December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Subject: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
by an7575＠anon.nymserver.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Kevin McCurry pretended to ask: I would appreciate any information on the trustworthiness/security of the below named individuals and service. Please, friends, spare me the gratuitous remarks about Sameer, etc., that's not the issue inthis case. Why are you asking for information on these people and then stating that you don't want 'certain types' of information on Sameer and others? Are you connected in some way to these people, perhaps, and just fishing for compliments that will be supplied by the prepared responses of others? Allow me to give my 'unprepared' response in regard to remailers in general, since you seem to be seeking only a one-sided viewpoint about the individuals involved. Firstly, remailers were developed by the cypherpunks as a method of monitoring supposedly private communications of others, in order to increase their own power and wealth. The communications passing through them remain private and anonymous only to those who aren't running them (or who haven't compromised the system). Secondly, the few remailers that aren't contolled by a small elite within the cypherpunks come and go rather quickly. Thirdly, the remailer owners only support compromised cryptography systems such as the newer versions of PGP produced by All-my-charges-mysteriously-disappeared- when-I-agreed-to-switch-to-a-new-system Zimmerman. If you want true anonymity, learn how to hack. TruthMonger

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is cypherpunks@toad.com still moderated?
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just curious, is the moderation experiment still continuing or it is over? Thank you. - Igor.

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REA_lly
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

3-12-97: US claims CIA was not spying on Germany but on rogue states doing business there. Spy has not been expelled. ----- REA_lly

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U.S. State Department crackdown (fwd)
by Dave Emery 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Conrad wrote > >From jjc(a)infi.net Wed Mar 12 00:21:16 1997 Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 00:20:36 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <2.2.16.19970312001929.4db72c86(a)mailhost.norfolk.infi.net> X-Sender: jjc(a)mailhost.norfolk.infi.net X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Pro Version 2.2 (16) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" To: die(a)die.com, ttyler(a)mich.com, troach(a)netcom.com, lrkn(a)zeus.anet-dfw.com, crisp(a)netcom.com, victor(a)best.com, "Michael F. Peyton" <Michael.Peyton(a)MCI.com>, dwilson(a)paprika.mwc.edu, stever(a)infi.net, rbritt(a)visi.net, larry51(a)aol.com, jmccolman(a)infi.net, brueger(a)infi.net, lburke(a)infi.net, donjr(a)infi.net, acolejr(a)erols.com From: Jim Conrad <jjc(a)infi.net> Subject: U.S. State Department crackdown Thought you'all might find this interesting ... >Return-Path: jmatk(a)tscm.com >X-Sender: jmatk(a)tiac.net >Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 17:26:56 -0500 >To: jmatk(a)tscm.com >From: jmatk(a)tscm.com (James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng) >Subject: U.S. State Department crackdown > >The U.S. State Department is starting to crackdown on the illegal >export of TSCM and SIGINT equipment under ITAR. > >Noice how section (b) is worded: > >"...equipment designed or modified to counteract electronic surveillance >or monitoring." > >-jma > > >================================================================= > >DEPARTMENT OF STATE - Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs >22 CFR Parts 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, and 130 > >================================================================= > > Category XI-Military [and Space] Electronics > > (a) Electronic equipment not included in Category XII of the U.S. Munitions >List which is specifically designed, modified or configured for military >application. This equipment includes but is not limited to: > > *(b) Electronic systems or equipment specifically designed, modified, or >configured for intelligence, security, or military purposes for use in search, >reconnaissance, collection, monitoring, direction-finding, display, analysis and >production of information from the electromagnetic spectrum and electronic >systems or equipment designed or modified to counteract electronic surveillance >or monitoring. A system meeting this definition is controlled under this >subchapter even in instances where any individual pieces of equipment >constituting the system may be subject to the controls of another U.S. >Government agency. Such systems or equipment described above include, but are >not limited to, those: > > (1) Designed or modified to use cryptographic techniques to generate the >spreading code for spread spectrum or hopping code for frequency agility. This >does not include fixed code techniques for spread spectrum. > > (2) Designed or modified using burst techniques (e.g., time compression >techniques) for intelligence, security or military purposes. > > (3) Designed or modified for the purpose of information security to suppress >the compromising emanations of information-bearing signals. This covers TEMPEST >suppression technology and equipment meeting or designed to meet government >TEMPEST standards. This definition is not intended to include equipment designed >to meet Federal Communications Commission (FCC) commercial electro-magnetic >interference standards or equipment designed for health and safety. > > > > =============================================================== > "If it doesn't involve a torque wrench, then it's not TEMPEST" > =============================================================== > James M. Atkinson Phone: (508) 546-3803 > Granite Island Group - TSCM.COM > 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ > Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk(a)tscm.com > =============================================================== > The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and the Most > Complete TSCM Counterintelligence Site on the Internet > =============================================================== > > > <:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:> <:> Jim Conrad - Ocean View Communications - jjc(a)infi.net <:> <:> 757-490-8127 Office - 757-587-8251 Fax - 757-473-6740 Pager <:> <:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:>

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TEMPEST protection
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to find out how hard (and expensive) would it be to try to protect my computer by TEMPEST-like measures. I am not an electrical engineer and am looking (hopefully) for a relatively easy to understand do-it-yourself type of manual. I have heard from my acquaintaince who is a tempest professional that it was not very possible. If that is indeed true, are there any measures that can be taken to at least complicate spying on my computer? Not that I think that Martians from the flying saucers are already listening, but it is interesting to find out how to do this stuff. Thank you very much. - Igor.

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Re: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Keely McCurry wrote: > From: an7575(a)anon.nymserver.com > Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 17:47:31 -0700 (MST) > > Kevin McCurry pretended to ask: > > I would appreciate any information on the trustworthiness/security of the > below named individuals and service. Please, friends, spare me the gratuitous > remarks about Sameer, etc., that's not the issue inthis case. > > Why are you asking for information on these people and > then stating that you don't want 'certain types' of > information on Sameer and others? > Are you connected in some way to these people, perhaps, > and just fishing for compliments that will be supplied > by the prepared responses of others? > Firstly, remailers were developed by the cypherpunks as > a method of monitoring supposedly private communications > of others, in order to increase their own power and wealth. > <<<< > Well, that is food for thought. It's an angle I had not considered. The motivation behind the 'generosity' of others should always be considered as a factor. > The communications passing through them remain private > and anonymous only to those who aren't running them (or who > haven't compromised the system). > <<<< > The system does involve trust on the side of the senders and integrity on the > side of the remailers. That was my question: are there members of this list > who can vouch [not swear] for or deny the integrity of the individual running > the anon.nymserver.com nymserver? > >>>> You are asking for opinions from people you don't personally know for opinions as to the integrity of others whom you do not know, in order to make decisions regarding placing your trust in someone else to guarantee your privacy and/or anonymity? > Is the server I asked about controlled, or not? Received: (from root@localhost) by shaman.lycaeum.org (Partyon/dude!) Judging from the (Partyon/dude!) in the headers from the server, perhaps questions regarding 'controlled substances' might be more pertinent. As well, the new-user info they send out tells you how to hack the accounts of others on the system, then tells you that the 'protection' against this is defaulted to 'off'. It goes on to say that you should turn it 'on' only if you are 'paranoid' of someone hacking 'your' account. i.e. - if you don't notice or understand the implications of this, then, by default, you are 'fair game' for hackers on their server. > Thirdly, the remailer owners only support compromised > cryptography systems such as the newer versions of PGP > produced by All-my-charges-mysteriously-disappeared- > when-I-agreed-to-switch-to-a-new-system Zimmerman. > What do you mean support? Which "newer versions?" Where does 2.6.2. stand in > this hierarchy? Must we use the i versions? I use several versions including > the international, and have noticed no difference in the ways the remailers > process the versions. PGP 2.0-->2.3a were released outside of the U.S. and imported into the country. The use of PGP=>2.5 suddenly became a 'non-issue' for use in the U.S. because they use both the algorithm and sub-routines developed by the NSA and the Military. Think about it. TruthMonger >def 2. one who attempts to stir up or spread something that is usually >petty or discreditable Such as blind acceptance of remailers and iconic cryptographical software?

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Re: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someone calling themselves TruthMonger wrote: >> Firstly, remailers were developed by the cypherpunks as >> a method of monitoring supposedly private communications >> of others, in order to increase their own power and wealth. That message was relatively funny, and trust is a serious issue in this business - even though the suggestion that _we_ in the Cypherpunks Elite Cabal did that, it doesn't mean that there aren't People With Ulterior Motives running remailers, or remailers hosted on machines run by bad guys who are actually monitoring their users. However, if you want to spread Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt, at least keep your facts straight; it does a much better job. >> Thirdly, the remailer owners only support compromised >> cryptography systems such as the newer versions of PGP >> produced by All-my-charges-mysteriously-disappeared- >> when-I-agreed-to-switch-to-a-new-system Zimmerman. ..... > PGP 2.0-->2.3a were released outside of the U.S. and imported into >the country. > The use of PGP=>2.5 suddenly became a 'non-issue' for use in the U.S. >because they use both the algorithm and sub-routines developed by the >NSA and the Military. The new algorithm was the International Drug Entrapment Agency algorithm, introduced in PGP 2.0 to replace the previous non-NSA-crackable algorithm, Bass-O-Matic. Pay no attention to the comments in the source about fnords, /* these aren't the subroutines you're looking fnord */ and follow the money. PGP 2.5 became a non-issue because RSAREF takes care of the patent problem - which is largely because the widespread use of PGP really did spread the RSA algorithm's popularity, and giving away free licenses was about the only way for RSA Inc. to regain any control over it at all. If you want to do a better job of FUD, you could talk about the under-the-table relationship between MIT and RSA or the RSA and NSA (they're only different by one letter!) or notice that the CAPSTONE implementations of Clipper used algorithms patented by PKP... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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[CRYPTO] OTP
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy C. May carries a turd in his wallet for identification purposes. _ _/| \'o.0' =(___)= Timmy C. May U

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Re: Ecash Brain Tennis
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal Finney wrote: > > On the Wired "brain tennis" debate, http://www.braintennis.com/, Kawika > Daguio of the American Bankers Association wrote: > > > The real danger of cyberspace is that it could be the tragedy of > > the commons in waiting. Technology alone won't provide participants > > sufficient security for e-commerce to flourish. Law, tradition, and good > > reputations and technology give rise to trust. Trust cannot be established > > solely though technical protocols. And trust is not irrelevant. > > What do you think he means about a "tragedy of the commons"? > I wonder if he just meant that there would be too many "commoners" trying > to engage in commerce, so you couldn't know who to trust? Be assured that those already in control of commerce in this country and others have already written new laws 'in their head' concerning the future of eca$h. I predict that these laws will be for our 'protection,' but will have the curious effect of limiting the control of eca$h to the already rich and powerful. Some groups such as the Anguila Antagonists may be able to wrest a certain number of digital dollars from the grip of the system currently in place, but above a certain point, they will eaten up, either passively or aggressively (crushed or bought off). If 'outsiders' begin to make too large a dent in the main players' piece of the action, then we can expect to see events similar to the Junk Bonds fiasco, with the 'bad guys' set-up and knocked down like bowling pins. We can expect automatic taxation at the time of all eca$h transactions, as well as strict laws against anonymity in the transfer of eca$h. Freelance cryptographers are going to be outlaws, by decree of law. It is quite simply a matter of money (power and control being merely prerequisites for controlling money). TruthMonger

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Re: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill Stewart wrote: > > However, if you want to spread Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt, > at least keep your facts straight; it does a much better job. The straight facts are that you can't trust your best friend not to bop your old-lady, given ample opportunity, and to put even more trust in a stranger is foolish. > > PGP 2.0-->2.3a were released outside of the U.S. and imported into > >the country. > > The use of PGP=>2.5 suddenly became a 'non-issue' for use in the U.S. > >because they use both the algorithm and sub-routines developed by the > >NSA and the Military. > > The new algorithm was the International Drug Entrapment Agency algorithm, > introduced in PGP 2.0 to replace the previous non-NSA-crackable algorithm, > Bass-O-Matic. Pay no attention to the comments in the source about fnords, > /* these aren't the subroutines you're looking fnord */ and follow the money. > PGP 2.5 became a non-issue because RSAREF takes care of the patent problem - > which is largely because the widespread use of PGP really did spread the > RSA algorithm's popularity, and giving away free licenses was about the only > way for RSA Inc. to regain any control over it at all. Are you saying that the patent on the RSA algorithm wasn't enforceable? > If you want to do > a better job of FUD, you could talk about the under-the-table relationship > between MIT and RSA or the RSA and NSA (they're only different by one letter!) > or notice that the CAPSTONE implementations of Clipper used algorithms > patented by PKP... The relationship between MIT and the NSA and the Military isn't very far under the table. The spooks funded MIT's RSA development, and they are not noted for funding projects for the good of the common man. To suggest that they would fund a form of cryptography that didn't have their own back-door for sounds implausible. TruthMonger

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