December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Receiving Messages Anonymously
by pdh＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Receiving anonymous messages is still an open problem. The solutions we have so far are cumbersome to operate. They also depend on a chain of machines remaining up and reliable for a long time, which is expensive. A quick solution is to use the list to send anonymous messages. It is inexpensive to tell if a message is encrypted for a key you control so it is cheap to find messages you can read. The nice thing about this solution is that it is quite difficult to make a complete list of cypherpunk recipients given the multi-rooted "tree" structure of the list. There are leaves in many countries. Even if every wire were tapped and tracked, it would be hard to guarantee that people were not moving list traffic around on diskettes. To make filtering easy for people, I would suggest adding an "X-Private-Message" field to the header. For PGP messages, the contents of this field could be "PGP-Key-Id:0xDEADBEEF". (New formats can be invented as new protocols are invented.) Some people will object to this new form of "noise" message. It should be easy for somebody to set up a subsetted version of the list which pre-filters the private messages. (Although, how anybody can read the raw list without a filter of their own is a mystery to me.) A good reason to receive the complete list is that it conceals the fact that you are receiving (or not receiving) anonymous messages. If you think you might ever in the future receive an anonymous message, this will allow you to do so without revealing it. This scheme could be attacked by actively intervening with the propagation of the list and supplying people with different messages depending on which branch of the "tree" they are on. This could be used successively to narrow the list of "suspects" receiving a certain message. There are two ways to prevent this. One is to receive the list from more than one source and compare the messages received. If many people are doing this, which is likely since each has a strong motivation to detect this attack, then the first attempts should be detected immediately. The other method is to have a trusted person post a signed list of message ids and checksums that have come down the wire every day. (Acknowledgement: This is probably a rehash of BlackNet.) Peter

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McVeigh Sentence
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was watching Dateline NBC interview the McVeigh jurors about the trial and the interviewer asked them what they found to be the strongest or most convincing evidence against McVeigh. A grandmotherly type answered that the most convincing of the evidence against him was the pictures of the dead bodies. Perhaps the prosecution could have gotten McVeigh convicted on even more charges if he had shown some pictures of heroin. I also watched McVeigh's lawyer give a statement that sounded like it was prepared for him by the Whitehouse spin doctors. From the very first, right through to the end of the trial, I had the feeling that McVeigh's lawyer seemed to be more of a spokesperson than a lawyer. I've had lawyers show more skill and ferver in keeping my dog out of the pound than he showed defending McVeigh. I don't know what exactly he was being paid $15 million for, but it sure as hell wasn't for defending McVeigh. Even when he speaks about the judge not allowing him to put on a real defense he acts like it's just a minor matter of no real import. The only mystery in the trial was whether McVeigh was part of the great pretense taking place or if he really thought his lawyer was working in his best interests. I suspect that he's just naieve. I wouldn't place any large bets on MvVeigh living long enough to take part in an Oklahoma City trial if that ever happens. The political interests down there want more than just a showcase trial--they want to find out the real story. Unless they get bought off or blackmailed the Feds are going to have to bring Jack Ruby out of retirement. TruthMonger

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RE: Digiweb.com's Movie Boys
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Brad Shantz <BradS(a)TRIsource.com> writes: > I already sent them the statutes against junk faxes (currently the only > real spam-killer we have available), and reported them to a number of > different agencies including the CAUCE. Check out www.cauce.org for > more information. This thread had nothing to do with crypto and has taken more time and effort to delete than the original troll. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: [IMPORTANT] Accounts payable
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy C. May styles his facial hair to look more like pubic hair. .oooO Oooo. ( ) _ _ ( ) \ ( / ) ( \ ) / ----\_)-/ (---) \-(_/---- Timmy C. May ( ) ( ) oooO Oooo

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PGP for Windows 95
by Silvakow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone yet checked out PGP for Windows 95? It's $50 at stores right now. Information from pgp.com, but I want to know more before I buy it. Is it worth it? Should I stick with PGP for DOS? And does anyone know if those PGP public keys are compatible with DOS PGP? |[(*+- Silvakow -+*)]|

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Re: PGP for Windows 95
by Arunas Norvaisa 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 08:55 AM 97.06.17 +0000, Silvakow wrote (and I quoted): > >Has anyone yet checked out PGP for Windows 95? It's $50 at stores >right now. Information from pgp.com, but I want to know more before >I buy it. Is it worth it? Should I stick with PGP for DOS? And >does anyone know if those PGP public keys are compatible with DOS >PGP? What d'ya mean??? PGP 5.0 is much more (not USD 50 in any case); freeware PGP (latest version 2.6.2 for USA and 2.6.3i outside US) is working just fine in MS-Dos shell under windoze'95... If you mean specific shell (what I doubt), it's not PGP itself and you'll still will get those dos windows anyway... -- greetz... Arunas Norvaisa - little guy, The Masses Inc. <mailto:arunas@post1.com> with subject: 'send key' to get PGP key PGP for idiots page <http://www.a-vip.com/an> and a mirror site <http://www.post1.com/~arunas> Programming Department: Mistakes made while you wait.

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Recipient Anonymity
by ghio＠temp0097.myriad.ml.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A group of servers collects messages of equal length for anonymous recipients. All servers exchange messages so that each has copies of all messages. A recipient wishes to retrieve a message from the servers without any server knowing which message he is receiving. The recipient selects a group of n servers. From each server, S_1...S_n-1, he requests a random selection of messages, with a 50% probability that any particular message will be selected. The server returns the xor of all messages requested. He sends the final server a request which is the xor of all the previous requests and the one single message that he wants. The xor of all the responses is the desired message. It is impossible to determine which message was received unless all servers collude. A variant of this scheme where there is only one server and a number of anonymizing proxies will also work, however in this case there must be sufficient delay to obscure the time correlations or the server will know which message was received, and collusion with any one of the proxies could reveal the recipient. It is also possible to eliminate the need for real-time communication and operate the system on a store-and-forward network. The recipient generates a one time pad and sends it to a remailer/messageserver along with a reply-block which is a nested series of encrypted message requests and next-hop addresses. Each remailer along the way xors the requested messages onto the existing message data before forwarding it to the next hop. When the recipient gets his message back, he decrypts it using the one time pad. To account for the situation where first and last remailer collude, it is desireable to have some of the intervening remailers apply a stream cipher to the message using a supplied key. The server-to-server broadcast eliminates the need for cover traffic, but the anonymizing proxy system does not. However, there is no reason that both schemes could not be used concurrently in the same network, and in fact they would look the same to the end-user. Except for the additional server-to-server communications necessary to broadcast new messages into the system, the bandwidth utilization is comparable to sender-anonymous remailers; it scales linearly as the number of parties involved in the delivery of a particular message. The failure rate is also the product of the failure rate for each server; if one server delivers corrupt data, the message is unreadable, and the recipient must identify the bad server and eliminate it from future requests.

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signup
by Karl Deardorff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

signup

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New PGP Key
by Mike Duvos 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Just a brief note to say that I have generated a new 1024 bit PGP key for my new ISP, zipcon.net. I have signed this key with itself, and with my Netcom key. Unlike my Netcom key, whose passphrase is only typed when I am alone with my PC, the Zipcon key will be used on a multi-user Linux system for signing posts and other such things, and will not be secure against having its passphrase sniffed. Feel free to use the Zipcon key for casual commuication, but "Eyes Only" stuff should ONLY be encrypted with the Netcom key. - -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ enoch(a)zipcon.com $ via Finger $ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBM6b9g8A6o0SuPU79AQGF9gP+MhGUUv6dL6T6gETgujfI61s52AFzrO8a /akS0492PdLoGLMvKbco+icnkQ6BQyJQw2lrV3G3mghQxXOBpJojW8z5mxD/eTUm QpaTO+AxiEnEQQcWb5X9PGGlJ/LLiJIo3Tc99DJhTIYgSTIkgNtYD7IgvAhziMwr jMHQjq9R/j8= =3UMb -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzOm9YkAAAEEANXQ12uCbPMlbON1kwbHfaLZ79MaSQCmB1AJ399gmt6LhYR5 aWtbeuRzDw1m5lF0hDveWDga1WG9PY7WQ0nq/W+Ww9SrrTPCI055rUW5RcAeKUNS Y6udUoCojMRT5bHMi/7CUm3OYtCw2T9DAE9NerOJ8IVpusqeVMA6o0SuPU79AAUR tB1NaWtlIER1dm9zIDxlbm9jaEB6aXBjb24ubmV0PokAlQMFEDOmlcY1TNKt+Wg9 AQEBKygD/ih1A1mjYcq8mrMmcBgDIAzu3RCbBv/uYGRXXherjKhrpdvHNTzd/LFF Z/Akg3owYhMJbHa9cbu4pCe1U+YgmGWqrsoXsuF87KrwUoO/HYI6ggosRhMazhdT 0H/zudqIMlyxXwLZqMiGI5XEkyHmkX4Jodh+SC7u7i1SjWTvYhCziQCVAwUQM6b1 8sA6o0SuPU79AQF+XAQAxKBswtbUe1/dforndHQ0+Fh6oRjdrfod3X/UQp3WIO+t cdSd0Vk2zVklECSV/vDjwEI46W9ZK/LVWhLuxVsGNJOnEYUFHfm89QIA7h8BkiIf iwRYdbrA32mHiogyy552Rq2YMOtQxa5T0/LrNSgOesXNV1UYBNC7bLkj3iA7gag= =f3h5 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Anon E-mail article in WSJ
by Alan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In today's (06/18/97) Wall Street Journal there is an article on Anonymous e-mail in the corporate environment. Talks about companies who have set up systems to recieve anonymous e-mail from employees to deal with specific situations in the workplace. Interesting stuff and very positive. (A few negatives were listed, but more as sidenotes than anything.) Page B-1 has the article. This time I will be making a copy... alano(a)teleport.com | "Those who are without history are doomed to retype it."

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