December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Cylink Corporation to Submit SAFER+
by David Honig 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.newspage.com/cgi-bin/NA.GetStory?story=b0414070.403&date=19980415 &level1=46545&level2=46549&level3=626 Cylink Corporation to Submit SAFER+ Algorithm to the National Institute of Standards and Technology April 15, 1998 SUNNYVALE, Calif.--(BUSINESS WIRE) via NewsEdge Corporation -- Non-Proprietary, Royalty-Free Algorithm will be Evaluated as a Replacement for Current Data Encryption Standard Demonstrating once again its commitment to deliver freely available encryption technology to the market, Cylink Corporation (NASDAQ:CYLK), a pioneer in commercial cryptography, today announces it plans to submit the SAFER+ algorithm to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). NIST is reviewing encryption algorithms that will replace the current Data Encryption Standard (DES) which has been used for more than 20 years. The new standard is called AES, or Advanced Encryption Standard. The evaluation will take approximately two years. SAFER+ is a royalty-free, non-proprietary encryption algorithm. Developed by world-class and world-wide cryptographers, SAFER+ is an enhancement of SAFER, which was first published in 1993. Since then, SAFER survived the scrutiny of many of the world's top cryptographers. Built on the proven track record of SAFER, SAFER+ is designed to meet the next generation of security requirements. Cylink estimates SAFER+ to be five times faster than DES, and ten times faster than Triple-DES. "Once again, Cylink is delighted to offer break-through technology to NIST and the information security community," said Chuck Williams, chief scientist at Cylink. "SAFER+ is the most recent example of our legacy of pioneering the use of cryptography in practical business solutions, including public key, SAFER, triple-DES, key recovery." SAFER was originally developed by Professor James Massey, a Cylink founder, and funded by Cylink. SAFER+ was sponsored by Cylink and jointly developed by Massey and Dr. Lily Chen, chief cryptographer at Cylink Corporation. Cylink is recognized as a pioneer in commercial cryptography since its commercial implementation of Diffie-Hellman public key management in 1984. It has: -- Developed the first public key management co-processor application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) for public key management acceleration; -- Brought to market the first triple DES (data encryption standard) encryption algorithm ASIC, and the first high-speed triple DES encryptor. -- Introduced several new products including a certificate-based access control system, a certificate-based LAN security system, and the world's first asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) cell encryptor. About Cylink and Algorithmic Research Cylink Corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, Algorithmic Research, are leading providers of encryption-based network security solutions. Their products enable the secure transmission of data over networks, including local-area networks (LANs), wide-area networks (WANs), and public packet-switched networks such as the Internet. Cylink and Algorithmic Research serve Fortune 500 companies, multinational financial institutions, and government agencies worldwide. For more information, visit our web sites at http://www.cylink.com and http://www.arx.com. ------------------------------------------------------------ David Honig Orbit Technology honig(a)otc.net Intaanetto Jigyoubu Steel : Meatspace :: Encryption : Virtual space

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BXA Encryption Export Seminar - San Jose, April 28
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think some cypherpunk representatives should attend this seminar. It's often useful to hear what the BXA is saying when they talk to exporters instead of a court or the press. You will probably learn something about crypto export law, too. If you have a portable cassette recorder, see if you can record it for future reference "and for others at my company". I'd go, but I have a bunch of committments on that date. Let me know how it turns out! John Bureau of Export Administration - U.S. Department of Commerce presents ENCRYPTION CONTROLS SAN JOSE, CA April 28, 1998 * 8:30 AM - 5:00 PM Hyatt San Jose * San Jose, CA ENCRYPTION CONTROLS - As a result of the release of new rules governing the export of encryption items previously controlled on the U.S. Munitions List, the export licensing responsibilities were transferred to the Department of Commerce (except those specially designed, developed, configured, adapted, or modified for military applications). This full-day program is being held to instruct and assist the exporting community with this change in jurisdiction. Representatives from BXA and the National Security Agency (NSA) will explain: the background and current U.S. policy, the main elements of the controls, License Exception KMI and the licensing process for encryption cases, and legislative initiatives and other issues to watch in the future. WHO SHOULD ATTEND? - This seminar is designed for exporters, freight forwarders, carriers, international trade consultants, attorneys, and others who support and advise exporters. If your organization is involved in a technology-related industry, especially computers, electronics, defense goods/services, etc., this seminar is a must. ENCRYPTION AGENDA 8:30-8:35 Opening 8:35-8:45 Overview of morning 8:45-9:00 Encryption Policy * What is it? * How does it affect your company? 9:00-9:15 Encryption Regulations * What's new? * What's different * How to classify an encryption product 9:15-10:15 Encryption Licenses and the inter-agency review process * Validated * Encryption Licensing Arrangements * Foreign Nationals 10:15-10:30 BREAK 10:30-11:00 Mass Market Encryption Software * Helpful Hints 11:00-12:00 License Exceptions: TMP - GOV - BAG for encryption items 12:00-1:00 LUNCH 1:00-1:45 License Exception Key Management Infrastructure (KMI) * Recoverable encryption items * Non-recoverable 56-bit DES with a plan 1:45-2:15 Key Recovery Agents 2:15-2:45 Exports over the Internet 2:45-3:00 BREAK 3:00-3:30 Next Steps 3:30-4:00 License practice/policy 4:00-4:45 Questions & Answers ABOUT THE INSTRUCTORS - The instructors are experienced export administration specialists and licensing officers from BXA's Washington, DC headquarters and Western Regional Office. The instructors - who played a major role in drafting the new encryption regulations - are available throughout the seminar to answer your questions. ACCOMMODATIONS - Special conference rates have been arranged with the Hyatt San Jose for those who need rooms. Please make your reservations directly with the hotel by calling (408) 993- 1234 or toll free (800) 233-1234. Mention the "BXA Seminar." Note: The hotel is conveniently located minutes from San Jose Airport and is also easily accessible by automobile. The Hyatt offers free parking. QUESTIONS?- For more information on the Encryption Controls topics, please call BXA's Western Regional Office at (714) 660-0144. For information about registration, contact the Federation of International Trade Associations at (800) 969-FITA or (703) 620-9098. REGISTRATION Note: Space is limited and will be accepted on a space availability basis . The Registration Fee for the Seminar is $125/person and includes continental breakfast, AM & PM breaks, luncheon and seminar materials. The registration fee is not refundable after April 22, 1998. Cancellation prior to that date is subject to a $25 administrative charge. To guarantee placement for the Encryption Controls Seminar in San Jose, FAX your registration to (703) 391-0159, and charge the fee on a MC, VISA or American Express, or mail your registration with your check payable to FITA-BXA to FITA, 1851 Alexander Bell Drive, Suite 400, Reston, VA 20191. Attendee Name(s): ____________________________________________________________ Company Name: ____________________________________________________________ Street Address: ____________________________________________________________ City, State, Zip: ____________________________________________________________ Phone: _______________________ Fax: _________________________ [ ] Enclosed is my check for $___________ ($125/person) [ ] We prefer to pay by credit card: ____ MC, ____ Visa, ____ AMEX Amount $_________ Acct #_______________________________ Expiry date:__________ Cardholder Name: ___________________________________________________ Cardholder Signature:________________________________________________ Sponsored by The Federation of International Trade Associations (FITA) (For information about FITA, call toll-free (800) 926-FITA)

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Commerce Secretary attacks crypto export limits
by Trei, Peter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,21120,00.html?st.ne.fd.mdh Crypto policy called a failure By Courtney Macavinta Staff Writer, CNET NEWS.COM April 15, 1998, 11:40 a.m. PT URL: http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,21120,00.html The government's policy restricting the export of strong encryption products has failed and is boosting the foreign market by hog-tying the U.S. industry, Commerce Department secretary William Daley conceded today. [...] But the software industry and privacy advocates were most intrigued today by Daley's admission that the administration's export limits on encryption (technology that secures digital communication) are hindering U.S. companies' ability to compete with global manufacturers. The export policy went into effect last January, and is overseen by the Commerce Department. Under the rules, software makers that are granted crypto export licenses must submit proof of their plans to build key-recovery features into their products after next year. Key-recovery systems make it possible for law enforcement agents--who have obtained a court order--to access computer users' private key that unscrambles their digital messages or files. "The ultimate result will be foreign dominance of the market," Daley said. "This means a loss of jobs here, and products that do not meet either our law enforcement or national security needs." There has been an ongoing fight to overturn the export limits. But a compromise hasn't been reached with law enforcement officials, who assert that access to keys is needed to combat a new wave of high-tech crime in which suspects can cover their tracks with crypto. [...]

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Re: Apple crypto engineer position available
by Mark Altenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 4/14/98, Robert Hettinga blathered on like this: >...Hint 1: Whatsisname Sidhu, > >who negotiated the world's first RSA license, and who probably could have >invented digital commerce on the internet all by himself if he only knew >what he had, already bought and paid for, wasted in a mail and LAN >protocol, buried in the bowels of the MacOS... >...Anyway, a more clueful Sidhu, (who, to be fair, couldn't have understood >what was coming) could have, with just a little of the right prompting :-), >taken some of the money you guys gave to, say, Steve, for instance :-), and >bought the blind signature patent at firesale prices from DigiCash ($10 >million is chump change, even to Apple, even then, :-)) at last year's >greater-fools exchange of ownership at "the world's greatest financial >cryptography company" (my name, not theirs).... > Quite amazing to look at all of the innovation that went on at Apple and wonder what could have been. From my perspective, the big mistake with Apple's first implementation of crypto was that it was part of an architecture (yep, PowerTalk). After close encounters with this and other wonderfully "flexible architectures", I've learned (the hard way) that this is one of the best oxymorons in computerdom. Architectures seem like wonderful, grandiose ways to solve a bunch of problems at once, but they usually lead a Titanic-like existence, eventually sinking into the abyss and taking almost everything with it, including products, businesses, reputations - you name it. Well, an amazing thing happened. Just before PowerTalk started taking on serious water, someone managed to throw DigiSign (Apple's digital signature technology based on RSA public keys) into its own life boat; Apple actually built a separate library for DigiSign that didn't require PowerTalk. But, unfortunately, there was leak in this boat, too. You see, the model for DigiSign's certificates was based on a heirarchy and required a certificate authority and all of the requisite infrastructure. No one had really done this yet so Apple had to do more than create DigiSign and put it into the Mac OS - they had to get this infrastructure in place, too. Now, even though Apple had the help of RSA and BBN, there was this even bigger problem of just helping people get it. The best way to help people understand technology is to make it accessible so almost anyone can play with it and use it. This is what Apple is known for - making technology so accessible that people just go nuts, doing things with it and taking it places no one ever dreamed. That's how Apple catalyzed the transformation of the publishing industry. Requiring a CA to make DigiSign work simply made this impossible. A peer to peer model, allowing people to create and sign their own certificates would have been far more appropriate for Apple's creative users. Then came PGP... C 'est la vie! Mark ---- mark(a)altenberg.com

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Commerce Report on the Digital Economy
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to Jay Holovacs we've put Daley's press conference remarks and an executive summary of the "The Emerging Digital Economy" at: http://jya.com/daley-ecom.htm And we offer the main text of the full report at: http://jya.com/emerg-dig.htm (164K, plus 11 images) It's available from Commerce in separate HTML chapters or the full text with appendices in PDF (300 pages) at: http://www.ecommerce.gov/emerging.htm

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Denning 98
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dorothy Denning's Spring 98 course schedule provides an informative overview and recommended readings: Information Warfare: Terrorism, Crime, National Security http://guru.cosc.georgetown.edu/~denning/cosc511/spring98/schedule.html The 1997 course was discussed here last year, along with criticism of a parallel student web site on criminal use of encryption, as noted by anonymous on UK Crypto: http://infinity.nus.sg/cypherpunks/dir.97.07.10-97.07.16/msg00003.html

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Entropy Gradient Reversals
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.rageboy.com/allthewords.html

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BioInfoWarFare? / Re: sorry
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mark Hedges wrote: > > *sigh* actually, that wasn't bad english, it was just accidental > >html email....i didn't realize netscape would do that and i apologize. > >ooooooooooooooooo > >colin the feeling that its > > cjm1(a)execpc.com all a lot of oysters > >maroney and no pearls. > >ooooooooooooooooo > > It's 'it's', not 'its'. > > Good English does not coherence generate. Sounds like a biological agraphia warfare attack, followed by a logic bomb... Hhmmm...I smell a Platypus?

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Hackworth
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

AN AMBUSHED MARINE Have a look at the following. A loyal, heroic Marine is being fed to the sharks. A letter to your congress person and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, with an info copy to your local newspaper, would help. For those who might want to help a good Marine financially he would be forever grateful. Tim Witham Legal Defense Fund c/o Robert Ferris Box 538 Jacksonville, NC 28541 SEMPER FI and perhaps the top brass in the Corps should refresh themselves as to what this wonderful expression means. Hack 14, March 16, 1998 NATION: "Criminal Injustice?" To judge from his military paper trail, Marine Sergeant Timothy Witham, a 33-year-old Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) specialist, is the embodiment of the Corps. A veteran of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Witham has also served with distinction in Somalia. Superlatives suffuse his service record: "Sergeant Withams professional achievement, initiative and loyal dedication to duty reflected great credit upon himself and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service," declared Lt. Colonel G.C. Cutchall in a citation issued when Witham received the Navy Achievement Medal. In a letter endorsing Withams application to become a Warrant Officer Candidate, Lieutenant Colonel E.M. Smith, his former commanding officer at North Carolinas Cherry Point Marine facility, praised Withams "seasoned leadership high degree of maturity poise, understanding and tact." In addition to his military service, Witham has also excelled in joint projects with civilian agencies, according to Smith: "He has established a tremendous rapport with outside agencies such as the FBI, various ATF state bureaus, Secret Service, DEA and other police agencies." Withams dossier includes a certificate of appreciation from the Secret Service for his work as part of a presidential security detail at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. He was also entrusted with similar security responsibilities during the 1994 Middle East peace talks and the UNs 50th anniversary in 1995. Abrupt Change of Heart Noting that Witham is "loyal, displays sound judgment, and is exceptionally reliable and trustworthy," Lt. Col. Smith recommended his application "with utmost enthusiasm." Withams current commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Ayala of Marine Wing Support Squadron 271, offered a similarly glowing endorsement last September. "[Witham] leads from the front. Superior knowledge of the EOD field. Can handle any mission and looks forward to challenging assignments," declared Ayala. "[Witham is a] true asset to his section and to this Squadron. His knowledge and expertise would make [him] an outstanding candidate for the warrant officer program." However, Ayalas opinion of Witham underwent an abrupt change just a few weeks later. "SSgt. [Staff Sergeant] Witham has proven that he is a threat to the good order and discipline of the Squadron and the U.S. Marine Corps," insisted Ayala in an October 17th memo. Ayalas radical reevaluation of Witham followed the October 16th arrest of Witham and five other Marines as a result of "Operation Longfuse," a 16-month joint sting operation conducted by the FBI, the ATF, and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). Witham found himself accused of "transporting a loaded weapon on base; conspiracy to commit larceny; larceny of military explosives, equipment, and firearms; wrongful disposition of military property; receiving stolen property; [and] federal firearms and explosives violations under the Federal Assimilated Crimes Act." Upon his arrest, Witham was designated "a flight risk," which led Ayala to support "continued confinement" until his pre-trial hearing which turned out to be a 79-day jail term. "Lesser forms of restraint would be inadequate to insure that he would appear at his hearing and court-martial," insisted Ayala. "This is not the first time that SSgt Witham has been involved in this type of incident." Curiously, in the same memo, Ayala noted that there had never been any previous disciplinary action taken against Witham which would suggest a serious delinquency on the part of his superiors if Witham had indeed been "involved in this type of incident" on earlier occasions. Just as curious is the fact that Form 1070 in Sergeant Withams personal file, which lists "offenses and punishments," is entirely blank. Literally in a single day, a model Marine with an unblemished record was transmuted into a felonious arms smuggler whose motivations were equal parts greed and radical "anti-government" views. Federal and military investigators have yet to find a particle of material evidence to prove that Sergeant Witham is the criminal they describe; their case depends entirely upon the testimony of three eminently impeachable witnesses a twice-convicted perjurer, a civilian ex-convict, and an ex-Marine of dubious integrity who served as a "confidential informant" for the feds during the undercover operation. Two of the witnesses peddled their testimony against Witham in exchange for lighter sentences. The "confidential informant" made an even better deal: He arranged for complete immunity before beginning his undercover work, and since October 17th he has been taken into the witness protection program. Last September, Staff Sergeant Timothy Witham was chosen from 20 very qualified candidates to become a Warrant Officer; now, after spending 79 days in jail, he faces the prospect of an April court-martial. Robert Ferris, a retired Marine officer and former commanding officer to Witham, told The New American: "I spent 24 years in the military, in the Army and Marines, and Ive never seen an abuse of power to compare with the treatment of this young man. He should be at Quantico going to school to become a Warrant Officer, and yet hes exhausting his life savings and seeing his career destroyed because the feds need to convict somebody to make a political point." The "political point" being made in the case of Tim Witham appears to be that mere suspicion of "anti-government" views is enough to destroy the career of a model military man. Extremist Spin The "Longfuse" investigation cast a net across several states, pursuing leads as far south as North Carolina and as far north as Massachusetts. Fourteen suspects were arrested on October 17th eight civilians and six Marines, including four stationed at Camp Lejune. Over the course of a year and a half, undercover investigators, focusing their efforts on gun shows, military bases, and gun dealers throughout the southeast, had purchased an estimated 150 pounds of plastic explosives, grenades, grenade launchers, shoulder-launched rockets, a handful of anti-personnel mines, and more than 50 machine guns. In the post-Oklahoma City bombing environment, the preferred spin of federal investigators was entirely predictable. Robert Ferris, who is now Withams next-door neighbor, was a witness on Withams behalf at two preliminary hearings: the "Magistrates hearing," which is held to determine if pre-trial confinement is necessary; and an "Article 32" hearing, which is the military equivalent of a grand jury. "The first thing out of the mouth of [military prosecutor] Captain [Michael] Richardson was Ruby Ridge," Ferris recalls. "They insisted that Tim was part of a ring of anti-government radicals who were stealing weapons and had sworn not to let the feds take them alive." Thus was Witham identified as part of the ubiquitous menace of "right-wing extremism." Initial press coverage of the "Operation Longfuse" arrests played up the alleged "anti-government" angle, and the feds did their best to abet such speculation at least in the beginning. "Federal agents seized truckloads of stolen military and civilian weapons yesterday in an expanding investigation into the theft and sale of machine guns, grenades and plastic explosives," screamed the October 18th Baltimore Sun. The paper reported that an anonymous investigator portentously warned that some of the civilian suspects arrested "have ties potentially to militia groups." The Raleigh, North Carolina News and Observer carried a similar warning: "A top official said he could not rule out the possibility that anti-government extremists were connected to the theft of military ordnance from Camp Lejune." "These are weapons that are of military use, very lethal weapons, and they were weapons that were in the wrong hands," fretted Treasury Department spokesman Jim Johnson at an October 17th press conference. "Thats the sort of thing all citizens should be concerned about." Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon added the disturbing observation that "C-4 was taken, which is highly dangerous and used by terrorists." For those who missed the message, the Dallas Morning News offered a useful summary: "Concern over the theft of high explosives has increased in military circles along with a broader anxiety about domestic terrorism, especially in the aftermath of incidents such as the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building." The "right-wing menace" is the medias favorite enemy, and ATF officials were careful to drop tantalizing hints that "Operation Longfuse" had uncovered something big. "You could outfit a small army with what weve recovered," claimed ATF special agent Mark Logan. ATF spokesman Earl Woodham primed the press for further dramatic developments: "The investigation has really just begun. Its like we just hit the base of an oak tree, and if we follow it up, we may find that it branches out very wide." Dubious Informant The man who planted the acorn that grew into the ATFs "oak tree" is a former Marine sergeant who had served as an EOD specialist with several of the arrested suspects. In early 1996, this sergeant reportedly instigated "Operation Longfuse" when he approached authorities at Camp Lejune to warn them that weapons and explosives were being stolen and sold at gun shows and gun dealerships. That his motives werent purely idealistic is suggested by the fact that he was careful to get complete immunity before taking an assignment as a paid confidential informant (CI). For the next year and a half, the CI worked numerous stings against Marines and civilian gun enthusiasts. The feds deployed other undercover assets as part of "Longfuse" and tried to tailor stings to the psychology of the suspects. In the case of Thomas Crawford, a Marine captain stationed in Massachusetts who was among those arrested on October 17th, the undercover agents reportedly posed as intelligence specialists who sought arms and explosives for deniable missions in Latin America "an Oliver North-type black ops project," according to one source. In the case of a second Marine sergeant who was caught in the sting and who became the second witness against Witham undercover feds reportedly posed as organized crime figures. "[The second Marine sergeant] wasnt going anywhere in the Corps," Sergeant Witham asserted to The New American. "He was consistently denied promotions; you might say he has more pass-overs than a satellite. I suspect that he had a real need to feel important, and the undercover agents were happy to feed his ego." From information made available during legal discovery, Witham relates, the second Marine "got involved in long drunken discussions with the undercover people in which he claimed to have been involved in all kinds of crimes, including at least one murder. He supposedly helped kill a guy and then disposed of the body with a woodchipper. Strangely, though, the prosecution didnt follow up on that particular story." The feds were willing to give credence to the second Marines alcohol-aided claims about Witham, which were covertly recorded. "They initially used those drunken boasts to make three charges against me," Witham recalls. "The first was that I had been involved in the theft of washing machines, dryers, and other appliances, as well as drywall and other things of that nature. The second was that I had been involved in forgery, and the third was that I had been involved in the theft of explosives. The prosecution dropped the first two charges but has stuck with the third." How credible is the second Marine as a witness? According to local press reports in North Carolina, he has twice pled guilty to perjury. Furthermore, he faced accumulated prison terms of up to 380 years on charges arising from "Longfuse" and reportedly made a deal with the prosecution in which he could peddle his testimony against others for a total of 12 years in prison with the possibility of parole after four. The third witness against Witham has served a prison term on firearms-related charges. He also reportedly made a deal for his testimony in a previous weapons theft case involving Army personnel. Casting a Large Net Given his own solid military background, and the dubious background of the witnesses against him, how did Sergeant Witham get entangled in this mess? Attorney Vaughn Taylor, who has acted as Withams legal counsel, believes that the sergeant was "caught in a very large casting net" thrown out by federal investigators. "There were two things that the government found very significant," Taylor related to The New American. "First, they were looking for people who had worked with Captain Crawford in EOD; secondly, they were looking at gun shows and people who did business at them. Of course, these two facts dont add up to a case, particularly when the suspect is someone like Tim Witham. As far as his military career is concerned, Witham all but walks on water; its impossible to imagine someone farther from the person described in these charges." Nor were the feds able to develop a material case against Witham. On October 17th, agents from the ATF and NCIS conducted a search of Withams home in Jacksonville, North Carolina; this included an examination of an adjoining building from which Witham, a federally licensed firearms dealer, sold guns and related merchandise. The October 20th "Report of Investigation" filed by special agent John S. Corpening of the ATFs Wilmington, North Carolina field office noted that "no machine guns or prohibited weapons were found" during the search of Withams home and business. The report did note that Witham was in possession of a stolen Ruger pistol. The gun had been brought to Witham for repairs; when he ran a check on its serial number, he learned that it was a stolen weapon, and informed the ATF. As instructed, Witham logged the stolen weapon in his Acquisition and Disposition record, and held it on behalf of the ATF. "Strangely, the ATFs search of my home was conducted, in part, by students of mine," Witham informed The New American. "For about three years Ive been involved with some of them in a drug interdiction program, so they knew me well before all of this." (Witham has also helped train ATF and FBI personnel in explosives disposal.) Despite the effort on the part of NCIS investigators and Marine officials to depict Witham as a danger to public order, the ATF did not seek revocation of his federal firearms license. "Even though I was in jail for 79 days and face court-martial, my firearms license is still active, and my inventory is still intact," observes Witham. "If I had done all of the things Ive been accused of, or any of them, would the ATF have left me with my weapons?" On December 19th, Major Robert Brubaker, the Judge Advocate General investigator who presided over Withams "Article 32" investigation, filed his report, which once again noted Withams sterling record and the poverty of the case against him. "Evidence was presented demonstrating that SSgt. Withams military character up to this point has been excellent," Brubaker pointed out. "He has a clean, in fact quite distinguished, service record." For a man identified as a "flight risk," Witham displayed little inclination to escape when presented with the opportunity. Brubaker noted that the "chasers" the MPs assigned to watch Witham were quite inept. "To say that their supervision of their charge was loose would be an understatement," reported the investigator. "I observed a couple of occasions when SSgt. Witham was alone without the chasers in sight. There was one occasion when SSgt. Witham himself tracked down his chasers to tell them he was going somewhere and they needed to be with him. To me, this rather strongly cuts against any argument that he is a serious flight risk." While Brubaker stated that "there probably is sufficient evidence to send the case to a court-martial," he also took note of the fact that "the government seems to be relying quite heavily on the statements of two witnesses of questionable integrity" to make its case against Witham. (Since that time a third witness has also offered to testify against Witham.) Abuse of Power It is possible that Withams impeccable service record belies his involvement in the felonious theft of military weapons and explosives. However, it is at least as likely that he is merely an exemplary serviceman who has been traduced by perjured statements offered in exchange for special prosecutorial considerations. His case serves as a precautionary tale about the federal governments increasing reliance upon paid undercover informants, especially in firearms-related investigations and other forms of covert operations against the "radical right." In his book Deadly Force, law enforcement analyst Carsen Stroud points out that in 1994 the Justice Department budgeted $100 million to spend on confidential informants, many of them involved in "quasi-criminal or actively criminal" enterprises. Also significant is the potential impact on military morale should Sergeant Witham prove to be the innocent victim of a politically motivated abuse of prosecutorial power. "I love the Marine Corps and have great respect for our federal law enforcement agencies," declares Robert Ferris, who was himself a respected field-grade commander. "But what is being done to Tim is simply wrong; its an abuse of power by corrupt and ambitious people who are, by God, going to get a conviction, whatever it takes to do so. In nearly a quarter-century of military service Ive never seen a comparable abuse of power." William Norman Grigg *************************************** Visit our home page at: http://www.hackworth.com Sign up for the free weekly Defending America newsletter on our website Snail mail to: P.O. Box 430 Whitefish, MT. 59937

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RE: Apple crypto engineer position available
by Anonymous Sender 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>PGP cut the gordian knot and demonstrated that it was _possible_ >to have a successful PKI application without a CA. But that is not >to say that a trusted third party cannot add value to an >application. PGP validated PKI generally but it did not invalidate >the CA concept - in the PGP system everyone is a trust provider, >everyone is in that sense a CA. PGP did in fact invalidate CA concept, very successfully. There is a world of difference between "everyone is a trust provider" and several centralized CAs. Authentication is an essential part of security. If one assumes wrong who she is talking to then all "strong crypto" used is irrelevant, since the middleman is browsing the plaintext. If there is a need, CA customers will be given middleman's keys and all traffic will be systematically captured, re-encrypted and forwarded to the intended recipient for as long as required. Maybe even keys with the same hash (id) can be generated to pass the verification. What percentage of users would do the non-automated, manual check anyway ? If trusting a secret key to escrowing entity (GAK) is a bad deal, how is trusting someone's identity to CA any different ? In both cases security is deposited with an organization that can be influenced in any number of ways. The CA concept does not work because security and privacy are inherently individual, and any forced insertion of third parties in the process is bound to miserably fail. The Fool

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