December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Rich Graves and fight-censorship
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can someone tell me why Rich Graves was kicked of fight-censorship some time ago? Maybe Rich Graves himself will answer.

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Censorware complaint online
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The complaint in the Loudoun County censorware case is at: http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/spoofcentral/censored/ -Declan

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Re: Coercive Monopolism vs Wimpyness
by Antonomasia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I thought it was time someone totally unbiased commented on this OS war thing! Blanc writes: >And, since Windows OS is so pitifully lousy, why do people continue to buy >it, even without the computer attached; why do they continue to upgrade, >even if it's so slow and bloated? Don't they realize Unix is better? >Don't they realize they're just making Billg richer? We buy computers ordered with blank disks in preference. In fact this one came with DOS and I wiped it on day 1. > Want to parse MS Turd documents? Windows 95 and MS Office. Red Hat's Applixware has had good reviews. Besides I'm happy to return unreadable messages asking for a different format. If the other guy refuses try him with DVI or something. It's different if you're being paid to use Windoze. I'll admit it - I did some Lose95 work today: what was it ? Trying to get a modem link to stay up. I've done more creative things, but not usually under Windoze. > Want to run that program your mother sends you and wants you to run? Quote her the exec format error you got. Ha ha ha. > Happened to buy a printer? It won't say "Yes! It works with Ghostscript!" But you should soon find out from other people. From: "Brian B. Riley" <brianbr(a)together.net> > Windows (who stole its interface from mac who stole it from xerox) > type GUIs are easier to use than CLIs, it is only since the > entrenchment of GUIs that they have come forth in the Unix/Linux > world. GUI interfaces are only easy for the few things they present you with, after which they are imnpossible. Unless you can connect your "find" and "sed" icons in a pipeline ... In fact I rarely even start X unless it's for the xboard chess game. speaking of which ... Is Unix dying--or even dead? From: "S. M. Halloran" <mitch(a)duzen.com.tr> From Edupage, 18 December 1997: <----------> TACTICAL SHIFT BY WORKSTATION COMPANIES Silicon Graphics Inc.'s plan to allow SGI graphics software to run on Microsoft's Windows NT operating system provides new evidence that a growing number of companies are giving up on Unix and instead standardizing on Windows NT. SGI hopes to be able to use its experience in developing high-end graphics software without having to spend a great deal of time building the underlying technology represented by an operating system. (Washington Post 17 Dec 97) <----------> But SGI never did put any effort into it, which was why their network programs were built on 'rcp' and needed fixing if you (horrors) set a password. > turnkey "office suite" and try to give MS a run for its money. There > is no time like now to get the X-Windows (or GUI-free-from-copyright) > Complete Office bundled together and have a media gathering to make > sure that all the important news organizations are informed. You > should get decent press exposure, since MS-bashing seems to be in > vogue. The Linux or FreeBSD people should select a mediagenic > spokesperson from the group--one with fire in the belly--and then do > the hard work of putting something together that a 25-year old > free-Unix developer's 72-year old grandmother can install to a x86 > box. In fact, your press conference would have real pinache if, in > fact, you put someone's 72-year old grandmother before a PC with an > empty disk drive, run the install, then type a short letter on the > fancy word processer, addressed to Bill G., with the message "Up > yours!" I can think of someone possibly suitable for this last bit. (R. what do you think ?) From: SL Baur <steve(a)xemacs.org> > Unix *is* far better and had the technology decades ago. > Where can I get a laptop without a pre-installed O/S (or with Linux > pre-installed) on it? Try these people. I'm not sure about laptops. : VA Research Linux Workstations | The World's Best Linux Workstations : | Featuring RedHat : http://www.varesearch.com | Now offering VarStation II Systems -- ############################################################## # Antonomasia ant(a)notatla.demon.co.uk # # See http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/ # ##############################################################

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The Jewish Defense League doesn't want you to know!
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Recently The Jewish Defense League succeded in shutting the domain ABBC.COM hosting a database of publicly available information of Jews who endorse censorship. The ISP CLEVER.NET forced Ahmed Ramito take off the list without any justifiable reason such as invasion of privacy. Under U. S. law public figures must demonstrate actual malice to recover damages for invasion of privacy and for defamation. But the information is publicly available and not covered by privacy laws in the United States. If you want to review what the extremist Jewish organization JDL doesn't want you to know go to http://www.dejanews.com Use the following search profile: ~a nobody(a)replay.com & Ahmed Rami Download it now and distribute it widely. Remember to download all the article segments! Be aware that The Jewish Defense League was founded by terrorist Meir Kahane whose Kach Movement was labeled a terrorist organization by the U. S. State Department. Related References: http://abbc.com http://www.hatewatch.org http://www.jdl.org

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Filed Friday afternoon
by bill payne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO William H. Payne ) Arthur R. Morales ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v ) CIV NO 97 0266 ) SC/DJS ) Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF ) Director, National Security Agency ) National Security Agency ) ) Defendant ) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BASED ON EVIDENCE FROM ADMISSIONS 1 COMES NOW plaintiffs Payne [Payne] and Morales [Morales] [Plaintiffs], pro se litigants to exercise their rights guaranteed under the Constitution and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As the court may know, Rule 26 (b)(1) Parties may obtain discovery regarding any mater, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and LOCATION of any books documents, or other tangible thing and the identity and location of persons have knowledge of any discoverable matter. Rule 36 states, Request for admission (a) A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for the purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth the request that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact including the genuineness of any documents described in the request. Copies of documents shall be served with the request unless they have been or otherwise furnished or made available for inspection and copying. The request may WITHOUT LEAVE OF THE COURT, be served upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon any other party with or after service of the summons and complaint upon that party. ... Plaintiffs capitalize WITHOUT LEAVE OF THE COURT. 2 Rule 36 states, {T]he matter IS ADMITTED unless, within 30 days after service of the request, or with such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection address to the matter signed by the party or by the party's attorney, ... Plaintiffs capitalize IS ADMITTED. 3 PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF REQUEST FOR ADMISSION TO NSA DIRECTOR KENNETH MINIHAN were served I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing request for admissions was mailed to Jan Elizabeth Mitchell, Assistant US Attorney, 525 Silver SW, ABQ, NM 87102 this Monday November 3, 1997. More than 30 days elapsed and Plaintiff's have received no response from Minihan or Mitchell. Therefore, Minihan ADMITS 1 NSA is involved in 'spiking' [modifying the advertised intended functions] electronic equipment. 2 NSA 'spiked' Iranian and Libyan cryptographic units so that the cryptographic key was transmitted with the cipher text. 3 Iranian messages were given to Iraq during the Iran/Iraq war. 4 NSA was involved in the conviction, by giving contents of secret messages, of Ali Vakili-Rad and Masour Hendi to the Court in Paris in the trial for the stabbing death of Shapour Baktiar. 5 Minihan knows where copies of intercepted messages are kept at NSA. 4 Requests for First set of Admission were mailed October 13, 1997. More than 30 days has elapsed. No response from lawyer Mitchell or respondents were received by Plaintiffs. Therefore, NSA employee Brian Snow ADMITS 1 He designed the cryptographic algorithm for the Missile Secure Cryptographic Unit (MSCU). 2 NSA funded the MSCU at Sandia labs. 3 In about 1983 he gave a presentation at NSA FANX building to some Sandians involved with the Missile Secure Cryptographic Unit. 4 In the presentation he showed electronic schematics of the units to the Sandians. 5 He told the Sandians about the electronic and operational problems NSA had with the cryptographic units he bought with him. 6 He told the Sandians that one of the cryptographic units failed in the Moscow embassy and transmitted clear text. 7 He concluded his talk telling the Sandians that NSA had no operational failures once NSA went to dual redundant cryptographic units. 8 He told the Sandians not to ask for a theoretical reason why dual redundant cryptographics never failed, in the sense of releasing classified data, but that this was based on practical experience. 9 William H. Payne was one of the Sandians in the audience of his talk. 10 He sat across the table from William H. Payne at lunch in the cafeteria in the basement of the FANX building directly after his talk. 11 He was involved in algorithms associated with the Clipper project. 12 He where the documents specifying the MSCU algorithm are located at NSA. 13 He knows where the documents specifying algorithms associated with the Clipper project are located at NSA. NSA employee Thomas White ADMITS 15 He served as the liaison between NSA and Sandia for the Deployable Seismic Verification System. 16 He forwarded documents such as NSA's Orange book and the public key Firefly chip to Sandia. 17 He told Bill Payne that NSA regarded former president Ronald Reagan as one of the US's greatest traitors. 18 He told Bill Payne that the reasons NSA regarded Ronald Reagan as one of the US's greatest traitors is that Reagan, on TV announced to the world that the US was reading Libyan communications. 19 He Bill Payne that the following day [after Reagan's TV announcement] NSA could no longer read Libyan communications. 20 He knows where the documents specifying Benincasa's correction to the original USO seismic data authentication algorithm are located at NSA. NSA employee Mark Unkenholtz ADMITS 21 He visited Sandia in about 1986-87 with R division employee Ed Georgio to discuss which data authentication algorithm should be used for the US/USSR deployable seismic verification system (DSVS). 22 He and Bill Payne discussed using public key for the DSVS system. 23 He concluded that there were too many problems with public key so it was best to continue using the old Benincasa USO (unmanned seismic observatory) algorithm. 24 In 1989 he and others asked Bill Payne to write a memorandum to NSA deputy director James J. Hearn requesting help from NSA to develop new data authentication algorithms. 25 He did this is because R division needed a letter of support for more funding. 26 The DRAFT letter he asked Payne to write is seen on Internet at jya.com, click cryptome, catch the thread at August 29, 1997, SANDIA REPORT, SAND91-2201 UC 706, Data Authentication for the Deployable Seismic Verification System, Appendix T, Benincasa's Algorithm Deficiencies. 27 He asked Payne to fax the DRAFT letter to his fiancee, Amy Johnston, since NSA did not have fax for unclassified work readily available to use. 28 The "To Mark and Ed, R" on page 183 of SAND91-2201 UC 706 addressed him and his boss boss at the time, Ed Donohue. 29 He told Payne that NSA takes about a year to evaluate an encryption/authentication algorithm before it can be distributed for use. 30 He told Payne, in a response to a question from Payne, that NSA runs crypto algorithms through statistical tests. 31 After Payne wrote the Appendix T memorandum, NSA sent a delegation to Sandia. 32 He and NSA employee Scott Judy designed a replacement algorithm for Beninicasa's USO algorithm. 33 The replacement algorithm was code named GRANITE. 34 The GRANITE design addressed some of the deficiencies in Benincasa's algorithm enumerated in Payne's Appendix T June 21, 1989 DRAFT letter to Hearn. 35 The GRANITE design addressed some of the deficiencies in Benincasa's algorithm enumerated in Payne's Appendix T June 21, 1989 DRAFT letter to Hearn. 36 He knows where the documents specifying Benincasa's to the original USO seismic data authentication algorithm are located at NSA. 37 He knows where the documents specifying his and Judy's GRANITE algorithm are located at NSA. NSA employee Scott Judy ADMITS 38 He met Payne at Sandia sometime after he wrote the DRAFT letter on Internet at jya.com, click cryptome, catch the thread at August 29, 1997, SANDIA REPORT, SAND91-2201 UC 706, Data Authentication for the Deployable Seismic Verification System, Appendix T, Benincasa's Algorithm Deficiencies. 39 He later met Payne again at NSA in a meeting. 40 He told Payne that NSA bases its cryptographer algorithm on principles other than mathematics. 41 He and NSA employee Mark Unkenholtz designed a replacement algorithm for Beninicasa's USO algorithm. 42 His replacement algorithm was code named GRANITE. 43 GRANITE design addressed some of the deficiencies in Benincasa's algorithm enumerated in Payne's Appendix T June 21, 1989 DRAFT letter to Hearn. 44 The number stepping on the internal registers of GRANITE was decreased in response to deficiency 2 enumerated in the June 21, 1989 letter to Hern. 45 He knows where the documents specifying Benincasa's correction to the original USO seismic data authentication algorithm are located at NSA. 46 He knows where the documents specifying his and Unkenholtz's GRANITE algorithm are located at NSA. NSA employee Edward Donohue ADMITS 47 He met Payne at Sandia sometime after he wrote the DRAFT letter on Internet at jya.com, click cryptome, catch the thread at August 29, 1997, SANDIA REPORT, SAND91-2201 UC 706, Data Authentication for the Deployable Seismic Verification System, Appendix T, Benincasa's Algorithm Deficiencies. 48 He was head of NSA's R division cryptographic algorithms division in 1989. 49 He knows where 1 Benincasa's original NSS/USO algorithm, 2 Benincasa's revision of 1, 3 The Unkenholtz - Judy GRANITE algorithm, 4 Brian Snow's MSCU algorithm, 5 the clipper algorithms, 6 the STU III algorithms. written specifications are located at NSA. NSA employee Paul Bridge ADMITS 50 He assumed liaison control from NSA employee Tom White for the US/USSR seismic data authenticator. 51 He placed a copy of WORKING AGREEMENT BETWEEN SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CONCERNING RESEARCH IN CRYPTOGRAPHY AT SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORY Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the National Security Agency (NSA) have established a working relationship which has gown substantially over the last decade. Currently, there exist several joint project areas of mutual interest. Different policies and administrative procedure exist at SNL and NSA which govern the handling of sensitive and classified material, and the documentation and dissemination of such work. It is the purpose of the Agreement to specify the general guidelines under which work will be administered in the area of cryptography research at SNL. First, SNL, in its role as systems integrator, requires and indigenous cryptographic capability to support its Department of Energy mission in the design and development of safe and secure nuclear weapons and in treaty verification. SNL and NSA agree to a cooperative effort to support SNL's needs in a manner consistent with the role of such work to national security. Second, NSA, in its role as the U.S. Government approval authority for cryptographic systems developed for and used in national security applications, recognizes its responsibility to provide support and guidance to SNL's activities in applying cryptography. Third, SNL will regard cryptographic research work as classified when it is initiated or created, i.e., will protect such work as "created classified", and will consult with NSA prior to handling such work as unclassified. Periodic technical and managerial discussions between SNL and NSA will be held to increase the awareness of the security concerns of both organizations and to develop and maintain an SNL cryptographic classification guide which will protect the national security interests of both organizations. This working agreement shall be effective on the date of the last signature and will be reviewed annually by SNL and NSA. It will be valid until terminated by mutual agreement. AGREED: ALBERT NARATH RADM JAMES S. MCFARLAND (USN) President Plans and Policy TITLE TITLE SANDIA NATIONAL NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY LABORATORIES June 10, 1991 22 July 1991 DATE DATE which is now seen on Internet at jya.com, click cryptome, catch the thread at August 29, 1997. 52 His purpose of giving Payne a copy of the Narath/MacFarland agreement an attempt to threaten Payne. 53 He told Payne that Sandia must regard the US/USSR Deployable Seismic Verification System (DSVS) authenticator as classified and get permission from NSA to place the unit in the field. 54 He told Payne that Sandia must have the DSVS authenticator TEMPEST tested . 55 He agrees Payne responded to him that the previous unit had already passed TEMPEST testing and that Payne's Sandia project leader, H. B. [Jim] Durham, did not want to spend the money to repeat the testing. 56 He told Payne that NSA should be getting the capability to build cryptographic devices. NSA employee Rick Proto ADMITS 57 He and group of other NSA employees met Sandians H. B. Durham, Ron Moya, and William Payne at NSA at Fort George G. Meade in about 1986 to discuss, in part, implementation of the Deployable Seismic Verification System data authenticator. 58 He and other NSA employees directed that the NSA Unmanned Seismic Observatory data authenticator algorithm designed by NSA employee Ronald Benincasa be implemented entirely in hardware. 59 He and the other NSA employees at the meeting, directed that the data authenticator be enclosed in a TEMPEST enclosure. Sandians expressed objection to the TEMPEST enclosure in that the authenticator was housed in a steel tube buried about 100 meters beneath ground surface. 60 He agrees that he and NSA employee Robert Morris met with Sandia cryptographer G. J. Simmons when Simmons asked them both the two questions: 1 NSA is sorry it delegated cryptographic implementation responsibility to Sandia for nuclear weapons; 2 NSA is trying to take back this responsibility? 61 He and/or Morris refuse to respond to Simmons' above question. Retired Sandia Employee Gustavus J Simmons ADMITS 62 He with Sandia Paul Stokes designed a data authentication algorithm for seismic treaty verifications in the early 1970s. 63 He and Stokes either patented, tried to patent, or contemplated patenting their authentication algorithm. 64 NSA, when we presented their seismic data authentication algorithm to the Agency, rejected its use. 65 He know that NSA gave Sandia the data authentication algorithm designed by NSA employee Ronald Benincasa to use in seismic verification rather than use your and Stokes algorithm. 66 He feels that the algorithm that he and Stokes proposed is as good or better than Benincasa's algorithm. 67 He feels that NSA demanding Sandia use Benincasa's algorithm could be a case of Not-invented-here as opposed to technical advantages over his and Stokes algorithm. 68 In about 1986 he gave a presentation in Sandia spook-shop building 868 to promote the use of public key cryptography for use in the Deployable Seismic Verification System. 69 No one, until he received a copy of Payne's technical report in 1992, SANDIA REPORT, SAND91-2201 UC 706, Data Authentication for the Deployable Seismic Verification System told him what algorithm and authentication technology was used. 70 He asked NSA employees Rick Proto and Robert Morris to the effect, 1 NSA is sorry it delegated cryptographic implementation responsibility to Sandia for nuclear weapons; 2 NSA is trying to take back this responsibility. 71 Proto or Morris did not answer his questions. 72 He retired before he planned from Sandia Labs. 73 He felt that NSA exerted some pressure on Sandia to have him retire. 74 He told William Payne on the phone that he was forced into early retirement as a result of NSA pressures. 75 He felt that some NSA algorithms do not are properly classifiable. 76 He felt that NSA abuses classification with regard to cryptography. 77 He feels that cryptography, by its 'slippery math' basis, is difficult, if not impossible, to regulate. Sandia employee D. Jerry Allen ADMITS 78 He was a supervisor Sandia's weapons components department. 79 NSA has responsibility for furnished Sandia the cryptographic algorithms and approving the implementation technology which went into the electronic locks in the US nuclear arsenal. 80 He told William Payne in about 1991-92 that it cost $300,000 per nuclear bomb to recall bombs to Pantex to remove and repair Sandia's failing semiconductor chips. Sandia employee Ronald Kulju ADMITS 81 He worked in Sandia weapons components department in about 1986/7. 82 He was working on a project which involved use of the Cylink corporation CY 1024 public key cryptography semiconductor chip. 82 He made an agreement in about 1986/7 with Payne. He would design the hardware oscillator for the CY 1024 if Payne would try to get CY 1024 to communicate with an 80c51 microcontroller using synchronous Mode 0 communications. 83 He told Payne that Sandia's public key cryptography chips did not get the same answers as the CY 1024. 84 He told Payne that NSA and Sandia was in the process of removing the public key cryptography from weapons systems. 4 Admissions reveal that NSA employees KNOW where the lawfully requested documents reside. And that NSA has EMBARRASSING problems with its cryptographic algorithms. 5 Rule 56 states. Summary Judgment states, The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs capitalize NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT. Admissions attest to the contention that there are NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT. WHEREFORE, 6 Replace judges Svet and Campos because these judges have demonstrated, IN WRITING, they do not follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 7 Award Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment as a matter of law based on admissions. 8 Have replacement judges ORDER Defendant to produce immediately produce documents in machine-readable format for publication on Internet. In preparation for settlement of this unfortunate bungled spy sting. And analysis of 'deficient' NSA cryptographic algorithm work designed to get the US government out of the cryptography business. 9 grant such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper. Respectfully submitted, _________________________ William H. Payne 13015 Calle de Sandias NE Albuquerque, NM 87111 _________________________ Arthur R. Morales 1024 Los Arboles NW Albuquerque, NM 87107 Pro se litigants CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing memorandum was mailed to Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF, Director, National Security Agency, National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Road, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000 and hand delivered to Jan E Mitchell, Assistant US Attorney, 525 Silver SW, ABQ, NM 87102 this Monday December 22, 1997. 13

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Re: Completely anonymous communications ARE only for "Criminals"
by Charlie Comsec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- gburnore(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) wrote: > :The fact that the people making the claims could not afford to pay even the > :costs probably influences the decision. > > Nope. If a lawyer believes he can win and there big money involved, he'll take > it on the premise that he gets paid if he wins. If the defendant has nothing > to offer, the lawyer won't do it. Thus, the falsly accused may not be able to > afford to go to court. The decision to sue is mostly based on how deep the > pockets of the defendant would be. Then what's the point of going to all the trouble of tracking someone down if you're unwilling or unable to take appropriate legal action against him after he's found? > :So you're suggesting that the victim should suffer. You are really saying > :that it is perfectly acceptable for someone to be run out of a newsgroup by > :a single person who refuses to be killfilable. > > > Yup, that's what he's saying. I don't recall ever saying that. How do you run a person out of an unmoderated NG? And if it's moderated, and the moderator is allowing what you consider libel against you, then you probably have a case against him. That's what the courts decided in a landmark case against an ISP. When you manage the content then you become responsible for it as well. Nor do I understand the "who refuses to be killfilable" part, either. How can someone you don't even know control your killfile? I can killfile anyone I want to, including "nobody@some_remailer". I haven't killfiled anyone, but I could do so if I wanted to. > :>:The problem is that devising workable solutions to problems that don't yet > :>:exist is much more difficult that resolving problems that do already exist. > :> > :>Many say the problem does exist. > : > :There are already problems with anonymous posts. It's all about abuse "on" > :the net, in this case. Everyone in the NANA groups say "That's abuse on the > :net, not abuse of the net. If someone is libelling or harassing you, take > :it up with the police." A traceless remailer makes that impossible. > > True. Why would that prevent you from contacting the police? But consider that libel is a civil tort not a criminal offense, so the police aren't likely to get involved, even if you could identify the culprit. Using a remailer does not make a person unidentifiable, just untraceable. There is a difference. > :>Good point. I again forgot he said "Are only for criminals" > : > :Oh, for crying out loud. I'll try to be more precise. Completely > :untraceable communications are only *needed* by people performing acts that > :are illegal by the laws of all jurisdictions where an anonymous remailer > :with trace logging exists. > > You did it again. If you change the word "only" to "sometimes" it would be > more correct. And probably no more so than pay phones or Netcom accounts. > :>:> I still think he's mistaken by thinking that all who post anonymously are > :>:> lawbreakers. > : > :I don't think that. I never said that. > > Yes, you did. And you did it again above. "only needed by people performing > acts that are illegal" Sounds the same to me. I don't know how you could have one without the other. > :>:I do too. But his premise was used to support his suggested remedy. If an > :>:anonymous user is NOT presumed to be a criminal, then you can't justify > :>:treating him like one. > : > :How is this "treating him like a criminal". I'm asking for a very small > :amount of information to be kept. Far less than that required to open a > :bank account. Are you saying that banks are treating people like criminals > :when they ask for ID? > > True. Very True. It should be "treat him like a suspect" and yes, the banks > treat you like a suspect everytime they ask for ID. They suspect you may be a > criminal if they don't know you. It's SUPPOSED to be that way. Banks are a poor analogy, because anonymity is more analogous to paying cash. When you sign your name to a check, you're already identifying yourself. Banking is an inherently identity-based institution. You're asking someone to trust you, and it's up to you to prove yourself to be trustworthy. A check is made valuable or worthless by virtue of the validity of its signature. Ideas can be evaluated on their own merit, just like paper currency can. I don't need to see two forms of ID to determine whether that $100 bill you just handed me is genuine or counterfeit. > :>I still wonder about what to do about "suspects" on the net. How do you > :>investigate one suspected without harming those NOT suspected? > : > :This is my point. > > > Duh, I know. The solution being what? Surrendering freedom for the sake of supposed security? I don't see that there is necessarily a dilemma between protecting victims versus preserving the freedoms of average citizens. It seems that every solution I offer Politas' is countered with a "yeah, but what about .... " objection. In an imperfect world, government cannot completely protect people from themselves. I'm really trying to understand what Politas' wants, but it's difficult. I've suggested several solutions to his hypothetical problems that don't infringe on the freedoms of the innocent, but each is quickly rejected. - --- Finger <comsec(a)nym.alias.net> for PGP public key (Key ID=19BE8B0D) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNJ7rOQbp0h8ZvosNAQHuNQf+JTOZwB/OMXag+Q/fp7vYjZ9pfHV0U5WI rlSgEmZzDIHPUqfns7cDrHSwhKYvfQn9L3VC64qgwRjNSiHcgCqo2f2pnv1Rogoe pu8nvhANfAFpSIiLQ3oMndVvp3xcNt3MGlFhrBGADgbJ1ky4RtdWeDWvz19tJWlM Zpy4igHDWyTFmgNTbccq5qeUrHR2mw9/QQb5GNWK9c6tmj54OMv0kOH8Xpqyl+Fq FocnOLXZI/MAacL5gaLFhNdsv9LkNaC+SeFlK1OxHkcNmTVc00VkPwEzAXtrLSA+ Te+FiRp61mz39CY3hg+Hg/fyLdrTIPK0QjAyL+Lg9ayJh1gVkS8rLw== =HyrT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Trans World Specials Fare Sales
by Trans World Specials 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Happy Holidays from your friends who bring your weekly Trans World Specials. We will not have a fare sale this week. Our next fare sale will be Tuesday, January 5th. Have a happy and safe holiday.

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Re: Lock and Load (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: "Michael H. Warfield" <mhw(a)wittsend.com> > Subject: Re: Lock and Load > Date: Mon, 22 Dec 1997 18:27:47 -0500 (EST) > Mix enscribed thusly: > > Jim Choate wrote: > > > Forwarded message: > > > > Not being a native English speaker, I do not understand the > > > > meaning and origin of the phrase "LOck and Load". > > > > > > It means to lock the rifles safety and load it's chamber in preperation for > > > firing at an enemy. It is usualy used in a military context but head-bangers > > > and such use it when talking about loading their bongs and I am shure other > > > groups use it as well in various contexts. > > > > Wait a second, aren't we supposed to load first and lock later? How > > can you load a rifle if it is on safety? > > The reference goes back to old flint lock muzzle loaders. You would > "lock" the firing mechanism in a safety position (kind of a half cocked > position), then load it through the muzzle (picture this and some old > cartoons about raming a ball on top of gun powder down the muzzle of a > riffle and the possiblities to picture why you would want this locked on > "safety"), then finish cocking the rifle to prepare it to fire. This also > relates to the term "half cocked" since a rifle that was only half cocked > (in its locked position) was not ready to fire. So going off "half cocked" > became a reference to going into something unprepared while "lock and load" > evolved into a reference to actively or vigorously preparing to engage in > something, be it a battle, an arguement, or what ever... This is only partialy correct, the fact is that half-cocked simply means the pan-head is down or covered so if the flint strikes the firing plate a spark will not be propogated into the firing chamber (a hole in the side of the barrel) and hence fire the weapon. Firing one of these weapons is a two step process once loaded and aimed. Pull the hammer back and remove the pan-head. The pan-head is *always* opened just prior to firing in order to eliminate as many causes of a mis-fire (eg rain hitting the pan-head or wind blowing the primer charge out of the pan-head) as possible. Traditionaly (as I was tought anyway) 'half-cocked' meant you didn't carry through all the way in preperations to the final goal. It is clear that it has taken on much broader meaning relating to general incompetance and over-zealousness. "Lock and load" is not in any of the infantry manuals I have ever seen from before the mid-1800's. And in every case it refered to a modern weapon not a muzzle load weapon. If anyone can point to an exception I would appreciate it. In all of them it refers to safety'ing the weapon and then loading a round into the chamber. It originaly came into use because of the operation of a bolt-action rifle. If the gun wasn't on safety when the bolt was driven home there was a small but real chance the firing pin (in the back of the bolt you just jammed down with some zeal) would go off and cause the weapon to mis-fire (if you and your buddy are both lucky - you missed both of you). As to the loading of the ball onto the gun-powder - you won't do it the way described above but once. The black powder will go off on about the 3rd tap and you won't have the two hands it takes to load a muzzle-loader. If you *ever* load a black powder be *absolutely shure* that there is a ball pad between the gun powder and the ball. It is *not* there for barrell sealing or some other silly explanation - it's there to inhibit compressive explosion of the black powder. Don't believe it, go down to the hardware or feed store and buy a small can of black powder. Then get a 3/4" pipe and cap. Put only one or two flakes of the black powder on the threads and then tighten with a pipe wrench (wear gloves, glasses, and apron). After about a half turn or so you should hear a distinct snapping sound. This is the black powder going off. This is what will happen if black powder gets between the ball and barrel while you're tapping - and there's a *lot* more gunpowder than a couple of flakes to take your hand (and your face if you're silly enough to be leaning over the barrel which is where not looking down the barrel of a gun comes from). Also, those guns didn't have safeties to engage. There was really only two ways to enshure a safe weapon once loaded - either have the panhead closed or take the flint or steel blade out of the hammer. Even when un-cocked the hammer and blade rests on the firing plate and any stiff strike will cause a spark. Easy to demonstrate - while holding one simply strike the hammer with the heel of your hand while in the dark - that little spark is what blew your face off. You can buy working 'Brown Bessie' models at most any gun or decent hobby store. They're cheap (around $100 last time I looked), loud, smelly, and loads of fun... Merry Christmas! ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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http:--cnnfn.com-quickenonfn-taxes-9712-22-q_taxes_poll-
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[IMAGE] [LINK] [ISMAP] graphic Should there be a flat tax? Results of new poll show Americans favor a flat tax, with some changes December 22, 1997: 3:36 p.m. ET [LINK] [INLINE] Post: President Decides Against Tax Plan Offer - Dec. 21, 1997 [INLINE] The Gallup Organization USA Today More related sites... NEW YORK (CNNfn) - According to a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll, Americans now favor, by a thin margin, a flat tax system in which all Americans would pay the same percentage of their income in taxes -- regardless of how much money they make. [INLINE] But the public opposes two central features of flat tax proposals: the elimination of deductions for mortgage interest and for charitable contributions. [INLINE] Only one third of the country would favor replacing the current income tax system with a national sales tax which would apply to all retail purchases. The public believes that most Americans pay their fair share in taxes. [INLINE] The poll interviewed 1,019 adult Americans on November 21-23. [INLINE] The results are as follows: [INLINE] Flat Tax System [INLINE] Favor, 51 percent [INLINE] Oppose, 46 percent [INLINE] Flat Tax System With No Mortgage Deduction [INLINE] Favor, 42 percent [INLINE] Oppose, 54 percent [INLINE] Flat Tax System With No Charitable Deduction [INLINE] Favor, 43 percent [INLINE] Oppose, 53 percent [INLINE] Replacing Income Tax With National Sales Tax [INLINE] Favor, 32 percent [INLINE] Oppose, 62 percent [INLINE] Do Most Americans Pay Their Fair Share in Taxes? [INLINE] Yes, 54 percent [INLINE] No, 43 percent [INLINE] Sampling error on all of the above questions: +/-3 percentage points. Link to top home | taxes | quicken.com on fn | contents | search | stock quotes | help Copyright © 1997 Cable News Network, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

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Re: SPECIAL REPORT: Censorware in the Stacks (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: SPECIAL REPORT: Censorware in the Stacks (fwd) > From: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) > Date: Mon, 22 Dec 97 21:34:42 EST > Jim Choate <ravage(a)ssz.com> writes: > > > > Subject: Re: SPECIAL REPORT: Censorware in the Stacks > > > From: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) > > > Date: Mon, 22 Dec 97 15:33:03 EST > > > > > On the contary. when no library was state (meaning, taxpayer) funded, and t > > > > Get your facts straight. The US has a library that from day 1 has been > > citizen supported. Every state (that I am aware of) has a state library that > > is funded by tax payers. Furthermore, Texas & Lousiana have had localy > > supported libraries and schools before they were even states. > > Jim, > > I suggest you get your facts straight. > > LOC is for the Congress. Have you tried getting in and doing your own private > research? It's not piece of cake. Wrong, the LOC is for the people. It is there (originaly) to provide a reference listing of all documents published and therefore claiming copyright. Currently it is open to any legitimate research project. I have used it on a couple of projects in the past to research writings no longer in print. > Every state has a public library NOW, just like every state has a welfare > office. However I have plenty of evidence that libraries in New York were > much better when there were many private ones who charged patrons for use > - which was the case about 100 years ago. New York does not equate to 'all the states'. A more than trivial point in your position. Bottem line, both Texas and Louisiana have public libraries that predate eithers entry into the Union. Go piss in that pot you lying commie sack of shit. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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