December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Guardian on EU-FBI Wiretap Pact
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to CM. The Guardian Weekly, Volume 156, Issue 9 Week ending March 2, 1997, Page 4: UK to join FBI phone taps Richard Norton-Taylor and Alison Daniels BRITAIN has secretly agreed with its European Union partners to set up an international telecommunications tapping system in co-operation with the FBI, it was revealed on Monday. The agreement covers telephones and written communications -- telexes, faxes and e-mail. To make tapping easier, telecommunications companies will be obliged to give security and intelligence agencies the key to codes installed in equipment sold to private customers. Detailed plans are being drawn up by officials in a secret network of EU committees established under the "third pillar" of the Maastricht Treaty, covering co-operation on law and order issues. Civil liberties groups, while agreeing that there was a need for such an agreement to fight against serious crime, said the plans raised a number of privacy and data protection issues and must be the subject of a full public debate. Britain is an enthusiastic supporter of joint action in this area, which is conducted on an inter-governmental basis with no role for the European Commission, the European Parliament or the European Court of Justice. It is an area where the EU's "democratic deficit" is most evident. Key points of the plan are outlined in a memorandum of understanding signed by EU states in 1995, which is still classified. It reflects increasing concern among European intelligence agencies that modern technology will prevent them from tapping private communications. EU governments agreed to co-operate closely with the FBI in Washington as they work out detailed plans. ----- As posted yesterday, for a report on EU-FBI wiretapping: http://www.privacy.org/pi/activities/tapping/

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No Subject
by Bohus Simek 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Blowfish
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim C[retin] May prefers to have sex with little kids because his own penis is like that of a three-year-old. _ o |<)_/# Tim C[retin] May TT <T

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer(a)lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer(a)hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 3 Mar 97 6:45:58 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de -++++++++-++ 1:22:34 99.99% hidden remailer(a)hidden.net *++.-# 5:22:40 99.98% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com ###--*.###-# 2:44:25 99.98% nym config(a)nym.alias.net +*#*#+**+-++ 16:11 99.98% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com *+#*#+#++#*# 2:24 99.95% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net ------------ 5:40:48 99.94% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net -+ *++*+ *** 28:51 99.63% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com __.._--__.-+ 22:39:55 99.55% replay remailer(a)replay.com --**++**+*** 15:52 99.41% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com ---+---._. 3:25:41 99.03% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com - -- -_*--- 2:17:36 98.95% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com -++++++ +++ 44:00 98.82% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net .- +- -. - 1:12:29 96.16% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ** *** +* 53:49 94.54% shaman remailer(a)lycaeum.org *+++++ + 24:17 91.73% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net ##-+*+ ## 9:05 91.47% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com . _ 91:28:31 89.63% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de -+++ 59:37 21.19% wazoo remailer(a)wazoo.com 37:27 -5.74% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Military Snooping
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green posted the message below elsewhere which raises provocative questions about military snooping on the Net to combat anonymizers and remailers: [Forward] At the FC'97 rump session, Paul Syverson from NRL presented a paper titled "Onion Routing". The description of the system sounds very much like Wei Dai's PipeNet. However, the development team seems to be unaware of PipeNet and the discussions about it that we had in the past. NLR has currently five machines implementing the protocol. Connection setup time is claimed to be 500 ms. They are looking for volunteers to run "Onion Routers". It appears the US military wants to access websites without giving away the fact that they are accessing the sites and is looking to us to provide the cover traffic. What a fortunate situation. They said that the source would soon be on the web page, but so far it has not appeared. http://www.itd.nrl.navy.mil/ITD/5540/projects/onion-routing/ [End forward] For those who don't want NRL snooping on their accesses, we've put three of the Onion-Routing papers at: http://jya.com/onion.htm http://jya.com/privnet.htm http://jya.com/hri.htm (a conversion from PDF)

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Re: DES Challenge / Who'da Thunk It?
by Cynthia H. Brown 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 3 Mar 1997, Sean Roach wrote: > At 02:36 PM 3/3/97 +0100, James Morris wrote: > ... > >Actually, there's a theory that the secret recipies for Coke, Pepsi and > >Kentucky Fried Chicken are part of a biological chinese lottery, where > >the results are collected via satellite-based spectrometry of atmospheric > >methane radicals. Note that children who are too young for these foods > >will quite happily eat Crayola. > > > >More than this I cannot say. > > You might be interested to know that Pepsi owns Kentucky Fried Chicken. > Take a look at the supply trucks some time, Taco Bell, Hot & Now (whatever > that is), Kentucky Fried Chicken, and Pizza Hut are all Pepsico subsidaries. > I'd say that the chips are weighted heavily on one side. Hope you know > which numbers to bet on. I'd lay my $ on the suppliers of red dye #3, yellow dye #7, etc., and get Pepsi, Coke and Crayola fanciers all at once. Cynthia =============================================================== Cynthia H. Brown, P.Eng. E-mail: cynthb(a)iosphere.net | PGP Key: See Home Page Home Page: http://www.iosphere.net/~cynthb/ Junk mail will be ignored in the order in which it is received. Klein bottle for rent; enquire within.

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NSA Sued by Cryptographer
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We've received from Anonymous a copy of a February 28, 1997, complaint against NSA by an ex-Sandia cryptographer: http://jya.com/nsasuit.txt (41K) The cryptographer, William Payne, was: project leader for the Missile Secure Cryptographic Unit [MSCU] at Sandia between about 1982 and 1986. The MSCU was funded by NSA. Payne designed and built the hardware/software data authenticator for the US/USSR Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for Sandia between 1986 and 1992. Payne held SECRET clearance when Payne worked for the Navy, DOE Q clearance, crypto and SCI access while at Sandia. The document says that Payne was a source for the Baltimore Sun story on NSA's "spiking" deal with CryptoAG*, and other stories, after he was fired in 1992 for attacking the quality of NSA's cryptography. It includes descriptions of agreements between Sandia and NSA, algorithms, critiques and procedures. A sample: Payne revealed to the public the value 31. "The algorithm required stepping two of its internal registers at a rate many times the data rate." NSA believes that 31 is classified. Payne believes that this is classification abuse. Therefore, Payne issued a FOIA to NSA crypto-mathematician Brian Snow also on June 10, 1996. I found no evidence that NSA possesses any special crypto skills, and apparently hides its deficiencies behind the veil of classification abuse. To the contrary, I discovered generic deficient crypto work. We brought this to the attention of NSA. Sandia even offered to help NSA fix its deficient crypto work. And NSA attempted to correct its deficient crypto work. Therefore, under 5 USC 522b I request access all technical documentation on, 1 Benincasa's original NSS/USO algorithm, 2 Benincasa's revision of 1, 3 The Unkenholtz - Judy GRANITE algorithm, 4 Your MSCU algorithm, 5 the clipper algorithm, 6 the STU III algorithms. I feel that published analyses of the above 6 algorithms will show the Clinton administration, congress, and the public that NSA possess no superior knowledge of crypto matters. Payne received no response from NSA. ---------- * "Cryptographic units were 'spiked' so that the crypto key was transmitted ['covert channel'] with the cipher text." For more on the CryptoAG story see: http://jya.com/cryptoa2.htm

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2-way anonymous ecash ?
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Peter Foldiak <Peter.Foldiak(a)st-andrews.ac.uk> Newsgroups: sci.crypt On http://www.digicash.com/ecash/aboutcrime.html Digicash says: "... ecash is not at all well suited for black markets, extortion, bribes and tax evasion. The reason is that only the payer is anonymous, the recipient of the money has no anonymity at all. Furthermore, all money that the payee receives must be given to the bank. It is not possible to hide from the bank the fact that you received money (and thereby hide it from the authorities). So tax-evasion is definitely out. For people who operate black markets the same story holds. First of all, their income is visible. The second reason is far better: if any of the customers ever wants to, he can prove that a certain payment was made by him. This means that a criminal accepting ecash can be identified with the retroactive help one of his customers. ..." Is this really true under all circumstances? Can (some kind of) e-cash be made truly two-way anonymous, like physical cash?

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Re: Presidential decrees and emergency powers
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>We've put the full 50USC Chapter 35 -- International Emergency Economic >Powers at: > > http://jya.com/50usc35.txt (284K) Thanks. This contains (among other things) the interesting Executive Order: >Continuation of National Emergency Declared by Ex. Ord. No. 12924 > >Notice of President of the United States, dated Aug. 15, 1995, 60 F.R. 42767, >provided: > >On August 19, 1994, consistent with the authority provided me under the >International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), I >issued Executive Order No. 12924 [set out above]. In that order, I declared a >national emergency with respect to the unusual and extraordinary threat to >the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States in >light of the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended >(50 U.S.C. 2401 et seq.). Because the Export Administration Act has not been >renewed by the Congress, the national emergency declared on August 19, 1994, >must continue in effect beyond August 19, 1995. Therefore, in accordance with >section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am >continuing the national emergency declared in Executive Order No. 12924. So the fact that Congress won't continue a law is justification for declaring an emergency which is justification for continuing it by presidential decree instead. Scary. Unfortunately it doesn't list all the earlier, expired decrees which would show what was originally used to start this thing off ("... the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States in light of the British army currently marching on Washington" perhaps?) Peter.

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RE: It is time to break Authenticode
by John Lehmann (SSASyd) 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Microsoft's recent arrogant and irresponsible reply to the Chaos > Computer Club hack on ActiveX requires response. An effective response > would be to steal the key of a major code signer and produce a signed, > malicious ActiveX control. Such an attack would demonstrate the > serious problems of Microsoft's security philosophy. > > ... > > The best avenue of attack is stealing the secret key of a respected > code signer. The target should be one of the major players, if not > Microsoft itself. Someone is sloppy to store their secret key on a It really should be Microsoft, for good exposure. > getting signatures right is well understood. Still, does anyone have > information on exactly how the signatures work? http://www.microsoft.com/kb/articles/q159/8/93.htm > > Stealing the key itself will almost certainly be an illegal act. > Morally, the demonstration signed control should itself not do damage. > Something like the Exploder control (which warns the user before > shutting down the machine) should be good enough to show the flaws of > ActiveX without causing trouble. The most interesting abuse the ActiveX thet I've heard of was a company that released an ActiveX control that modified the security manager used to verify and pass ActiveX controls, essentially registerring their company as a trusted provider. Thus once this one control was accepted, all other controls signed by that company were automatically accepted by the browser. The company quickly retracted the control and claimed that the authentication abuse was a feature put in while the control was in beta-cycle and accidently left in when it was finally released. Oops! (This was reported on the www-security mailing list, but I have lost the ref) Perhaps an interesting "nudie screensaver" control could be made to mail any Root.cer Cert.cer and Cert.spc (I guess) files lying around on the target computer to a well known mailing-list... One wonders whether it would even be illegal. *sigh* I suppose it would be. -- JJL

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