December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Definition of AP?
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> >Subject: Definition of AP? >Reply-To: jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >>Anonymous wrote: >> Can you give me a definition/description of AP in a few concise lines? >Probably. > >Ideally, it would capture the theory/purpose/methodology in terms that >those unfamiliar with the concept could immediately understand. > >AP, considered generically, is a system which allows individuals and groups >of people to anonymously defend themselves from all types of agression, most >peculiarly including agression tolerated or even done by governments. Dear Mr. Bell: We have been both pleased and relieved to note that over the past several months you have used the troublesome initials "AP" much less frequently than has been your habit. This measurable improvement in your attitude has considerably reduced the influx of damaging materials into your files. Today, however, it has been brought to our attention that you took the opportunity to launch into an explanation (relatively controlled, we hasten to say) of the basic theory you have been propounding regarding AP. More troublesome is the evidence that you, yourself, posted the supposedly anonymous question to which you responded. We sincerely hope that such felonious manipulation of e-mail traffic and information does not indicate a return to your previous unacceptable outbursts. Knowing you have been attempting to "moderate" your posts, we are certain you will accept our offer of 5 sessions of Deep Tissue--Relaxation Therapy at the therapist of your choice -- with whom we have been in contact. Always hoping for the best, we remain, The Bell Team secserv(a)whitehouse.gov

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Re: remailer spam throttle
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes: > Dimitri Vulis <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> writes: > > Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes: > > > [encrypt the message and send the recipient the key, discard the > > > key, when they request the message they supply the key] > > > > That's a good idea, but it'll take up a lot of disk space at the > > machine running the remailer. Right now, remailers that provide > > latency don't keep an e-mail for more than about 12 hours. Once > > you start keeping them around for a few days (a reasonable grace > > period for a first-time user), it's a lot more disk space. > > "Disk is cheap." I just bought a 3.8Gb quantum for $300. That's 4 > times cheaper Gb/$ ratio than last disk I bought a year ago. I paid over $700 for a 2GB disk about 18 mos ago. Yes, disk prices are falling through floor - giving the lie to the scum that tries to control Usenet "spam" - but is it really worth it to have to maintain a huge spool space to support a remailer? If you really think you can afford a few GB of extra disk storage, start up a Usenet site of virtue. > 1Gb encrypted message pool? No problem. > > Don't have the resources for the 1Gb disk? Your ISP will be charging > you many times that for your leased line. > > If it's an issue charge postage to cover your storage and transmission > costs. > > However, I suppose if you're using an ISP shell account, and have no > leased line, you may have more space restrictions. It should be possible to run a remailer on an average $19.95/mo shell account. Most of them come with a disk quota of a couple of megabytes. I do think that keeping a lot of mail in the queue (more than is kept by the remailers that use latency now) would make such accounts unsuitable for remailers. > A better idea, (for both ISP shell account and leased line version) > would to send the recipient the encrypted data, you keep the key :-) > > (View it as a secret split where the parts happen to be different > size, you keep the small one). > > They send you the data and you decrypt, send it back and discard the > key. You could store 16 million keys on your 1Gb remailer spool > partition. That 16 million keys would represent 16 Gb of delivered > encrypted email. > > You could still cope with a fair number of messages in 1Mb remailer > key spool in your home file space on an ISP based shell account. > > I think this solves remailer resource objections. yes, this sort of solves the storage problem. Thinking how this might work... Alice's remailer gets an e-mail for Bob. Alice's remailer generates 2 pseudo-random numbers, K and L, and uses K to encrypt the message with a symmetric cryptoscheme. Alice's remailer sends the encrypted message and L to Bob with the following note: if you want to receive the key to decrypt this message, send back L and acknowledge the disclaimer. Alice's remailer retains the triple (K,L,Bob). Because it's small, it can be kept for a long time. If Bob sends back L, the remailer sends Bob K so he can read his message. I see a few problems with this. I'm sure it can be improved. 1. What if Bob is another remailer, unknown to Alice? 2. What if Bob doesn't have the program to decode his message? (It's fair to assume that everyone can fine PGP. It's not fair to assume that everyone can find e.g. triple DES.) 3. What if the LEA's decide that the collection of triples on Alice's computer is worth looking at, for instance, for the list of addresses. (OK, they could be encrypted probably.) 4. What if the LEA's decide to find out how K, L are generated? > You still have the problem of saturation of your network bandwidth. > You can probably encrypt (it's symmetric key, say IDEA) fast enough > for encryption overhead to be less of a problem than the saturation of > the bandwidth of your leased line. I think IDEA or triple DES would be fast enough for this. > Your other problem is user acceptance -- your average user may still > object to receiving Mb's of junk which while the contents don't offend > him (he can't read it), the sheer volume may annoy him. Given how some people react very negatively to what they consider "unsolicited e-mail", I think it might be a bad idea to send them large encrypted messages w/o confirming that they want them. But it's also a bad idea to keep an unknown's e-mail on the remailer. The only way out, IMO, is to *discard* an unknown's e-mail and to tell him what positive action he can take so future e-mails don't get discarded. And by the way: a remailer should probably keep a list of people who have been told about the need for a positive action, so they won't get duplicate notices more than every week or so. If X sends Y 10 e-mails and the remailer sends Y 10 identical notifications with the instructions how to enable receipt, Y might get justifiable upset. When Alice's remailer gets an e-mail for Bob, it should do something like: try to fetch Bob's public key from a well-run key server / \ success failure | | encrypt the e-mail discard the with bob's key and e-mail! pass it to Bob | was the form letter sent to Bob in the last 7 days? \ / no yes \ / exit send bob the form letter Wow, isn't that a perry flow chart. :-) ... > > Suppose a LEA wants to search the computer hosting the remailer. > > They come across a bunch of encrypted files. > > The operator has to convince the LEA that they don't have the means > > to decrypt the e-mails or even to figure out who they're from. > > Well you can't can you? It may be hard to prove a negative to a LEO who doesn't know what the hell you're talking about. You have a file in your spool that was encrypted with a key that your program generated, but now you no longer have the key? Well, tell us how the key was generated. ... > I agree with what you're saying that technological aptitude can > provide some metric of cluefullness. And that cluefullness usually > correlates with good net citizenly behaviour (eg understanding what a > remailer is, and not legally threatening, or setting the Feds on to > the human owner of a bot. > > However there exist quite a few counter examples: cluefull people who > do not use PGP, or consider it to be too much hassle (quite a lot of > them hang out on cypherpunks, and will actually object if you send > them encrypted email, even though spending most of their time on > cpunks arguing about the usefulness and essentiality of these tools > for privacy). Well - if generating and publishing a PGP key were a requirement to be able to receive anonymous e-mail, I'm sure they'd do it. Some people (like Dale) legitimately question certain uses of PGP, but I think in this case it's worth encouraging its use. > Also some journalists are pretty clueful (or useful to be able to send > information too, shall we say, journalists as a group having a bad > rep), and not many can handle PGP. Hmm - I'm sure John Markoff and even Declan can handle PGP. If, for example, Jon Schwartz can't handle PGP (and I don't know whether he can :-), then he doesn't deserve any anonymous tips. Free market in action. Later - thanks a lot for the extensive comments. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Another Article on Jim Bell from the Oregano
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill Stewart wrote: > > The government tried to prove that he was trying to manufacture > meth, but was unable and Jim pleaded guilty to a lesser charge. Misleading. He pled guilty to a 'different' charge, which had nothing to do with 'drugs', but was some EPA type of thing, as I recall. > >(Of course, > >what are prohibited molecules and non-prohibited molecules is an ever > >changing maze. It is pretty hard to keep track of what is "legal" and > >"illegal" in that area. Seems to be "whatever we say it is". > > It's actually quite straightforward - it all depends on the > intent of the molecules being arrested. If they're just loitering around, > it's not illegal, but if they're loitering with intent to commit public > intoxication, or conspiring to form an illegal syndicate, you may be > in big trouble.... I bought some drugs once, intending to try them. Then I changed my mind... -- Toto "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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Re: Reporters, Declan, Columns, Articles, and Angles
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> writes: > At 1:00 AM -0400 4/9/97, Declan McCullagh wrote: > >I'll be going to both events, of course. I'll try to drag an article or > >column out of the "regulation in the digital age" conference, so check out > >netlynews.com around that time. Maybe in the Afterword section. > > Just when I was beginning to think Declan was not just a typical journalist.. > (long flame skipped) I guess Timmy May is still miffed at Declan for exposing Timmy and Cocksucker John Gilmore as plug-pulling censors? --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: which remailers are safe?
by Alec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:01 AM 4/9/97 -0500, 00043.an(a)edtec.com wrote: |For some reason my anonymized posts here are never arriving? |So I try this service - does anyone know about edtec.com? |The problem is, does anyone really know who their remailer is? |Which ones are known absolutely to be run by safe operators, |and which ones are thought or known to be trolls by Unsavory Characters? |I am very interested to see if this post makes it to the list! Dear 00043.an, I have a sense of being here before! 'Twas a post such as this that called forth TruthMngler. Spare us! Alec

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Re: Black box attacks (was Re: Crypto-Dongel)
by Cynthia H. Brown 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 9 Apr 1997, Jeremiah A Blatz wrote: > Dave Emery <die(a)pig.die.com> writes: > > I have heard about thermite devices being used for this in > > the sort of applications that might warrent it. Granted that this > > is a royal fire hazard unless very carefully engineered, but at least > > it is not an explosive per se.... > > Thermite is probably overkill unless you're trying to dust something > big like a hard drive. Just a bit of magnesium (which is often used as > primer for thermite) should do the trick on a chip. I wonder if it's > really essential to be so drastic, though? Would just getting the chip > really hot be enough to wipe it? What about exposing it to a big arc? > One might imagine a PCMCIA with a voltage doubling diode ladder and a > small capacitor... would this be sufficient? If you're trying to destroy a standard IC, why don't you just hook up the power and ground pins to a 120V AC outlet? No special equipment or substances required, just a couple of wires. Done it myself, and some chips make a really neat popping sound as the top blows off :-) Warning for the electronically challenged: don't use this method if you care about the rest of the board. Cynthia =============================================================== Cynthia H. Brown, P.Eng. E-mail: cynthb(a)iosphere.net | PGP Key: See Home Page Home Page: http://www.iosphere.net/~cynthb/ Junk mail will be ignored in the order in which it is received. Klein bottle for rent; enquire within.

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Re: which remailers are safe?
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

00043.an(a)edtec.com wrote: > > does anyone know about edtec.com? > The problem is, does anyone really know who their remailer is? > Which ones are known absolutely to be run by safe operators, > and which ones are thought or known to be trolls by Unsavory Characters? The edtec.com remailer is run by communist agents within the CIA who share their informations with capitalist agents in Red China. I will phone you at your unlisted number later tonight, in order to discuss this matter further. -- Toto "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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Re: Reporters, Declan, Columns, Articles, and Angles
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Declan McCullagh wrote: > I've been on cypherpunks long before I got my press credentials. The > topics genuinely interest me, and this is one of the few jobs where I can > follow them full-time. If I wanted to make a decent living, I would have > taken that job as a management consultant instead. (Some of us aren't > independently wealthy, Tim.) Mercenary? Not quite. Journalists don't get > paid a whole hell of a lot. And Declan's articles genuinely interest 'me'. Having done a variety of 'reports' ranging from business reports to press reports, I recognize that they have to be written so as to be readable to those with no deep-rooted background in the events or issues being reported. While those who faithfully follow the CypherPunks list and the issued discussed here may find his reports somewhat shallow, I try to read them from the perspective of those who have an interest in the issues but only limited knowledge concerning them. From this perspective, Declan's reports do a good deal to enlighten the masses in regard to whatever issue he addresses. -- Toto "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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Re: on micro-explosions was Re: Black box attacks (was Re: Crypto-Dongel)
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:46 PM 4/8/97 -0700, shadow(a)count04.mry.scruznet.com wrote: >instead of minute quantities of explosives one could use extremely fine wires >suspended a small distance from the substrate to be destroyed. >Feed a short(below 3 ms) high current pulse(figure a 400w/s photoflash supply) >the wavefront from the exploding wire will be in the supersonic region. >this method may be used in lieu of explosives to achieve the effect of >a high order detonation. gee wonder if the >atf will forbid us capacitors and wires now :) Wavefronts are a possibility. The disadvantage of any capacitor based system is that capacitors discharge over time. If the system gets disconnected from the power supply, before long the device has to be activated or lose its effectiveness. "Use it or lose it". This may not be ideal for the particular application. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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WebWorld 29
by Bubba Rom Dos 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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