December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

ZDNet Members-Only: JavaOne Discount!
by announce＠lists.zdnet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ZDNET ANNOUNCEMENT 3/26/97 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Greetings from ZDNet! Ziff-Davis, a Silver co-sponsor of JavaOne(sm) has an exclusive offer for ZDNet Members: Attend JavaOne(sm) on April 2-4 for a *SPECIAL* low rate of $995, a $200 discount! What: JavaOne, Sun's 1997 Worldwide Java Developer Conference Where: Moscone Convention Center, San Francisco, California When: April 2-4, 1997 Here's your chance to get in-depth technical knowledge directly from the source: Sun's Java Development Team. JavaOne(sm) is three very full days of intensive Java learning from the people who invented Java. If you are an Internet developer or want to be one, you won't want to miss it! Keynotes will be delivered by Scott McNealy, James Gosling, Alan Baratz, Vinton Cerf, Eric Schmidt, and Jeff Johnson. In addition to the three day conference, there will be loads of extracurricular activities that will further your opportunity to learn about Java and to meet other Java developers. For complete information on the conference, visit the JavaOne web site at http://java.sun.com/javaone/ To register at this special rate of $995, please call 800-668-2741 (US & Canada), or 415-372-7077 (International) before March 28, and refer to source code "JAVAZIFF." If space is still available, you can register at this special rate on-site too, but you will have to mention source code "JAVAZIFF." For more Information: http://java.sun.com/javaone/ 800-668-2741 (US & Canada) 415-372-7077 (International) _______________________________________________________________ ZDNet Announcements are periodic notices of new features, special events and free offers available to members of ZDNet. --To subscribe to ZDNet Announcements, please send mail to: announce-on(a)lists.zdnet.com You can leave the subject and body blank. --To unsubscribe to ZDNet Announcements, please send mail to: announce-off(a)lists.zdnet.com You can leave the subject and body blank. _______________________________________________________________ Powered by Mercury Mail: http://www.merc.com

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Re: PSYOPS/infowar
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is surely going to piss some people off, but let's some fun with this, shall we? At 9:30 pm -0500 on 3/29/97, Greg Broiles wrote: > According to Ronald Duchin, graduate of the US Army War College and > former special assistant to the Secy of Defense and director of the > Veterans of Foreign Wars, activists fall into one of four categories: > radicals, opportunists, idealists, and realists. He recommends a > three-step strategy to neutralize activists: > > 1. isolate the radicals Tim May Kelly Goen Phil Zimmermann (then) Belize, say > 2. "cultivate" the idealists CFP (a virtual terrarium :-)) EFF (agrabiz!) Phil Zimmermann (now) Eric Hughes Michael Froomkin Any cypherpunk who's actually making money on this stuff :-). Anguilla Vanuatu Me ;-) > 3. co-opt the realists into agreeing with industry RSA Mondex (a little hand-biting here, on my part) x.blabla SET-folk David Chaum Hong Kong Indonesia The Phillipenes Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete with the New York Times?" Andrew Kantor: "Yes." Stahl: "Isn't that dangerous?" The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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FCC Internet Paper
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As summarized below the FCC has issued a long paper: "Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications Policy." To supplement the FCC's PDF and WordPerfect versions we've converted it to HTML: http://jya.com/oppwp29.htm (270K; 189K images) ------- From: Robert Cannon <cannon(a)DC.NET> Subject: FCC Releases staff Working Paper on Internet policy To: CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM News Release -- March 27, 1997 DIGITAL TORNADO: THE INTERNET AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY FCC Staff Working Paper on Internet Policy The FCC's Office of Plans and Policy (OPP) today released a staff working paper analyzing the implications of the Internet for the FCC and telecommunications policy. OPP Working Paper No. 29, "Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications Policy," was written by Kevin Werbach, Counsel for New Technology Policy. OPP periodically issues working papers on emerging areas in communications; these papers represent individual views and are not an official statement by the FCC or any FCC commissioner. "Digital Tornado" represents the first comprehensive assessment of the questions the Internet poses for traditional communications policy. A central theme running through the paper is that the FCC, and other government agencies, should seek to limit regulation of Internet services. In framing his approach, Werbach states: "Because it is not tied to traditional models or regulatory environments, the Internet holds the potential to dramatically change the communications landscape. The Internet creates new forms of competition, valuable services for end users, and benefits to the economy. Government policy approaches toward the Internet should therefore start from two premises: avoid unnecessary regulation, and question the applicability of traditional rules." After providing an analytical framework to understand the forces driving Internet growth, and describing the Internet's development and architecture, the paper addresses three primary areas: CATEGORY DIFFICULTIES Policy and legal questions arising from the fact that Internet- based services do not fit easily into the existing classifications for communications services under federal law or FCC regulations. PRICING AND USAGE Policy questions arising from the economics of Internet access, including assertions by local telephone companies that current Internet pricing structures result in network congestion, and arguments by Internet service providers that telephone companies have not upgraded their networks to facilitate efficient transport of data services. AVAILABILITY OF BANDWIDTH Regulatory and technical issues affecting the deployment of technologies promising to enable high-speed Internet access to the home and to businesses, including the implications for the Internet of the FCC's role in promoting universal service. The paper is available on the FCC World Wide Web site, <http://www.fcc.gov/>. The file is available for online viewing in PDF (Adobe Acrobat) format at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp29.pdf or for downloading in WordPerfect format at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp29.wp Copies may also be purchased from International Transcription Services, Inc., 1919 M Street, NW, Room 246, Washington, DC 20554, (202) 857-3800. -FCC-

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WebWorld 19
by Bubba Rom Dos 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: OPINION: moderation and anonymity
by Igor Chudov ＠ home 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jay Denebeim (denebeim(a)deepthot.cary.nc.us) wrote * Igor Chudov @ home <ichudov(a)algebra.com> wrote: * * >3. It is a common misconception to think that since anonymity means no * >accountability, it will lead to abuses. Even though such an argument may * >be made in general (it is subject to a significant disagreement), it * >does not apply in the least to moderated groups. Since moderators are, * >generally, responsible for the content of the messages that they allow, * >the final responsibility and control is in their hands. If a certain * >anonymous posting does not satisfy the newsgroup charter, moderators can * >always reject it. I would like to thank Jay for his thorough and thoughtful comments. I agree with many of his point, and leave only those that I disagree on. * You can have both accountability and anonymity. From a newsgroup * moderator's perspective it's not necessary to know the account of the * person, only a way to uniquely identify the individual. There is * cryptography available for every machine that can provide these unique * signatures without requiring a valid from address. You are correct, there are tools allowing individuals to sign their articles and verify electronic signatures. My moderation bot STUMP even has built in support for PGP signature verification. Some of its features are directly indended to be helpful for anonymous users who want to not only post to newsgroups, but also maintain their reputations. As you know, I think that anonymous users can be great contributors to moderated newsgroups. I am not sure that this article is the place to go into a lot of detail about these features, but I can summarize them for those who are interested. However, there is a big and sticky question of what identity really is. For example, I can establish several PGP keys and post anonymously using all of them in turns. What would be my identity? And if I use one of the keys to post off-topic articles and you "punish" that key not knowing that the same physical person uses several others, what's the point of such "punishment"? That is not to say that using PGP signatures in moderated groups is bad: it is great, especially since anonymous users who use PGP to sign their articles can be safely put to the preapproved list of robomoderator bots. The problem is that while we have IDENTIFICATION, there is little we can to do enforce ACCOUNTABILITY. * However, the current newsgroups where this issue has been raised are * all robo-moderated purely for spam elimination. That means that there * must be some way to identify posters so they can be mechanically * blocked if necessary. Cryptography and/or valid e-mail addresses * (whether those addresses actually show up in posts or not) are * necessary for the filtering function to be totally bullet-proof. I disagree with this point. First of all, forging email messages to look like they come from non-anonymous addresses is very easy (just telnet to port 25 and type 3 magic lines). Second, a person can secretly have multiple keys. If someone is determined to bypass a robomoderation bot that does not require EVERY preapproved poster to positively identify herself, they will get through. By the way, I believe that most forgeries in moderated groups are results of personal problems of posters AND moderators, and moderators need to honestly take care of the underlying problems. It is very hard if not impossible to deal with determined and knowledgeable forgers. I would much rather ensure that they get equal access to the group than try to fight them by technical means. * Actually, the cryptographic signature posts are the only 100% reliable * ones, although all newsgroups I'm aware of only accept the forgable * from: lines currently, the spammers have not figured out how to get This is 99% correct, but not 100% correct. Newsgroups that are moderated by STUMP will NOT ACCEPT forged From: lines pointing to posters who have requested special cryptographic protection. All articles purporting to be from such persons pass mandatory check of a PGP signatures. * past robomodded groups yet, and if they do forge addresses, they are * breaking the law currently (fraud), so I don't know that this will * ever become an issue. * * Now, there are some other, even less reliable, methods of * robo-moderating. The 'clue test', which requires a password on your * first post that is listed in a FAQ is one that I think would work * quite well today. It does have a problem in that if the spammers ever Yes. It is an absolutely great method for newsgroup that do not want to bother themselves with the costs of having a human moderator, while at the same time eliminating spam and multiposted "flame" threads. We now have two bots, one of which is yours, that allow to quickly set up such automoderated groups. People who are determined to post off-topic articles to such groups have very many ways of getting past the robomoderator bot. That is usually OK since it is not the regulars who are the problem. - Igor.

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junk mail analysis, part 2
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Last time I gave the equilibrium for the junk mail game. Now I will look at a modified game that allows the sender to include an ecash deposit with his email. (Note that there is a slight change of notation from the game tree given last time.) A: Send mail? / \ no / \ yes / \ (0,0) A: Decide deposit d | | | B: Read mail? / \ no / \ yes / \ (-d,d) B: Accept offer? / \ no / \ yes / \ (-d,d-c) (s,r-c) Solution We again apply the method of backward induction. In the last stage B accepts if r >= d. Therefore in the next to last stage, B knows that if he reads, his expected payoff is P(r<d)*(d-c) + P(r>=d)*E(r-c|r>=d). However, in equilibrium it is not possible that P(r<d) > 0 since A is always better off by offering a deposit of 0 instead of any deposit greater than r. Therefore B reads if E(r|r>=d)-c >= d. Now we come to A's deposit decision. A knowns that if he offers any d such that r >= d and E(r|r>=d)-c >= d, B will read and accept. A is indifferent between any such d, so he might as well offer the smallest such d if it exists. If it doesn't exist, A offers d=0. Finally A again always sends regardless of the parameters, since A can get a payoff of at least 0 by sending, and may do better if there is a small probability of B making a mistake. Conclusions We saw that if there exists a d such that r >= d and E(r|r>=d)-c >= d, A offers the least such d, and B reads and accepts. Otherwise A offers d=0, and B does not read. Interestingly, if E(r) > c, d=0 satisfies r >= d and E(r|r>=d)-c >= d, so we reach the same outcome as before. However, if E(r) < c, the outcome of the new game represents a Pareto-improvement since for realistic distributions of (s,r) it seems likely that for all sufficiently large r there exist d such that r >= d and E(r|r>=d)-c >= d, and for these values of r both the sender and the receiver do better than they did in the previous model. Let's call the smallest such r t. Unfortunately the outcome is still not Pareto-optimal if t > c. This conclusion opens the question of whether a better solution exists. One possibility is the following (called the pre-payment solution). A: Send mail? / \ no / \ yes / \ (0,0) A: Decide pre-payment p | | | B: Read mail? / \ no / \ yes / \ (-p,p) B: Accept offer? / \ no / \ yes / \ (-p,p-c) (s-p,r+p-c) If there is enough interest, I'll follow up with a comparison between the pre-payment solution and the deposit solution.

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Microsoft ammunition (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 27 Mar 1997 16:11:50 -0600 > From: Toto <toto(a)sk.sympatico.ca> > Subject: Microsoft ammunition > But, if you're tired of the repetition, here's a > reason you should sit through another sermon: > RandomNoise's Coda. Coda lets you design entire > Web pages in Java rather than use a mixture of > HTML content, tags, and Java applets. > > A Java-based Web page removes the distinction > between application and data. It presents data > just as an HTML page would, but every element on > the screen has the potential to be an interactive > part of a sophisticated application. Mix this with the distributed processing model of Plan 9 and you may just have tomorrows computer environment. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

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Re: Analysis of proposed UK ban on use of non-escrowed crypto.
by Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Kent Crispin wrote: > Thus, in PGPs case at least, if you want escrowed encryption, then > you must escrow the signature key. Hence the DSA which is a signature algorithm that does not do encryption. I think the use of the same key for both is a bad idea BUT note that if you have a secure signature scheme you don't need an encryption key at all. Simply generate yourself a fresh set of public key parameters for each communication in the manner of IPSEC. The hard problem of setting up security is knowing the identity of the other party. All else pales into insignificance in comparison. Consider the following scenario. SMTP is adjusted so that it has a DH key exchange crypto option. A typical conversation becomes:- EHELO You-got-crypto-mate? 269 Yeah I have crypto XCHAL RSA 248af23876acdef 270 [key-id] [DHparameters e, n, e^x mod n] [sig-of-challenge+DH-params] XENCRYPT [IV] [e^y mod n] [Conversation continues encrypted under key e^y^x mod n AND keybits padding out messages as appropriate.] Now this type of scheme could be implemented without a certificate infrastructure and severly increase the difficulty of snooping. In that case the message would be sent even though [sig-of-challenge+DH-params] was absent. But with a CA infrastructure you could make sure that you hads contacted the correct machine, one authorised to accept mail for fred(a)ibm.com] all you need is a means of hacking the following assertion into X509v3: "Is authorized user of DNS namespace identifier matching" Add in a date and the protocol could be made very reilient and entirely transparent. Now that mail is moving away from godamn awfull crap like sendmail towards engineered systems like notes or exchange adding in protocol extensions becomes easier. If the mail sending agent knows that mail to a particular host should be sent encrypted the system can be made much more transparent than PGP or S/MIME. Like the punters might be able to use it without getting screwed too often. I think email security has often been the perfect being the enemy of the good. One huge problem has been braindamaged ideas about routing email through store and forward mailers rather than connecting to the real destination to start with. Phill

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Re: OECD: No GAK
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Is this in reference to the various GAK initiatives by the administration >or are they finally pushing for forced restrictions on domestic crypto? Has >anyone seen these drafts? I assume that the draft KRAP legislation at CDT Peter Junger cited here is what Markoff refers to: http://www.cdt.org/crypto/970312_admin.html Anyone know of other KR/TTF drafts in the US, UK, FR, JP, AU or elsewhere among the 29 signators of Wassenaar? The Wassenaariors have a wider ambition than the OECDistes.

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OECD: No GAK
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times, March 27, 1997, pp. A1, D3. U.S. Rebuffed in Global Proposal For Eavesdropping on the Internet By John Markoff In a setback for the Clinton Administration that demonstrates the difficulty of setting global policies for the Internet, the leading industrial nations have declined to embrace a United States proposal to allow computer eavesdropping by the world's law enforcement agencies. The United States proposal, backed by Britain and France, was an attempt to restrict the private use of increasingly advanced data-scrambling technology that can protect the privacy of electronic mail and other forms of computer communication. The equipment can make it difficult for law enforcement officials to crack a code when they suspect it is masking criminal or terrorist activities. The proposal called for international endorsement of a system in which mathematical keys to computer-security codes would be held by escrow agents from whom law enforcement officials could obtain the keys once they have a court's wiretapping warrant. But policy guidelines scheduled to be released in Paris today by the 29-nation Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development fail to endorse the United States proposal. And they leave such leeway for members to regulate data-scrambling technology--or not--that computer security experts say any uniform international policy remains elusive. "The difficulty with the guidelines is that anybody can interpret parts of them in their own way," said Konstantine Papanikdaw, a policy analyst for information security at the European Commission in Brussels. Indeed, the industrial world seems to be deeply divided on whether governments can ever legitimately eavesdrop on the electronic communication of their citizens. Because messages on the Internet are easy to intercept, a growing number of individuals and corporations are protecting the privacy of their communications and the security of their commercial transactions by scrambling such information. Some O.E.C.D. nations, including Britain and France, have either outlawed or are in the process of tightly regulating the private use of data-scrambling systems. But other nations--including Australia, Canada Denmark and Finland--have policies that protect individual privacy. Among other member nations, Japan had initially resisted the United States proposal but was said to be moving closer to it, while Germany remained deeply divided. Most other countries, inside or outside the O.E.C.D., have yet to confront the data-scrambling issue. And even the United States has a somewhat contradictory national policy that permits citizens to use whatever data-scrambling software they wish within the nation's borders, but restricts the export of the most up-to-date computer-coding technology. That seeming contradiction, however, did not prevent the Clinton Administration in recent months from waging a vigorous behind-the-scenes effort for its proposal. And hoping to resolve some of the policy conflicts, the Administration is now circulating draft legislation on Capitol Hill which would attempt to control even the domestic use of data-scrambling software and establish a key-escrow system for the United States. While the O.E.C.D. has no authority to set international policy, its recommendations are frequently used by member nations in setting their own foreign and trade policies. And the privacy and law-enforcement aspects of the Internet are issues on which member governments have been desperate for guidance. But even though most of the O.E.C.D. discussions involved law enforcement officials, who have been the main advocates for measures that would insure their ability to crack codes, European officials say that there was never much agreement on what to do. And so the primary recommendation in the report, a copy of which was obtained by The New York Times, simply gives O.E.C.D. member nations the latitude to do as they see fit when it comes to data scrambling, which is formally known as cryptography. "National cryptography policies may allow lawful access to plain text, or cryptographic keys, or encrypted data," the report says. Privacy-rights advocates see the O.E.C.D. guidelines as a critical setback for the Clinton Administration. "The U.S. proposal to endorse lawful access to private keys was explicitly rejected by the O.E.C.D. member countries," said Marc Rotenberg of the Washington-based Electronic Privacy Information Center and a member of the O.E.C.D.'s advisory group. "The O.E.C.D. chose instead a policy based on voluntary, market-driven development of cryptography products." And even supporters of the United States position acknowledged that guidelines were a disappointment. "The United States probably had more success raising consciousness then getting language that could he treated as an endorsement for key recovery," said Stewart Baker, a former National Security Agency official who participated on the American delegation to the O.E.C.D. Meanwhile, executives for the United States computer industry were critical of the O.E.C.D. for even leaving the door open for governments to set national policies on data scrambling. "We think that markets, not governments, should be the primary determinants of technology solutions," said Jon Englund, a vice president at the Information Technology Association of America, a trade group. Many experts question whether governments can ever hope to insure law enforcement access to electronic messages or to restrict the spread of super-strong coding software, because new, more powerful versions can always be developed and easily transmitted over the Internet in the blink of an eye. And any international effort is almost certainly doomed if some countries refuse to go along with a common approach, because people looking for strong encryption can simply acquire it wherever the laws are lax. In fact, the big German company Siemens A.G. recently introduced an encryption system that it advertises as being much more powerful than American companies can export under United States law. Besides the United States, France and Britain both support a system for enabling law enforcement officials to obtain keys to data-scrambling codes. France has already passed a stringent law that requires participation in such a system, although the rules to carry out the law have not yet been worked out. And in recent days, Britain has quietly circulated the most restrictive proposal of any nation, a domestic policy under which the Government would allow private use only of cryptography that was officially licensed, to make sure that the software uses code that law enforcement officials can crack. Under such laws, of course, criminals and terrorists might logically choose to use unauthorized encryption software. But the mere fact that such use would be a crime may be a deterrent--or give the police grounds to arrest anyone whose communications were indecipherable. In Germany, encryption remains a deeply divisive issue. The Interior Ministry has supported the need for encryption restrictions of some sort, but the Justice Ministry and the Economics Ministry have both signaled their opposition. And German businesses have been outspoken opponents against any new restrictions on data scrambling. Meanwhile, United States export restrictions have been a boon for Brokat Informationssysteme G.m.b.H., a two-year-old start-up company in Boblingen, Germany. Brokat supplies secure electronic transaction software for banks like Deutsche Bank and on-line services like America Online in Europe. One of Brokat's hottest products is the Expresso Security Package which essentially adds strong encryption to the World Wide Web browsers and Internet server software sold by two of the largest American software companies-- Microsoft and Netscape Communications. [End]

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