December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

KOW_tow
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1-28-97: "New Crypto Engines From Trusted Information Systems Allow Easy International Use of Strong Encryption " By supporting any application that calls for the use of algorithms such as DES, Triple-DES, or 128-bit RC2 or RC4, "this product will allow Windows users to use encryption as easily as they use a mouse. Previously, if developers wanted to use encryption in their products, they had to consider writing two different versions, dealing with changing export regulations, and so on. Now, they can write one version of the program and sell it worldwide, knowing that the CSP will handle the encryption legally and safely." "Two Companies Set to Offer Key Recovery Services Using Technology from TIS " SourceKey and Data Securities International (DSI) have applied for approval to operate Key Recovery Centers to support exported encryption products. TIS also announced today that it is in negotiations with the National Computing Centre, Ltd. of the U.K. and Philips Crypto BV of the Netherlands to license the first non-U.S.-based Key Recovery Centers for third party use. "Burns Prepares To Reintroduce Encryption Bill" "This time around," Burns said, "we intend to put a bill on the President's desk and find out if he is truly on the side of the users and providers of rapidly expanding high-tech goods and services." It would prohibit a mandatory system under which producers or users of hardware and software would be required to surrender a decoding "key" to a third party. ----- KOW_tow

1 0

Re: OTP security
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> 1.You've got 16 hardware devices that each generate random noise. > 2.One of the devices fails (or is sabotaged) and emits a predictable stream > (10101...) > 3.The other 15 devices are just fine, and the stream generated by one > device does not effect the stream of another. > 4.You do not know of the (failure/sabotage) until *after* you've generated > your encyrted documents and they are out of your hands. > > So the revamped question is: > How secure are those documents now? Bottom line: You have lost some possible decryptions of the cyphertext. Every 16th bit is now determined therefore each 2nd byte has only 128 possible states. This, rather suprisingly, does not seem to affect the security (though I would say this is a flawed conclusion as we have a pile of sand problem here, how many grains make a pile, how many rngs can be flawed before the security is affected?) I really haven`t had the time to look at it properly, I will do so in the near future as it seems to be an interesting problem... Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

1 0

Re: Sovreign Right of Lawful Access
by tmcghan＠gill-simpson.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

according to the notorious jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> > {snip} They're getting desperate. "Sovereign Right of Lawful Access" > doesn't state HOW DIFFICULT that "access" is to be. {snip} Just might get a bit more 'difficult', if these demagogues get their grandstand play off.... >Encryption Export Bill Backed In Senate >WASHINGTON - A bipartisan group of U.S. senators has endorsed a bill >to promote U.S. exports of encryption technology by removing government >barriers on foreign sales. >"Foreign companies are fully utilizing this technology, while >Americans companies have their hands tied with draconian U.S. laws on >encryption," Sen. John Ashcroft, R-Missouri, said. >He joined Sens Conrad Burns, R-Montana and Patrick Leahy, D-Vermont >in endorsing the Promotion of Commerce Online in the Digital Era >.................^^........^..^........^.............^.......^.. >(PRO-CODE) bill. Don't you just love their cute little acronym? Must have laid awake nights thinking that one up! Thomas M. McGhan tmcghan(a)gill-simpson.com http://www.gill-simpson.com voice: (410) 467-3335 fax: (410) 235-6961 pagenet: (410) 716-1342 cellular: (410) 241-9113 ICBM: 39.395N 76.469W

1 0

The Politics of Export Restrictions - Clarified
by Rick Hornbeck 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I agree the strategy would have to be hijack-proof. Something like Gore experiencing a convenient "change of heart" towards the end of this current term and convincing Clinton and the administration to soften crypto export restrictions which would make Gore look like a hero to the high-tech community just in time for the election. Naturally this would have to be carefully scripted but the objective would be to keep the democrats in power. Just a theory. >Return-Path: <owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com> >Date: Wed, 29 Jan 1997 23:43:43 -0800 >From: Greg Broiles <gbroiles(a)netbox.com> >To: Rick Hornbeck <rnh2(a)ix.netcom.com> >Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: Re: The Politics of Export Restrictions >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > >At 09:44 PM 1/29/97 -0800, Rick Hornbeck wrote: > >>Is it possible the unreasonable crypto export restrictions are simply being >>imposed at this time for the purpose of making Al Gore look good when he >>runs for President in 2000? > >I suppose it's plausible, but it's an opportunity open to both candidates, >and more plausibly (because of lack of collaboration) to the Republicans - >e.g., Dan Quayle and the "Crypto Freedom For Americans" platform, promising >to rescue Silicon Valley from those evil regulatory Democrats. > >If I were an evil politician trying to set up a trick like you suggest, I >think I'd want a scheme that my opponent(s) couldn't hijack and use against >me. > >-- >Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: >gbroiles(a)netbox.com | >http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. > | > > >

1 0

The BrydDes descracker. Beta-version available.
by svolaf＠inet.uni-c.dk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

BrydDes is a DOS program, which issues a known plaintext attack for DES encryption. The method is brute force. ECB mode and CBC mode with known IV are supported. On a Pentium 120, this version of the program can test 369,000 keys in a second. Please note that this is a beta-release. A new version will be shipped February 11th, or earlier if errors are discovered. So far source is not included. Automatic restart from the last key tested is not supported yet, but a shell could be written. The code is tested on a Pentium, but should run on a 486. The program is available at http://inet.uni-c.dk/~svolaf/des.htm Svend Olaf PS. "Bryd" is crack or break in Danish.

1 0

Re: Rejection policy of the Cypherpunks mailing list
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > The list has been disentigrating for some time since the disgusting > > incident when Dimitri was forcibly unsubscribed from the list. > > I'm curious about the gratuitous use of the word "forcibly" by > Paul. Does this mean Gilmore took a fire axe to the computer or > something? Dimitri was unsubscribed. It was done more or less > against his will. ("More or less" because he in effect said to > John, "bet you can't stop me.") What does "forcibly" add to this > discussion besides melodrama? No force was required. John had > the right and ability to pull the plug on Dimitri. "No animals > were harmed in the making of this film." "Force," my ass. If you can honestly say you think that Dimitri agreed to his being unsubscribed and not being allowed to re-subscribe then I concede the point, however, you cannot argue this. > > have also been a number of postings from members of the list claiming > > to understand anarchism who support censorship to "protect new > > members of the list". > > There are various definitions of "censorship" and various flavors > of anarchism. I'm a market anarchist, Paul is not. Paul claims > to believe that any form of moderation is censorship. I think > that enforcing standards of decorum on a private, voluntary list > are not censorship. Reasonable minds may differ. I acknowledge > that Paul's interpretations are not without some justification. > (I just think they are incorrect in the instant case.) Paul, on > the other hand, seems to be a True Believer. He brooks no view > other than his own. (Curiously hypocritical under the > circumstrances.) My point is not that moderating a private forum is censorship, this is not supposed to be a private forum (if at any point John chooses to make it so that is his right as the list is his property, however, he professes, at least in a collective sense along with the other list founders, that it is a free and anarchic list where people would not be prevented from posting whatever they want, censorship in this context (call it moderation of you like) seems to me out of place)). > > So, there would be no intellectual dishonesty in a country claiming > > to be a free and open society "trying out" fascism for a month or > > two? - After all it`s a private country just as this is a private > > list.... > > Paul's sophistry is showing. Nation-states are entities that > exercise a monopoly on the use of force (real force, Paul) > within (and often without) their boundries. Mail lists are far > more like private homes, businesses or clubs. When you are a > guest there, you are subject to their rules of behavior. The list is indeed a private forum and I resent the term sophistry. My interpretation of the lists original purpose and idealogy is clearly different from your own so we are arguing the wrong point. My interpretation is that the list was supposed to act as a community as much as a forum and is therefore erring to the side of a nation state as opposed to private property, even though, when we come down to it it is someones property.. Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

1 0

Re: Fighting the cybercensor
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ichudov(a)algebra.com writes: > Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: > > ichudov(a)algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes: > > > > > > Why, death of Jim Bell from his own murder machine is a very exciting, I > > > would say a very Kafkian thing to happen. I am looking forward to it. I > > > even think that Jim Bell would not oppose such an outcome that much, > > > since his assination bot would be such an important invention for the > > > humanity. Maybe it will reverse the course of world history! > > > > Igor, you keep misspelling "assassination" as in "talk.politics.assassinati > > an unmoderated Usenet newsgroup carried by all honorable Usenet providers. > > No, I knew what was the correct spelling, but I like the shorter one > more. It sounds funny to me. > > - Igor. > It looks like Igor has made it to Sandy's list of "flamers" whose every submission is procmailed to "cypherpunks-flames". The above quote is crypto-relevant (as is assassination politics) and contains no flames. it was tossed into "cypherpunks-flames" by a robot. The time stamps clearly show that Sandy didn't even look at it. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

2 1

RE: Fighting the cybercensor
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:16 PM 1/28/97 -0800, Sean Roach wrote: >At 10:47 PM 1/27/97 -0800, jim bell wrote: >>In the current political system, in the US for instance, 51% of the >>population is able to screw the remaining 49%, just as long as they can >>maintain the majority. Or, perhaps even more accurately and ominously, a >>tiny fraction of the population (the current leadership class) is able to >>screw the 49%, as long as they have the un-thinking backing of the remaining >>and relatively uninvolved 51%. >> >>AP disables this system. AP turns government into the moral equivalent of a >>pick-up football game: Nobody is being forced to play, and everybody and >>anybody can simply "get up and leave" whenever he wants to. The moment the >>"rules of the game" to make an individual's continued participation >>unsatisfying, he can leave. >> >... >In our society, which, if I remember correctly, 10% of the population >control 90% of the wealth, AP would only lead to 10% of the population being >able to screw the remaining 90%. At least as it is, it takes a simple majority. No, that doesn't work. AP does involve money, that's true, but what "the poor" lack in individual assets they make up for in numbers. And AP implements a sort of "mutual disarmament," by not only preventing that 10% from screwing the 90%, but also prevents the 90% from screwing the 10%. >As for the murder of the rich, here is a scenerio. > >A collection of poor pool their capitol to have a tyrant killed. >The tyrant assembles a counter-wager saying that anyone able to prove thier >ability to kill him without harming him, and who can show they got through >will get 110% of the poor's bid. Question: Where does he get the money for the reward? If he gets it through taxation, he'll anger the people who were taxed and they'll pay to see him die. If he got in through taxation in the past, enough people will STILL be angry enough with him to see him dead. His employees (the ones who probably have the most opportunity to kill him) would be made just about as wealthy by killing him as taking him up on his odd offer. Worse, for him, is that he'd lose money paying off those people if they showed they could have "succeeded." Even if they were not motivated to actually kill him, they'd be motived to SHOW they could kill him, and notice that they'll become just about as rich for KILLING him as merely showing they can! Notice that your idea also assumes that an employee has to become willing to, in effect, plot against his employer in such a way that he can be assured that his actions won't be incorrectly interpretated as a genuine assassination attempt. How can you (or anyone else?) tell the difference until the plan either succeeds or fails?) Moreover, how can the employee trust that his boss will actually honor his promise? I think you're also (falsely) assuming that a deliberately-unsuccessful assassination demonstration immunizes the tyrant from a repeat performance. True, it's often useful to know what kinds of attacks are possible, but that doesn't mean that the system can be fixed to prevent future repetitions... The tyrant, then, either loses his life or a lot of money, and he still can't trust anybody. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

1 0

Re: Fighting the cybercensor
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Sean Roach wrote: >> At 08:15 PM 1/28/97 -0800, Steve Schear wrote: >> >I think a hole in your thinking is to assume that the assasins have no >> >motive other than financial gain. I would submit that there are those that >> >have the skills, training and a political agenda coherent with the >> >wagerers, lacking only the financial incentive to make the risks >> >acceptable. These wetworkers won't consider accepting the bribe of the >> >rich/powerful > >> This may be true, but the example was to show how easy a defensive line >> could be thrown up around the powerful. For example, conventional body >> guards could be included, ones with no real pay but with the fore knowledge >> that they will be buried with the tyrant. These body guards could be ten >> children out of each local village. Merely a human shield. > >[snippo] > >In Prizzi's Honor, Nicholson sez "If you try to hide in a submarine on >the bottom of the ocean, we will find you". But it's not even that >difficult. Lob a missile into the place and blow it up. Earth >penetrators are getting better too, for the Sadaam types. And >there's a zillion more. Does this "rich person" really want to >spend his/her life living in a sealed tomb? Yep. Chemical Biological Weapons (CBW), the choice of many future terrorists and assassins, can now be produced by anyone with a solid background in organic chemistry or microbiology and a relatively modest amount of funding (< USD 10,000). Delivery can be by any number of means, including: static (e.g., planted at a location in wait for the target and remotely triggered, for example by a pager. Cost less than USD 500) or dynamic (e.g., a small remotely piloted or autonomous aircraft, for example, a modified giant-scale RC plane. Cost less than USD 3000 if remotely controlled, USD 5000-10,000 if autonomous using DGPS guidance). EE experience is assumed. If the assassin is unconcerned with collateral damage his success depends only on knowing where his target will be and when. Since CBW agents can have a considerable kill zone there is no need for 'crosshair' accuracy. --Steve

1 0

Just ask you a question
by biz25＠prodigy.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I just want to ask you a question. This is not "unsolicated" email. Do you want me to post you the URL & information if you are MLM & Business Opportinuties Seeker? Please put "SUBSCRIBE" in the subject line. I will put your name on my list. You may give me your new URL. I will send your URL to the people who are on the "Subscribe" email list. If you don't want me to post you the URL & information, please type "UNSUBSCRIBE" in the subject line. I will remove your name on my list. Thanks, Sonia

1 0