December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: In God We Antitrust, from the Netly News
by Ryan Lackey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> [people disparaging the AMD/Cyrix Processors, as well as defending them] I have used a K6-200 overclocked to a K6-300 (83mhz bus speed) for some time now, mostly accomplishing the cooling issue by leaving it in my bedroom with the window open all winter. It's a great value -- for $200+$100 I got a processor and motherboard capable of PII-level performance in things like code compiles, etc. I've even hand-optimized some code for the K6 -- it's a great chip. If I find investors/customers/etc. by March-July 98 for Eternity DDS, though, I'm planning to buy 8 DEC AlphaPC motherboards with dual 21264 processors. Some pieces of Eternity DDS are now being implemented in Oracle for speed of implementation reasons, and other pieces are being prototyped in Scheme (maybe), so even my K6 is getting hammered. Plus, I'm now testing some kernel modifications, and having to reboot the only functional server, bring Oracle back up, initialize the world, bring up a web server and an encrypted filesystem, etc. all without disrupting service too much whenever I make a minor change, then do it every time I need to change one character in the kernel, is really annoying. Running the different services on different machines would be far more realistic and practical. [*Obcrypto*: I have gotten incredibly backed up with work of various kinds, and email. However, I still have time for silly web service questions. Here goes: Does anyone know of a way I can take a web server, say AOLserver, which does not support useful SSL, and also does not distribute source, and retrofit a useful 128-bit SSL implementation to it? It has a C API, but I haven't looked at the API enough to see if I could do it within the API. Are there any proxies which could be stuck between the insecure server and the user (preferably with an ssh link between the servers) which could provide SSL proxy service? It seems like this should be trivial to do, but I haven't tried yet, and I want to have some reedeming value for this post.] -- Ryan Lackey rdl(a)mit.edu http://mit.edu/rdl/

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Re: Talk of Banning Research into Human Cloning (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 13 Jan 1998 06:10:14 +0100 (MET) > Subject: Re: Talk of Banning Research into Human Cloning > From: nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) > > Though I'm not a constitutional expert, this would seem to me to be a > > violation of various rights. A First Amendment right to speak and publish > > as one wishes for one, a Fourth Amendment right against search and seizure > > Actually, not at all. > > There is no ban on publishing information on cloning, "just" a ban on the > activity. Spin doctor bullshit. Without the research there isn't anything to publish. By banning the basic research we would in fact be banning the publishing of the results of that scientific research. > Hence the first amendment is not implicated. If it were the > case the every action (as opposed to speech/publication) were protected by > the 1st Am. then every statute making robbery a crime would be > unconstitutional too. Not at all. Equating swinging of ones fist in a empty field and swinging it into somebodies nose and then taking that supposition as justification to ban fist swinging *is* most certainly unconstitutional. Furthermore, robbery isn't illegal under the Constitution unless its the federal government taking the material and refusing to follow the Constitutional directive to pay for *all* property, irrespective of how it was gained, for public use as those duties are relegated per the 10th to the purvue of the states. > Similarly, the 4th Am. is not implicated. The right to be secure against > UNREASONABLE search and seizure is not violated when and if congress > passes a law defining a new crime, or you are arrested for committing it. The question here is whether Congress even *has* the power to regulate those sorts of behaviours without an amendment being passed by the states to surrender their authority per the 9th and 10th to the federal government. > > and to be secure in one's papers, and probably more general rights that > > have long-held that government agents cannot tell people what books they > > again, note that the ban is on CLONING, not THINKING OR WRITING OR READING > about cloning. It's not the same thing. Without doing the research it isn't possible to think very much about cloning except in a *very* abstract manner. That forcing of abstraction against ones will may very well infact be unconstitutional. > > may read, what thinking they may do, and whom they may asssociate with (if > > the Civil Rights Act is viewed as the unconstitutional anomaly it is). > > This is an aside, but the CRA is in no way anomalous given the 13th, 14th > and 15th Amendments. It is only "anomalous" if one sticks to the > Constitution as written in the 18th century... and ignores the articles > written in that same century that clearly contemplate amendments.... The articles contemplating the amendments are irrelevant to this issue. Only the actual amendments are relevant. What people might *want* to do has nothing to do with what they *can* do under the limiting documents of this country. > > But a ban on cloning research would not be a matter of "national security," > > only of ethics and religious beliefs. Whatever the arguments for banning > > unapproved research into CBW and nuclear weapons, banning cloning research > > is an entirely different set of issues. > > > > Arguably, many of the legal bans in force today are due to ethics, e.g.: No, they are a result of political wrangling by small groups to gain political power and the economic and social conseuences thereof. They also result from a clearly premeditated absolution of the Constitution that these self same 'representatives' gave an oath to uphold with their lives. The justification that is profered is the ethics of the constituents. > A. Michael Froomkin +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) > Associate Professor of Law > U. Miami School of Law froomkin(a)law.miami.edu > P.O. Box 248087 http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/ > Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA It's warm here. Your a law professor and your logic, respect for the Constitution, and basic scientific comprehension is this bad? No damn wonder we're in the shit hole we're in now... ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Premail/PERL 5.004 fix
by Jim Burnes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Punks: I've needed to upgrade PERL recently to 5.004 because some new software wouldn't work without it. I didn't want to do it because I heard it would break premail. I decided to DL the old perl-5.003 RPM from sunsite just in case 5.004 really screwed premail up. The actual truth of the matter is that 5.004 just warns you that premail re-declares several variable. Apparently this has no effect on the program, but those warnings are pretty annoying. Here is now you fix it: Define a WARN trap that checks a variable (DOWARN) to see whether it should warn or not. Since the re-declarations occurr in three different places you just have to set DOWARN to 0 before the line and then DOWARN to 1 after the line. Crude, but effective. Most of this code can be found by doing a man page on 'perlfunc', but I thought I'd save someone the time. Here is the diff for premail version .449. 100a101,102 > BEGIN { $SIG{'__WARN__'} = sub { warn $_[0] if $DOWARN } } > $DOWARN = 0; 1274a1277 > $DOWARN = 0; 1275a1279 > $DOWARN = 1; 1356a1361 > $DOWARN = 0; 1357a1363 > $DOWARN = 1; 6319a6326 > $DOWARN = 0; 6320a6328 > $DOWARN = 1; Your milelage may vary... Jim Burnes jim.burnes(a)ssds.com

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fbi wiretapping law runs into friction
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message From: jackdoolin(a)earthlink.net Date: Thu, 17 Jul 1997 14:56:59 -0400 Subject: SNET: Phone firms resist FBI wiretap gear - -> SearchNet's SNETNEWS Mailing List - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Published Wednesday, July 16, 1997, in the San Jose Mercury News Phone firms resist FBI wiretap gear New York Times Asserting that the FBI is trying to force the development of wiretapping equipment that goes beyond the law, telephone industry executives said Tuesday they would petition the Federal Communications Commission to resolve a dispute over the limits of digital surveillance in the information age. Industry executives are expected to ask the commission to step in today after more than two years of negotiations with law enforcement authorities over standards for advanced digital telephone switching gear intended to permit the police and FBI agents to listen to suspected criminals. The two sides failed to reach an agreement at a meeting last week in Boston. ``We've come to an impasse and only the FCC can resolve it,'' said Stewart Baker, a Washington lawyer representing the industry. FBI officials said Tuesday they were still confident that disagreements with the industry could be worked out. Another negotiating session is scheduled for next week. ``We're still committed to the negotiating process,'' said Edward Allen, section chief in the Information Division at the FBI. The Communications for Law Enforcement Act, which was signed into law by President Clinton in 1994, calls for spending $500 million to modify the nation's telephone network for wiretapping and specifies a standard-setting process to redesign the equipment. Telephone industry officials have warned that the cost of making the modifications requested by law enforcement might run into the billions of dollars. They also contend that the FBI has overstepped its mandate and is trying to control the process of setting standards. The law, they say, specifies only that the agency will be consulted in setting the standard. Industry executives say their companies will be at risk of being sued by civil liberties groups over privacy invasions. Law enforcement is asking for the ability to maintain a wiretap in a conference call even after the individual who is the object of the court- authorized wiretap drops out of the phone call. Such a capability would require costly modifications to the telephone network, industry officials said. ``We're taking this action out of monumental frustration,'' said Thomas Wheeler, president of the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association, a trade group in Washington. The telephone industry is facing an October 1998 deadline to comply with the law. Wheeler said the members of his association were growing increasingly concerned that in the absence of a standard they would have insufficient time to develop new products that comply with the law. The legislation provides for $10,000 a day in penalties for companies that fail to meet the requirements. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBM85q+qNGQSu3SfxnEQKGXwCg/g2blX0utPaIZU8RX0zkTIQY1jQAni8E jpaUHWxH5/mlmkPbtN3oU1Z6 =25h5 - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - -> Send "subscribe snetnews " to majordomo(a)world.std.com - -> Posted by: jackdoolin(a)earthlink.net ------- End of Forwarded Message

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toc.htm
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FEDERAL GUIDELINES FOR SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE INTRODUCTION I. KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS A. DEFINITIONS B. LIST OF COMPUTER SYSTEM COMPONENTS C. DETERMINING THE COMPUTER'S ROLE IN THE OFFENSE II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES A. SEARCH WARRANTS B. PLAIN VIEW C. EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES D. BORDER SEARCHES E. CONSENT SEARCHES 1. Scope of the Consent 2. Third-Party Consent a. General Rules b. Spouses c. Parents d. Employers e. Networks: System Administrators F. INFORMANTS AND UNDERCOVER AGENTS III. SEIZING HARDWARE A. THE INDEPENDENT COMPONENT DOCTRINE B. HARDWARE AS CONTRABAND OR FRUITS OF CRIME 1. Authority for Seizing Contraband or Fruits of Crime 2. Contraband and Fruits of Crime Defined C. HARDWARE AS AN INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE OFFENSE 1. Authority for Seizing Instrumentalities 2. Instrumentalities Defined D. HARDWARE AS EVIDENCE OF AN OFFENSE 1. Authority for Seizing Evidence 2. Evidence Defined E. TRANSPORTING HARDWARE FROM THE SCENE IV. SEARCHING FOR AND SEIZING INFORMATION A. INTRODUCTION B. INFORMATION AS CONTRABAND C. INFORMATION AS AN INSTRUMENTALITY D. INFORMATION AS EVIDENCE 1. Evidence of Identity 2. Specific Types of Evidence a. Hard Copy Printouts b. Handwritten Notes E. PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 1. In General a. Doctors, Lawyers, and Clergy b. Publishers and Authors 2. Targets 3. Using Special Masters F. UNDERSTANDING WHERE THE EVIDENCE MIGHT BE: STAND-ALONE PCs, NETWORKS AND FILE-SERVERS, BACKUPS, ELECTRONIC BULLETIN BOARDS, AND ELECTRONIC MAIL 1. Stand-Alone PCs a. Input/Output Devices: Do Monitors, Modems, Printers, and Keyboards Ever Need to be Searched? b. Routine Data Backups 2. Networked PCs a. Routine Backups b. Disaster Backups G. SEARCHING FOR INFORMATION 1. Business Records and Other Documents 2. Data Created or Maintained by Targets 3. Limited Data Searches 4. Discovering the Unexpected a. Items Different from the Description in the Warrant b. Encryption H. DECIDING WHETHER TO CONDUCT THE SEARCH ON-SITE OR TO REMOVE HARDWARE TO ANOTHER LOCATION 1. Seizing Computers because of the Volume of Evidence a. Broad Warrant Authorizes Voluminous Seizure of Documents b. Warrant is Narrowly Drawn but Number of Document to be Sifted through is Enormous c. Warrant Executed in the Home d. Applying Existing Rules to Computers 2. Seizing Computers because of Technical Concerns a. Conducting a Controlled Search to Avoid Destroying Data b. Seizing Hardware and Documentation so the System Will Operate at the Lab I. EXPERT ASSISTANCE 1. Introduction 2. Finding Experts a. Federal Sources b. Private Experts (1) Professional Computer Organizations (2) Universities (3) Computer and Telecommunications Industry Personnel (4) The Victim 3. What the Experts Can Do a. Search Planning and Execution b. Electronic Analysis c. Trial Preparation d. Training for Field Agents V. NETWORKS AND BULLETIN BOARDS A. INTRODUCTION B. THE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa 1. A Brief History of the Privacy Protection Act 2. Work Product Materials 3. Documentary Materials 4. Computer Searches and the Privacy Protection Act a. The Reasonable Belief Standard b. Similar Form of Public Communication c. Unique Problems: Unknown Targets and Commingled Materials 5. Approval of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Required C. STORED ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS VI. DRAFTING THE WARRANT A. DRAFTING A WARRANT TO SEIZE HARDWARE B. DRAFTING A WARRANT TO SEIZE INFORMATION 1. Describing the Place to be Searched a. General Rule: Obtain a Second Warrant b. Handling Multiple Sites within the Same District c. Handling Multiple Sites in Different Districts d. Information at an Unknown Site e. Information/Devices Which Have Been Moved 2. Describing the Items to be Seized 3. Removing Hardware to Search Off-Site: Ask th Magistrate for Explicit Permission. 4. Seeking Authority for a No-Knock Warrant a. In General b. In Computer-Related Cases VII. POST-SEARCH PROCEDURES A. INTRODUCTION B. PROCEDURES FOR PRESERVING EVIDENCE 1. Chain of Custody 2. Organization 3. Keeping Records 4. Returning Seized Computers and Materials a. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Rule 41(e) b. Hardware c. Documentation d. Notes and Papers e. Third-Party Owners VIII. EVIDENCE A. INTRODUCTION B. THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE C. AUTHENTICATING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS 1. "Distinctive" Evidence 2. Chain of Custody 3. Electronic Processing of Evidence D. THE HEARSAY RULE IX. APPENDICES APPENDIX A: SAMPLE COMPUTER LANGUAGE FOR SEARCH WARRANTS 1. Tangible Objects a. Justify Seizing the Objects b. List and Describe the Objects (1) Hardware (2) Software (3) Documentation (4) Passwords and Data Security Devices 2. Information: Records, Documents, Data a. Describe the Content of Records, Documents, or other Information b. Describe the Form which the Relevant Information May Take c. Electronic Mail: Searching and Seizing Data from a BBS Server under 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (1) If All the E-Mail is Evidence of Crime (2) If Some of the E-Mail is Evidence of Crime (3) If None of the E-Mail is Evidence of Crime d. Ask Permission to Seize Storage Devices when Off-Site Search is Necessary e. Ask Permission to Seize, Use, and Return Auxiliary Items, as Necessary f. Data Analysis Techniques 3. Stipulation for Returning Original Electronic Data APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY APPENDIX C: FEDERAL EXPERTS FOR COMPUTER CRIME INVESTIGATIONS APPENDIX D: COMPUTER SEARCH AND SEIZURE WORKING GROUP APPENDIX E: STATUTORY POPULAR NAME TABLE APPENDIX F: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Statutes Federal Rules Federal Regulations Legislative History Reference Materials Go to . . . CCIPS Home || Justice Home Page _________________________________________________________________ Updated page May 9 , 1997 usdoj-jmd/irm/css/mlb _________________________________________________________________

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Re: (eternity) autonomous agents
by redgod＠usa.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FUCK! WHO REGISTER ME TO THIS MAILING LIST? CAN YOU TELL ME HOW TO REMOVE MYSELF FROM IT? I WILL MAD! OH GOD! TOO MANY EMAIL! At 03:51 PM 1/13/98 -0800, William Knowles wrote: >On Tue, 13 Jan 1998, Tim May wrote: > >> At 1:23 PM -0800 1/13/98, William Knowles wrote: >> >> >Anguilla seems to be a doing agood job on becoming a country >> >willing on hosting data havens. >> >> Oh yeah? >> >> It's been a while since we talked about this (at least on the Cypherpunks >> list), but a couple of years ago there was much discusson on the CP list >> about just what items would be allowable in Anguilla. Vince Cate gave his >> assessment, which I found fairly nebulous, in that it appeared the Ruling >> Families would allow what they would allow, and not allow what they would >> not allow---there seemed to be a lot of ad hoc rulings. > >If memory serves me right it was because Vince bounced off the Taxbomber >site because it offered second passports, camouflage passports, and other >products that was considered a fraud, Which to me sounds odd since there >is some other company selling most everthing and then some from an .ai >domain which Vince's company has the monopoly on handing out .ai domains > >http://www.ultramec.com.ai > >> (Given that copies of "Penthouse" are illegal in Anguilla, if I recall this >> correctly, and given that gun are illegal, and drugs are illegal, I rather >> doubt that Anguilla would happily host "The Aryan Nations Bomb Site," or >> "Pedophile Heaven," or "Gun Smuggler's Digest. " Or the even juicier stuff >> any "data haven" with any claim to really being a data haven will surely >> have.) > >You also have to wonder how far in the future it will be before the >special forces of some banana republic drops in on Vince to blow-up >his operation for as he advertises publishing censored information >on ones ex-president on the Internet, or for that matter I have >yet to see abortion information coming from his servers. > >What has happened in Anguilla proves that there will be a need for >different flavors of datahavens, Different degrees libility that >datahaven owners will want to store information on their servers. >I would love to open a XXX WWW site in Anguilla pulling in the >industry average of $5-10K a month and not pay any taxes there, >But it won't happen in Anguilla with the present adminstration! > >> >And there are likely under a hundred oil companies looking >> >for firms to 'recycle' their old oil platforms and drilling >> >rigs wasting away around the world, I'm sure some might just >> >give you one just to be rid of future liability. >> >> Given the willingness of the French to have SDECE sink Greenpeace ships in >> neutral ports, how long before a couple of kilos of Semtex are applied to >> the underside of these oil rigs? >> >> Given what happened with "pirate broadcast tankers," the future is not bright. > >Isn't there a microstate off the coast of England called 'Sealand' run >from a former oil rig/gun battery for the last 20 years? > >> When the first "oil rig data haven" is found to have kiddie porn, >> bomb-making info, and (shudder) material doubting the historicity of the >> Holocaust, the U.N. will cluck and the public will cheer when it is boarded >> and seized, or simply sunk. >> >> As I said in my last piece on this subject, there is no security in >> meatspace comparable to what is gotten with mathematics. >> >> --Tim May > >I agree completely, But there is still room for massively distrubted >datahavens on oil rigs, barges, gun batteries, island nations or >hiding in Norm's LAN in Cicero IL. All the harder to supress that >information. > > >William Knowles >erehwon(a)dis.org > >== >The information standard is more draconian than the gold >standard, because the government has lost control of the >marketplace. -- Walter Wriston >== >http://www.dis.org/erehwon/ > >

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Re: SC rules 1st doesn't cover lies [CNN] (fwd)
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>So you have to be an employee of the government to be a citizen? Yes. Welcome to America, Land of the Freeh.

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Supplement to DoJ Seizure Guide
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's a long October 1997 supplement to the 1994 DoJ Guide to Search and Seizure of Computers for which Jim Choate posted the TOC just now. It reflects recent campaigns, raids and counterattacks as the battle for supremacy between law and technology intensifies and both sides search and seize each's best and worst: http://jya.com/doj-ssgsup.htm (100K)

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Censorship free ISP
by White Liberty 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry for the cross-posting, but some of the readers may hopefully address this: Could you recommend me a censorship FREE InterNet Service Provider that in addition to a "no censorship" policy also guarantees your privacy. I am an ex-patriate Danish who live in the United States, but has a friend who wants to publish material deemed hateful in my birth country. In Denmark, they still struggle with laws abridging freedom of expression in regard to "hate speech." Could you recommend any ISP to me in the United States that satisfies this? I know Cyberpass in California does not censor based on content. But I am sure there are many many others. Please respond in personal mail or to cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net.

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Re: (eternity) Service denial attacks on Eternity
by redgod＠usa.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FUCK! WHO REGISTER ME TO THIS MAILING LIST? CAN YOU TELL ME HOW TO REMOVE MYSELF FROM IT? I WILL MAD! OH GOD! TOO MANY EMAIL! At 04:51 PM 1/12/98 +0000, Ross Anderson wrote: >Tim May wrote: > >> It is also likely in the extreme that a working Eternity service will >> quickly be hit with attackers of various sorts who want to test the limits >> of the service, or who want such services shut down. > >Exactly. When I first talked about Eternity, which was at either the >1994 or 1995 protocols workshop, I was walking back to my seat when >Bob Morris (then at the NSA) said, from behind his hand in a stage >whisper, `Kiddyporn!' > >Adam Back added: > >> the spooks / feds have a history of posting their own child porn if >> none is available to seize > >Indeed, and a decade or so ago there was a scandal when it turned out >that the spooks were using the Kincora Boys' Home in Belfast as a pedo >brothel in order to entrap various local politicians. For them to say >now that they need key escrow to suppress Kiddyporn is a bit rich! > >However the main threat is the court order - Anton Pillar or whatever >- and the best weapon against court orders is anonymity. If they don't >know your address they can't serve you the order or arrest you for >contempt. > >Tom Womack: > >> I can imagine *use* of the service becoming a felony > >I mentioned in the paper that Mossad might deny Eternity service to >the Muslim world by posting something rude about the Prophet Mohammed. > >One must of course create a lawful excuse for people to have Eternity >software mounted on their system. Maybe in addition to the `public' >Eternity service we should have many corporate or even private >services, many of which have escrow capabilities and are thus clearly >law-abiding and accountable :-) > >There are many other possibilities. One topic that oozes into my >consciousness from time to time is that one might integrate covert >communications and storage with an anti-spam mail program - maybe a >natural way forward if Adam hides Eternity traffic in spam! > >Tim again: > >> Great idea, but where are the customers? > >Some 90% of security research effort is on confidentiality, 9% on >authenticity and 1% on availability. Corporate infosec expenditures >are exactly the other way round, and tools to enable disaster recovery >databases to be spread holographically over a company's PCs could save >a fortune compared with the cost of some current arrangements. If a >few of these backup resources have hidden directories that mount the >public Eternity service, then who can tell? > >At the Info Hiding Workshop at Portland in April, I will present a new >idea which may facilitate such implementations of Eternity. This is >the Steganographic File System - designed to provide you with any file >whose name and password you know. If you don't know this combination, >then you can't even tell that the file is there. We do not need to >make any assumptions about tamper resistance; it can be done using >suitable mathematics. (This is joint work with Roger Needham and Adi >Shamir.) > >Ross > >PS: we need a better word for `eternityspace', and Bell Labs have >already trademarked `Inferno'. So what - Nirvana? Valhalla? >

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