December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Civil War Crypto Question... (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Sun, 21 Dec 97 21:46:22 PST > From: jim(a)mentat.com (Jim Gillogly) > Subject: Re: Civil War Crypto Question... > > Jim Choate skribis: > > On pp. 43 - 44 [of Hagerman's "The American Civil War..."] > > ... a 'cipher disk' whereby the Union was able to > > change their telegraph codes on an hourly schedule. It was apparently very > > effictive in dealing with taps and such. > > > > Anyone know of another source that discusses this disk? I looked in Applied > > There's a very brief mention of a disk in "Masked Dispatches: Cryptograms > and Cryptology in American History, 1775-1900", available from the NSA > Central Security Service. (Series 1, Pre-World War 1, Volume 1, United > States Cryptologic History), Center for Cryptologic History, by Ralph > E. Weber, 1993. Thanks for the reference. > On page 110 he says: "The North, on the other hand, adopted a handy "on-line" > means of changing the basic flag code by prearrangement or at will, even within > the act of transmission. This was done with a disk, in which the alphabet on > the inner disk revolved against an outer ring of flag combination, enabling an > instant change of code." > > My impression from this and from the chapter summary is that the disk was > used for flag codes but not telegraphy. For telegraphy the Union apparently > used a word-based route transposition that Friedman found unimpressive. Actualy it was used for telegraphy and flags. You see Mahan, the inventor of the disk had also just invented the first ever alphabetic flag system. Because of this system, instead of the wig-wag system others used, McClellan was the first general in history to change his orders of attack 3 times in 3 days *and* win the battle. The problem on the Peninsula was the land was too flat and the woods too thick to use it (see my original references around the same few pages). Friedman? Who the hell is Friedman? None of my references has anyone by that named listed, let alone involved. McClellan was the general in charge of the Army of the Potomac. Meyer was in charge of the Signal Corp, which at the time was responsible for tactical communications for McClellan. Originaly Meyer intended to use his new flag system but because the terrain, flat and wooded, on the Peninsula they found they weren't reliable. They were also using the balloons from the Union Aeronautic Department under Lowe. They were quite effective, haven't found out if they used Meyer's signal system. The flip side was the fully civilian Military Telegraph under Stager which handled strategic telegraphy was fighting Meyer for control of the various communications along technological boundaries. At this time, while they were fighting the South and each other, they brought in some Beardslee equipment (a rail-based portable telegraph system) which apparently didn't work well at all. The Beardslee system was the first use by an American army of portable telegraph equipment, it ran between McClellan's headquarters to Stoneman's at Mechanicsville. Apparently one of the chief problems was that wagons and people kept cutting the lines. Merry Christmas! ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord ?"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"cracker"} = "<remailer(a)anon.efga.org> cpunk mix remix pgp hash ksub esub latent cut ek reord post"; $remailer{'redneck'} = '<config(a)anon.efga.org> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"bureau42"} = "<remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org> cpunk mix pgp ksub hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"neva"} = "<remailer(a)neva.org> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub ?"; $remailer{"lcs"} = "<mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> mix"; $remailer{"medusa"} = "<medusa(a)weasel.owl.de> mix middle" $remailer{"McCain"} = "<mccain(a)notatla.demon.co.uk> mix middle"; $remailer{"valdeez"} = "<valdeez(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"arrid"} = "<arrid(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"hera"} = "<goddesshera(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"htuttle"} = "<h_tuttle(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix reno winsock) (weasel squirrel medusa) (cracker redneck) (nym lcs) (valdeez arrid hera) This remailer list is somewhat phooey. Go check out http://www.publius.net/rlist.html for a good one. Last update: Thu 23 Oct 97 15:48:06 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- hera goddesshera(a)juno.com ------------ 5:03:45 99.86% nym config(a)nym.alias.net +*#**#**### :34 95.82% redneck config(a)anon.efga.org #*##*+#**** 2:00 95.44% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +++ ++++++* 19:18 95.27% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de -- ---+--- 2:34:19 95.16% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net *++***+ ++ 11:26 95.11% replay remailer(a)replay.com **** *** 10:06 94.93% arrid arrid(a)juno.com ----.------ 8:50:34 94.41% bureau42 remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org --------- 3:38:29 93.53% cracker remailer(a)anon.efga.org + +*+*+*+ 16:32 92.80% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca + +*-++++ 24:14 92.79% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -..-..---- 9:59:18 92.22% neva remailer(a)neva.org ------****+ 1:03:02 90.39% valdeez valdeez(a)juno.com 4:58:22 -36.97% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net 1:01:28 -2.65% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: Completely anonymous communications ARE only for "Criminals"
by Charlie Comsec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- gburnore(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) wrote: > It's not clout, it's a capability. You can ask that many different types of > numbers be blocked. You can ask that incomming and or outgoing be blocked > _FROM_ _YOUR_ _HOME_ _PHONE_. If your local telephone company will provide you with that service, that's great. I suspect that it's not universally available, especially in Australia where the person I was replying to lives. But, as you pointed out, you can always ASK. The worst they can say is no -- or maybe "Chuck U. Farley", if you catch the customer "service" person in a bad mood. <g> > :Second, as you can probably tell from his return address, Politas is located > :in Australia, where different rules apply. > : > Indeed, that's true. Chances are however, that his phone company will catch > up with the U.S. sooner or later. :) Could be. I was only trying to deal with the options available to him here and now, just as I was dealing with the remailer network at it exists here and now. The big difference between the two is that he PAYS to be connected to the phone company's network, so that gives him a little bargaining power in asking for certain features. The remailers, in contrast, don't charge you for receiving mail and your two existing options are to use the net as it currently exists or disconnect yourself from it with a blocking request. It's sort of like public television. You've got a user community and a much smaller support community. Comments from users get considered, of course, but I'm sure that suggestions from actual supporters carry a bit more weight. > :Just don't sign up for pager service with a company that blocks calls from > :pay phones, then. > > The latest scoop is those that don't block will find another way to pass the > costs on to all subscribers. Those that _DO_ block will allow the unblocking > based on request from a user and that user's willingness to +pay+. Of course. One does have to make a decision whether its worthwhile to pay the extra fee for the convenience of someone being able to page him toll-free from a pay phone. Those who don't allow SELECTIVE blocking and who pass the costs on to all subscribers will eventually lose most of their customers who don't want to subsidize a service they don't want or use. Their prices will become non-competitive. > :I figure if an extra 18.5 cents is going to make that much of a difference to > :me, I probably didn't want to talk to that person that badly, anyway. So I'd > :either opt to not pay extra for 800 access, and let people page me at their > :own expense, or else be more selective who I gave my toll-free access > :number to. > > That would make _WAY_ too much sense now wouldn't it? Just like the internet, there are a lot of newbies to pagers, cell phones, PCS, etc. who don't know all their available options. That will change with time. But if you get your "expert advice" from the sales droid of the week at your local Radio Shack... > :I have a friend who has basic pager service with a local, non-toll-free > :access number. He also has separate 800 service that rings through to his > :pager number. The more expensive 800 number is given out more selectively > :than the local number. > > Precicely. However, the original discussion was not what pager companies > would or wouldn't want to do with the ability to block payphones, the issue is > whether it's not only possible (it is) but is it available to anyone. THe > answer to the second one is becomming yes in more areas as tine goes by. You > can even block anyone who doesn't display their caller id number. Of course, > then if you blocked your own number from displaying to protect yourself, your > friends who block unannounced numbers to protect themselves wouldn't get to > talk to you. > > > Oh, one other thing. It's NOT difficult to trace a phone number anymore. Even > though pressing *69 won't always give you the number that called you, the > phone company +can+ still track the number to it's source. Technology is currently progressing faster than our human protocols can keep up with. But I'm confident that the lag time will be relatively short. For example, people have now adapted their own sense of manners and propriety to deal with such things as unsolicited calls from telemarketers. When someone calls you, it's usually impolite to hang up on them. Many now make an exception for junk calls from telemarketers. Some phone company even offer a service where you can press a *xx code, hang up, and the telemarketer will be told that you don't accept such calls and be requested to add your number to his do not call list. There was an ongoing debate a few years ago when caller ID was first introduced involving the usage of caller ID, caller ID blocking, and even "blocker blocking". Ultimately when it's all sorted out we'll wind up with more choices than we had to start with. The phone number that you're calling from is now an item of data which can be OPTIONALLY transmitted along with the phone call. And the omission of that data, by way of caller ID blocking, is itself a data item. The technology exists to take certain actions based on that data interchange. The hardest part is DECIDING how one wishes to use that data. Will I accept calls with caller ID blocked? Will I block caller ID on my outgoing calls by default? Will I create an access list of calls of numbers allowed to ring my phone? Will I block the blocked calls altogether or merely divert them to my answering machine for screening? Perhaps this serves as a useful model in analyzing anonymous communications in general, particularly e-mail. Are people who e-mail anonymously or who call from pay phones to be considered "criminals" or otherwise viewed with suspicion? Should we require some form of positive identification, such as a government issued and escrowed crypto key, to authenticate all forms of communications, even calls from pay phones? As you've probably guessed, I'm against limiting those options. People who wish to communicate anonymously (truly anonymously, not the model suggested where you reveal your identity to someone and have to trust him to keep it confidential) should be allowed to do so. And people who don't wish to receive such communications should have the option of not receiving them. The unblockable call tracing technologies you've mentioned will make the use of pay phones more popular with people who value their privacy. Like unlisted numbers, the security of the data gathered by such systems is no greater than the willingness of a telco employee to refuse a bribe. Watch for even more proposals to make the use of pay phones less convenient or less private. It's already happening. Some large cities, for example, have strongarmed the phone companies to replace the normal push button pay phones with the old rotary dial style just to prevent people from using them to page drug dealers! Of course, you can't use them to page anyone else, either, or to access your own voice mail, or avail yourself of any service that utilizes data entry via DTMF tones. All in the name of "keeping us safe". - --- Finger <comsec(a)nym.alias.net> for PGP public key (Key ID=19BE8B0D) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNJ56kgbp0h8ZvosNAQFTWwf9Hhhwl1Q6SB42fWZzC1BdDOlmtR6W1+AU GxDOCU/2CEEnUVrF/9tsYk1eAPkPCgFmnevydb/7a+DOo1XpvX3itMwW4FOqSyPn rLzG6MbddEORGNRVcMQAD+aF+Uvqnh8cU5GrvEe0jp66p/wz6YvpeXwHcIzbmN20 A+pXz7KNrlB9RzVr/46QubjO/VrQe0JW60SMUbHpBXpV/rHv2MzN0Fla2qYqw5Ki kOnhI2+lCzLpKPvCvM4uHJ3fBLg79+m/LTRdL10uFvngB5wlEXaWffYZOfFk+SaX v0IxfpOZouLJ36iBfH960o6dcDtR/G69+LkgyJpsWCEB69jP9xON1g== =Ih9r -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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SPECIAL REPORT: Censorware in the Stacks
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

======= The Netly News (http://netlynews.com/) December 22, 1997 SPECIAL REPORT: Censorware in the Stacks by Declan McCullagh (declan(a)well.com) Antiporn crusaders and free speech advocates have locked horns for years over whether public libraries may cordon off large portions of the Internet. A lawsuit to be filed today against a Virginia county promises to answer that question and set new guidelines for free speech in the stacks. Mainstream Loudoun, a local group, and 11 other plaintiffs are challenging Loudoun County's decision to adopt one of the country's most iron-handed Internet policies, The Netly News has learned. In October, the library board voted to buy software called X-Stop that forbids both children and adults from visiting many sexually explicit web sites -- and plenty of innocuous ones too, such as Quaker and AIDS resources. The plaintiffs hope to persuade a federal judge that X-Stop's overzealousness violates not just traditions of intellectual freedom in libraries, but the First Amendment as well. The 47-page complaint, which calls the restrictions "a harsh and censorial solution in search of a problem," also challenges a rule encouraging librarians to look over your shoulder and make snap judgments on which web sites should be off limits. [...]

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Re: Completely anonymous communications ARE only for "Criminals" (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: 22 Dec 1997 15:20:08 -0000 > From: Charlie Comsec <comsec(a)nym.alias.net> > Subject: Re: Completely anonymous communications ARE only for "Criminals" > Technology is currently progressing faster than our human protocols can keep > up with. Spin-doctor bullshit. Technology is *created* by people. When the day comes where we don't understand it we will quit making progress at the rate we are. It *is* true that if you spend your days watching Opra and your nites watching some cop-show then you will have no clue as to what is going on. To understand technology *requires* activity and participation, something that people are becoming less and less inclined to do when they can go flip on their PlayStation or play Quake 2 and claim to be on the bleeding edge... Posers, lamers, and wanna-be's. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Hate speech and censorship (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Mon, 22 Dec 1997 14:46:08 +0000 ( ) > From: Paul Bradley <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> > Subject: Re: Hate speech and censorship > Yes, those on the list a few months ago (around the time the list moved > from cocksucker John Gilmores toad.com to the distributed list format) Dude, that was well over a year ago... ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Civil War Crypto Question... (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: Date: Mon, 22 Dec 97 08:10:02 PST From: jim(a)mentat.com (Jim Gillogly) Subject: Re: Civil War Crypto Question... (fwd) > > used for flag codes but not telegraphy. For telegraphy the Union apparently > > used a word-based route transposition that Friedman found unimpressive. > > > > Friedman? Who the hell is Friedman? None of my references has anyone by that > > named listed, let alone involved. > In case you weren't being ironic or something, Weber was referring to William > F. Friedman, the star of the US cryptologic effort during WW2, who was > commenting on the strength of the Union cryptosystems long after it was too > late to do anything about them. I gather the word-based route transposition > was quite good enough to conceal the meaning from the Confederates, so I > suppose one shouldn't be censorious. Actualy that was so far out in left field that I didn't make the connection. Really couldn't care less about Friedman and his WWII views of the Civil War, not relevant to what I am doing. And further, if Friedman is claiming that this code wheel wasn't invented by the telegraphers, for the telegraphers then perhaps he isn't as historicaly accurate as some claim of him. It is clear that Myer invented the code wheel, per his and McClellans own documents, expressely for telegraphy as a direct results of the success of Myers new flag signaling system previous to the Peninsula campaign. Perhaps there is some confusion over exactly *which part* of the Union Army was using what. McClellan was using Myer and his techno-marvels at the tactical level and this had no relation to the strategic communications - the big boys might very well have been using some fancy transposition cipher. After Antietam McClellan told Myer: "When I start from this camp, I want to break loose from the regular telegraph lines and depend upon those under my command." The 'regular telegraph' was Military Telegraph which was the strategic minded folks. That McClellan had no stomach for them is clear. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________| ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: SPECIAL REPORT: Censorware in the Stacks (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: SPECIAL REPORT: Censorware in the Stacks > From: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) > Date: Mon, 22 Dec 97 15:33:03 EST > On the contary. when no library was state (meaning, taxpayer) funded, and they Get your facts straight. The US has a library that from day 1 has been citizen supported. Every state (that I am aware of) has a state library that is funded by tax payers. Furthermore, Texas & Lousiana have had localy supported libraries and schools before they were even states. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Hate speech and censorship
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On behalf of the non-racist cypherpunks, please accept an apology for Paul Bradley's racist message: > uneducated and foolish arabs such as Parekh should stick > to what they do best: running kebab shops and/or selling cheap fake rolex > watches to tourists. This does not reflect the mainstream view on the list. Cypherpunks understand that disparaging the racial background of others is a weak and invalid form of argument. While it may be appropriate to criticize actions taken during the list moderation experiment, casting the issue in racial terms only reveals the ignorance and bigotry of the writer.

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Only the Paranoid Survive
by Eric Cordian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Intel CEO Andy Grove was just named Time Magazine's "Man of the Year" for 1997. -- Eric Michael Cordian 0+ O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division "Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law"

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