December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Now we know why they ban crypto...
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Lotus-FromDomain: BIONOMICS@INTERLIANT @ OUTBOUND From: "VitaminB"<VitaminB(a)bionomics.org> To: "DAILY DOSE"<DAILY_DOSE(a)maxager.com> Date: Fri, 26 Sep 1997 16:17:40 -0700 Subject: <<Vitamin B>>(September 26, 1997) Le Brain Drain Mime-Version: 1.0 Vitamin B: Your Daily Dose of Bionomics September 26, 1997 Le Brain Drain In the age just past, a nation's natural resources were the key to its success; today it is its intellectual capital. And with the world linked like never before, nations must nurture intellectual capital lest it walk away. But don't believe us. Ask our friend Olivier. When Olivier Cardic figured out that if his electronics company were based in England his 1995 net profit would have been $300,000, compared to just $80,000 in France, he decided to do what 1,000 French entrepreneurs have done already. Move. In the era of globalization, voting with your feet becomes a pretty easy stroll, especially when the country you're in is France. Consider this: British employers pay 10.2% of salaries in payroll taxes, compared with an insane 46% in France. According to Jean-Pierre Letouzet, president of RGA Systemes, a systems engineering company, "We live in a Marxist system. France has never been capitalist. We're not prepared for globalization, and we're sinking." Last year, Cardic asked French authorities on national radio to, "Explain to me why it is better to be unemployed in France than a worker in England?" The French authorities didn't have an answer for him. Neither do we. Source: _Business Week_, October 6, 1997 --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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S/MIME Crack? Beware press bearing incomplete stories
by Bruce Schneier 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What I did: write a Windows 95 screen saver that automatically brute forces 40-bit RC2 keys. The screen saver is has an easy interface, and parallizes nicely. What I didn't do: break S/MIME. I did not find any flaw in the S/MIME security specification. I did not find any flaw in any of the cryptographic algorithms used. I did not find any flaw in any software implementation of S/MIME. There is nothing wrong with the S/MIME standard. What I find, though, is that many S/MIME implementations don't interporate at anything stronger than 40-bit RC2. I find that the default encryption is 40-bit RC2, and the user isn't given any indication that the encryption level should be changed. 40-bit RC2 is weak. This is nothing new to anyone who reads the S/MIME specifications. In fact, the S/MIME specification is very forthcoming in discussing security of 40-bit RC2. > 2.6 ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier > > Receiving agents MUST support decryption and encryption using the RC2 > algorithm [RC2] at a key size of 40 bits, hereinafter called "RC2/40". > Receiving agents SHOULD support decryption using DES EDE3 CBC, > hereinafter called "tripleDES". > > Sending agents SHOULD support encryption with RC2/40 and tripleDES. Later in the spec, the following appears: > Before sending a message, the sending agent MUST decide whether it is > willing to use weak encryption for the particular data in the message. > If the sending agent decides that weak encryption is unacceptable for > this data, then the sending agent MUST NOT use a weak algorithm such > as RC2/40. The decision to use or not use weak encryption overrides > any other decision in this section about which encryption algorithm to > use. And even later: > 2.6.2.3 Rule 3: Unknown Capabilities, Risk of Failed Decryption > > If: > - the sending agent has no knowledge of the encryption capabilities > of the recipient, > - and the sending agent is willing to risk that the recipient may > not be able to decrypt the message, > then the sending agent SHOULD use tripleDES. > > 2.6.2.4 Rule 4: Unknown Capabilities, No Risk of Failed Decryption > > If: > - the sending agent has no knowledge of the encryption capabilities > of the recipient, > - and the sending agent is not willing to risk that the recipient > may not be able to decrypt the message, > then the sending agent MUST use RC2/40. And: > 2.6.3 Choosing Weak Encryption > > Like all algorithms that use 40 bit keys, RC2/40 is considered by many > to be weak encryption. A sending agent that is controlled by a human > SHOULD allow a human sender to determine the risks of sending data > using RC2/40 or a similarly weak encryption algorithm before sending > the data, and possibly allow the human to use a stronger encryption > method such as tripleDES. I wrote this screen saver not to trash S/MIME (even though the announcement was used by another company), but to 1) illustrate that 40-bit RC2 really is insecure, and 2) try to force companies who implement S/MIME to get DES and triple-DES to interoperate. I heard recently that RSADSI has said there is a triple-DES message on their website that can be understood by both Microsoft Internet Explorer and Netscape Communicator. I don't know about the message, but when I tried to get DES and triple-DES to interoperate a few months ago I couldn't. Bruce ********************************************************************** Bruce Schneier, President, Counterpane Systems Phone: 612-823-1098 101 E Minnehaha Parkway, Minneapolis,MN 55419 Fax: 612-823-1590 http://www.counterpane.com

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RE: Chutzpah! FBI Calls Privacy Extremists Elitist
by Fisher Mark 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I believe the enlightened Legislator who attempted to legislate Pi was >none other than Jesse Helms (although this could be a legislative >myth!) and when Ol'Jesse proposed it (because he was "sick of all these >egg-heads with their big numbers") John Glenn said something on the >order of ' if your legislation passes Senator, I wouldn't want to >driver over any bridges in your state!' Alas (according to my failing memory) it was legislator from my home state of Indiana during the early part of this century, who had planned to make a killing in textbooks if Pi == 3.0 was accepted. Fortunately he was called on it when it went before the whole legislature. I just have to wonder, how much of what we hear from various LEAs is due to the political desires of the people doing the talking -- I'd suspect that a majority of line officers (or the majority of those who are informed on the topic) would have something quite different to say. "In a confusing situation, follow the money. If there isn't any money, follow the power." Domestic crypto controls just fall _way_ too easily into the trap of increased state power (vs. the actual percentages of crimes whose investigations are impeded by crypto) to make me think that this is anything other than just a blatant political move on the part of the LEA managers. ========================================================== Mark Leighton Fisher Thomson Consumer Electronics fisherm(a)indy.tce.com Indianapolis, IN "Their walls are built of cannon balls, their motto is 'Don't Tread on Me'"

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ACLU opposes deviant Markey-White version of SAFE
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The House Commerce committee approved the deviant Markey-White amendments as a "compromise" package. Note: "It is now clear that any version of this bill will be used to attack domestic encryption protection." -Declan ----------- FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Contact: Emily Whitfield (212) 549-2566 Thursday, September 25, 1997 Phil Gutis (202) 675-2312 WASHINGTON -- Citing civil liberties concerns, the House Commerce Committee late yesterday overwhelmingly beat back an attempt by law enforcement to hijack what had been introduced as a pro-privacy encryption bill. The American Civil Liberties Union, which supported the original version of H.R. 695, the Security and Freedom through Encryption Act ("SAFE") applauded the committee's action, but said it could not support the new version of SAFE, which contains a new set of civil liberties problems. "We survived the hijacking only to find that we are still in enemy territory," said Donald Haines, Legislative Counsel on privacy and cyberspace issues for the ACLU's Washington National Office. "It is now clear that any version of this bill will be used to attack domestic encryption protection. Therefore, the ACLU strongly opposes bringing any encryption legislation to the floor at this time." The amendment that was rejected yesterday sought to reverse the original intent of SAFE, a bill that would ease controls on export of strong encryption technology. Sponsored by Reps. Michael Oxley, R-OH, and Thomas Manton, D-NY, it would have given law enforcement agencies easy access to every private computer file, e-mail, telephone conversation, and online communication in America. By providing this "backdoor" for law enforcement, the ACLU said the amendment would leave a door open to others seeking unauthorized access to private communications. But in rejecting the law enforcement power grab, the Committee essentially re-wrote the SAFE bill, adopting amendments that would: š Establish a "codebreaking" center for law enforcement that would improperly involve the National Security Agency (NSA) in domestic affairs. š Reinstate an objectionable provision in the original SAFE bill that would criminalize, for the first time ever, the use of domestic encryption. š Double the penalties for criminal use of encryption, up to a maximum of 20 years in prison. š Provide immunity for anyone who turns over encryption "keys" to law enforcement, setting the stage for a mandatory "back door" for law enforcement access to private files and communications. "We were heartened that privacy and free speech were cited by so many committee members as the reason why the FBI amendment had to be rejected," Haines said. "We now call upon all members of the House to take these fundamental civil liberties into account in considering any bill addressing the use of encryption." With yesterday's vote, the last of five versions of the SAFE bill may now proceed to the House Rules Committee for a decision on how the bill will be presented to the House. The chairman of that committee, Gerald Solomon, R-NY, has vowed publicly to block any version of SAFE that does not have the Oxley-Manton amendment. In a letter sent to members of the Commerce Committee yesterday, the ACLU joined a broad spectrum of groups in calling for "no compromise on privacy protection by encryption." The letter urged the members to oppose the Oxley-Manton amendment, as well as any attempts to limit the right of all Americans to get and use whatever encryption protection they want. The letter was signed by the ACLU, Americans for Tax Reform, The Eagle Forum, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Privacy International and the United States Privacy Council. "All efforts, direct and indirect, to restrict our right to the greatest possible privacy protection must be rejected," Haines said. "Whether you are sending sensitive corporate documents or your family's travel plans, you have a right to speak privately." The last three committees to act on SAFE (National Security, Intelligence and Commerce) have all added anti-privacy provisions, while bills from the Judiciary and International Affairs committees lack provisions to protect First Amendment rights in the the use of encryption. Both those bills also contain the criminalization provision present in the other bills, although without the even stiffer penalties added to the new version of SAFE. A group of leading scientific, educational and engineering organizations also voiced their opposition yesterday to any legislation imposing strict domestic controls on encryption. The groups said that the amendment would have a "grave effect" on cryptographic research in the United States, and could also negatively impact U.S. commerce while benefiting overseas companies not subject to controls. Encryption programs scramble information so that it can only be read with a "key" -- a code the recipient uses to unlock the scrambled electronic data. As more of our messages are sent via computers, digital switches, and wireless phones, they must be encrypted, otherwise our messages can be seized and read by others. There are no laws that now prohibit using as strong encryption as possible inside the United States. But, unless keys are made available to the government, the Clinton Administration bans export of encryption equipment and software, treating the products as "munitions." In response to these continued attacks on privacy rights, the ACLU this summer launched Take Back Your Data!, a nationwide citizen campaign to fight for legal reforms to privacy laws and resist further encroachments on the right to privacy. Through its website at www.aclu.org, the ACLU urges visitors to contact their elected officials and voice support for or opposition to pending legislation. In addition, the ACLU said that it is drafting omnibus privacy legislation that would, if adopted, fulfill the basic goals of the Take Back Your Data! campaign. The legislation will be unveiled later this fall, followed by a broad-based effort to encourage members of Congress to co-sponsor the legislation.

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Re: Remailer Attack
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Robert A. Costner wrote: >At 03:03 AM 9/26/97 -0400, Monty Cantsin wrote: >>Right now it's [the remailer network] sort of usable, but only for the >>dedicated, and there aren't many of us. I seem to be the only >>persistent authenticated nym who posts with any frequency. >... >>One problem with operating a nym is that people almost always respond >>to it with suspicion and hostility, even on this list. It would be >>nice to have an ordinary looking e-mail address that took in messages, >>encrypted them for your public key, and then sent them out to >>alt.anonymous.messages for pickup. Going the other way it would be >>nice if the account would accept signed messages and send them out as >>normal e-mail or news articles. This would allow nyms to participate >>in NetWorld like everyone else. > >Your desired functionality seems to be describing the operation of a nym >server, which you are not using. No, the nym servers differ in two important ways. 1. They use a reply block so your true identity lies encrypted beneath the public keys of several remailers. I would rather the message went to alt.anonymous.messages. (I guess this could be jury-rigged by supplying a reply block which sends the messages to a Usenet gateway.) Didn't the weasel remailer operator recently move his accounts over to redneck because of police interest? Weren't we reassured that no identities were revealed and that they wouldn't be revealed? That should be a good illustration of the weakness of a reply block to an ordinary e-mail address. Also, by my reading of the "uptime" statistic in Raph's remailer chart, a reply block is not going to be very reliable for receiving mail. Are there any nyms out there using the nym servers who will endorse the reliability of reply blocks? Would you run a business using them? 2. The nym servers advertise that the accounts are nyms through the choice of domain names. So, presumably, people will respond with the same hostility that they respond to any other anonymous message. I presume the remailer operators want to minimize the number of times somebody is defrauded through an anonymous account. But, by the same logic, ISPs should carefully identify their customers the same way a bank does. E-mail addresses should not be used as an authentication method. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNCvO2paWtjSmRH/5AQEuFQf5AUPisKJypoHrU7H2Oi8bbs2GSBP+IvS3 iQJd+JO7rQv6h8rZ/qPKrgZOViAz95xNCVHLabQsIZKPJxxhjV94obu5k2+QW06S i7PrsQM9y4+G611Cej5ND2axo9yDxprOV3/IQ/VuXvmXxyK8Xeg4Wt7GD/Skatc9 dVvTwPCD523tZJeYvKSq9l4AE/Gum+7LTEmWewz36dOm9dNokrRLcM3IqDhzhigW np9tFPxwdrVy2AEDl8RCg8oAVzJt1sjW7CytuCK3kOyeh9hF0NlcSgE+BtMoVoqW IhMVVeD4pMjeHWohAfyTuEEzDRPkNdBf/9YUulik+aMkR4TWnXUG+A== =xYd9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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SSZ is back!...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Just a quick note to say that SSZ is back after a 2 day downtime caused by the phone company throwning my trunk onto another trunk because of a switch in central office location (I'm closer to the new one). The only problem was the ISDN wasn't listed in the to-throw list so that pair got pruned out. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Bidzos editorial moves across business wires
by David HM Spector 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This just went out over the wires... attributed to Investors Business Daily Headline: Guest Editorial Nothing Safe About Encryption Bills ====================================================================== By D. JAMES BIDZOS Congress is intent on regulating encryption technology in the name of law enforcement, no matter what the cost. But the real debate's not about fighting crime. It's about the ability of American business to compete in our new networked world. The Senate is nearing a vote on a bill, by Sen. John McCain, R- Ariz., and Sen. Bob Kerrey, D-Neb., requiring all encryption products made, sold or used in the U.S. to provide on-demand government access to encrypted files with a court order. In the House, the story's more complicated. The Commerce Committee on Wednesday approved the Security and Freedom through Encryption Act, a bill by Rep. Bob Goodlatte, D-Va. that was written to bar domestic controls on encryption. A few weeks ago, SAFE was amended to resemble the Senate bill. But the Commerce Committee scrapped the change and restored the bill's original language. The battle now moves to the Rules Committee, where Rep. Gerald Solomon, R-N.Y., vows to restore the decoding provisions. FBI Director Louis Freeh wants encryption controls passed. He told the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology that without such a law, "Our ability to investigate and sometimes prevent the most serious crimes and terrorism will be severely impaired." No one wants the FBI stymied in its efforts to fight crime. Unfortunately, the debate in Congress so far has painted the Senate bill's opponents as ignorant of public safety and national security concerns, or, worse, willing to put commercial interests ahead of them. What's missing from the current encryption debate is a clear understanding of the implications of the Senate bill, and the identification of safeguards against abuse of a "key recovery" system. Key recovery means that someone other than the main user holds a copy of an encryption key. Everyone agrees that key recovery is useful, even necessary. The bottom line is, who should hold the keys? Strong encryption is already a fact of life in the U.S. and around the world. Advanced, strong, unescrowed encryption is used in millions of products, including every Web browser sold by Netscape Communications Corp. and Microsoft Corp. Law enforcement and the national security establishment view strong encryption as a threat to their efforts to safeguard the public from those who would encrypt incriminating data. But this is a myopic view. Fact is, in our evolving cyber-society, everything about us will be stored digitally. Contrary to the position of the FBI -which says it only wants to maintain wiretap capabilities as they have existed since 1968 - the proposal for key recovery is not the digital equivalent of putting alligator clips on phone wires. It's more like giving the government the keys to all of our personal and professional lives. While the FBI says such access will only be by authorized court order, it has not explained how controls and audits will prevent abuse of these valuable keys. Would people allow local and federal law enforcement to have and store a copy of the keys to their homes and their filing cabinets? The computer industry fears that a law requiring products to include U.S. government access will make them unable to compete in a market where roughly 60% of their revenues come from outside the U.S. And U.S. firms operating overseas are very concerned. Foreign governments with key recovery would have every reason to use it to steal trade secrets and pass them on to their own industries. In France and elsewhere, government spies often help state-owned firms steal trade secrets from U.S. companies. The FBI hopes that the U.S. encryption market can sway the rest of the world. But if other countries take the position - as Germany has - - that they will not control the export of encryption or require key recovery, how will U.S. industry compete? Along with Germany, encryption companies are springing up in South Africa, Ireland, Belgium, Switzerland and Singapore to exploit opportunities created by a restrictive U.S. export policy. The administration and Congress seem ready to accept that American industry will become a casualty of the crypto-wars as it struggles to comply with a law no one fully understands, and foreign suppliers step in to meet the demand. We can only hope that Congress will stop and think on this critical issue before enshrining key recovery in law. D. James Bidzos is president of RSA Data Security Inc. in Redwood City, Calif. ------- End of Forwarded Message -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- David HM Spector spector(a)zeitgeist.com Network Design & Infrastructure Security voice: +1 212.580.7193 Amateur Radio: W2DHM (ex-N2BCA) (ARRL life member) GridSquare: FN30AS -.-. --- -. -. . -.-. - .-- .. - .... .- -- .- - . ..- .-. .-. .- -.. .. --- "New and stirring things are belittled because if they are not belittled, the humiliating question arises, 'Why then are you not taking part in them?'" --H. G. Wells

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In response to Declan's questions about crypto.com
by Jonah Seiger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This morning, a private note from me to Declan -- part of an ongoing personal conversation between Declan, CDT, and his editors at Time -- was forwarded to several public lists. It was not, as some have assumed, an attempt to obscure the substantive issues he raised. Unfortunately, this whole thing explored before CDT had a chance to respond to Declan's questions directly. I hope that the points below will help to clarify the issues: 1. CDT, along with VTW, EFF, ATR and Wired, spent the last two weeks rallying Internet users to call the Committee in opposition to Oxley-Manton. We generated thousands of phone calls from constituents to the Committee, which we believe was a decisive factor in the defeat of Oxley-Manton. 2. CDT rallied support among the computer and communications industries, including many companies that have not yet weighed in yet on this issue. Opposition from the baby bells, along with companies who have in the past been favorable to the Administration's position (like IBM and TIS), probably made the difference in defeating Oxley-Manton 3. CDT did NOT support, nor work on, the White-Markey proposal. We strongly oppose the increased criminal provisions (as well as the criminal provisions in the original SAFE bill). We are also concerned about the role of the NET Center and the proposed liability limitations for key recovery agents (though we do not believe that any liability limitations were included in the final bill) 4. CDT continues to support efforts to relax encryption export controls. We believe that export relief is critical to promoting privacy and security on the Internet, both at home and abroad. We are steadfastly opposed to ANY domestic requirements, mandatory or "voluntary", to incorporate key-escrow, key-recovery, or other "immediate access" requirements. 5. We expect that all efforts to enact encryption reform legislation are stalled for the remainder of this year, and we do not support any effort to bring SAFE to the House floor. All our efforts are focused on stopping Congress from passing any bill in the foreseeable future, unless and until it is clear that domestic law enforcement access requirements will NOT be a part of any legislation. 6. We are not working for a "compromise" with the FBI or any other supporters of domestic encryption controls. We also recognize the realities of politics. No matter how much any of us might wish it to be true, members of the Commerce Committee were not willing to stand up and simply oppose everything. It was not in the cards. White and Markey offered them a chance to defeat Oxley while throwing a small bone to law enforcement. We believe that passage of SAFE with the White-Markey amendment, despite the problems with the criminal provisions, is on balance, a step forward in the fight for encryption policy reform. That's why we have described the vote on cryto.com as a "vote in favor of privacy". I do not expect that this will convince all of our detractors, but I do hope this clarifies the substance of Declan's criticism. As always, I am happy to respond to queries about CDT's positions and tactics, but I am not interested in engaging in public flame throwing. Best, Jonah * Value Your Privacy? The Government Doesn't. Say 'No' to Key Escrow! * Adopt Your Legislator - http://www.crypto.com/adopt -- Jonah Seiger, Communications Director (v) +1.202.637.9800 Center for Democracy and Technology pager +1.202.859.2151 <jseiger(a)cdt.org> PGP Key via finger http://www.cdt.org http://www.cdt.org/homes/jseiger

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No Subject
by CDR Filter Account 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Plea from a parent who wants to keep their kid free of SSNs
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- John Bishop wrote: >Well, seeing how Mr. Treibs is not a Nazi, satan worshipper, or pagan >fundamentalist, I doubt that the ACLU will want much to do with him. This slur is unwarranted. The ACLU has a long tradition of defending religious rights, even those of Christians. My personal favorite is the case of the Jehovah's Witnesses in the 1950s. The Witnesses believe that they cannot honestly pledge allegiance to the flag. They believe that they owe allegiance to God. Were the government to act in a way that was other than God's intention, they would be unable to cooperate. This had to go all the way to the Supreme Court and it was the ACLU that did it when nobody else would. Be my guest to criticize the ACLU, but you'd do better to pick one of their weak points. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNCtLP5aWtjSmRH/5AQG45Qf8Doesmpghrdt572xVCXtTCy1K/TY0h75I OwJV4hG/NHo/QnUyD2m3qoH0GzAPntCEyDcg8J5BLBJlkYPQXS8yDZu6irHtstIj 3gLSbL8sXQQ+0SfFPt4iRQPFd8x0erjZE7MH8wxvZGwUQJfHnUtrG8PaOdFWyzpg tg9/lBet+GAM18DtQhqYPN1/eJ+bkoW6MBq83ncSVJ2CD90mGQBK7/Ifunn8jLUG fZ1CMdanJjjCOhLOEWIGqx6kJXZQhmol3DMrCDYTYXemP3GNoaPeHScZJB5GsiPF WFzqzgyakncp+P1EGWqr+2+TG+4LV1cXg9kJOfD3q9z1uz+/n4CRvA== =9B3r -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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