December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Ocean going cities
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Fri, 16 Jan 1998 16:32:41 -0500 From: <testarne(a)media.mit.edu> To: technomads(a)UCSD.EDU Subject: Ocean going cities Just read in an architecture rag called "Metropolis" about floating cities for the rich! I guess being a nomad is becoming chic. Anyways, the two ships are ResidenSea 958ft long with 250 1100-3200 sq ft homes ranging from $1.2-$4.3 million each. driving range putting green 2 pools, helipad gardens, retractable marina. According to the mag, this one looks like it will get built with construction to start soon. Freedom Ship 4320 ft 25 stories for 65,000 people starting at $93,000 includes library school bank hotel hospital, light manufacturing and 2 landing strips!!! How Stephensonesque. I'll be very depressed if the commercial folks do this before the hackers. Now, I wonder where I put that decommissioned aircraft carrier? :-) Thad Starner MIT Media Laboratory Wearable Computing Project --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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17 Dec '03

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security and hidden networks (was On the LAM--Local Area Mixes)
by Rishab Aiyer Ghosh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

summary this post suggests that technically, routing through a sub-network does not necessarily increase complexity or hinder traffic analysis, as it can be treated as a virtual node. given that, LAM-type networks may not provide much protection in a politically unkind environment. i also suggest a way of rating (or classifying) secure networks based on how well they hide suspect data and routes in other traffic. as this in response to tim may's LAM post, i'll respond quoting that. Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> writes: >A message would enter the physical site, bounce around to N machines, and >exit, perhaps going to other machines and sites, and back again, etc. (The >image was of perhaps 20 or 30 cheap PCs linked with Ethernet in a set of >apartments in Berkeley--obtaining search warrants or court orders to allow >monitoring of all 20 or 30 machines, scattered across several physical >addresses, would be "problematic.") i won't repeat my objections to a reliance on "problematic" court orders, which i've made in another post. let us simply assume, for example, that i am the NSA, and i don't need court orders, but i'm a sneaky sort so i don't want to go in with guns blazing just yet. Alice has a network, alice.net, 10.1.1.0. she has many machines on this network, some hers, some belonging to Bob. when Alice and Bob plan stink-bomb attacks on the IRS (sorry, when they, or Li-Xia and Bu-pang, write articles on human rights violations in xinjiang) to Carol and David, outside their network, they first bounce their packets around their 30 machines. i sniff all packets going into and out of the network 10.1.1.0, from the upstream provider (Alice has her whole building in a faraday cage, which is ok because she never tries to use her mobile phone indoors). so. does it matter in the least, to me, whether alice wrote her last rant from kitchen.alice.net (10.1.1.1) or garage.alice.net (10.1.1.2) or whether it was actually Bob - Bob Inc, to be safe - from 10.1.1.33? it could matter politically/legally (if i wanted to prosecute) or technically (if i want to trace traffic down, to, from or through alice's net). technically first: it doesn't really matter. i treat alice's net as a hermetically sealed virtual "node"... >-- the routing topology of the site may be an interesting area to look at. >Ideally, a "Linda"-like broadcast topology (all machines see all packets, >like messages in a bottle thrown into the "sea") could have certain ... which is all the more correct topologically if broadcast addresses (10.1.1.255) are used. so i treat alice's net as a single node, and monitor traffic as it enters and leaves that "node". just as i would monitor traffic entering and leaving a single machine, without caring much which disk drive or memory bank it passed through. with a single physical entry and exit point to the network it can be treated exactly as if it were a single node for the purposes of any traffic analysis (security/traceability). multiple physical connections might complicate it slightly, but if i'm sniffing them all, and they connect to the same set of machines (i.e. the same network), not much (if it's IP the address spaces may differ but that's a minor matter). depending on what remailer math tells us - and we really do need remailer math, as tim pointed out! - bouncing traffic around sub-nets may have little impact on security. it could remain the same; i don't see how it could become much better; it could plausibly get worse, if multiple nodes in a single subnet can eat into your random route hops resulting in concentration of traffic through fewer virtual "nodes". the only situation in which this isn't true is if the source and destination of traffic are both within the sealed network - presumably what would happen most of the time with tim's suggestion of voice/high-bandwidth stuff. now for the political/legal bit. given that i'd like to see cypherpunk technology as daring enough to be of use outside western democracies, let's look at a slightly challenging situation. you're a bunch of people, each with your own firm for added safety, in this building. now i'm not a decent american cop, worried about court orders etc. ok, i don't exactly want to shoot all of you at once. but if i am satisfied (which i could be, using technical methods) that lots of "suspicious" stuff is coming from your network, then i'll certainly come in and reeducate you all on your "errors and distortions." (sorry, just finished a week of watching andrzej wajda films at a retrospective.) oho. it's a BIG building. and i don't really suspect all of you. ok, i go have a chat with the network admin - Alice - and hold her responsible. she has great respect for the government and police and would never write such a nasty thing as "the state tortures political prisoners?" uh oh. so i tell her that for the good of the country she must let someone listen in at her machine ("you didn't keep logs? ah, that was a mistake, no?") - i'm now inside, and the sealed network shrinks. of course if i'm impatient and don't believe her innocent approach, i just use the rubber hose. the same goes for multiple physical links into the same network. can _technology_ - rather than relying on law-abiding cops, and rights-abiding laws - provide a solution? the key is the BIG building. the more non-suspicious routes there are - i.e. a route through normal, unsuspected people, typically but not necessarily outside the physically well-protected area - the harder to usefully treat a network as a virtual node. looking at 10.1.1.0 as a node may help, just 256 people there; but 10.1.0.0 is a bit big to make a coherent "node" so although a LAM may be a great way to _test_ new tech and protocols out, i'd think it a big mistake to actually deploy it, as it were, on a large scale. it wouldn't help at all in the tough spots, and it would only serve to make the easier spots tougher, strengthening the immune system of would-be tyrannical states (i.e. the nicer western democracies). in general "WAMs" would be much more helpful and secure. the other thing that helps is of course the degree of non-suspicious traffic on suspected routes. putting them together, i think you can get some measure of the utility of a protocol and topology. the ideal would a) make it technically impossible to trace the route of suspicious traffic; and b) make it politically/legally difficult to prosecute originators/destinations of suspicious traffic. it would do this by a) blurring the distinction between suspicious and "regular" routes; and b) make it difficult to distinguish suspicious from harmless traffic on those routes; c) make it difficult or impossible to block suspicious routes or intercept/monitor suspicious traffic without causing unacceptable deterioration of service for "ordinary" traffic. two ratios seem useful to me as a way of organising cryptoanarchic network protocols. suspicious routes/ordinary routes; suspicious/ordinary traffic on any route. an ideal universal DC-Net with padding to keep constant throughput would have both ratios tending towards 1 - there is only one route - broadcast - for everyone; and traffic is constant so the degree of really suspicious stuff is unknown. pure Blacknet-type systems tend towards [1,0] - there is only one route, assuming everyone uses it. but without padding, you could suspect all traffic. Pipenet tends towards [0,1] - there are many routes, and they're all pretty suspicious as it's possible for the monitor to discriminate among them. but traffic is constant, so you don't know when to suspect. regards, rishab First Monday - The Peer-Reviewed Journal on the Internet http://www.firstmonday.dk/ Munksgaard International Publishers, Copenhagen Intl & Managing Editor - Rishab Aiyer Ghosh (ghosh(a)firstmonday.dk) Mobile +91 98110 14574; Fax +91 11 2209608; Tel +91 11 2454717 A4/204 Ekta Apts., 9 Indraprastha Extn, New Delhi 110092 INDIA

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17 Dec '03

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Re: OpenPGP WG meeting minutes
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hironobu Suzuki <hironobu(a)h2np.suginami.tokyo.jp> writes: > > > Miscellaneous: (Comments not recorded) > ... > > We should not just put in everyone's pet algorithms. > > I agree. > > But I want new algorithm id for MISTY1 when this document become > RFCXXXX. MISTY1 which was designed by Matsui-san looks so good. I > believe an algorithm which is described in RFC is not a `pet' one. > > > ----MISTY1 INTERNET DRAFT---- > INTERNET-DRAFT H. Ohta > Expires in six months M. Matsui > Mitsubishi Electric Corporation > December 1997 > > > A Description of the MISTY1 Encryption Algorithm > > <draft-ohta-misty1desc-00.txt> > > > --- > Hironobu SUZUKI Independent Software Consultant > E-Mail: hironobu(a)h2np.suginami.tokyo.jp > URL://www.pp.iij4u.or.jp/~h2np To learn some English, chop-chop. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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RC1 and RC3 ??
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Why doesn't it have RC1 and RC3 though there are RC2, RC4 and RC5 of RSADSI RC series ? ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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$50 encryption policy contest
by Dr. Alan Sherman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

$50 www Contest I will pay $50 to the best www page created by 12noon EST, February 15, 1998, meeting the enclosed specifications. In short, the page must have a form through which anyone may enter a question, which will be automatically entered onto a list of submitted questions displayed on another page. I will use the winning entry to collect questions for the upcoming March 6 talk on encryption policy by Barry Smith (FBI). How to enter: email a url of your entry to sherman(a)cs.umbc.edu include the phrase "Barry Smith Contest Entry" in the subject header. All URL's for all entries will be listed from http://www.cs.umbc.edu/events/spring98/crypto2.shtml Rules: 1. The page must work from the CMSC computing environment, but initial judging will take place on the designer's server. 2. Anyone in the world may enter. 3. If no one submits an adequate entry by February 15, a $20 prize will be awarded to the best entry that meets a restricted set of specifications. In this case, the contest will be extended for one more week, with a reduced prize of $30 for the best full entry received by 12noon EST, February 22, 1998. 4. Entries will be judged on the basis of satisfying the specifications, robustness, creativity, ease of use, and visual appeal. 5. Group work is allowed and encouraged. 6. I will be the sole final judge of the winner. Specifications: A. $20 Restricted Specifications 1. The form must include entries for a restricted-length question (at most 500 ascii characters), an email address, and optionally a name. 2. The form must include a submit button, which when clicked, will automatically append the question to a list of questions on a separate www page. Each displayed question must include the author's email and name (if provided). B. $50 Full Specifications In addition to the $20 specifications, the forum must also meet the following sp[ecifications: 3. (**important**) The page of submitted questions must have a means by which anyone can score the quality of the question on a scale of 1 to 5 (say, by clicking on the appropriate score button), with 5 being the highest score. For each question, its median score must be displayed. Questions must be listed in order of decreasing median scores. 4. The form must have an entry for optional URLs. These URLs must be posted with the question in such a way that they are active. 5. There must be an entry for sender status (selection from a list of options, such as cypherpunk, NSA employee, UMBC student, other student, government employee, faculty, industrial engineer, ...) 6. (optional) For each question, also list the number of votes entered for each score in addition to the median score. 7. (optional) Reject any question containing a vulgar word. 8. (optional) Feel free to add other appropriate constructive functionality.

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17 Dec '03

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PipeNet description
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just got a couple of requests for information about PipeNet and I realized that I never did make my final description of it public. The attached informal write-up was done shortly after Crypto '96 as a result of discussions with Hal Finney, David Wagner, and Eric Hughes. I haven't worked on it since then, mostly because the Onion Routing project is doing similar work and appears to be much better funded (I did send them a copy of this write-up per their request). --- The Model Consider a network of processors which send messages to each other asynchronously. We assume that each node is identified by its public key, and that links between nodes are secure. The adversary may control a fixed subset of the nodes. However all messages between any two honest nodes are confidential and always arrive (unmodified) in the order sent (this can be achieved with a standard transport level security protocol). The Protocol The protocol is based on the idea of virtual link encryption. After an anonymous connection is established, the originating node sends a constant stream of (constant size) packets to a second node at a fixed rate. The second node shuffles the packets it receives during a time unit and forwards them in random order to others. A connection is a path in the network. The first node in the path is the caller, and the last node is the receiver. The rest are called switches. Anonymity in this scheme is asymmetric - the caller is anonymous, but not the receiver. Each node in the path shares a key with the caller and knows the nodes immediately in front of and behind it. Every pair of adjacent nodes shares a link id. Each switch in the path therefore has a key and two associated ids. Call the id that it shares with the previous node (the one closer to the caller) type A, and call the other id type B. For each id, the switch expects exactly one packet tagged with that id in each time unit. When it receives a packet tagged with a type A id, it decrypts that packet with the associated key, tags it with the corresponding type B id, and forwards it to the next node. When it receives a packet tagged with a type B id, it encrypts the packet with the associated key, tags it with the corresponding type A id, and forwards it to the previous node. The forwarding is always done at the end of the time unit, and the order in which packets are sent is random. For each packet going from the caller to the receiver, the caller must multi-encrypt it with the keys it shares with each of the nodes in the path, starting with the receiver. It then sends the packet to the first switch tagged with the appropriate link id. Each switch will strip a layer of encryption and forward the packet to the next node. For a packet going from the receiver to the caller, the receiver encrypts it with the key it shares with the caller and sends it to the last switch in the path. Each switch will add a layer of encryption and forward the packet to the previous node. To establish a connection, the caller (N0) performs the following steps: 1. Select a node (N1) at random and establish a key (K1) and link id (S1) with N1. 2. Select another node (N2) at random. 3. Request that N1 establish a link id (S2) with N2. 4. Establish a key (K2) with N2 through N1. 5. Request that N1 use K1 to decrypt all messages tagged with S1, tag the decrypted message with S2 and forward them to N2. Also request that N1 use K1 to encrypt all messages tagged with S2, tag the encrypted messages with S1 and forward them to N0. 6. Repeat steps 2 to 4 l-2 times. (Name the i-th node, key, and id Ni, Ki, and Si respectively.) 7. Repeat steps 2 to 4 a final time, but with the receiver node (Nl) instead of a random node. Timing We assumed earlier that communications links between honest nodes are vulnerable to delay attacks. Therefore we must ensure that link delays do not reveal traffic information. Each node expects one packet from each link id in each time unit. Extra packets are queued for processing in later time units. However, if it does not receive a packet for a link id in a particular time unit, it stops normal processing of packets for that time unit and queues all packets. This ensures that any delay is propagated through the entire network and cannot be used to trace a particular connection. The process of making and breaking connections must also not leak information. This can be done by using a protocol analogous to mix-net. Link forming/destroying requests are queued and performed in batches in a way similar to queuing and mixing of e-mail in a mix-net.

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Re: (eternity) Eternity as a secure filesystem/backup medium
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:33 AM 1/18/98 EST, Ryan Lackey wrote: >Documents by specification last only as long as someone is willing to pay >to keep them up. This is not necessarily forever. But it can be, and the costs of doing so aren't much higher than storing it for the first couple of years. Depends on what service the customer wants to buy. And there are applications that require more than 100 years of data protection, e.g. ownership of copyrights which last 50 years beyond the author's death. But for Matt Barrie's question, any permanent document will do. >> Can we assume that using Moore's law this is at >> least 1 bit every 18 months for symmetric crypto? >Do the math, though, for 128bit. There are traditional analyses >which include the amount of silicon on the earth, the number of atoms >in the universe, etc. The general consensus is that traditional >techniques are not feasible for brute forcing 128bit ciphers before >the heat death of the universe. Hard to say. Assuming that Quantum Cryptography doesn't allow finite-sized computers to do large exponentially complex calculations in short finite time, you're probably limited by the number of atoms in the available supply of planets, and Heisenberg may still get you if that's not a low enough limit. Moore's law isn't forever. But there's no particular reason to limit RC4 or RC5 to 128 bits; those are convenient sizes for MD5 hashes of passphrases. So if you're paranoid, use RC4-256 and superencrypt with 5-DES. Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, bill.stewart(a)pobox.com PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639

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