA, call toll-free (800) 926-FITA)

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Commerce Secretary attacks crypto export limits
by Trei, Peter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,21120,00.html?st.ne.fd.mdh Crypto policy called a failure By Courtney Macavinta Staff Writer, CNET NEWS.COM April 15, 1998, 11:40 a.m. PT URL: http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,21120,00.html The government's policy restricting the export of strong encryption products has failed and is boosting the foreign market by hog-tying the U.S. industry, Commerce Department secretary William Daley conceded today. [...] But the software industry and privacy advocates were most intrigued today by Daley's admission that the administration's export limits on encryption (technology that secures digital communication) are hindering U.S. companies' ability to compete with global manufacturers. The export policy went into effect last January, and is overseen by the Commerce Department. Under the rules, software makers that are granted crypto export licenses must submit proof of their plans to build key-recovery features into their products after next year. Key-recovery systems make it possible for law enforcement agents--who have obtained a court order--to access computer users' private key that unscrambles their digital messages or files. "The ultimate result will be foreign dominance of the market," Daley said. "This means a loss of jobs here, and products that do not meet either our law enforcement or national security needs." There has been an ongoing fight to overturn the export limits. But a compromise hasn't been reached with law enforcement officials, who assert that access to keys is needed to combat a new wave of high-tech crime in which suspects can cover their tracks with crypto. [...]

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Commerce Report on the Digital Economy
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to Jay Holovacs we've put Daley's press conference remarks and an executive summary of the "The Emerging Digital Economy" at: http://jya.com/daley-ecom.htm And we offer the main text of the full report at: http://jya.com/emerg-dig.htm (164K, plus 11 images) It's available from Commerce in separate HTML chapters or the full text with appendices in PDF (300 pages) at: http://www.ecommerce.gov/emerging.htm

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NT
by nobody＠nsm.htp.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone know how to completely crash a NT workstation with no possibility of recovery?

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Entropy Gradient Reversals
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.rageboy.com/allthewords.html

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BioInfoWarFare? / Re: sorry
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mark Hedges wrote: > > *sigh* actually, that wasn't bad english, it was just accidental > >html email....i didn't realize netscape would do that and i apologize. > >ooooooooooooooooo > >colin the feeling that its > > cjm1(a)execpc.com all a lot of oysters > >maroney and no pearls. > >ooooooooooooooooo > > It's 'it's', not 'its'. > > Good English does not coherence generate. Sounds like a biological agraphia warfare attack, followed by a logic bomb... Hhmmm...I smell a Platypus?

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Hackworth
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

AN AMBUSHED MARINE Have a look at the following. A loyal, heroic Marine is being fed to the sharks. A letter to your congress person and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, with an info copy to your local newspaper, would help. For those who might want to help a good Marine financially he would be forever grateful. Tim Witham Legal Defense Fund c/o Robert Ferris Box 538 Jacksonville, NC 28541 SEMPER FI and perhaps the top brass in the Corps should refresh themselves as to what this wonderful expression means. Hack 14, March 16, 1998 NATION: "Criminal Injustice?" To judge from his military paper trail, Marine Sergeant Timothy Witham, a 33-year-old Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) specialist, is the embodiment of the Corps. A veteran of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Witham has also served with distinction in Somalia. Superlatives suffuse his service record: "Sergeant Withams professional achievement, initiative and loyal dedication to duty reflected great credit upon himself and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service," declared Lt. Colonel G.C. Cutchall in a citation issued when Witham received the Navy Achievement Medal. In a letter endorsing Withams application to become a Warrant Officer Candidate, Lieutenant Colonel E.M. Smith, his former commanding officer at North Carolinas Cherry Point Marine facility, praised Withams "seasoned leadership high degree of maturity poise, understanding and tact." In addition to his military service, Witham has also excelled in joint projects with civilian agencies, according to Smith: "He has established a tremendous rapport with outside agencies such as the FBI, various ATF state bureaus, Secret Service, DEA and other police agencies." Withams dossier includes a certificate of appreciation from the Secret Service for his work as part of a presidential security detail at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. He was also entrusted with similar security responsibilities during the 1994 Middle East peace talks and the UNs 50th anniversary in 1995. Abrupt Change of Heart Noting that Witham is "loyal, displays sound judgment, and is exceptionally reliable and trustworthy," Lt. Col. Smith recommended his application "with utmost enthusiasm." Withams current commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Ayala of Marine Wing Support Squadron 271, offered a similarly glowing endorsement last September. "[Witham] leads from the front. Superior knowledge of the EOD field. Can handle any mission and looks forward to challenging assignments," declared Ayala. "[Witham is a] true asset to his section and to this Squadron. His knowledge and expertise would make [him] an outstanding candidate for the warrant officer program." However, Ayalas opinion of Witham underwent an abrupt change just a few weeks later. "SSgt. [Staff Sergeant] Witham has proven that he is a threat to the good order and discipline of the Squadron and the U.S. Marine Corps," insisted Ayala in an October 17th memo. Ayalas radical reevaluation of Witham followed the October 16th arrest of Witham and five other Marines as a result of "Operation Longfuse," a 16-month joint sting operation conducted by the FBI, the ATF, and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). Witham found himself accused of "transporting a loaded weapon on base; conspiracy to commit larceny; larceny of military explosives, equipment, and firearms; wrongful disposition of military property; receiving stolen property; [and] federal firearms and explosives violations under the Federal Assimilated Crimes Act." Upon his arrest, Witham was designated "a flight risk," which led Ayala to support "continued confinement" until his pre-trial hearing which turned out to be a 79-day jail term. "Lesser forms of restraint would be inadequate to insure that he would appear at his hearing and court-martial," insisted Ayala. "This is not the first time that SSgt Witham has been involved in this type of incident." Curiously, in the same memo, Ayala noted that there had never been any previous disciplinary action taken against Witham which would suggest a serious delinquency on the part of his superiors if Witham had indeed been "involved in this type of incident" on earlier occasions. Just as curious is the fact that Form 1070 in Sergeant Withams personal file, which lists "offenses and punishments," is entirely blank. Literally in a single day, a model Marine with an unblemished record was transmuted into a felonious arms smuggler whose motivations were equal parts greed and radical "anti-government" views. Federal and military investigators have yet to find a particle of material evidence to prove that Sergeant Witham is the criminal they describe; their case depends entirely upon the testimony of three eminently impeachable witnesses a twice-convicted perjurer, a civilian ex-convict, and an ex-Marine of dubious integrity who served as a "confidential informant" for the feds during the undercover operation. Two of the witnesses peddled their testimony against Witham in exchange for lighter sentences. The "confidential informant" made an even better deal: He arranged for complete immunity before beginning his undercover work, and since October 17th he has been taken into the witness protection program. Last September, Staff Sergeant Timothy Witham was chosen from 20 very qualified candidates to become a Warrant Officer; now, after spending 79 days in jail, he faces the prospect of an April court-martial. Robert Ferris, a retired Marine officer and former commanding officer to Witham, told The New American: "I spent 24 years in the military, in the Army and Marines, and Ive never seen an abuse of power to compare with the treatment of this young man. He should be at Quantico going to school to become a Warrant Officer, and yet hes exhausting his life savings and seeing his career destroyed because the feds need to convict somebody to make a political point." The "political point" being made in the case of Tim Witham appears to be that mere suspicion of "anti-government" views is enough to destroy the career of a model military man. Extremist Spin The "Longfuse" investigation cast a net across several states, pursuing leads as far south as North Carolina and as far north as Massachusetts. Fourteen suspects were arrested on October 17th eight civilians and six Marines, including four stationed at Camp Lejune. Over the course of a year and a half, undercover investigators, focusing their efforts on gun shows, military bases, and gun dealers throughout the southeast, had purchased an estimated 150 pounds of plastic explosives, grenades, grenade launchers, shoulder-launched rockets, a handful of anti-personnel mines, and more than 50 machine guns. In the post-Oklahoma City bombing environment, the preferred spin of federal investigators was entirely predictable. Robert Ferris, who is now Withams next-door neighbor, was a witness on Withams behalf at two preliminary hearings: the "Magistrates hearing," which is held to determine if pre-trial confinement is necessary; and an "Article 32" hearing, which is the military equivalent of a grand jury. "The first thing out of the mouth of [military prosecutor] Captain [Michael] Richardson was Ruby Ridge," Ferris recalls. "They insisted that Tim was part of a ring of anti-government radicals who were stealing weapons and had sworn not to let the feds take them alive." Thus was Witham identified as part of the ubiquitous menace of "right-wing extremism." Initial press coverage of the "Operation Longfuse" arrests played up the alleged "anti-government" angle, and the feds did their best to abet such speculation at least in the beginning. "Federal agents seized truckloads of stolen military and civilian weapons yesterday in an expanding investigation into the theft and sale of machine guns, grenades and plastic explosives," screamed the October 18th Baltimore Sun. The paper reported that an anonymous investigator portentously warned that some of the civilian suspects arrested "have ties potentially to militia groups." The Raleigh, North Carolina News and Observer carried a similar warning: "A top official said he could not rule out the possibility that anti-government extremists were connected to the theft of military ordnance from Camp Lejune." "These are weapons that are of military use, very lethal weapons, and they were weapons that were in the wrong hands," fretted Treasury Department spokesman Jim Johnson at an October 17th press conference. "Thats the sort of thing all citizens should be concerned about." Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon added the disturbing observation that "C-4 was taken, which is highly dangerous and used by terrorists." For those who missed the message, the Dallas Morning News offered a useful summary: "Concern over the theft of high explosives has increased in military circles along with a broader anxiety about domestic terrorism, especially in the aftermath of incidents such as the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building." The "right-wing menace" is the medias favorite enemy, and ATF officials were careful to drop tantalizing hints that "Operation Longfuse" had uncovered something big. "You could outfit a small army with what weve recovered," claimed ATF special agent Mark Logan. ATF spokesman Earl Woodham primed the press for further dramatic developments: "The investigation has really just begun. Its like we just hit the base of an oak tree, and if we follow it up, we may find that it branches out very wide." Dubious Informant The man who planted the acorn that grew into the ATFs "oak tree" is a former Marine sergeant who had served as an EOD specialist with several of the arrested suspects. In early 1996, this sergeant reportedly instigated "Operation Longfuse" when he approached authorities at Camp Lejune to warn them that weapons and explosives were being stolen and sold at gun shows and gun dealerships. That his motives werent purely idealistic is suggested by the fact that he was careful to get complete immunity before taking an assignment as a paid confidential informant (CI). For the next year and a half, the CI worked numerous stings against Marines and civilian gun enthusiasts. The feds deployed other undercover assets as part of "Longfuse" and tried to tailor stings to the psychology of the suspects. In the case of Thomas Crawford, a Marine captain stationed in Massachusetts who was among those arrested on October 17th, the undercover agents reportedly posed as intelligence specialists who sought arms and explosives for deniable missions in Latin America "an Oliver North-type black ops project," according to one source. In the case of a second Marine sergeant who was caught in the sting and who became the second witness against Witham undercover feds reportedly posed as organized crime figures. "[The second Marine sergeant] wasnt going anywhere in the Corps," Sergeant Witham asserted to The New American. "He was consistently denied promotions; you might say he has more pass-overs than a satellite. I suspect that he had a real need to feel important, and the undercover agents were happy to feed his ego." From information made available during legal discovery, Witham relates, the second Marine "got involved in long drunken discussions with the undercover people in which he claimed to have been involved in all kinds of crimes, including at least one murder. He supposedly helped kill a guy and then disposed of the body with a woodchipper. Strangely, though, the prosecution didnt follow up on that particular story." The feds were willing to give credence to the second Marines alcohol-aided claims about Witham, which were covertly recorded. "They initially used those drunken boasts to make three charges against me," Witham recalls. "The first was that I had been involved in the theft of washing machines, dryers, and other appliances, as well as drywall and other things of that nature. The second was that I had been involved in forgery, and the third was that I had been involved in the theft of explosives. The prosecution dropped the first two charges but has stuck with the third." How credible is the second Marine as a witness? According to local press reports in North Carolina, he has twice pled guilty to perjury. Furthermore, he faced accumulated prison terms of up to 380 years on charges arising from "Longfuse" and reportedly made a deal with the prosecution in which he could peddle his testimony against others for a total of 12 years in prison with the possibility of parole after four. The third witness against Witham has served a prison term on firearms-related charges. He also reportedly made a deal for his testimony in a previous weapons theft case involving Army personnel. Casting a Large Net Given his own solid military background, and the dubious background of the witnesses against him, how did Sergeant Witham get entangled in this mess? Attorney Vaughn Taylor, who has acted as Withams legal counsel, believes that the sergeant was "caught in a very large casting net" thrown out by federal investigators. "There were two things that the government found very significant," Taylor related to The New American. "First, they were looking for people who had worked with Captain Crawford in EOD; secondly, they were looking at gun shows and people who did business at them. Of course, these two facts dont add up to a case, particularly when the suspect is someone like Tim Witham. As far as his military career is concerned, Witham all but walks on water; its impossible to imagine someone farther from the person described in these charges." Nor were the feds able to develop a material case against Witham. On October 17th, agents from the ATF and NCIS conducted a search of Withams home in Jacksonville, North Carolina; this included an examination of an adjoining building from which Witham, a federally licensed firearms dealer, sold guns and related merchandise. The October 20th "Report of Investigation" filed by special agent John S. Corpening of the ATFs Wilmington, North Carolina field office noted that "no machine guns or prohibited weapons were found" during the search of Withams home and business. The report did note that Witham was in possession of a stolen Ruger pistol. The gun had been brought to Witham for repairs; when he ran a check on its serial number, he learned that it was a stolen weapon, and informed the ATF. As instructed, Witham logged the stolen weapon in his Acquisition and Disposition record, and held it on behalf of the ATF. "Strangely, the ATFs search of my home was conducted, in part, by students of mine," Witham informed The New American. "For about three years Ive been involved with some of them in a drug interdiction program, so they knew me well before all of this." (Witham has also helped train ATF and FBI personnel in explosives disposal.) Despite the effort on the part of NCIS investigators and Marine officials to depict Witham as a danger to public order, the ATF did not seek revocation of his federal firearms license. "Even though I was in jail for 79 days and face court-martial, my firearms license is still active, and my inventory is still intact," observes Witham. "If I had done all of the things Ive been accused of, or any of them, would the ATF have left me with my weapons?" On December 19th, Major Robert Brubaker, the Judge Advocate General investigator who presided over Withams "Article 32" investigation, filed his report, which once again noted Withams sterling record and the poverty of the case against him. "Evidence was presented demonstrating that SSgt. Withams military character up to this point has been excellent," Brubaker pointed out. "He has a clean, in fact quite distinguished, service record." For a man identified as a "flight risk," Witham displayed little inclination to escape when presented with the opportunity. Brubaker noted that the "chasers" the MPs assigned to watch Witham were quite inept. "To say that their supervision of their charge was loose would be an understatement," reported the investigator. "I observed a couple of occasions when SSgt. Witham was alone without the chasers in sight. There was one occasion when SSgt. Witham himself tracked down his chasers to tell them he was going somewhere and they needed to be with him. To me, this rather strongly cuts against any argument that he is a serious flight risk." While Brubaker stated that "there probably is sufficient evidence to send the case to a court-martial," he also took note of the fact that "the government seems to be relying quite heavily on the statements of two witnesses of questionable integrity" to make its case against Witham. (Since that time a third witness has also offered to testify against Witham.) Abuse of Power It is possible that Withams impeccable service record belies his involvement in the felonious theft of military weapons and explosives. However, it is at least as likely that he is merely an exemplary serviceman who has been traduced by perjured statements offered in exchange for special prosecutorial considerations. His case serves as a precautionary tale about the federal governments increasing reliance upon paid undercover informants, especially in firearms-related investigations and other forms of covert operations against the "radical right." In his book Deadly Force, law enforcement analyst Carsen Stroud points out that in 1994 the Justice Department budgeted $100 million to spend on confidential informants, many of them involved in "quasi-criminal or actively criminal" enterprises. Also significant is the potential impact on military morale should Sergeant Witham prove to be the innocent victim of a politically motivated abuse of prosecutorial power. "I love the Marine Corps and have great respect for our federal law enforcement agencies," declares Robert Ferris, who was himself a respected field-grade commander. "But what is being done to Tim is simply wrong; its an abuse of power by corrupt and ambitious people who are, by God, going to get a conviction, whatever it takes to do so. In nearly a quarter-century of military service Ive never seen a comparable abuse of power." William Norman Grigg *************************************** Visit our home page at: http://www.hackworth.com Sign up for the free weekly Defending America newsletter on our website Snail mail to: P.O. Box 430 Whitefish, MT. 59937

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RE: Apple crypto engineer position available
by Anonymous Sender 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>PGP cut the gordian knot and demonstrated that it was _possible_ >to have a successful PKI application without a CA. But that is not >to say that a trusted third party cannot add value to an >application. PGP validated PKI generally but it did not invalidate >the CA concept - in the PGP system everyone is a trust provider, >everyone is in that sense a CA. PGP did in fact invalidate CA concept, very successfully. There is a world of difference between "everyone is a trust provider" and several centralized CAs. Authentication is an essential part of security. If one assumes wrong who she is talking to then all "strong crypto" used is irrelevant, since the middleman is browsing the plaintext. If there is a need, CA customers will be given middleman's keys and all traffic will be systematically captured, re-encrypted and forwarded to the intended recipient for as long as required. Maybe even keys with the same hash (id) can be generated to pass the verification. What percentage of users would do the non-automated, manual check anyway ? If trusting a secret key to escrowing entity (GAK) is a bad deal, how is trusting someone's identity to CA any different ? In both cases security is deposited with an organization that can be influenced in any number of ways. The CA concept does not work because security and privacy are inherently individual, and any forced insertion of third parties in the process is bound to miserably fail. The Fool

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The Great Internet Bandwidth Crisis
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It seems to me that the chief impediment standing in the way of the Internet becoming a propaganda and marketing tool suitable for use and control by a few rich and powerful business entities is the comparatively inexpensive and easy access of millions of users to the same technologies available to megacorporations. History itself leads me to suspect that the money and power moguls will use a variety of real and imaginary issues to place greater monetary burdens and access restrictions on many aspects of the Internet and Web, particularly those that have commercial potential. A current example is the attempt by various Telecos to raise the cost of access for other businesses, citing alleged burdens placed on their resources by ISPs at the same time that they are scrambling to enter the same market by undercutting their competitors. The Great Teleco Resource Crisis will undoubtedly be mirrored at some point in the future by the Great Internet Bandwidth Crisis. I suspect that although it will be as bogus as the Telecos' current imaginary crisis, it will come at a time when the major players have divided up enough of the infrastructure pie among themselves to be unanimous in their nod-and-wink agreement as to the severity of the crisis. Undoubtedly, this will be just one of a variety of crisis in which will require restrictive legislation and cost-increasing regulations that will save bandwidth for future children and protect adult citizens from the extreme danger of engaging in commerce with other average adult citizens such as themselves. It seems to me that the *only* way that the Internet can be kept from being used as just another tool for herding the masses into larger and more efficient feeding pens is to enable and empower the citizens to freely and safely control their own financial and commercial destiny in their Internet transactions. The more accessible and widespread the control over one-to-one monetary transactions, the more difficult it will be for a few entities to lead the citizens around by financial rings run through their noses. The government currently has a variety of budgetary axes held over the heads of the citizens, such as federal funding and grants in which money taken away from the citizens is returned to them on a statewide, local or individual basis only upon conditions that involve giving up rights and liberties that are due them. In order to resist being herded by a myriad of legal, licensing and regulatory 'axes' into increasingly global feeding pens, the citizens will need access to tools which allow secure financial transactions with differing levels of identity versus anonymity available to them. The reason that major business has not yet been able to divide up the financial pie available through the Internet is the excessive amount of resources that they need in order to compete for the attention of Internet users, given that average citizens are providing equal or better information and services for free or for a low cost. The sooner that the masses are able to engage in free commerce with one another via the Internet--whether it be giving Grandma Jones a dollar for her cookie recipies, or engaging a student across the continent in private research in return for money, for goods or for services--then the sooner the masses will scream loud and long when government or corporate entities threaten to take this ability to be self-sufficient away from them. Those who wish to circumvent the loss of privacy, liberty and freedom that they forsee as being possible on the Internet need to realize that most of those who are not currently empowered to manifest those possibilities in their individual life will little recognize or protest the 'present' loss of those 'future' possibilities. Unless there is a widespread dissemination of working tools accessible to the average citizen, then the future will be controlled by those with the funds and resources to limit financial transactions on the Internet to a self-defined 'way things are.' "Teach a man to buy his fish from you, and you'll feed yourself for a lifetime."

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IntenseWhore VidKid Sex Machine
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.pathfinder.com/time/magazine/1998/dom/980420/notebook.techwatch.… PLAY STATION Vidkids hooked on high-impact games with stereo sound tracks will have a tough time leaving their seats at next month's E3 convention. That's when BSG Laboratories will debut the Intensor, a $500 speaker-studded chair (with between-the-legs bass and separate subwoofer) to give hard-core players a body-thumping shot of visceral reality. It seems to me that enterprising children with mechanical ability should be able to use common household items, such as vacume cleaners, blow-driers, doorknobs and wax-fruit to 'enhance' the vidiot experience that BSG Laboratories will be pimping. It seems to me that an enterprising young Tom Cruise type might be able to combine an enhanced version of the IntenseWhore with a variety of adult MPEGs and pick up some major cash in between his friends' 'cumings' and goings. Sounds like something for the 'Got My Nut'ly News to pursue.

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