December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: c2 internet accounts
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, On Tue, 28 Jan 1997, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: > does c2net still offer internet accounts? I liked their > offer for internet accounts with a 5 mb web site via > telnet. does anyone else know of a place for cheap > telnet only accounts? C2Net no longer offers new shell accounts and we are phasing out pre-existing accounts. We still offer virtual web hosting. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: can Sun Tzu be a cypherpunks?
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

nobody(a)nowhere.com wrote: > Question: Can cypherpunks use these methods to defeat those > who would take our freedom? WARNING! "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" Is A Very Dangerous Document ------------------------------------------------------------------- It is reputed among many of the top minds in the Computer Industry to be a very real, and revealing, documentary of some of the horrors of the Industry which are sometimes rumored, but seldom exposed. But be warned-they say it in private, not in public. Though management at the major Corporations in the Industry brush aside the document as the mad ramblings of an unstable, failed business executive, the fact remains that there are more and more people coming forward who claim to have suffered demotions or loss of employment after deliberately or inadvertently revealing their support of the document's claims and it's authenticity. If you choose to read this manuscript, do not speak of it in casual conversation at your place of employment, or around strangers in any business or social environment. Though it is almost impossible to document cases of reprisal of this nature, the increasing numbers of ex-employees of major Corporations in the Computer Industry making these claims, and the devastating consequences they allege to their professional and private lives, make it wise to be discreet in expressing any opinion, or even knowledge, of this document. If you choose to share this document with others, it would be wise to do so discreetly, even anonymously, should you be unsure of the reliability and discretion of whomever you choose to share this knowledge with. Though I personally lean toward viewing the manuscript as authentic, my exhaustive research into it's origin has always come to a dead-end, even among the principals involved. C.J. Parker, former President of Pearl Harbor Computers, Inc., denied emphatically, in a face-to-face encounter with anything whatsoever to do with the document. When I pressed him with questions regarding the hasty demise of his business and the unraveling of his personal life after the public circulation of "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" began, he became very agitated and distraught, bordering on violence, and the interview was abruptly terminated. Dr. William M. Denney, one of the few principals in the manuscript referred to directly, was reluctant to be interviewed, but eventually made a few comments which I found to be very revealing. Dr. Denney, Vice-President of Basis, Inc. in Emmeryville, Ca., consistently rated as one of the top ten Unix Open Systems vendors in the world, said, "I deny any knowledge of or participation, in any way whatsoever, with anything connected to 'The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre', and it would be wise for others to do the same." I find this statement to be very cryptic and, at the same time, very revealing; very much in line with what would expect from one associated with the alleged underground computer society described in the manuscript. As for Mr. Torry Basford, a former employee of Bell Labs who was Mr. Parker's first mentor in the world of Unix and is rumored to be laboring in obscurity in a small community college somewhere in the southwestern U.S., Mr. Parker would only say, "The man has suffered enough, please leave him alone." Regardless of the origins or authenticity of the document, it is considered by many to be extremely unsettling, perhaps even dangerous, and one might be better served to avoid reading the manuscript, if for no other reason than simple peace of mind. ___________________________________ If you would like a copy of the manuscript, send me a private email indicating a desire to receive it. Toto

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Re: Fighting the cybercensor
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Phillip M. Hallam-Baker wrote: > > > > jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> wrote in article <5ch9f2$cuu(a)life.ai.mit.edu>... > > > Look, I've proposed what I consider to be a remarkably consistent method to > > prevent the kind of political tyranny that you criticize, and I don't see > > any recognition of this fact. > > Thats because its a whacko solution that has no credibility > or consistency. > > If anyone tried to set up such a market and a price went out > on any of the heads of state fantasized about Mr Bell would be > dead as a doornail in a week. But, if Jim writes the bot well, puts it in an unknown place (remember, all communications are done through remailers), he could die, but the assassination bot would still work. It may be an interesting problem: what steps are necessary to take to provide for the bot maintainers' sudden death in such a way that the bot would survive for a long time (at least 10 years) w/o any maintenance? Several things need to be done, such as running several versions of the bot so that they could all communicate and work as hot standbys in case one of the instances stops communicating; change their anonymous address from time to time to deal with shut down remailers; probably slowly propagate as virii, so that killing them all would be hard; what else? It could be done akin to Thompson's famous backdoor in /bin/login, as a perpetual trojan horse. How to prevent the bot's detection by sysadmins? - Igor.

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Recovery of Windows NT administrator password
by Garrard 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An inherited Windows NT system that I am involved with has a lost administrator password ( no one no longer knows what it is ). Can anyone point me to software products/companies that can help in the recovery. Given Microsoft's dismal record on security I am sure there must be solutions to this dilemma. Any help would be greatly appreciated. Best Regards David L. Garrard

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Physical meet, Sat. Feb. 15 - not 18.
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, I apparently didn't pay much attention to what month I was looking at when I made the initial meeting. Turns out the 18th is a Tuesday obviously a day that few of us can make. As a result I looked at the 'real' Feb. calendar and the meeting date is as follows: Saturday, Feb. 15, 1997 6pm. HEB Central Market Restaurant Look for the red 2nd. ed. Applied Cryptography book For more info email 'austin-cpunks(a)ssz.com' Also invited to this meet are members of the mailing lists: Experimental Science Instrumentation Advanced Computer Experimentation Sorry for the confusion. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

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Re: Best Computer School?
by Rick Osborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:32 PM 1/28/97 -0500, Derek Atkins wrote: >This is really exagerating. You do not need a 4.0, 1600, etc. to be >admitted to MIT. Sure, you need good grades, but a 3.6 average and >1350-1400 SAT scores is perfectly adequate to be admitted to MIT. I disagree and can speak from experience. I was denied admission to MIT even thought I had a 3.82 GPA, 1440 SAT (one try), and had taken 9 AP tests with two 5's, four 4's, two 3's, and one 2. As for being well-rounded, I was on several academic teams, sang in Chorus, acted and stage managed in Drama, and played Tennis. The only thing I didn't have that the next MIT applicant had was money. I made the mistake of letting them know that I was dirt poor and would need full aid/grants/etc, and to quote "The Great Escape" it was "Zzzt! To the Russian front!" >For what it's worth, I wanted to go to MIT my sophomore year in high >school, too Lucky you. It had been a dream of mine since I was an annoying overachiever of 6. Sux to be white trash, I guess. MIT may be a great school, but they tend to be snooty assholes for the most part. (DISCLAIMER: Not all MIT grads/attendees are necessarily "snooty assholes", I'm just saying that I've yet to meet one that wasn't.) _________ o s b o r n e @ g a t e w a y . g r u m m a n . c o m _________ "He who knows, does not speak. He who speaks, does not know."

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CNN: Court ok's College control of Internet access
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Note: Heavily edited. Forwarded message: > COURT SAYS COLLEGES CAN RESTRICT INTERNET ACCESS > > > January 28, 1997 > Web posted at: 1:35 p.m. EST > > NORMAN, Oklahoma (CNN) -- A U.S. District Court in Oklahoma has > ruled universities have the right to limit access to explicit > material on the Internet. > > A federal judge ruled University of Oklahoma president David Boren, > a former U.S. senator, has every right to determine what sites > students and faculty can view while on the campus Internet system. > > Boren was sued by University professor, Bill Loving, who claimed his > First Amendment rights were being infringed upon. > > The court ruled against Loving, also an attorney, saying his > constitutional rights were not violated and that he is not entitled > to injunctive relief. > > "I am certainly pleased by the judge's decision," Boren said. "The > university did its best to strike a careful balance in order to > protect legitimate academic and intellectual freedom while at the > same time assuring that the university not act as a distributor of > obscene material, which is not protected by the First Amendment." > rule

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Re: Best Computer School?
by Matthew Toth 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

MIT is one the best schools in the country for C.S. Close behind is Carnegie Mellon University (C.M.U.) in Pittsburgh, PA. (the folks who put out CERT.) Not sure how much Crypto they do, though.

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Re: Machine readable form (was:RE: [DES] DES Key Recovery Project, Progress Report #7)
by Phil Karn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Read the following text from the introduction to the new December 30, 1996 regulations: A printed book or other printed material setting forth encryption source code is not itself subject to the EAR (see Sec. 734.3(b)(2)). However, notwithstanding Sec. 734.3(b)(2), encryption source code in electronic form or media (e.g., computer diskette or CD ROM) remains subject to the EAR (see Sec. 734.3(b)(3)). The administration continues to review whether and to what extent scannable encryption source or object code in printed form should be subject to the EAR and reserves the option to impose export controls on such software for national security and foreign policy reasons. This seems clear enough. If it's printed on paper, it's kosher for export. But if we're really overt about it, we may goad the government into attempting to control printed source code as well. That could prove most interesting. Phil

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Last nail for US crypto export policy?
by Ian Goldberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

EXPORTABLE CRYPTOGRAPHY TOTALLY INSECURE: CHALLENGE CIPHER BROKEN IMMEDIATELY January 28, 1997 - Ian Goldberg, a UC Berkeley graduate student, announced today that he had successfully cracked RSA Data Security Inc.'s 40-bit challenge cipher in just under 3.5 hours. RSA challenged scientists to break their encryption technology, offering a $1000 award for breaking the weakest version of the code. Their offering was designed to stimulate research and practical experience with the security of today's codes. The number of bits in a cipher is an indication of the maximum level of security the cipher can provide. Each additional bit doubles the potential security level of the cipher. A recent panel of experts recommended using 90-bit ciphers, and 128-bit ciphers are commonly used throughout the world, but US government regulations restrict exportable US products to a mere 40 bits. Goldberg's announcement, which came just three and a half hours after RSA started their contest, provides very strong evidence that 40-bit ciphers are totally unsuitable for practical security. "This is the final proof of what we've known for years: 40-bit encryption technology is obsolete," Goldberg said. The US export restrictions have limited the deployment of technology that could greatly strengthen security on the Internet, often affecting both foreign and domestic users. "We know how to build strong encryption; the government just won't let us deploy it. We need strong encryption to uphold privacy, maintain security, and support commerce on the Internet -- these export restrictions on cryptography must be lifted," Goldberg explained. Fittingly, when Goldberg finally unscrambled the challenge message, it read: "This is why you should use a longer key." Goldberg used UC Berkeley's Network of Workstations (known as the NOW) to harness the computational resources of about 250 idle machines. This allowed him to test 100 billion possible "keys" per hour -- analogous to safecracking by trying every possible combination at high speed. This amount of computing power is available with little overhead cost to students and employees at many large educational institutions and corporations. Goldberg is a founding member of the ISAAC computer security research group at UC Berkeley. In the Fall of 1995, the ISAAC group made headlines by revealing a major security flaw in Netscape's web browser.

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