December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

noise spheres
by Laszlo Vecsey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Are there any texts available on interpreting patterns found in noise spheres? - lv

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Re: quote
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 28 Sep 1997 at 19:11, Zooko Journeyman <zooko(a)xs4all.nl> farted: > Igor Chudov contributed a quote from some government manual: >> These anti-government extremists and supporters are convinced >> citizens are being systematically oppressed by an illegal, >> totalitarian government. They believe the time for traditional >> political reform has passed, that their freedom will only be >> secured by resistance to the law and attacks against the >> government in several forms. >> >> Members of these groups bond to one another and lose contact with >> other people who hold different opinions. The isolation works to >> reinforce their views, which in turn gives them new purpose. >> This new purpose may take ordinary ideas to extremes, rationalize >> their problems into blaming government, and cause members to >> compete with each other to make stronger statements. > Couldn't've said it better myself. > I see the same pattern in cypherpunks and in my non- (or > barely-) 'Netted extremist friends of the right, the > libertarian, and the left varieties. > I've argued with myself for years about whether the spread of > the Net would connect these people back to their fellow humans, > by offering uncensorable, violence-free communication channels, > or whether it help them to make virtual communities consisting > solely of people who reinforce their own beliefs. > I'm still hoping for the former... > Z, hopeful cynic Jerk! You don't have the slightest clue about what is going on over here, do you?

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Re: Digital Postage (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Sun, 28 Sep 1997 23:04:24 -0700 > From: Bill Frantz <frantz(a)netcom.com> > Subject: Re: Digital Postage (fwd) > At 2:04 PM -0700 9/28/97, Jim Choate wrote: > >I can assure you that any business will not use multiple protocols unless > >their interface is the same for all of them. There simply isn't enough > >business to have very many systems. > > While this is certainly true for remailers at the present, it is not true > for businesses in general. Most of the stores I deal with locally will > accept cash, checks or credit cards. The interface (and accounting) for > these is quite different. (E.g there is no online check for cash, like > there is for credit cards, and sometimes checks.) These are all the same payment mechanisms. I run a business and the actual accounting for cash, credit cards, etc. doesn't make my books a lot of difference except in what column I put the numbers. My bank certainly doesn't care where that money came from once deposited in my account from somebody elses account. I believe you are caught up in details of the system and not in differences between systems. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Remailers and ecash
by phelix＠vallnet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 29 Sep 1997 02:10:39 -0500, "Robert A. Costner" <pooh(a)efga.org> wrote: > >At first I thought some of the stuff Monty Cantsin was discussing was >interesting, but it has gotten out of hand. I've asked the question >before, Why would remailer operators want to accept Ecash? After seeing >the conflicting messages coming from Mr. Catsin, I to rephrase it, why does >*Mr Catsin* want remailer operators to use Ecash? > >The first answer I got was so that remailer reliability could increase. >The theory as I understood it was that remailers were run like a hobby, not >a business, so the money would be an incentive to bring in professionalism. > So I proposed, and documented, that the minimum level to achieve this >would be a $50K investment over a year's time. This is in fact, more or >less what the Cracker remailer takes to run. Most of the resources are >donated in some way, but this is their equivalent retail value. Even so, >with Monty's pricing structure and Cracker's current level of traffic it >would be enormously profitable. > >Then Mr. Cantsin seemed to go back to the all you need are some spare parts >theory of remailer operation. Enormous profits of $200 per month, or even >$5,000 per year. Well, Cracker handles close to 25% of worldwide remailer >traffic of it's kind[1]. And it's not much. I would say this is due >mainly to the user interface. Making remailers more difficult to use by >adding Ecash is not going to increase traffic significantly. > > >I recommend that people start pricing at a quarter per message per hop > >In my opinion, and I've been known to be wrong, this is a seriously messed >up comment. A quarter per message is too much, much less a quarter per >hop. A price of 1/100 of a penny per message is closer to a proper >valuation. But the problem here is in the pricing model. It should not be >transactional unless to encourage the very casual user. A pricing model >should be flat rate. One price for a month, or even a year's service. The >net is based on a peering price structure, not an inter-lata structure. >Trying to compute or add charges at each hop is against the nature of >information flow for the net. > Why? Each hop adds value to the message (in this case, increased anonymity/security). Shouldn't a person have to pay more for increased value? Also, how would a user pay per-month to each remailer and maintain total anonymity and ease of use. Flat rate pricing requires one to open an "account" with each remailer he would ever use before sending the first message. Then at each hop, the message is linked to some "account" on the server which is someway linked to the user (specifically, a set of messages going through a server can be linked to the same "account", which to me is totally unacceptable). This seems overly complicated and could compromise the users anonymity. Finally, with flat rate, what would prevent a person from spamming? > >We are talking about how to get a working payment system up for > >remailers which gets us great service and provides privacy and > >security. > >The point I have never gotten past is how you expect a payment system to >change the level of service? The next point I'm still shaking my head over >is what about remailer services is not up to your standards? The only >thing I have heard you mention is latency, which is a feature programmed >into the remailers. If anything, people would pay to add latency, not to >take latency away. > For me, the main problems I see are the number of remailers available and spam prevention. Going commercial solves these problems. Also, there will still be free remailers around. > >Remailers are used by a small highly > >specialized market of perhaps a few hundred people. > >There is some truth in this statement. But there are also remailers run by >a variety of companies such as hotmail, juno, and the like. They encompass >millions of users. Millions of users who want a remailer, but will not >tolerate the level of entry required for a Type-I or Mixmaster remailer. >Until client software can be improved and made as easy to use as an >integrated spelling checker, the "advanced" remailers will have no true >market share. (Oh, I forgot. Most of the world uses email clients without >integrated spell checkers.) Agreed. I've just finished going through the Eudora API docs and I think sending a message through remailers can be as easy as clicking one button on the toolbar (just like with signing a messages with the pgp plugin). For everyday use, everything else (like choosing the remailer chain) can be automated. -- Phelix

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Last Call!!! (uce)
by kposyov＠freeyellow.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"This is a ONE TIME MAILING ONLY! However, if you are NOT interested in being contacted via e-mail about similar products and services, we would CERTAINLY like to know about it. Drop us a note by hitting REPLY. Thankyou." Hello, I want to introduce you to a new and proven money-making program that is very easy to market, earns you $100 for each sale, and gives you the freedom to work from anywhere in the world you'd like. In fact, you don't even need to sell! All you need to do is have all your prospects call a TOLL FREE HOT LINE presentation which completes the selling and closing on your behalf! With the amazing portable communication power of the Internet, you're on your way to the financial freedom you've been dreaming of for so long! Anyone can do this, even your child! It's so simple. Just as I've referred many others, I'm now referring you. Others have responded to my simple offer, and have earned a bundle! I love this business! I can work this from anywhere! In fact - I'm able to take my laptop computer, which is paid for with my income from this program, and work from my hotel room, my bedroom, my kitchen, the beach, Paris, London, Tokyo, New York, the Bahamas, on my favorite cruise ship, from my favorite get-away island, from my RV, from my car, from my porch... you get the picture? I'M HAVING FUN WHILE I WORK! Now you can have the same! Really, how easy can it get? This is how easy... just refer people to this number... "Just Call 1-800-811-2141 7am - 9pm MST You MUST have this PASS CODE #45815" Let's say you referred 20 people to this number... and all were as sold as you on the program... You would earn a handsome check for $2000! FANTASTIC! Now imagine if you referred 50! or 100! or 1000! These numbers are easily attainable by the power everyone now has in this new technological age of the Internet! IT DOESN'T STOP THERE! YOU CAN ALSO EARN A RESIDUAL INCOME THROUGH AN OPTIONAL MONTHLY PRODUCT PROGRAM! SO POWERFUL! If you follow what I have just done, and present this TOLL FREE NUMBER to as many people as you can, you will no doubt be earning a substantial weekly income. In fact, someday, we may end up meeting on some cruise ship or tropical beach! I'M NOT JOKING! THIS PROGRAM WORKS! Checks come out every Friday. You can have one in your mailbox by as early as next week. By referring other people to the above TOLL FREE NUMBER, you will earn $100 for each sale made when they call with your PERSONAL PASS CODE! You can get started TODAY by securing your own PERSONAL PASS CODE! Just call the TOLL FREE NUMBER and listen to the friendly presentation. You'll be amazed at what you will be able to accomplish financially by simply doing what I'm doing... Here's what I do... I say, "Please Call 1-800-811-2141 7am - 9pm MST You MUST have this PASS CODE #45815" What have you got to lose? PERHAPS ALL YOUR FINANCIAL BURDENS? QUICK COMPANY PROFILE: Fortune 5000 is a member of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Better Business Bureau in Kansas. Absolutely Legitimate! This is a business opportunity that has already made many people very rich. You pay a one time membership fee for the right to refer others and earn hundreds, even thousands of times your membership fee in return. You save thousands of dollars on more than 250,000 items in our huge wholesale catalog. Plus, thousands of other great deals and freebies! No monthly requirements! If you are not satisfied, you get your money back. How can you lose? ...YOU'LL LOSE IF YOU DON'T MAKE THIS CALL!!!!!

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Fwd: Re: [NTSEC] pgp 5.0 back door
by Ray Arachelian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 28 Sep 1997 20:41:06 -0400 (EDT) From: Michael Warfield <mhw(a)iss.net> To: gryzor(a)thepentagon.com Cc: ntsecurity(a)iss.net Subject: Re: [NTSEC] pgp 5.0 back door ??? > hello, > I have a little question Pgp 5.0 freeware have an global back door key of > the us gouvernment or not ?? Not. Phil Zimmerman is an absolute religous fanatic about backdoors! When ViaCrypt implimented a commercial escrow feature to give companies the ability to issues keys where they had a key escrow, he used that as a reason to break their contract. He had a "no backdoor" clause in the ViaCrypt agreement for PGP. After the US goverment tried to investigate Phil into bankruptcy for several years, I seriously doubt he would do ANYTHING to assist them except to assist them into a pit somewhere... > thxs 4 advance > Gryzor Mike -- Michael H. Warfield | Voice: (770)395-0150 (770)522-4823 Senior Engineer | Fax: (770)395-1972 Internet Security Systems, Inc. | E-Mail: mhw(a)iss.net mhw(a)wittsend.com 41 Perimeter Center East, Suite 660 | http://www.iss.net/ Atlanta, GA 30346 | http://www.wittsend.com/mhw/ PGP Key: 0xDF1DD471 http://www.wittsend.com/mhw/pubkey.txt

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Re: [NTSEC] pgp 5.0 back door
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Michael Warfield <mhw(a)iss.net> writes to Ray Arachelian or somebody: >... Phil Zimmerman is an absolute religous fanatic about backdoors! >When ViaCrypt implimented a commercial escrow feature to give companies the >ability to issues keys where they had a key escrow, he used that as a reason >to break their contract. He had a "no backdoor" clause in the ViaCrypt >agreement for PGP. After the US goverment tried to investigate Phil into >bankruptcy for several years, I seriously doubt he would do ANYTHING >to assist them except to assist them into a pit somewhere... The PGP Web site in http://www.pgp.com/products/differences.cgi has a list of differences between PGP 5.0 (personal PGP) and PGP 4.5.x (corporate PGP). The corporate one includes a feature that the private one doesn't called "message recovery". Given Phil's fanaticism outlined above, this presumably isn't any way to get at the plaintext without the user's knowledge or cooperation, but just what the heck IS it? I can't find a description of the feature on-line. The manual itself is on-line in PDF, which presumably answers this question for acrobat fans. I see nothing about "message recovery" in the hard-copy PGP 4.5 manual. For the guy who's concerned about backdoors in PGP 5.0 -- there's no reason to believe there are any. There's source out there for you to download, and you can browse it over and compile a copy for yourself. I recommend buying a legal copy anyway, even if you are going to use the one you compiled yourself, to encourage makers of strong crypto for the masses -- if you're getting value, may as well pay for it and feel good about yourself. Salvo Salasio - -------------------------------------------------------------------------- P.S. For CypherSaber CipherKnights: set your secret decoder ring to "WriteYourCongressman" to decrypt this: e91a 46d8 fba9 aaf5 927f 7a3f 1ded 8757 a741 4bb6 5568 3a5a f118 dc2b 11de ebb3 e873 ffa1 d520 09ea 52b6 65c3 a42a 3d14 befa 0f3e ff09 e09a ad26 f877 aa84 4722 8ac3 770a 0aad 48a0 bf1e 9c51 2b1e a54f 8a7e 3e14 b0d1 3a84 8852 f9db d7ce 73b5 4066 d516 4d77 0395 37e2 b79c 9acd 6107 ecff 72bc e985 0ede fcf0 eabd b903 9217 a0fc b95d 5ad7 3431 ba73 0d98 360b cef2 f863 ed54 8aa4 b0a9 6ed1 a2bb 8449 346f 1a7f f431 b8cf 95e3 b372 b0f5 c8a9 5ae1 622f d59f c990 fd6d 3611 bc1e d842 82c7 c112 27d8 8b1e f3d8 f769 a10c d4f7 6360 dea4 f6cf feb3 e8c6 c72b 7b4a 03dc 00c4 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNC/Bm9eed+DWkqwBAQGeNwP+I857P9Tf5fJU6O6ahI3uvxmgM1jFTzJH E05r7vhOX7oZnosUhYVni7BpYwlfusEyWFs1TzPgDDxnPveNi36mDwSEoD17A0wP fH4767MUHkNHaVntLBbHBCbKytQKarZC0X1eLa5rvg76WJtP5WBooyLkDbURrJuR jjQgifCV7hg= =PIRT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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cyphernomincom
by Tom McCaskill 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know where I can download a copy of the cyphernomicon. I found a web page where I can read it, but I'd prefer one text file that I can read with out being online Thanx -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.7.1 mQCNAzLizK4AAAEEAJ0uBc2mH6b7rAmHBFyHpk92is55ZMFanLqdiRU6iyut8v7u 70CNpvVlnlFsHFjhqgvdkJeuDTF8PselBGv6VkvYXVxKlQTyLvxYLJYuY1zrefah fFF/6i3v2FAOtBUp2/oEMmw9QMA8+1FWJXsuYkz0toVDq+xdGzVLXWU23HQ/AAUR tCdUb20gTWNDYXNraWxsPG1jY2Fza2lsbEBtaW5kc3ByaW5nLmNvbT6JAJUDBRAy 4s1SNUtdZTbcdD8BAcHTA/9eDI+2Yx5tm0ZpfPaYq8vq/GliEUai7Vl4IGCYEPwo SK4zKbx1HwAKgBy396EDK1RECtpekKLbz5XuUNkl77zwwQsQ+dTTSJoeO7ArCmea ZeJ5kQoNn2Qt+d7KcMK0zCUAKt1zVX8V2EWt01vw8yJi88KC5e3uLmLvpgLLV3iw Cg== =Weyw -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: Remailers and ecash
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[..] : Then Mr. Cantsin seemed to go back to the all you need are some spare parts : theory of remailer operation. Enormous profits of $200 per month, or even : $5,000 per year. Well, Cracker handles close to 25% of worldwide remailer : traffic of it's kind[1]. And it's not much. I would say this is due : mainly to the user interface. Making remailers more difficult to use by : adding Ecash is not going to increase traffic significantly. Basicly most of those 3400 message cracker handles daily are cover trafic, a big chunk of the rest is from people "playing" around with the remailer, then there are those few that needs some form of anonimity so they can inform a mailinglist/postmaster/complaints department, and then maybe once a week or so there is that message that would be paid for if remailers were for pay. So in short, if remailers were to be paid for, traffic would halt. -- Alex de Joode | usura(a)SABOTAGE.ORG | http://www.sabotage.org Sabotage Internet: Your Internet Problem Provider.

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord ?"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"cracker"} = "<remailer(a)anon.efga.org> cpunk mix remix pgp hash ksub esub latent cut ek reord post"; $remailer{'redneck'} = '<config(a)anon.efga.org> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"bureau42"} = "<remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org> cpunk mix pgp ksub hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"neva"} = "<remailer(a)neva.org> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub ?"; $remailer{"lcs"} = "<mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> mix"; $remailer{"medusa"} = "<medusa(a)weasel.owl.de> mix middle" $remailer{"McCain"} = "<mccain(a)notatla.demon.co.uk> mix middle"; $remailer{"valdeez"} = "<valdeez(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"arrid"} = "<arrid(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"hera"} = "<goddesshera(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"htuttle"} = "<h_tuttle(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix reno winsock) (weasel squirrel medusa) (cracker redneck) (nym lcs) (valdeez arrid hera) The remailer list here has been out of date for some time, but should be up to date now. I'm still working on updating the web page. Last update: Mon 29 Sep 97 6:47:20 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nym config(a)nym.alias.net ####*####*+# 1:27 100.00% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ++++++*++*** 25:44 99.96% redneck config(a)anon.efga.org **#*#+#*#### 3:20 99.95% cracker remailer(a)anon.efga.org +*++++++++++ 21:17 99.94% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net ****- *++*** 11:05 99.87% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -__.----.--- 9:27:51 99.86% neva remailer(a)neva.org - -------**- 3:02:03 99.79% hera goddesshera(a)juno.com ----------- 5:50:56 98.89% replay remailer(a)replay.com ******* ** * 3:58 98.77% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ----+---- 2:58:39 98.57% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ****-**+ -** 2:51:11 98.53% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net -+-+-- - + 1:20:11 97.13% bureau42 remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org ---------- 4:05:18 91.99% arrid arrid(a)juno.com --.----- 9:26:00 83.33% valdeez valdeez(a)juno.com 4:58:22 -3.13% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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