December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: DES challenge status?
by Anil Das 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ben Byer wrote: >=20 > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >=20 > What exactly is the status of RSA's DES contest? I understand that at > least two of the smaller contests have already been cracked, but I > haven't seen much beyond theoretical discussion on the list on the > topic of the DES contest. >=20 =09Two? The only publicized solution so far is the RC5/32/12/5 solution from Ian Goldberg at Berkeley (and independently from Germano Caronni at ETH Z=FCrich). =09Are you saying that you know that the 48 bit RC5 contest is solved already, or are you just counting Ian's and Germano's solutions separately? -- Anil Das

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Best Computer School?
by Hal Abelson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rick Osborne <osborne(a)gateway.grumman.com> writes: The only thing I didn't have that the next MIT applicant had was money. I made the mistake of letting them know that I was dirt poor and would need full aid/grants/etc, and to quote "The Great Escape" it was "Zzzt! To the Russian front!" Just to set the record straight, MIT's admissions is need-blind. Lots of things go into our admissions decisions, but whether or not an applicant needs financial aid is not one of them. Admissions and financial aid are handled out of separate offices, and the people making the admissions decisions don't even see the financial aid requests. One exception: We are experimenting with the possibility of considering the amount of aid needed in the case of a few international applicants, but even here this is only a minor consideration for a small number of applicants. For domestic applicants, financial aid plays no role at all in the admissions decision. -- Hal Abelson

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Re: Sovreign Right of Lawful Access
by Mike McNally 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jim bell wrote: > > I see no reason to believe that the advent of telephone technology > in the late 1800's should have retroactively re-written the US > Constitution ... This point, unfortunately, seems to be lost in the woods. At the panel discussions in this conference, so many people used phrases like "... law enforcement doing what they need to do..." on *both* sides of the GAK fence. "Need" to do? Well, they might "need" to do lots of things under their own view of reality, but that doesn't mean it's reasonable to negotiate towards that position. Why is it that just because one party shows up with a wacked-out agenda that the "honorable" thing to do is work towards a consensus solution? -- ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Mike McNally -- Egregiously Pointy -- Tivoli Systems, "IBM" -- Austin mailto:m5@tivoli.com mailto:m101@io.com http://www.io.com/~m101 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

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Re: FBI=LIE
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Shostack wrote: > http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/news/washpol/fbi-lab.html > Login cypherpunks, password cypherpunks. > WASHINGTON -- For decades the FBI's reputation as a crime-fighting > agency has rested heavily on its high-tech forensic laboratory, which > could solve baffling crimes from a speck of blood, a sliver of paint > or the thinnest filament of human hair. > But an investigation by the Justice Department's inspector > general has put the FBI laboratory, and the way the agency has > used it, under the glare of public scrutiny. The findings, which were > turned over to FBI officials last week, are threatening to shatter the > image of an agency on the cutting edge of scientific sleuthing. The L.A. Times today (Wed) ran an article telling about three top lab people working on the OKC bombing case, and how they were moved or scuttled due to discrepancies. This was a new development. You'll note also that although Fujisaki (sp?) in the 2nd O.J. trial did not permit it to be introduced (to my knowledge), there was evidence that a high-up FBI lab person who testified in the first trial falsified or seriously distorted certain facts to help the prosecution. This may yet be pursued like the Fuhrman thing.

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Re: Fighting the cybercensor
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sean Roach wrote: > At 08:15 PM 1/28/97 -0800, Steve Schear wrote: > >I think a hole in your thinking is to assume that the assasins have no > >motive other than financial gain. I would submit that there are those that > >have the skills, training and a political agenda coherent with the > >wagerers, lacking only the financial incentive to make the risks > >acceptable. These wetworkers won't consider accepting the bribe of the > >rich/powerful > This may be true, but the example was to show how easy a defensive line > could be thrown up around the powerful. For example, conventional body > guards could be included, ones with no real pay but with the fore knowledge > that they will be buried with the tyrant. These body guards could be ten > children out of each local village. Merely a human shield. [snippo] In Prizzi's Honor, Nicholson sez "If you try to hide in a submarine on the bottom of the ocean, we will find you". But it's not even that difficult. Lob a missile into the place and blow it up. Earth penetrators are getting better too, for the Sadaam types. And there's a zillion more. Does this "rich person" really want to spend his/her life living in a sealed tomb?

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Re: Rejection policy of the Cypherpunks mailing list
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

aga wrote: > On Tue, 28 Jan 1997, Dale Thorn wrote: > > aga wrote: > > > On Tue, 28 Jan 1997, Dale Thorn wrote: > > > > > > But seriously, I was just telling the folks over the weekend, if I > > > > > > had my hand on the button, a lot of people would die very quickly. > > > > > > As in The Day The Earth Stood Still, a single act of aggression would > > > > > > suffice to be immediately terminated. > > > No trial, huh? > > Good question. The law we have right now already assumes that there > > are situations where a criminal will not go peacefully, if at all. > > In some countries (years ago?) such as England, bobbies were known > > to not carry firearms for ordinary street duty. Am I right? But > > here in the USA, that would be unthinkable. > > So my proposal doesn't eliminate the responsibility portion of law > > enforcement. I'd say, if a target were eliminated thru negligence, > > malfeasance, or other wrongdoing under "color of law" or whatever, > > let the courts handle that as they do now. > Just who is doing the eliminating? > > My suggestion would give the law enforcers the ability to dispense > > the first level of justice expeditiously, which they cannot accomplish > > now due to all of the red tape and the corrupt legal system (lawyers > > specialize in getting chronic offenders off, particularly "traffic" > > offenses). By transferring a major portion of the bureaucracy to > > the pencil pushers, we can free up the street cops to do what they > > do best, namely bust or eliminate criminals. > Cops can never be trusted to "dispense justice," and half of the > cops are themselves criminals in what they do. Most cops steal > evidence and lie like crazy in Court. All they want is a conviction, > and it mattters not how it is obtained. All true. But I'm not suggesting the creation of anything new here. Cops already carry guns and kill people. All I'm suggesting is that they be empowered to kill when: 1) The crime is aggression against another person or persons; 2) The evidence is so solid (recorded?) that the officer (who risks being prosecuted if he kills unjustifiably) can carry out the enforcement without undue apprehension; 3) These things are reviewed by the elected representatives of the people, to make sure there's no hanky-panky going on. > > I dare say that the downside of this is much less pleasant than the > > virtual anarchy (in the bad sense) we suffer now. If the police get > > out of control, A.P. will arrive just in time to plug a few of those > > holes, so to speak. Ideally, future robotics should be able to > > provide something like Gort (sp?) to take the place of human officers, > > given advances in the kind of pattern matching needed to deter > > aggression and the like. Those who don't make it past the robots, > > well, the rest of us can learn to behave, and we'll be much better > > off when we do. > > I would trust robots more than humanoids. The Gort (sp?) robot is a perfect example, and I don't think it's all that many years away.

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Re: Cats Out of Bags
by tmcghan＠gill-simpson.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

According to Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> > "In an interview Tuesday, [David L.] Aaron [the Feds' Crypto Ambassador] disputed the {snip} > "When I talk to other governments," he said, "they still don't feel... ===(mis)quoted, paraphrased, and enhanced from current news reports=== The Clinton administration's newly named point man on encryption policy is citing international support for U.S. policies limiting use of encryption and called for industry cooperation. Speaking to the RSA Data Security Conference in San Francisco, David Aaron said that U.S. allies support the concept of lawful access by governments and the use of key recovery mechanisms. The White House's continued restrictions on encryption have been unpopular in the cryptography community and among major U.S. corporations and high tech companies because of the business disadvantage vis a vis foreign firms. Aaron alleges that U.S. trading partners have misgivings about the U.S. government's decision in October to allow 'moderately strong' 56-bit encryption, to be exported, under controlled circumstances, but were willing to cooperate on the policy. "As far as I can see, the international encryption market will not be a free-wheeling affair," he said, adding companies should consider that lawful access and key escrow capabilities may become "a growthe industry" In his speech, Aaron also listed cases where the U.S. government said encryption was used in terrorist plots, drug dealing, child pornography and espionage, adding the White House, "in no way seeks to expand law enforcement powers nor reduce the privacy of individuals." Independent experts strongly disagreed with Aaron's characterization of the international posture following his address here, and leading U.S. legislators said they would continue to push for further reform of the restrictions. "I just don't think it will work," Sen. Conrad Burns, a Montana Republican who has been behind the legislative effort to promote use of stronger levels of encryption, said of the White House encryption policy. "I think if bad people want to do bad things to good people, they certainly won't want to file their key (with any law enforcement authorities)," Burns said in a satellite conference. Marc Rotenberg, director of the Washington, D.C.-based Electronic Privacy Information Center, rebutted Aaron's suggestion that Washington has broad international support for its concept of lawful access by governments to the keys to encrypted files and communications. Rotenberg said at the recent Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) meetings on encryption policy, that was not the case, nor were a number of countries pushing for stronger controls, as Aaron said they had been. Germany, Australia, Japan and Canada all are advancing competing cryptography capabilities, according to Rotenberg. Thomas M. McGhan tmcghan(a)gill-simpson.com http://www.gill-simpson.com voice: (410) 467-3335 fax: (410) 235-6961 pagenet: (410) 716-1342 cellular: (410) 241-9113 ICBM: 39.395N 76.469W

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encrypt_3.html
by Lynx_User＠linux.nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reuters New Media [ Yahoo | Write Us | Search | Info ] [ Index | News | World | Biz | Tech | Politic | Sport | Scoreboard | Entertain | Health ] _________________________________________________________________ Previous Story: Kodak To Buy Wang Software Business Next Story: Netscape Counts On User Upgrades In 1997 _________________________________________________________________ Wednesday January 29 3:26 PM EST U.S. Encryption Envoy Seeks Industry Cooperation SAN FRANCISCO - The Clinton administration's newly named point man on encryption policy is citing international support for U.S. policies limiting use of encryption and called for industry cooperation. Ambassador David Aaron, special envoy for cryptography, said on a speech to the RSA Data Security Conference in San Francisco that U.S. allies support the concept of lawful access by governments and the use of key recovery mechanisms. Key recovery would involve storing encoding keys in escrow so authorities could get access to them to unscramble data in an emergency, such as to uncover criminal activity. The White House's continued restrictions on encryption have been unpopular in the cryptography community and among major U.S. corporations and high tech companies, which argue the limitations put U.S. business at a disadvantage. Aaron said some U.S. trading partners have misgivings about the U.S. government's decision in October to relax U.S. export controls to allow export of moderately strong 56-bit encryption, but were willing to cooperate on the policy. "As far as I can see, the international encryption market will not be a free-wheeling affair," he said, adding companies should consider that lawful access and key escrow capabilities may become "a growing international requirement." In his speech, Aaron also listed cases where the U.S. government said encryption was used in terrorist plots, drug dealing, child pornography and espionage, adding the White House, "in no way seeks to expand law enforcement powers nor reduce the privacy of individuals." But some independent experts who monitor cryptography policy disagreed with Aaron's characterization of the international posture following his address here, and leading U.S. legislators said they would continue to push the White House to further liberalize the restrictions. "I just don't think it will work," Sen. Conrad Burns, a Montana Republican who has been behind the legislative effort to promote use of stronger levels of encryption, said of the White House encryption policy. "I think if bad people want to do bad things to good people, they certainly won't want to file their key (with any law enforcement authorities)," he told conference attendees over a satellite linkup. Burns appeared in the linkup with three legislative colleagues to stress that together they would push to put "get the administration out in front of the cryptography curve." Marc Rotenberg, director of the Washington, D.C.-based Electronic Privacy Information Center, rebutted Aaron's suggestion that Washington has broad international support for its concept of lawful access by governments to the keys to encrypted files and communications. Rotenberg said at the recent Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) meetings on encryption policy, that was not the case, nor were a number of countries pushing for stronger controls, as Aaron said they had been. In fact, countries such as Japan, Germany, Australia and Canada all have competing cryptography capabilities they are promoting, he added. The OECD guidelines are due to be published next month. Copyright, Reuters Ltd. All rights reserved _________________________________________________________________ Earlier Related Stories * Encryption Export Bill Backed In Senate - Wed Jan 29 9:54 am _________________________________________________________________ ________________________ ___________ Help _________________________________________________________________ Previous Story: Kodak To Buy Wang Software Business Next Story: Netscape Counts On User Upgrades In 1997 _________________________________________________________________ [ Index | News | World | Biz | Tech | Politic | Sport | Scoreboard | Entertain | Health ] _________________________________________________________________ Reuters Limited Questions or Comments

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KOW_tow
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1-28-97: "New Crypto Engines From Trusted Information Systems Allow Easy International Use of Strong Encryption " By supporting any application that calls for the use of algorithms such as DES, Triple-DES, or 128-bit RC2 or RC4, "this product will allow Windows users to use encryption as easily as they use a mouse. Previously, if developers wanted to use encryption in their products, they had to consider writing two different versions, dealing with changing export regulations, and so on. Now, they can write one version of the program and sell it worldwide, knowing that the CSP will handle the encryption legally and safely." "Two Companies Set to Offer Key Recovery Services Using Technology from TIS " SourceKey and Data Securities International (DSI) have applied for approval to operate Key Recovery Centers to support exported encryption products. TIS also announced today that it is in negotiations with the National Computing Centre, Ltd. of the U.K. and Philips Crypto BV of the Netherlands to license the first non-U.S.-based Key Recovery Centers for third party use. "Burns Prepares To Reintroduce Encryption Bill" "This time around," Burns said, "we intend to put a bill on the President's desk and find out if he is truly on the side of the users and providers of rapidly expanding high-tech goods and services." It would prohibit a mandatory system under which producers or users of hardware and software would be required to surrender a decoding "key" to a third party. ----- KOW_tow

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Re: The Politics of Export Restrictions
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Agreed. It's the Republicans who are the most adamantly pro-crypto. They'd love to use it as a noose to hang Gore in 2000. If Gore switches positions -- which I think unlikely -- it'll just be another area where both parties agree. A minor point: since Gore has been the chief crypto-critic of this administration, if he switched he'd leave himself open to charges of waffling. Then again, some administration officials tell me they expect this debate to be resolved within a year, so go figure. -Declan On Wed, 29 Jan 1997, Greg Broiles wrote: > At 09:44 PM 1/29/97 -0800, Rick Hornbeck wrote: > > >Is it possible the unreasonable crypto export restrictions are simply being > >imposed at this time for the purpose of making Al Gore look good when he > >runs for President in 2000? > > I suppose it's plausible, but it's an opportunity open to both candidates, > and more plausibly (because of lack of collaboration) to the Republicans - > e.g., Dan Quayle and the "Crypto Freedom For Americans" platform, promising > to rescue Silicon Valley from those evil regulatory Democrats. > > If I were an evil politician trying to set up a trick like you suggest, I > think I'd want a scheme that my opponent(s) couldn't hijack and use against > me. > > -- > Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: > gbroiles(a)netbox.com | > http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. > | > >

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