December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Machine readable form (was:RE: [DES] DES Key Recovery Project, Progress Report #7)
by Anil Das 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Jan 29, 2:23pm, Phil Karn wrote: > Subject: Re: Machine readable form (was:RE: [DES] DES Key Recovery Project > I think you're being far too subtle here. The issues have been clearly > drawn in my case. The government is also now officially on record as > reserving the authority to regulate the exports of even paper copies > of cryptographic source code (e.g., books). But isn't your case still based on the arbitrariness of prohibiting the export of a floppy while allowing the export of a book containing the same information, unlike the Bernstein case, which is based on the constitutional protection for free speech? That is the impression I got from the various press reports and web pages. -- Anil Das

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RE: Fighting the cybercensor
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:15 PM 1/28/97 -0800, Steve Schear wrote: >I think a hole in your thinking is to assume that the assasins have no >motive other than financial gain. I would submit that there are those that >have the skills, training and a political agenda coherent with the >wagerers, lacking only the financial incentive to make the risks >acceptable. These wetworkers won't consider accepting the bribe of the >rich/powerful This may be true, but the example was to show how easy a defensive line could be thrown up around the powerful. For example, conventional body guards could be included, ones with no real pay but with the fore knowledge that they will be buried with the tyrant. These body guards could be ten children out of each local village. Merely a human shield. In an attack, they would scatter, but the parents would know that the children would die if a successful action were taken against the tyrant. Also, the tyrant could put an open bounty on anyone caught trying to harm him. Just bring the decapitated head of the assassin along with a VHS cassette of the attempted action for a big reward. By layering the defenses, it becomes increasingly difficult for anyone to get through. Obviously the castles walls are the first line of defense, so a reward is given for anyone caught using any entrance to the fortress except those that are provided. The household is told that their participation will result in the extermination of their families. They are then told that if they know of an impending action and fail to report it or attempt to stop it, they are considered party it those actions. A human shield of innocents is "given the privaledge to live in the fortress with our great leader" so that actions by concerned parties is limited further. A standing bounty is placed on the head of the assassin, who so ever brings in the head of the assassin and all children parented by that person after the assination will be given a reward of some set sum. Probably 110%. A bounty is set on security breaches, this bounty would probably be 110% of the death mark on the tyrant. A series of more conventional boobytraps are layed in normally inaccessable areas, the layers of these either being prisoners who have unknowningly been condemned to die, the tyrant himself, or some other disposable or trustable deployment device. The most common of these would probably be a mine field between the two outer most walls of the fortress, and maybe a funnel-gun parimeter inside of that. An inner sanctum with self contained air, water, and food is maintained for the tyrant and h[is/er] closest relatives/advisors. This sanctum would be accessed by biometrics and only used in a percieved emergency. All dissent is declared illegal with capitol punishment for the mere discussion of the impending death of the tyrant, exceptions to this would be persons in the direct company of the tyrant with the tyrants full awareness, and permission.

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Re: Best Computer School?
by Cynthia H. Brown 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Mon 27 Jan, SpyKing queried: > This is a little off topic but maybe someone can help. I've got a > teenage son (HS sophomore) who's interested in majoring in computer > science in college with a particular interest in cryptography. He's > leaning toward MIT. Any suggestions from list members as to colleges > to investigate? Avi Rubin at NYU has compiled a list of all security- and crypto- related university courses that he is aware of. The URL is: http://www.cs.nyu.edu/~rubin/courses.html (This was posted on sci.crypt a couple of weeks ago.) Hope this gives a starting point, Cynthia -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: cp850 iQCVAwUBMu/0bpOg7xGCJGQtAQEEPgP8DIMqGqUmGWXtWWrQpv7OP+iIFxegwS9J 6+ZRg1OeB/ivLV2ZTvPbyZJ5a0zevrGIM4uPPjt2YQVLdpyZrpWm0TNPlPE4bgb8 hWEKkpfF8HVRF5jf4s80x3nhmtMzRLSSXy9L03f/m+I45l9HkTOQ4tX7U3WE42ea 9rGdR7SUm1U= =qDPt -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- =============================================================== Cynthia H. Brown Ottawa, Ontario, Canada E-mail: cynthb(a)sonetis.com Home Page: http://www.sonetis.com/~cynthb/ PGP Key: See Home Page Junk mail will be ignored in the order in which it is received. It is morally as bad not to care whether a thing is true or not, so long as it makes you feel good, as it is not to care how you got your money as long as you have got it. - Edmund Way Teale, "Circle of the Seasons"

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Re: PGPmail for Windows, Version 4.5
by Robert Rothenburg 'Walking-Owl' 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 27 Jan 97 at 22:39, Alan Olsen wrote: You wrote: > I would like to see PGPMail support Pegusus Mail for the reason that I have > used the crypto plug-in for Pegusus and found it inadiquate for general > usage. Same here. The PGP plug in was awful... (if it didn't find the key... and the key had to have the exact user-id you were mailing to) it sent it out in the clear. A serious bug. > Pegusus's current crypto hooks do not deal well with remailers and multiple > keys. PGPMail does not deal with remailers as well as I would like, but it > is far easier to use than the Pegusus solution. Might be worth making suggestions to the Pegasus Mail team... now that PGPMail is out, they could 'modify' the plug-ins for Version 3.0 (which I hear they are working on). Since it's made in New Zealand, there's no ITAR/EAR problems. As for remailers, once crypto is plugged in, a remailer plug-in with would work. (That's possibly an easy-enough hack too.) An API for PGPMail you'd be a nice thing... then one can write apps to use it. Rob ----- "The word to kill ain't dirty | Robert Rothenburg (WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com) I used it in the last line | http://www.asb.com/usr/wlkngowl/ but use a short word for lovin' | Se habla PGP: Reply with the subject and dad you wind up doin' time." | 'send pgp-key' for my public key.

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Making OCR'ed code transfer easier
by miner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A month or two ago someone related their experience with OCRing code and getting it to work; even when it compiled correctly there were still subtle errors that he/she had to spend hours finding. With the recent threads on OCRing the DES cracker I was thinking of ways to make it more foolproof without going so far that the FEDs would get excited. If the author/publisher was to include a hash of the source code the person doing the scanning would know when it was good without having to compile it and then run it to discover there were still errors in the source. A hash per page of code would be even easier as it would localize the errors to a more manageable area, or even more sophisticated methods could be used to localize any errors. How far you could go in providing feedback on the correctness of the OCR process without getting the FEDs all excited is the question. Just a thought miner

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Re: Best Computer School?
by Cynthia H. Brown 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Mon 27 Jan, SpyKing queried: > This is a little off topic but maybe someone can help. I've got a > teenage son (HS sophomore) who's interested in majoring in computer > science in college with a particular interest in cryptography. He's > leaning toward MIT. Any suggestions from list members as to colleges > to investigate? Avi Rubin at NYU has compiled a list of all security- and crypto- related university courses that he is aware of. The URL is: http://www.cs.nyu.edu/~rubin/courses.html (This was posted on sci.crypt a couple of weeks ago.) Hope this gives a starting point, Cynthia -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: cp850 iQCVAwUBMu/0bpOg7xGCJGQtAQEEPgP8DIMqGqUmGWXtWWrQpv7OP+iIFxegwS9J 6+ZRg1OeB/ivLV2ZTvPbyZJ5a0zevrGIM4uPPjt2YQVLdpyZrpWm0TNPlPE4bgb8 hWEKkpfF8HVRF5jf4s80x3nhmtMzRLSSXy9L03f/m+I45l9HkTOQ4tX7U3WE42ea 9rGdR7SUm1U= =qDPt -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- =============================================================== Cynthia H. Brown Ottawa, Ontario, Canada E-mail: cynthb(a)sonetis.com Home Page: http://www.sonetis.com/~cynthb/ PGP Key: See Home Page Junk mail will be ignored in the order in which it is received. It is morally as bad not to care whether a thing is true or not, so long as it makes you feel good, as it is not to care how you got your money as long as you have got it. - Edmund Way Teale, "Circle of the Seasons"

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Re: AltaVista sprouts a hole ...
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On or About 29 Jan 97 at 2:13, Rich Graves wrote: > Yes, I mentioned that here and in comp.org.eff.talk a couple weeks > ago. No need to turn images off. Just tell AltaVista you want > text-only: > > http://altavista.digital.com/cgi-bin/query?pg=&text=yes > > You may also find the text-only page a hell of a lot faster. Funny you should mention this. It's the only search engine I use, and it's the one on my "links" site. http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia/links.html Ross =-=-=-=-=-=- Ross Wright King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia Voice: 415-206-9906

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Re: Workaround for filtering/cybersitter
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 29 Jan 1997 17:33:41 -0500, you wrote: >If I had experience with Netscape plugins and spare time, I'd >try it myself. But here's my proposed solution. >A plugin in Netscape intercepts all requests, encrypt the URL >with a pubkey algorithm, encode the string base64, send it as GET input to >a proxy server. >The proxy server decodes and decrypts the URL, gets the requested page, >and returns it. This beats out URL-based filtering. Depends who is doing the filtering? If it's mom and dad keeping you from looking at naughty pix, maybe. If it's the gov't keeping you from looking at subversive sites, maybe not: they'll go out of their way to block such proxies, and in some countries you could get in hellish trouble for owning such a plug-in. Rob

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Re: AltaVista sprouts a hole ...
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On or About 29 Jan 97 at 2:13, Rich Graves wrote: > Yes, I mentioned that here and in comp.org.eff.talk a couple weeks > ago. No need to turn images off. Just tell AltaVista you want > text-only: > > http://altavista.digital.com/cgi-bin/query?pg=&text=yes > > You may also find the text-only page a hell of a lot faster. Funny you should mention this. It's the only search engine I use, and it's the one on my "links" site. http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia/links.html Ross =-=-=-=-=-=- Ross Wright King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia Voice: 415-206-9906

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Re: PGPmail for Windows, Version 4.5
by Robert Rothenburg 'Walking-Owl' 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 27 Jan 97 at 22:39, Alan Olsen wrote: You wrote: > I would like to see PGPMail support Pegusus Mail for the reason that I have > used the crypto plug-in for Pegusus and found it inadiquate for general > usage. Same here. The PGP plug in was awful... (if it didn't find the key... and the key had to have the exact user-id you were mailing to) it sent it out in the clear. A serious bug. > Pegusus's current crypto hooks do not deal well with remailers and multiple > keys. PGPMail does not deal with remailers as well as I would like, but it > is far easier to use than the Pegusus solution. Might be worth making suggestions to the Pegasus Mail team... now that PGPMail is out, they could 'modify' the plug-ins for Version 3.0 (which I hear they are working on). Since it's made in New Zealand, there's no ITAR/EAR problems. As for remailers, once crypto is plugged in, a remailer plug-in with would work. (That's possibly an easy-enough hack too.) An API for PGPMail you'd be a nice thing... then one can write apps to use it. Rob ----- "The word to kill ain't dirty | Robert Rothenburg (WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com) I used it in the last line | http://www.asb.com/usr/wlkngowl/ but use a short word for lovin' | Se habla PGP: Reply with the subject and dad you wind up doin' time." | 'send pgp-key' for my public key.

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