December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

REminder: Physical meet this Wednesday
by Christian Claborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The last message had Thursday in the subject... It's Wednesday. 2 -- C -- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This Wednesday!!! San Diego Area CPUNKS symposium Wednesday, Sep. 24, 1997. Topic: What action do we take if the situation get's out of hand (See message below from Mark H. below). It is my belief that any group, no matter how small, can accomplish great things if they apply themselves. Cypherpunks are not just "users", they poses several additional quanta of the stuff that enables creative thought, and skill. Don't forget to bring your public key fingerprint. If you can figure out how to get it on the back of a business card, that would be cool. If you want the suspicious crowd there to sign your key, bring two forms of ID. Place: The Mission Cafe & Coffee Shop 3795 Mission Bl in Mission Beach. 488-9060 Time:1800 Their Directions: 8 west to Mission Beach Ingram Exit Take west mission bay drive Go right on Mission Blvd. On the corner of San Jose and mission blvd. It is located between roller coaster and garnett. It's kind of 40s looking building... funky looking (their description, not mine) They serve stuff to eat, coffee stuff, and beer + wine stuff. See you there! New guy, bring your fingerprint. Drop me a note if you plan to attend... 2 -- C -- - ------------------------ Date: Fri, 12 Sep 1997 16:04:22 -0700 (PDT) From: Mark Hedges <hedges(a)infonex.com> To: all-at-infonex(a)infonex.com Subject: federal cryptography legislation Sender: owner-all-at-infonex(a)infonex.com - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- A bill called "SAFE" (HR-695, "Security and Freedom with Encryption") in the U.S. House of Representatives would have allowed U.S. software companies to export strong cryptography, and would have promoted privacy in all U.S. communications. Cryptography is mathematical means of making a message secret. Now, this bill has been rewritten to introduce more restrictive cryptography legislation than ever before seen in the U.S. Public support for cryptography use and export is very strong, as evidenced by the California state legislature's unanimous vote 9/5/97, calling on Congress and the President to revise and relax export laws (SJR-29). Companies world-wide already produce strong cryptograpy software, and U.S. buisness is rapidly losing ground in the world-wide software and telecommunications market. The House National Security Committee this week voted to continue export restrictions in the SAFE bill and to install "key escrow" proposals of the defense and intelligence organizations. This would not only continue the status quo legislation, it would strictly regulate and restrict domestic use of cryptography, an unprecedented act. Key escrow legislation in SAFE would mandate government "back doors" in all communications software before the end of the millennia in the United States, imposing criminal penalties for use of secure cryptography. Effectively, every citizen would be required to give law enforcement involuntary and transparent access to all communications, including financial, business, and personal messages. Key escrow also exposes all U.S. communication to a single point of failure, which a hacker, spy, or corrupt official could exploit to gain access to all personal, industry, and financial information. More information is available in our most recent press release. Press releases can be viewed at http://www.anonymizer.com/press/. Please, call your congressional representatives and senators and encourage them to oppose restrictive legislation on cryptography and mandated government access to all communications. Names and phone numbers for your local legislators can be obtained from www.house.gov and www.senate.gov. Sincerely, Mark Hedges Anonymizer Inc. Infonex Internet Inc. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNBnJhBVo2SUWMp6NAQFyNQP/UuogfBfcjRw7q5rda8+1BrGkMEHpixau J7JfbhKyv5yWdPZsnh8F3m/kaUahLEaSdLCcmAJzbroKApGBjUtT6bRacOtVps3X TzZXLO2NZd4UBsksUC1f3WWnnRl8+03jiQMboSpBvUVmHqA1sFiz3OQpJVWv1yge jEEk7R2Maeg= =VrfI - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNCRRAIP1MBWQ+9udAQHNuAf/Wf/vf7O7A3iZhd9BjlzyI0FvcOTelUOs 5JhxXN0w86YWzoluZue8jY7uKmxGVuySdikQSw4OxLS5wZG05nByoIQlhlzLPYIl vrQuQZ0EeGIOycwS7IuNLFFyx+C1E7HxcdX0UR3qMDgEiiFb09DlcuDHeSp52RZW s6t7AFR7ZoVz28KanihgDRQdk9QTw0HuaZV3hHNl11610HaPURRe4SX7zgR1cHAf naoTZI70GqVoUVYVrm+oVHln7HsdFqnrO/1GAVpLzKpEnzfT9C0d0o7T4t/WX4CM yeeO2UZUwfg01VyCHORpFYbx1SrFlW4rZNZqOJMP2lA2cNDZBsLrhg== =/sWk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... __o .. -\<, Claborne(a)CYBERTHOUGHT.com ...(*)/(*)._ Providing thoughts on your computing needs. http://www.CYBERTHOUGHT.com/cyberthought/ PGP Pub Key fingerprint = 7E BF 38 3F 24 A7 D1 B0 54 44 96 AA 10 D0 5D 51 Avail on Pub Key server. PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! Dreams. They are just a "screen saver" for the brain.

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Its working read this, give it a chance,
by wdsmsn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

WE CAN NOT TELL YOU HOW EXCITED EVERYONE IS THAT IS GETTING INVOLVED IN THIS PROGRAM IT IS WORKING LIKE A CHARM, FINALLY A WAY TO MAKE A LOT OF EXTRA MONEY WITH NO GAMBLE. , ....... WHEN YOU HEAR OF THOSE THAT DID IT AND HOW GREAT IT WORKED YOU WILL WISH YOU WOULD HAVE TRIED IT, Five people who said it did not work and it was just a scam, are now involved in it , After they saw what others have received. *** Print This Now For Future Reference *** This is working people are reporting tremendous results, Give it a try what have you got to lose.... HOW TO MAKE $800,000.00 CASH IN FOUR WEEKS! How about taking the profits and opening your own business? How about telling that boss you hate to go jump in the lake? Do this Keep it among people you know how can you possibly lose here??? Then ask yourself... How much can I make??? The answers should tell you it's worth a try. All you can lose is 5 bucks (SO WHAT!!!) Yet you may make a nice profit. Read on. Jane Nelson tells how she ran this program four times last year. This first time, she received $500,000 in cash, and over $700,000 the last three times this year. If this letter is continued, as it should be, EVERYONE PROFITS! Just send one person FIVE DOLLARS - THAT'S ALL! After the first time, you'll see how easy it is and how beautifully it works! Now here are the simple details... Follow WHAT TO DO below and IN ONLY FOUR WEEKS YOU'LL RECEIVE UP TO $700,000 because most people will respond, due to the LOW INVESTMENT and HIGH PROFIT POTENTIAL. WHAT TO DO On a blank sheet of paper, write "Please put me on your mailing list" along with your name and address and put it with a Five-Dollar Bill. Through regular mail, send this to the last person on the list below. ONLY THE LAST PERSON ON THE LIST GETS YOUR NAME AND $5 BILL! Then remove that name from the list. Move the other three names down and add your name to the list in the #1 position. After you have re-typed the list with your name in the #1 position, MAKE AT LEAST 20 COPIES OF THE LETTER AND SEND IT OUT IMMEDIATELY TO 20 OR MORE PROSPECTS. Friends, relatives - anyone you'd like to see get rich along with you! The faster you act, the faster you'll get your money! US Mail or Email!!! For email, you can just copy this whole letter and paste it into the body part of AOL's "Compose Mail" box. Then be sure to remove the last name on the list below, and add your name as the first. YOU STILL HAVE TO USE REGULAR MAIL TO SEND YOUR $5 AND ADDRESS TO THE LAST NAME! That's what keeps this legal and how everyone gets paid! That's all there is to it! Here's how it works: 1. You send out 20 letters to 20 Prospects 2. Those 20 mail out 20 letters each (400) 3. Those 400 mail out 20 letters each (8,000) 4. Those 8,000 mail out 20 letter each (160,000) 5. And those 160,000 people mail YOU 5$ each ($800,000) Your entire investment is only $5!!! Very inexpensive when you consider the results you can get! HONESTY AND INTEGRETY MAKE THIS PLAN WORK. Breaking the rules on the way it is sent only messes up your chance of it working right! DON'T BREAK THE RULES! Be sure to follow the instruction and omit nothing. At this time we are receiving an almost 100% return rate for people wise enough to participate in the plan. The majority receive about $700,000 on average! And rest assured this plan is 100% Legal! You are providing a service to people to put them on your mailing list. (Please refer To): (Title 18, Section 1302 of the US Postal Code and Lottery Laws.) PLEASE MAIL YOUR LETTERS ASAP! I WISH YOU SUCCESS AND TOGETHER WE'LL ALL PROSPER. DON'T GIVE UP ON YOUR DREAMS! -------------------------------------------------------------------- #1 Ray Favereau 822 Kalli Creek Lane St. Augustine Fl 32084 #2 Danielle Burkes 1057 Larkspur Loop Jacksonville Fl. 32259 #3 J.D. Clark, P.O. Box 613, Lahoma, OK 73754 #4 Ryan Thomas, P.O. Box 2872, Joplin, MO 64803 Include your email address for courtesy updates.

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Oxley crypto update: vote in 90 minutes
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Today's vote will be held in less than two hours. Keep in mind that this is just one committee out of five that's considering the SAFE bill. The impact of the committee's draft of SAFE is not nearly as important, IMHO, as the political impact of the vote. Can one of the nation's richest industries muster up the votes to defeat law enforcement -- in the //Commerce// committee, of all places? Many eyes will be watching the committee today. I hear that Oxley is nervous and has been calling people he never did before. His staff tells me that yes, he has been calling everyone on the committee. He'll be distributing letters of support from groups -- including law enforcement groups in California -- that will buttress his amendment. Oxley's staff tells me the version of Oxley II posted by CDT is almost certainly inaccurate and out of date. Solomon, chair of House Rules, is circulating a letter saying only SAFE with Oxley will go to the floor. The pressure's on. Rumors are flying that industry may cut a deal (perhaps brokered by White) that may give up civil liberties in exchange for export controls. We'll see soon. As of yesterday Oxley appeared to have a majority of perhaps 32-34 out of the 51 or so people on the committee. -Declan >In case anybody is counting votes, my own congressman (Brian Bilbray, R-CA) >sits on the House Commerce committee. I just got a call back from his >staff saying that Bilbray opposes the Oxley amendment and continues >to support the original SAFE bill, which he co-sponsored. > >Any other word on how today's vote is going? > >Phil

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Announcing ZDU's Fall Course Catalog!
by announce＠lists.zdnet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----------------------------------------------------------------- ZDNET ANNOUNCEMENT 9/24/97 ----------------------------------------------------------------- ZDU Announces Its Biggest Course Catalog Ever. Point your Web browser to: http://www4.zdnet.com/chkpt/zdna970922001/www.zdu.com ZDNet University is excited to announce the widest selection of online classes ever. This Fall, choose from over 70 new courses designed to help beginners become experts--plus a brand new selection of advanced level courses for experts and professionals to hone their skills. You'll also enjoy new features like the how-to guides, the Campus Pub, special offers, and an updated design. It's now easier than ever to navigate, browse, enroll, and learn! Here's just a sample of the latest additions to the Catalog: * Dynamic HTML * Internet Advertising * Implementing Extranets * Marketing Your Site for Free * Building Internet Communities * Security on the Web * Advanced Photoshop * Build a Web Application with Oracle Webserver * Essentials of Microsoft Networking * Advanced Javascript * and many more! Learn more about ZDNet University, the Web's leading source for high-tech education. Drop by right now to tour the campus on the Web to learn more about how ZDU works: http://www4.zdnet.com/chkpt/zdna970922001/www.zdu.com _________________________________________________________________ ZDNet Announcements are periodic notices of new features, special events and free offers available to members of ZDNet. --To subscribe to ZDNet Announcements, please send mail to: announce-on(a)lists.zdnet.com You can leave the subject and body blank. --To unsubscribe to ZDNet Announcements, please send mail to: announce-off(a)lists.zdnet.com You can leave the subject and body blank. _________________________________________________________________ Powered by InfoBeat: http://www.infobeat.com

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Crypto articles in New York Times Cybertimes web site
by Martin Minow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There are several interesting articles in today's (Sep 24) New York Times "Cybertimes" web page. <http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/092497encrypt.html> has an overview and links to other articles. (This is a free page for USA sites, but requires a login and password.) Martin Minow minow(a)apple.com

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NYT cybertimes article excerpt.
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

quoted without permission - I think this is fair use... btw, the NY Times site is pretty good. While a registration and email address are needed, I have not seen any sign of abuse of this information (yet). ----------------------------------------- start quote In fact, Kerrey's legislation could easily create the largest bureaucracy ever -- by some estimates requiring more record keeping than all the states' departments of motor vehicles, the Internal Revenue Service and the various welfare agencies combined. While no one knows how Congress or the FBI intends to carry out key-recovery legislation, it is entirely possible that anyone installing a piece of software on a hard drive will need to register it like people now register a car with the Department of Motor Vehicles. While most people own only one car and file only one tax return a year, many computer users have multiple copies of programs like Quicken, Notes or Power Point. Each could require a separate registration if it includes encryption features -- and many users will be shocked to discover what qualifies as encryption, which is becoming increasingly common even in trivial programs like games because it is a good way to regulate copyright infringement. [...] One Congressional staff member who participated in drafting the legislation but asked not to be identified conceded that the bill would force developers of new software to seek approval for their products from the United States government even if the products did not explicitly include encryption features. Such approval would be the only -> way to escape prosecution, he said. While admitting that -> this language would add a six- to nine-month delay in -> releasing new products, the staff member asserted that the -> computer industry would simply have to build this time into -> product development cycles. end quote -------------------------------------- This "Congressional staff member" is clearly a ninth-dan black belt ninja of cluelessness. Add 6-9 months to SW development cycles? Prior restraint on SW publication? The mind boggles. Anyone who maintains that the convenience of law enforcement should be the over-riding factor in the organization of our society has, in my opinion, lost the right to call themselves an "American." Peter Trei trei(a)process.com DISCLAIMER: My opinons. No one elses.

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The CipherSaber Manifesto
by Arnold G. Reinhold 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In George Lucas' Star Wars trilogy, Jedi Knights were expected to make their own Light Sabers. The message was clear: a warrior confronted by a powerful empire bent on totalitarian control must be self-reliant. As we face a real threat of a ban on the distribution of strong cryptography -- in the United States and possibly world-wide -- we must emulate the Jedi masters by teaching people how to build strong cryptography programs all by themselves. If this can be done, strong cryptography will become impossible to suppress. While cryptographers like to wallow in the complexity of their art, the basic elements of a strong cryptographic system are quite simple and well known in the programming community. By choosing a simple but strong cipher that is already widely published and agreeing on how to use it, anyone with elementary programming skills will be able to write their own program without relying on any products that can be banned. CipherSaber-1 (CS1) uses Ron Rivest's RC4 algorithm as published in the second edition of Bruce Schneier's Applied Cryptography. RC4 is widely respected and used in a number of products, including SSL. With a long enough key RC4 is considered strong and it is also extraordinarily easy to explain and to reproduce. As Schneier says, "The algorithm is so simple that most programmers can quickly code it from memory." Implementations of RC4 are available on the Internet but it is actually easier to write your own version. The legal status of RC4 is the subject of some controversy. The RSA division of Security Dynamics still considers RC4 confidential and proprietary. It is not patented and, to the extent that Schneier is correct (and no one doubts him), it is not confidential. However, anyone wishing to build a commercial product using CipherSaber might find it cost-effective, as well as polite, to obtain a license from RSA. Apologies to Prof. Rivest for suggesting individuals use his invention without his consent. If there were another strong algorithm so singularly suitable, CipherSaber would have used it. CipherSaber-1 is a symmetric-key file encryption system. Messaging takes place by attaching binary files to e-mail. Because CipherSaber uses a stream cipher, an initialization vector must be used to prevent the same cipher key from being used twice. In encrypted CipherSaber-1 files, a ten byte initialization vector precedes the coded data. For decryption, the initialization vector is read from the file and appended to the user key before the key setup step. CipherSaber-1 can be implemented in 16 lines of QBasic (38 individual Basic statements). The source code is short enough for tee-shirts and coffee mugs. But there is no need to distribute source code at all. CipherSaber can be passed on by oral tradition, if necessary. Soapbox The U.S. Congress is considering legislation that would ban the domestic distribution of cryptographic products that do not provide for immediate government access to the plaintext of messages. This government access must be possible without the consent or even the knowledge of the message{s sender or recipient. The stated intent is to protect us from criminals and terrorists. The simplicity of CipherSaber should prove once and for all that the criminals and terrorists of this world will not be deprived of strong cryptography simply because the distribution of unapproved products is banned. They can get the necessary technology to make their own from existing publications whenever they feel they need it. Another goal of CipherSaber is to demonstrate that strong cryptography cannot be banned without severe restrictions on freedom of speech. Banning the sale of a complex computer program or even the multi-volume printed edition of PGP source code may seem acceptable to many people. Banning the simple instructions needed for CipherSaber will require the starkest abridgment of the First Amendment. Finally, CipherSaber can be a useful pedagogical tool, helping to educate students by presenting them with a real-world programming problem that has both technical and ethical dimensions. Teachers of computer science and authors of books on programming should consider including CipherSaber as an exercise in their courses and texts. CipherSaber in some sense parallels the time honored doctrine of jury nullification, where jurors simply refuse to convict persons of violating laws that the jurors determine are unreasonable or unjust. Similarly technologists may take lawful steps as individuals to prevent their work from being used to build a totalitarian infrastructure. It is not that the present U.S. Government is evil -- it may well be the most benign government in history. But once the technology for totalitarian control is in place, this or any government will inexorably use it more and more. And that technology is coming together with alarming rapidity. George Orwell{s novel 1984 is not science fiction, it is just one more high tech product plan that missed its original delivery date. So what is CipherSaber? CipherSaber-1 is a simple use of existing technology: 1. The encryption algorithm is RC4 as published in the beginning of Chapter 17 of Applied Cryptography, Second Edition, by Bruce Schneier, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1996. RC4 is on page 397 in the English edition, ISBN 0-471-11709-9. 2. Each encrypted file consists of a ten byte initialization vector followed by the cipher text. A new random ten byte initialization vector should be created each time encryption is performed. 3. The cipher key, the array K(i) in Schneier's notation, consists of the user key, in the form of an Ascii text string, followed by the initialization vector. The above is all a programmer needs to know in order to write a program that can encipher and decipher CipherSaber-1 files. Explanation of CipherSaber-1 features The user key is a text string, rather than a hex value, because humans are more likely to be able to memorize a text string with sufficient entropy. To leave room for the initialization vector, the length of the user key must be less than 246 bytes. A user key with a minimum of 15 random letters or 6 short words selected at random from a dictionary should be used for medium security (70 bit entropy). For higher security use 20 random letters or seven random words. (90 bit entropy). Any unique values can be used for initialization vector, but use of random values makes encrypted files indistinguishable from random noise. Note that the initialization vector is not kept secret. The random number generation used to make the initialization vector does not have to be particularly strong. The "rand" functions in most programming environments will suffice for a moderate number of messages, provided the function is seeded in some non-deterministic way, such as using the system clock. For file encryption, a user need only memorize one key or passphrase. For messaging, users need to exchange pairs of keys through some secure means, most likely in person. Maintaining a list of correspondent{s keys or passphrases in a master file, preferably encrypted, is less convenient than public key encryption. But it may be all that is left in a few years if PGP key servers are banned. It may even be possible to teach a manual version of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, perhaps using large number calculators (easily built in Java 1.1). The D-H procedure need be carried out just once per pair of correspondents, since CipherSaber eliminates the need to exchange keys for every message. Users can, of course, add features of their own to CipherSaber programs. For example a secure diary system that stored files in CipherSaber would be easy to write in Java or Visual Basic. However it is important to keep CipherSaber itself simple so everyone can write a program that will read and write CipherSaber files. CipherSaber programs can be easily written in almost any programming language. The Basic language, which used to come with all DOS based computers, is suitable. It can still be found on the Windows {95 CD-ROM in the OTHER\OLDMSDOS directory. Just copy QBASIC.EXE and QBASIC.HLP to your hard drive{s DOS directory and you can start programming. Macintosh users can download the free Chipmunk Basic interpreter from the Internet. Begin by writing a program that can copy binary files byte by byte and then test it thoroughly before you add the encryption algorithm. Become a CipherKnight To popularize CipherSaber, a "gif" file, encrypted using CipherSaber, has been posted on the Internet at http://ciphersaber.gurus.com/cknight.cs1 This file, when decoded, can be printed as a CipherKnight wall certificate. The certificate may be displayed by persons who met certain criteria, including writing the program that decrypted the certificates. Here are the honor-system-enforced rules: CipherKnight requirements 1. Write you own CipherSaber program. 2. Write a letter to your political representative expressing your opinion (whatever it may be) of the proposed ban on the distribution of strong cryptography within the United States. 3. Download and install PGP, generate a key pair and post it to a public key server. 4. Use a CipherSaber to send an secret message to another person. 5. Decrypt and print the CipherSaber wall certificate using the CipherSaber program you wrote yourself. The key is: "ThomasJefferson" Any of the eligibility requirements above is waved if it illegal in the applicant's local jurisdiction or if the applicant reasonably believes carrying it out would place him or her in danger. Test Files The following files are provided on the CipherSaber web site, http://ciphersaber.gurus.com, to help you check your work. cstest1.cs1 This is a short text file encrypted with "asdfg" as the user key. Here are the contents of cstest1.cs1 in hex, in case you cannot download the file for some reason: 6f 6d 0b ab f3 aa 67 19 03 15 30 ed b6 77 ca 74 e0 08 9d d0 e7 b8 85 43 56 bb 14 48 e3 7c db ef e7 f3 a8 4f 4f 5f b3 fd cstest2.cs1 This text file was CipherSaber-1 encrypted with the key "SecretMessageforCongress" Remember that keys are case sensitive. cknight.cs1 This file is encrypted with the key "ThomasJefferson" It contains your CipherKnight wall certificate as a .gif file. chalng.cs1 chalng.cs1 is a text file encrypted with CipherSaber-1 and a secret key. A reward of $100 will be paid to anyone who can decipher this file. Spread the Word "It is the common fate of the indolent to see their rights become prey to the active. The condition upon which God hath given liberty to man is eternal vigilance." John Philpot Curran, 1790 Even if the proposed ban on strong cryptography does not become law this year, it is important that CipherSaber be distributed as widely as possible throughout North America. Please help in any legal way you can. Arnold G. Reinhold Cambridge, Massachusetts arnold(a)iecc.com http://ciphersaber.gurus.com September 23, 1997 - ------------------------------------------ Ascii key+ || 08d0a5d961603380e2949d682c 10 Byte IV || bfe8da5c1dec3aba9725d4f689 Ron's No.4 || 40761763d4d38935e8bd8a44bf All u need ==== 4656a7bd7f9ae5d082a30cdfa7 CipherSaber || f21a918d29c5917956d0468eaf - ------------------------------------------ Legal Notice CipherSaber programs may be subject to export controls in the United States, and many other countries and may be illegal altogether in some countries. Persons within the United States should not give copies of CipherSaber programs to foreign nationals, except for Canadian citizens, without a license. Persons traveling to other countries should familiarize themselves with local regulations. Consult a lawyer if you need legal advice. See the CipherSaber web site http://ciphersaber.gurus.com for additional notices. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBNClrG2truC2sMYShAQE6awQAsejPMAW+qYUZf7JXKXoL1XZl7Ebp7VPN 31yhKDmXFd8Ka9bss+HDwLSvMynigs/JmxzbGfVTc+Z1y5BqaqTqGcLcjHeEBnwb IVzLg9MsPs1MNytFpbay7m7ZKdGgbN4hIhM6kMF959Wk8oFeGfEDGWaC1/2GEJKt KHjU43k/A44= =bIlj -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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BXA TAC meeting in Portland yesterday
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As noted previously by John Young <http://www.jya.com/bxa082597.htm>, the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Export Administration's Technical Advisory Committee held a meeting yesterday in Portland, OR. C2Net paid for me to fly up to Portland and attend the meeting. The following are notes re what happened - It was difficult to determine precisely who is on the Committee and who isn't; the meeting room had a table with seats for (approx) 15 people; at that table were seated approx. 10 people who were representing hardware/software manufacturers, law firms, 2 people from BXA, two "special guests" from European companies (whose names I didn't recognize), and two "special guests" from Japanese companies - Susumi Hirai for Sony, and Kobashi Toduchi for NEC. (apologies for the spelling re Japanese names, those are my guesses at the correct spellings, but I bet they're wrong.) There were seats in an "audience section" for another 30 people, all of which were occupied. Among the companies represented (either in the audience or on the committee) were Tektronix, Boeing, Dept of Energy, Motorola, Intel, Rockwell, Novell, McDonnell-Douglas, Boeing, Cisco, and Sun, and C2Net. The attorney who spoke at a Cypherpunks meeting this spring re export control was there, don't know if he was there on behalf of PGP and/or other clients. (arrgh, didn't write his name down because I remembered it, now I can't remember it.) There was an attorney representing a consortium of manufacturers. The meeting opened with a short summary/discussion of current events - this part produced the most information relevant to crypto and export control issues. Eileen at BXA (didn't get her last name), who seems to be in charge of drafting regulations and granting/denying export licenses, said that they've been slow recently re actions on crypto-related licenses because they're understaffed, but they have recently hired 10 people to process crypto-related applications, 8 of whom are in public-contact positions. She said that they don't have a technical background, but are considered policy analysts; that they've been receiving technical training from "other agencies", but their technical training (and their ability to get straight to work) has been hampered by the slowness of getting security clearances for them. 2 of the 10 have already been cleared/approved. She said that they've been learning about the "history of encryption". The public-contact positions will each handle a section of the alphabet - so, for example, the first person will handle export applications from individuals/companies with names starting from A through F, and so on. Eileen said that they have been circulating a new draft of encryption regulations relating to/concerning financial institutions; a draft of it was apparently circulated (I think) to a closed-session meeting of the Committee previously. One of the committee members asked her for a ballpark estimate of the date when those regs will be released for public comment, and she deferred, saying that there were "so many agencies" that had to look at them that it was too difficult to guess. Apparently, the most difficult/controversial part of these regulations concerns the definition of a financial institution (FI); she said that they've been granting licenses to applicants who are clearly FI's, and that organizations who think that they might qualify as an FI should write to BXA and request an advisory letter or opinion letter about whether or not they qualify. She also said that they've been drafting and circulating export regulations designed to implement the Wassenaar Arrangement; they've been circulating inter-agency. She said that they anticipate having the final draft finished at the end of this week or the beginning of next week, at which point it'll be sent to the Federal Register for publication; and that FR publication will take 2 more weeks, so these ought to be available to the public sometime in mid-October. She also noted that BXA has been relatively inactive with respect to enforcement actions re cryptography, but that the enforcement/compliance section of BXA has also made new hires, and that they anticipate ramping up enforcement. 5-6 people from the enforcement section were at the meeting (turns out I sat right next to them) but they all left at 10 AM for another meeting - among them a DOC/BXA attorney I recognized from the Bernstein hearings. After that, the committee spent approx. 2 hours discussing nonproliferation controls (related to nuclear/biological/chemical weapons) - I didn't bother with a lot of notes about that, since it's not especially interesting to me right now. There was a lot of discussion about how difficult it is to determine whether or not an export is allowed or not - as I understand the regs it's not permissible to export *anything* which will be used in aid of producing N/B/C weapons, even otherwise unassuming things like lightbulbs or ballpoint pens or carpeting or whatever. (I don't know much about this area of export law, so please don't take my impressions as especially informative, haven't done reading/research re this and I may be full of shit. caveat emptor.) Everyone who doesn't work for the government expressed frustration re the difficulty of figuring out how much effort they need to put into tracking down the ultimate user(s) and purpose(s) of otherwise innocuous exports - the BXA folks weren't very helpful, pointing out that they're going to exercise their discretion not to enforce/punish exporters who really weren't at fault, but that there were no hard and fast rules available, either. The discussion here reminded me very much of recent testimony by the Commerce Dept before Congress - they're more concerned with intelligence (collecting data re who's buying what, in what quantities, and when) than they are with preventing people from gaining access to goods. There was also some discussion about foreign implementations of crypto export controls and Wassenaar - apparently Jim Lewis (the name isn't familiar to me) and David Aaron are currently in London, lobbying re crypto export control/key escrow, and a delegation will go to France, Bonn, and Tel Aviv later this month on a similar mission. One speaker said that he expects the UK to adopt controls re "intangible" items - by this he seemed to mean control over the export of "technical data" and "technical assistance" related to controlled items, similar to the US' control over providing data/information/assistance to foreigners related to export-controlled items. It was also noted that there are a lot of "informal contacts" in the UK between universities and employers and the visa office, such that the UK has been able to control some access by foreign people to technical data and information, by refusing them a visa or otherwise making their desires clear to the people in the UK who they expect would have contact with the foreign person. Re Japan, it was noted that Japan began enforcing much stricter export controls at the end of 1996, shortly after NTI developed a 3DES chip; MITI (Japan's "technology" ministry? perhaps someone can provide more data here) has concluded that exports of crypto stronger than 56 bits should be subject to strict export control. Japan does not have a "general license" scheme, whereby some products are generally considered eligible for export, which would apply to crypto - apparently all exports equire a license. About 100 Japanese companies have applied for or been granted (couldn't tell from the context) export licenses for crypto. Japan does not have special "financial institution" exceptions to its crypto export control laws; but it does implement the "mass market software" exception for crypto which is part of the Wassenaar Arrangement. There was some discussion re crypto export control in the EU; the speakers noted that crypto control laws apply to GSM phones, which (potentially) would have made them non-portable across national borders, which everyone (including governments) thought was a stupid result, so GSM phones are (formally? informally? couldn't tell) exempt from the export control laws. Similarly, it is now legal to have/use crypto on a laptop for personal use; at one time, this was not the case, but large companies' policy was that crypto should be used anyway, regardless of the export control laws. EU countries are also (apparently) writing the "mass market software" exception to the WA's control over crypto into their regulations; one speaker commented that the EU countries are "working on" key recovery. (the term used was "key escrow"). The consensus of the speakers seemed to be that the TTP/key escrow draft legislation for the UK is effectively dead, due to the shift in power to Labor. It was also noted that the Walsh Report re crypto in Australia recommends that purchasers of crypto equipment in Australia avoid depending solely on US-based sources for crypto, because of the danger that the US may implement mandatory key recovery. I'm on the mailing list to get formal minutes from the meeting, but that can apparently take up to 90 days. The next meeting will be 12/9/97 in D.C.. -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | Export jobs, not crypto. http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | http://www.parrhesia.com

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cancel subscription
by DONN CARROLL 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please cancel my sbscription to the encription letter. there are to many. Donn, syzygy(a)mymail.net

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What is a crypto product. Was [nobody@replay.com: Re: "priorproducts"]
by Martin Minow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(I've changed the list from coderpunks to cypherpunks, as this is getting off-topic for the former list.) At 12:48 AM -0500 9/17/97, Black Unicorn wrote: > >This brings up interesting coding implications. What is a "cryptographic >product" and to what extent can key generation be seperated from the >definition. To what extent do we want it to be? > I would say that a "cryptographic product" is any [insert patent lawyer language here] that can be used to encrypt or decrypt a message, and a "key" (the thing you escrow) is the mechanism by which a message is converted between plaintext and encrypted text. (Note, then, that I am including both halves of a public key pair.) By this, admittedly devil's advocate, reasoning, the sender would have to escrow the actual session key, not just the private key that the receiver uses to recover the session key. After all, if you use PGP to encrypt a message using a public key -- and don't possess the corresponding private key -- you couldn't read your own message, but my reading of the law is that the government still must have immediate access to the plaintext. Martin Minow minow(a)apple.com

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