December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

No Subject
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Choosing to not become a member of the collective society/mindset the government has put in place will soon become illegal. Money laundering is illegal for a very simple reason everything is becoming illegal: Control. Money laundering prevents the government to "control" your money. When they could not take your money in the interest of national/public/child safety for such wasteful ventures like the perpetual war on drugs ,and when you thought for yourself and realized how wasteful it all was and that you would not willing give your money the government made it illegal to hide your money. Then they came up with asset forfeiture laws to legally take your vaporware, commonly referred to as 'money'.

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Re: Book Review - Coordinating the Internet
by damaged justice 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- forwarded message -- >From: danny(a)staff.cs.su.oz.au (Danny Yee) Newsgroups: aus.books,usyd.net,rec.arts.books,alt.books.reviews,rec.arts.books.reviews,alt.culture.internet,misc.books.technical,alt.books.technical,aus.computers,aus.org.efa,comp.org.eff.talk,talk.politics.misc Subject: Book Review - Coordinating the Internet Followup-To: alt.culture.internet,talk.politics.misc Date: 12 Dec 1997 11:37:48 GMT Organization: Basser Dept of Computer Science, Uni of Sydney, Australia Lines: 103 Approved: danny(a)cs.usyd.edu.au Message-ID: <66r7mc$3kk$1(a)crux.cs.su.oz.au> NNTP-Posting-Host: staff.cs.su.oz.au X-Server-Date: 12 Dec 1997 11:37:48 GMT http://www.anatomy.su.oz.au/danny/book-reviews/h/Coordinating_Internet.html title: Coordinating the Internet edited: Brian Kahin + James H. Keller publisher: The MIT Press 1997 other: 491 pages, references, index The superstructural politics and economics of the Internet (such issues as censorship and taxation) have long held centre stage. Increasingly, however, the politics and economics of the low level operation of the Internet have emerged from the shadows. It is these -- the governance and pricing of routing, addressing, and naming services -- which are the subject of _Coordinating the Internet_. The first four essays consider general issues in Internet governance. Gillet and Kapor explain how 99% of the Internet operates without centralised control and suggest that coordination of domain name assignment and IP address allocation will eventually look "a lot more like coordination of the rest of the Internet". Gould provides a UK perspective, suggesting the evolution of English constitutional law and the supranational powers of the European Union as possible models for the Internet. Johnson and Post argue for decentralised governance, highlighting serious problems with alternatives such as extending national sovereignty, international treaties, or governance by international organisations. Rutkowski is less enthusiastic, claiming that "the notion of Internet self-governance is in fact an illusion arising from the relative unfamiliarity of many people associated with the Internet with either its history or the surrounding legal and regulatory constructs in which it exists". The domain name system is probably the most visible area of contention at the moment; it is the subject of seven of the papers in _Coordinating the Internet_. Five of them take different positions on the legal arguments over its interaction with trademark law and the political arguments over which organisations should be involved in its administration: the United Nations, the United States Federal government, InterNIC, and the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority just some of the contenders. Taking a step back, Andeen and King compare the DNS with telephony addressing in World Zone 1 (the North American Numbering Plan) and Mitchell, Bradner and Claffy argue that the obsession with the DNS is a red herring, that issues of Internet governance and sustainability are far broader. Moving on to less prominent but probably more fundamental issues, Rekhter, Resnick and Bellovin write about the need to provide financial incentives for route aggregation and efficient use of the address space, and suggest a framework for property rights and contracts that will achieve this. And Hoffman and Claffy evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of metro-based addressing (based on geography rather than provider). There are five papers on interconnection and settlement systems and agreements between service providers. Bailey and McKnight survey the variety of interconnection agreements and argue for the introduction of usage-sensitive pricing in conjunction with integrated services with guaranteed quality of service. Cawley, in contrast, extols "the virtues (and appropriateness) of capacity-based pricing and flat-rate tariffs", but suggests that many kinds of pricing models can coexist and that "interconnection and settlement are best left to market forces". Chinoy and Salo review what the transition from the NSFnet to commercial backbones teaches us about oversight and scaling issues. Farnon and Huddle use theoretical efficiency modelling to argue that the present "sender keeps all" settlement system is flawed. And Mueller, Hui and Cheng recount the history of the Hong Kong Internet Exchange. The final two papers deal with quality of service evaluation, with performance monitoring and statistics. Almes presents an overview of the IETF IP Provider Metrics effort, while Monk and Claffy suggest ways of overcoming practical obstacles -- political and economic as well as technological -- to adequate data acquisition. _Coordinating the Internet_ is moderately technical (though it avoids plumbing the complexities of protocols such as BGP) and on some issues its presentation of so many different viewpoints may be more confusing than clarifying. But it is an accessible and informative collection -- and an important and timely one, given the increasing urgency of some of the issues it debates. -- Disclaimer: I requested and received a review copy of _Coordinating the Internet_ from The MIT Press, but I have no stake, financial or otherwise, in its success. -- %T Coordinating the Internet %E Brian Kahin %E James H. Keller %I The MIT Press %C Cambridge, Massachusetts %D 1997 %O paperback, references, index %G ISBN 0-262-61136-8 %P xviii,491pp %U http://mitpress.mit.edu/book-home.tcl?isbn=0262611368 %K Internet, politics, economics, law 12 December 1997 --------------------------------------------------- Copyright (c) 1997 Danny Yee (danny(a)cs.usyd.edu.au) http://www.anatomy.usyd.edu.au/danny/book-reviews/ --------------------------------------------------- -- end of forwarded message --

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Only criminals don't support concealed-carry laws
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Fri, 12 Dec 1997 08:18:04 -0800 To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> From: Somebody Subject: Only criminals don't support concealed-carry laws >.> > =============================================== > NEWS FROM THE LIBERTARIAN PARTY > 2600 Virginia Avenue, NW, Suite 100 > Washington DC 20037 > =============================================== > For release: December 9, 1997 > =============================================== > For additional information: > George Getz, Deputy Director of Communications > Phone: (202) 333-0008 Ext. 222 > E-Mail: 76214.3676(a)CompuServe.com > =============================================== > > > The evidence is clear: Only criminals don't > support concealed-carry laws, say Libertarians > > WASHINGTON, DC -- If you want to reduce crime, allow more > people to carry more concealed guns, the Libertarian Party said today. > > And that opinion is confirmed by a new Cato Institute study, > which found that violent crime rates dropped dramatically in the 24 > states that have passed "concealed-carry" laws -- which allow ordinary > citizens to carry concealed weapons. > > "At this point, the only people who don't support > concealed-carry laws are criminals," said Steve Dasbach, the party's > national chairman. > > In those 24 states, concealed-carry laws force local police to > grant most citizens a concealed weapon permit after meeting certain > qualifications. Usually, that includes getting fingerprinted, passing a > criminal background check, and taking a gun safety course. > > "For years, gun-control advocates claimed that laws allowing > concealed weapons would lead to murder and mayhem," said Steve Dasbach, > chairman of the Libertarian Party. "But the exact opposite is true: > Concealed weapons actually save lives." > > The Cato Institute study, timed to coincide with the 10-year > anniversary of Florida's controversial concealed-carry law, found that > in the 24 states with concealed-carry laws, murders dropped by 7.7%, > rapes fell by 5.2%, robberies decreased by 2.2%, and aggravated > assaults were reduced by 7%. > > And in states where politicians continue to outlaw concealed > weapons? > > "There's blood in the streets," Dasbach said. "After accounting > for all other factors, the study calculated that in 1992 alone, 1,414 > more people were murdered than would have been if concealed-carry laws > were in effect." > > And the carnage doesn't end there: An additional 4,177 people > were raped, 11,898 more were robbed, and 60,363 more assaulted solely > as a result of the increased criminal activity that apparently comes > with concealed weapons bans, the study said. > > "But who is surprised that violent street thugs prefer to prey > on people who can't shoot back?" Dasbach asked. "By refusing to approve > concealed-carry laws, politicians in other states have painted a target > on the back of America's most vulnerable citizens." > > The study also shoots a hole in two other gun-control myths, > Dasbach said. One is that concealed-carry laws will resurrect the "Wild > West," turning ordinary Americans into trigger-happy gunslingers. > > "The study found that the number of concealed-carry > permit-holders convicted of murder committed in public is exactly zero, > and less serious crimes are extremely rare," he said. For example, only > one in 5,000 Floridians have had their permits revoked for crimes > involving a firearm. > > The other myth: That accidental shootings will become > commonplace. > > "The number of accidental deaths increased so slightly (less > than half of 1%) that implementing concealed-carry laws in every > remaining state would result in less than one additional death per year > - -- far less than the number of lives saved because of the reduced > murder rate," said Dasbach. > > "In other words, the real danger comes not from concealed > weapons, but from the lack of them," he said. > > Dasbach emphasized that although concealed-carry laws are a > major step in the right direction, they're not the perfect solution for > Libertarians. > > "Right-to-carry laws are only a partial victory because > Americans shouldn't have to seek government permission to exercise any > Constitutional right. Imagine what would happen if politicians dared to > require every journalist to pass a writing test to get a permit to > cover city hall, or tried to force ministers to demonstrate a basic > knowledge of religion before giving a sermon," he said. > > But requiring a permit is better than the alternative, he said: > Sentencing innocent people to death because they can't legally defend > themselves. > > "Denying terrified Americans the right to carry a gun is like > putting them at the front of the line on Death Row," he said. "At they > very least, politicians should have the decency to stop disarming > America's most vulnerable citizens: Crime victims." > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.6.2 > > iQCVAwUBNI4ttdCSe1KnQG7RAQGH+wP9E9V7Qz84YFPtuo/ccCLGoYfU5C11G7dD > lr9oHNdd+JtkaBhoDB+NmDpO3lccNueq5Cl4ZxO8uJ67LjeMU4gvFhev8eMUr3Rs > Cj2zuWTEa94Xnl4gR3BBKnlykyIIc5WCpN9ftsmA3zB4bP4rpVNfJgcKPW2BQs+U > dMEaQprF4V8= > =GkYU > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > > The Libertarian Party http://www.lp.org/ > 2600 Virginia Ave. NW, Suite 100 voice: 202-333-0008 > Washington DC 20037 fax: 202-333-0072 > __________________________________________________________________________ <somebody's.sig> --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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Re: Another of Gary Burnore's Lies Exposed
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Sam" <sam-001(a)dpinc.ml.org> wrote: > > Three examples: Speculation about Wotan and MailMasher, Speculation about > > DataBasix and one of many posts from the anon asshole complaining that ^^^^^^^^^^^^ > > > > Here are selected paragraps from each. The full messages follow: > > [snip] > > I'd rather look at full messages. Good idea. Notice Gary's usage of ad hominem argumention to avoid the issues on the faulty premise that if you hate the messenger then you can safely ignore the message. To Gary Burnore, his constant use of the perjorative "anonymous asshole" is apparently intended in the same manner as "heretic" was in the Middle Ages or "witch" was in 17th century New England. > This is something about warez and remailer, and Burchell discussing the > possible identity of whoever was behind whatever was discussed here. > Nothing is said regarding the issue here of forging databasix addresses > through the remailer, who was doing it, and why. > > I happen to recall that this was what this thread is supposed to be about. The original premise was that since the Mailmasher pseudonym server was allegedly allowing forgeries, it should be shut down. McClatchie's problem was that he mistook Mailmasher for a remailer and sought to prove that it allowed forgeries through the pasting of From: headers when, in fact, Mailmasher never had this capability. (Some of the remailers formerly did, but that was corrected long before the June incident with Gary Burnore, Belinda Bryan, and Jeff Burchell.) The "evidence" that was posted back then in an attempt to implicate Mailmasher in forgery consisted of usenet posts with truncated Path headers which stopped at the mail-to-news gateway from which they were posted. And none of the messages was more recent than 2/97. Mailmasher was a predecessor to Hotmail and the other web-based e-mail providers. The difference was that Mailmasher didn't require you to identify yourself to establish an account, but you could choose a pseudonym and use that instead. It never had any capabilities to specify a From: address. This the forged messages apparently not only had forged "From:" lines, but a forged "Message-ID:" as well, to make it look as if it came from Mailmasher. The forger, however, apparently chose the wrong site to implicate. If you'll reread Jeff's post (the one in the URL that I previously posted), you'll get a little insight into Gary's actions and apparent motives for his later attacks on Jeff's other server, the Huge Cajones Remailer. Let me quote a short excerpt: -> I still don't know what the hell is going on with DataBasix, Wells Fargo -> and Gary Burnore, but I suspect that someone used huge.cajones to say -> something extremely unflattering about Burnore (from what I can tell, -> he had it coming). Burnore then decided that he would make things -> difficult for me. First, he wanted the user who had posted something -> "inflammatory" about him revealed. When I told him that I couldn't -> do that, he carried on about mail logs and identifying the host that -> a message came from (the usual). I didn't explain to him that my -> machine keeps logs, but not anything involving a *(a)cajones.com -> address. He then requested the logs, which I denied (and told him -> to get his lawyer to send a request...) The issue was an "unflattering post", not any sort of forgery or other abuse. The so-called "spam bait" only "conveniently" appeared later when DataBasix was in need of more ammo to use to get the remailer shut down: -> Between the time he first contacted me, and the time I received the -> letter from Belinda Bryan, is when the baiting of databasix addresses -> began (slowly, with just a few posts). Now how would a third party, who was not privy to Gary and Belinda's private dealings with Jeff be able to exploit that timing by initiating the spam baiting at just the "right" time? It was almost as if the abuse appeared right on cue, just in time to bolster the case of DataBasix vs. Huge Cajones. And notice that from Jeff's chronology, the demand by Gary Burnore and Belinda Bryan for Jeff Burchell to turn over his logs to them came BEFORE this alleged "spam baiting" and was based on the unflattering CONTENT of a post, not on any alleged "forgery". None of this can be called speculation. It's a factual, historical account of DataBasix' dealings with Jeff Burchell. Plain and simple, Gary's demand for Jeff's logs was a blatant attempt at censorship through intimidation. IOW, the clear implication was "if you dare to criticize me, I'll hunt you down and you'll be sorry". > Earlier, Anonymous wrote: ``Contrary to your accusations, not all of > Jeff's post was "speculation".'' You took issue with that, in the context > of your disputed attempt to obtain the remailer's logs. > > Well, in this very sizeable post, speculations do, indeed, comprise only a > portion of it. The rest is a detailed narrative of the communications > between the players involved so no, it was not all just a speculation. > > Furthermore, you are disputing the fact that you wanted to obtain the > remailer's logs. I fail to see what facts you have posted which dispute > Jeff Burchell's version of the story. I cannot find the portion that > supposedly supports your claim that you did not seek to violate the > anonymity of the remailer. Burchell accomodated your demands, and put in > place measures that would prevent the alleged abuse from taking place. > Yet, you still demanded the logs. That's precisely my point. And now he refuses to disclose his motives for that demand or what he intended to do with the names and addresses contained in those logs. Every time he's asked the question of why he attempted to violate the privacy of hundreds or perhaps thousands of remailer users, it elicits another tantrum that goes, "Lies! Prove it! Why are you harassing me? What are your demands?" > > Note: I have several more posts like these, if you're interested. > > This one is a fine example of someone (the anonymous asshole, no doubt) > > whining about the "content based censorship" > > because he couldn't spambait us anymore. > > [snip] > > That's fine, but I do not see why this is relevant. It's not relevant. His usage of "anonymous asshole" is apparently generic for anyone who dares to challenge him and who posts anonymously, and is an obvious attempt to demonize all such individuals to divert attention from his own tactics. The whole "spam bait" issue is obviously a smoke screen, since the alleged spam-bait came AFTER the demand for Jeff's logs.

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Re: Whoever thinks the "word" is censored, post the 'word' fool
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

gburnore+NOspam(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) wrote: > :My only guess is that the posting person thinks that Replay censors more > :than one word, and that giveing the word away would tell Replay which > :filter to lift. If I had found something like that, I'd pass the info > :around privately to a bunch of friends first, and make sure that I was not > :the only one expereienceing the prob. > > Some have asked him to email it privately as well, seems he's not done that > either. I'm curious -- how would you know whether he's done so or not? I don't recall you making that invitation to him. Do you even accept incoming e-mail from remailers? > :Or, he could just be trolling. :) > > Doubt it. It really sounds like he believes the word is being censored. Maybe it's time for Alex to join this thread and either say "no, we don't filter on any words at the Replay remailer", or else "yes, here's a list of the words we consider to be objectionable, so please omit them from your posts through the Replay remailer". I'm half expecting that his posts aren't showing up either because he's screwed something up in the message to the remailer (like misspelling the word "Newsgroups" in the header, for example), because the posting gateway is flaky, or because some Net Nazi has taken it upon himself to indiscriminately forge cancels to posts he doesn't like. But some definitive word, one way or the other, would go a long way towards clarifying this situation. I see no rational reason for covertly blocking posts based on content. *IF* he didn't want something posted, then an announcement that the Replay remailer rejects posts containing certain words or phrases would make life simpler for all concerned. And to whoever created the subject line for this message, I'm tempted to either post the word "fool", or say that it's a lousy "Mr. T" impression. :)

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free ACM publications
by VaX#n8 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks readers may be interested in the ACM digital library, which is open free to the public until the end of this year, at which it becomes a rather expensive members-only luxury. Many complete articles are available online in PDF format. Reviews and abstracts will remain free. A search for "encryption", "cryptanalysis" or "cryptography" in the title and abstract reveals some interesting papers. As usual, use but don't abuse; I don't want to regret telling everyone about this, particularly since I haven't started reading yet myself. Information wants to be free: http://www.acm.org/dl -- VaX#n8, Junglist

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Smartcard demo canceled
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I won't be able to make it to tomorrow's meeting. Therefore, my smart card demo has been canceled. Sorry about that, -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred

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CDT VTW "aces" launch "bold" new Net-firm, by Brock Meeks
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- http://www.msnbc.com/news/129054.asp Noted Net lobbyists form for-profit firm Two non-profit cyberspace advocates now look to market Internet strategies By Brock Meeks WASHINGTON -- This is a story of defection. Two well-known voices on cyberspace advocacy issues Jonah Seiger of the Center for Democracy and Technology and Shabbir Safdar of Voters Telecommunication Watch said Tuesday they're forming a company specializing in "Internet campaign strategies." Spin doctors for fun and profit. And along they way, they hope to help make the Internet safe for Democracy. [...] The move is a dramatic shift for the two. In four years they have been at the forefront of the most contentious issues in cyberspace. They've created and honed their Internet strategies in the bare-knuckle world of Washington politics with incessant digital lobbying. No more. "We aren't going to be walking around the halls of Congress lobbying on behalf of anybody," Seiger said. IS ANYBODY HERE? The move is bold, even brash. Seiger and Safdar are banking that the Internet is, first, a viable medium for "moving an issue" as they call it and, second, that companies or organizations are going to be willing to pony up money to mount an Internet campaign. On second thought, maybe this is simply blind faith. If this defection is born of blind faith in a nascent medium, then Seiger and Safdar are true disciples. Seizer's own currency inside the Center for Democracy and Technology has been on a steady rise; he routinely is quoted on cyberspace issues. Now he's chucked all that for a start-up that depends on a medium that hasn't yet proven it can sustain a commercially viable site. [...] Whether or not the sound bite plays at the bank and with a host of potential clients, is another matter altogether. If Mindshare is going to be successful, it'll have to have an ace up its digital sleeve. It doesn't. It has two: Seiger and Safdar. ###

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Could a Jim Bell do the same thing?
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From a news.com feature: Sometimes, Daufenbach notes, a freshly arrested child pornographer facing a long sentence will agree to let his email account "hum" (continue running), with Customs picking up the traffic. A year ago, Daufenbach assumed the identity behind one such account. A molester and child pornographer (Daufenbach declined to reveal the person's name) began emailing Daufenbach's undercover account and then switched to real-time online chat, one of the biggest challenges for any cyberinvestigator. "A lot of people don't like doing it," says the Customs agent. "You have to think on your feet." Molesters often talk graphically about the children they abuse--and expect the same from their confidants. "If you get nervous and flustered," notes Daufenbach, "you'll blow it."

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"24 hour cybercops"
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message From: "Henry Ayre" <henri(a)alaska.net> Subject: SNET: Re: [CTRL] Janet Reno Promises Net Cops 24/7 Date: Fri, 12 Dec 1997 09:59:23 -0900 - -> SearchNet's SNETNEWS Mailing List It has been said that it takes a thief to catch one. Ergo, it must take a murderer to catch one. In both cases Janet Reno fits right into this program described below. H. Ayre - ---------- > From: Das GOAT <DasGOAT(a)aol.com> > To: CTRL(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM > Subject: [CTRL] Janet Reno Promises Net Cops 24/7 > Date: Friday, December 12, 1997 2:54 AM > > HIGH TECH COPS TO PROWL THE NET 24 HRS A DAY > > by Marcia Stepanek, Examiner Washington Bureau > San Francisco Examiner, Dec 11, 1997 > > WASHINGTON -- Top law-enforcement officials from the world's industrial > powers have announced plans to field cyber-SWAT teams to help catch criminals > who use the Internet and other computer technology to commit crimes. > <snip> > At the heart of the pact is a plan in which law enforcement officers with > computer expertise will be available 24 hours a day to assist investigations > of Internet crimes ranging from child pornography to fraud and money > laundering. > In addition, the nations [including the US, under Janet Reno] agreed to > form special police units to track Internet crime and criminals. > They also agreed to review police staffing levels to ensure that law > enforcement is adequately equipped to detect, prevent and punish computer > crimes. > US Attorney General Janet Reno initiated the meeting on computer crime, > the first-ever international gathering of justice ministers from the so-called > G-8 nations, the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, germany, France, > italy, Japan and Russia. > > To subsribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: > SUBSCIBE CTRL [to:] LISTSERV(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM > > To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: > SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] LISTSERV(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM > > Om - -> Send "subscribe snetnews " to majordomo(a)world.std.com - -> Posted by: "Henry Ayre" <henri(a)alaska.net> ------- End of Forwarded Message

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