December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

PROTECT YOUR FAMILY
by IQ Mailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

*+*+ This message is provided under the strict C.A.R.E. Code of Ethics. (Conscientious Advertising through Responsible E-mail). You can view the code at: iq-internet.com/care.html PROTECT YOUR FAMILY My LIFECARD does exactly that. You or any member of your famil will have instant worldwide access to a wide range of potentially life saving medical and personal information in case of an emergency. SAFETY SECURITY PEACE OF MIND MYLIFECARD was the first TRUE medical emergency information card and is STILL the state of the art. You spend THOUSANDS of dollars a year to protect your family's health. You owe it to your family to spend a few pennies a day for MYLIFECARD. DON'T DELAY!!!!! FOR MORE INFORMATION: Type in the word INFORMATION in the body of your message and hit reply. *+*+ To REMOVE your name from our list *+*+ reply with NO MAIL in the subject line.

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USAF Hack mirror
by skeeve＠skeeve.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Another hack mirror up.... http://www.skeeve.net/usaf/ so far I have: Central Intelligence Agency - http://www.skeeve.net/cia/ US Department of Justice - http://www.skeeve.net/doj/ Kreigman Furs - http://www.skeeve.net/kriegsman/ US Air Force - http://www.skeeve.net/usaf/ we these people never learn... put your webserver on CDrom today ;) anyone else know of any other mirrors... i heard www.nasa.gov recently got done.. anyone have a mirror i can add to the collection? --------------------------------------------------------------------- | Skeeve Stevens - MyInternet personal.url: http://www.skeeve.net/ | | email://skeeve@skeeve.net/ work.url: http://www.myinternet.net/ | | phone://612.9869.3334/ mobile://0414.SKEEVE/ [753-383] | ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Cryptanalysis Trainer
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:05 PM 12/29/96 -0500, John Young wrote: >We've transcribed from PDF to ASCII the cryptanalysis >program in Appendix F of the US Army's Field Manual >FM 34-40-2, Basic Cryptanalysis, September, 1990. > > http://jya.com/appf.htm Why does it not surprise me that the code is in BASIC... BTW, the link to the PDF does not work. Seems the CGI they use to feed the pdf files is broken. (Or someone paniced and pulled it in a manner that broke the CGI. Would not be the first time...) --- | If you're not part of the solution, You're part of the precipitate. | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/ |alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com|

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HOW TO HACK www.pgp.com -- stupid CGI script xploit
by Secret Squirrel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Go to www.pgp.com Go To "Keyserver" Go To "Query" In the search window, type `whoami` (note the back quotes). Watch for result. How stupid. Seems to be a common problem of cgi scripts. like the one in norway... xaxaxa

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 30 Dec 96 6:48:57 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net +#*#+#+ 1:44 99.99% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de +++++++ 1:06:00 99.99% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com +++++++ 33:39 99.98% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com -++++++ 1:11:39 99.98% nym config(a)nym.alias.net *##*### :19 99.97% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net ------+ 1:37:49 99.97% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ++++++ 1:06:32 99.96% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com ------ 2:20:53 99.86% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com _ .-*+* 17:45:40 99.70% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com **** +* 8:06 99.55% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net * **+* 29:35 99.50% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com *##** * 1:02 99.43% replay remailer(a)replay.com * -** + 1:13:13 98.96% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com --- - 7:19:53 95.17% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net .-.- - 10:43:57 91.13% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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New crypto regs online
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hola, The new regs for crypto exports are available at: http://www.epic.org/crypto/export_controls/interim_regs_12_96.html Dave ========================================================================= David Banisar (Banisar(a)epic.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel) Electronic Privacy Information Center * 202-547-5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * HTTP://www.epic.org Washington, DC 20003 PGP Key: http://www.epic.org/staff/banisar/key.html =========================================================================

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Just another government fuckover: New crypto regulations
by Attila T. Hun 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- books are and have been protected prior to the US Constitution. one can presume books with crypto source code would be protected accordingly; one Federal judge (Patel in SF) has ruled source code is protected under freedom of speech and therefore can be published; yet another judge in the Washington area has ruled it is not. There is no question the feds will appeal Patel's ruling in the Ninth Circuit (known to be pro rights in general, but difficult to predict). eventually it will go to the US Supreme Court. my personal opinion is the Supreme Court will rule against it using a rationale that the actual source code sections of a book can be classified as can any other intellectual property under the National Security Act. Secondly, they will not consider that form of speech an inalienable right. I had my rounds with the bastards years ago, no fucking humour whatsoever, and prone to use the IRS to enforce what the courts could not afford to enforce due to the requirements of disclosure in the courtroom at the time (which have since been plugged); and if that does not work, set you up for financial fraud, fraud by wire, or dope. Today dope is the perfect charge; it has been whipped into a frenzy by the feds and their CIA infiltrated media. let me assure any doubters the real extent of terror which the spooks can apply. the US Government has not been a legal government for years; it is a private club which can be bought, and its services sold to the highest bidder. It is a collection of whores who are part of a cabal of the very rich and powerful; it is totally unaccountable to the public it represents. Waco, Ruby Ridge, and the bombing of their own federal building in Oklahoma City in order to scare Joe Couch Potato into giving up personal freedoms for security are perfect examples of a government drunk on it owns powers. Just like Oswald, they have a perfect patsy with the defendants in OKC. P.J. O'Rourke states it correctly: "And the Clinton administration launched an attack on people in Texas because those people were religious nuts with guns. Hell, this country was founded by religious nuts with guns." O'Rourke also said: "Giving money and power to the government is like giving whiskey and car keys to teenaged boys" and there is no better example than the cocaine stoned, reckless mentality of Bill Clinton. an important fact to keep in mind in US judicial review: few of the judges can be relied on 1) to resist pressure from the Feds and 2) to take the rights of the people seriously and as 'inalienable rights.' this may sound pessimistic and cynical, but the courts have been sliding, in some cases rather quickly, to a position that echoes the UN Bill of Rights: the UN's "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" (ICCR): Article 18 states that "everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion" but specifies that "freedom to manifest one's religions or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and necessary..." in other words, I do not think we will see the feds permit the use of books to export cryptography. this almost becomes irrelevant outside the academic world in the provisions of the regs which effectively block hardware or software products and in effect seem to cut off the loophole of US companies funding overseas operations and importing the results, etc. the new regs basically ban it all ways. and the new regs are not the supposedly improved and friendly versions promised --they are draconian. books are an intellectual 'solution' to the problem. the real problem is the hardware. in order to negate governments and their virtually stated intentions of blocking our inalienable freedoms, particularly freedom of speach, we must be able to distribute universal crypto worldwide, and be able to improve it as the shadow governments of the various spook shows improve their ability to break our code. this last round on the ITARs blew out distribution. asking visitors to your web sites if they are U.S. citizens is not going to be sufficient for Bubba's goons: Janet Reno and Jamie Gorlich. the only real solution is guerilla warfare; anonymous distribution; overseas' establishment of clearing houses for updates and source code. freedom of information is just that simple; there are no compromises. Patrick Henry said: "Give me Liberty or Give me Death." publish, publish, and civil disobedience. Patrick Henry used handbills. knowledge is knowledge --get it in the public domain, and in the public's hands even if you must go door to door like a fuller brush salesman... but your product is free and it is for their freedom. don't waste your time getting out the vote; get out there and fight. contribute. if you do not have the balls to do it, you are not for freedom. the only natural cure for corrupt government is bright sunshine. and a rope. == Tyranny Insurance by Colt Manufacturing Co. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 Comment: Encrypted with 2.6.3i. Requires 2.6 or later. iQCVAwUBMsd+nb04kQrCC2kFAQGxVQP5AUM06j8anB3MLUzMUe8WjOqhVwPjSd7d RhaGyrRwAdSpU1CPSYNX9+zsTnaJtgsN0rQYLrbKQD1eKDPKAQlnz5vJ6SAVhRwi nNF2e4Pj/wD7SVBwHFmjsaOpWmNx9+ON++/EZNbs3c3nH/2n7tiC7eJJcte+apNE G3lwdSSxXhU= =MD+E -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Export proposal
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:24 PM 12/29/96 -0800, sameer wrote: [...] > Stewart Baker has been quoted as saying that banned "easily >scanned printed texts" isn't far away. (Rebecca Vesely's Wired News >article) The language of the new regulations supports this view. It seems to me that the USG wanted to ban easily scannable text, but wasn't sure how to best define "easily scannable". This is a property that is difficult to define. Once they come up with a workable definition, expect the regs to be amended. >We are now just one step away from non-GAK crypto being >illegal in the US. As Michael Froomkin has noted, this will require an act of Congress. I expect the administration to send a pro-GAK bill to Congress in 1997. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred Make your mark in the history of mathematics. Use the spare cycles of your PC/PPC/UNIX box to help find a new prime. http://www.mersenne.org/prime.htm

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Re: "Structuring" of Communications a Felony?
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:11 PM 12/29/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: > >For example, while citizen-units in the United States are free to move to >new locales without permission and without registration, unlike in some >countries, the tax collector expects a valid home (or at least mailing) >address on tax returns. There is no requirement that you list a home address just as there is no requirement that you have a home. A mailing address anywhere on earth is sufficient for tax purposes. The form *says* home address but no one's done any time for not putting one on the form (right Brian). Proving that you had another home than the one listed on the date you filled out the form is beyond the capability of even the federal government. The instructions even say "use P.O. Box only if the Post Office doesn't deliver mail to your home" but don't say anything about mail receiving services and so forth. If you know how, you can even wander into most rural post offices and get a P.O. box in an area that doesn't have home delivery without living in the vicinity or proving it. Addresses are much too slippery things to control very well with the US model. DCF

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Re: "Structuring" of Communications a Felony?
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:08 PM 12/29/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >As to the "anonymous speech" rulings, I mainly know of the 1956 Georgia >case, in which the Supremes struck down a law requiring that leaflets >handed out have a name attached. I don't know of more recent rulings, >especially ones related to the Internet. This was upheld by another recent case involving an anonymous pamphlet from an Ohio woman. >If origin-labelling is unconstitutional, as Steve claims, then on what >basis can the U.S. Postal Service require identification for packages over >one pound? Surely what is inside the package may be considered "speech" (by >those interested in pushing the point). The new rule doesn't require that ID be presented at the Post Office. You just have to present the package in person and fill out a form. They could try and require ID later, of course. >And there are many other situations where anonymity is no longer allowed, >where once it was. The gambling example Brian Davis brought up is an >example: for the purposes of tax collection, regulation of gambling, etc., >winners of nontrivial amounts must identify themselves. They have to identify themselves they don't have to present identification (an important distinction). Brian also pointed out that the guy could have avoided the problem if he'd been smarter. >1. A sharp increase in spamming, mass mailing, threatening letters, >etc....sort of like the "denial of service" and spamming/looping attacks >seen here on Cypherpunks, and being seen widely on the Net. This will >increase pressure to "do something about it." A Senator Exon type person >will introduce legislation to require e-mail be labelled. If they have yet to successfully mandate positive ID for bank or credit accounts, how can they expect to successfully mandate positive ID for something as ephemeral as an Email account? >In closing, I think the Supreme Court will, when it eventually agrees to >hear a relevant case, will differentiate between protected anonymous speech >in public forums and the labelling of sealed packages, sealed letters, and >sealed e-mail. They will argue along the lines of saying that the labelling >law is for the protection of society and not for tracking down dissidents. >The effect will of course be the same, but this will be the fig leaf which >allows them to uphold such laws. Though they have not done so over the several centuries we've had anonymous postal mail. DCF

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