December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: GSM technology
by Asgaard 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 17 Jan 1997, Adam Back wrote: > into the data port. You can't fit the laptop and GSM phone > combination into your shirt pocket. What are you going to use for a With a reasonably sized shirt pocket you can fit a Nokia 9000 Communicator into it: a combination of GSM phone and 386 computer, with 6 MB storage (OS and default applications use 4 of those) and 2 MB RAM. It runs fax, SMS (Short Messages Services), a Terminal, SMTP, IMAP4, MIME1, WWW and telnet. The operative system is GEOS (tm) 3.0. I guess it's not very programmable though (and there is no PGPhone implementation for GEOS) and data speed is only 9600 bps. And there is probably no connection between the mic/speaker and the computer. But it's only 173 x 64 x 38 mm, and perhaps the next generation of such devices might be interesting for reengineering into secure end-to-end crypto phenes? Asgaard

1 0

Re: Dr. Vulis' social engineering experiment
by Jane Jefferson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Also Sprach Adam Back: > > It is my belief > that his posts can only be understood in a "meta" sense -- he is > engaged in a highly complex cryptographic experiment. People who read > and respond to his individual posts are the unwitting subjects in his > experiments. His posts and the responses to them are actually the > data-set for a thorough cryptanalysis of mailing list threats. His > current topic under investigation is Denial of Service (DoS) attacks > on mailing lists. I agree that this is what is being done, but the experiment dorsn't have as much to do with cryptanalysis as much as it has to do with sociology. The limits here are not mathematical and static, they are social and based on the limits of tolerance of both the group and the individual. > I await with interest the last phases of Dimitri's experiment, when > the cypherpunks list becomes a moderated forum. That appears to be the main brunt of his efforts, to "push the envelope" of free speech in order to force it's definition. Perhaps to exhibit the necessity for a controlling authority, and thus justify the existence of the various agencies which are trying to control the flow of information in this country and elsewhere. > I hope Dimitri's selfless efforts in furthering understanding of DoS > attacks on mailing lists is properly acknowledged when he publishes > his findings on completion of his experiments. I also hope that > Dimitri will document his recommendations for mailing list > configuration and management in light of his experiments. I would not say that what he is doing is a bit selfless, the Clipper Chip crowd are probably lining his pockets in a big way. That's acknowledgement enough for me. :-/ "In peacetime, a warlike man sets upon himself." -- Nietzsche -- Marcus: "They'll try to kill you." | Xena: "Oh, I still have a few tricks | "Here we GO!!!" left up my sleeve...I don't | -- Jane's Addiction have any sleeves!" -- Xena bloopers |

6 8

Re: Dr. Vulis' social engineering experiment
by Jane Jefferson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Also Sprach Adam Back: > > It is my belief > that his posts can only be understood in a "meta" sense -- he is > engaged in a highly complex cryptographic experiment. People who read > and respond to his individual posts are the unwitting subjects in his > experiments. His posts and the responses to them are actually the > data-set for a thorough cryptanalysis of mailing list threats. His > current topic under investigation is Denial of Service (DoS) attacks > on mailing lists. I agree that this is what is being done, but the experiment dorsn't have as much to do with cryptanalysis as much as it has to do with sociology. The limits here are not mathematical and static, they are social and based on the limits of tolerance of both the group and the individual. > I await with interest the last phases of Dimitri's experiment, when > the cypherpunks list becomes a moderated forum. That appears to be the main brunt of his efforts, to "push the envelope" of free speech in order to force it's definition. Perhaps to exhibit the necessity for a controlling authority, and thus justify the existence of the various agencies which are trying to control the flow of information in this country and elsewhere. > I hope Dimitri's selfless efforts in furthering understanding of DoS > attacks on mailing lists is properly acknowledged when he publishes > his findings on completion of his experiments. I also hope that > Dimitri will document his recommendations for mailing list > configuration and management in light of his experiments. I would not say that what he is doing is a bit selfless, the Clipper Chip crowd are probably lining his pockets in a big way. That's acknowledgement enough for me. :-/ "In peacetime, a warlike man sets upon himself." -- Nietzsche -- Marcus: "They'll try to kill you." | Xena: "Oh, I still have a few tricks | "Here we GO!!!" left up my sleeve...I don't | -- Jane's Addiction have any sleeves!" -- Xena bloopers |

3 2

Re: GSM crypto upgrade? (was Re: Newt's phone calls)
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:41 PM 1/16/97 GMT, Adam Back wrote: > >Bill Frantz <frantz(a)netcom.com> writes: >> As long as the man in the middle can't imitate a familiar voice, >> this procedure is reasonably secure. > >This is the approach taken by PGPfone also. If the value of the >conversations was high (>$100,000?) passable voice imitation wouldn't >be that hard I suspect. I have long considered how easy it would be to use a sound card to modify the human voice to match within certain tolerances the voice of another. There are currently on the market, phones specifically designed to modify the voice of the user so that kids can answer as adults, women can answer as thier own protective boyfriends, bosses can answer anonymous calls as the secretary, etc... There are currently on the market keyboards that allow you to sample some real world sound and use it as a voice in your music, (the model I saw, a toy produced by Radio Shack, simply sped up or slowed down the sound to achieve this.) I have thought, if a machine were to take the incoming voice, analize (apologies for spelling) it to get a spectrum signature, a pattern that can be added or subtracted from another, and could then add the difference between that and the victims signature to the users voice, then real-time, on-the-fly con jobs would be easy. The only thing that the user would be responsible for would be the accent, and the day-to-day vocabulary of the victim. I told a friend about this and he confirmed that such was available if you knew where to look.

1 0

Re: Newt's phone calls
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:07 PM 1/20/97 -0500, Phillip M. Hallam-Baker wrote: >Depending on the country and bank you can probably perform almost >any transfer you like by fax. I moved my pension from one bank >to another simply by sending a fax. I have done similar transactions >with Swiss, German and UK banks. > >For some reason the fax is considered to be a practically >infallible authentication device. Quite why is beyond me since >it should be obvious to anyone that all one needs to fake a >fax is a photocopier, document signed by account holder, paste >and scissors. You get everything needed on a signed cheque. > A check is no good, most checks are now printed on paper with special lines that are supposed to become obvious after copying. A signed letter or even a mailing envelope would probably be better. Also, scotch tape makes those pexky shadows disapear like magic. My dad uses it to make multiple versions of make-up math tests that trivially look like the origional in order to goad persons who were sick on test day so that they could get the answers from someone else into printing down those answers and getting less than random probability. (multiple choice)

1 0

Re: microcurrency: Netscape vs. Microsoft
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:46 AM 1/20/97 -0800, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: >[microcurrency] >>It will also not catch on until there are better standards involving >>microcurrency transactions amongst the vendors. It would also help if >>there was a single interface (or "helper app") for whatever vendor you >>decided to go with. I am not sure that is feasible. Single interface, perhaps. Sun's Java Wallet is step in this direction. Single helper app, not a chance. The systems are too different, and do not share a sufficient number of properties, to use the same helper app. >as I see it, I think there are a few key standards that need >to be devised: > >1. an html tag that indicates how much a link costs, probably in >the <a href="" cost=xx> type syntax This could be done, but is, IMHO, too inflexible. >2. modification of http to support a payment mechanism, by sending >a token. Take a look at PEP and UPP. This may not be what you are looking for, but it is a start. Available at any IETF draft repository. [...] >>Currently every vendor of payment schemes has made it proprietary in some >>way. (At least the ones I have seen.) This means that if the user visits >>three different web pages, each using a payment scheme from a different >>vendor, that user has to be signed up with all of those vendors. (Or at >>least have their helper apps.) The systems are *not* interchangeable due to fundamental differences in the design. This is not a software/UI issue. I do not expect the signup requirements to last much longer. To give just one example, take a look at the current discussions on dev-lucre, a list for the Unofficial Cypherpunks Implementation of Ecash. [Sorry, I don't have the archive URL.] http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/ntlucre/ has the latest version. The list is currently discussing an ActiveX Ecash control. With -lucre, you no longer need to sign up with an issuer. Assuming an ActiveX control, the client software installs itself. As to the merchant software, Stronghold already ships with Ecash support built in. Netscape has announce that Navigator will ship with CyberCash. There is definitely movement at the browser/server end. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred Make your mark in the history of mathematics. Use the spare cycles of your PC/PPC/UNIX box to help find a new prime. http://www.mersenne.org/prime.htm

2 1

Re: Airport security [no such thing]
by drose＠azstarnet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alan Bostick wrote: [...] >She presented the gate agent with *four* tickets and *four* IDs. "Where >are these other people?" the agent asked. "They're parking the car," >said the traveler. The agent gave her all four boarding passes; and my >companion and I were bumped to the third boarding group. > >The woman in front of us was white and middle-class-looking, traveling >with what appeared to be her family. One wonders what would have >happened were she a swarthy man wearing robes and a burnoose. Or if she >were just wearing shabby clothes. My guess is that you and your companion would have been further discommoded, with the possible concomitant saving of your lives.

1 0

Interesting item from Nwlibertarians@teleport.com
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Mon, 20 Jan 1997 17:44:32 -0800 (PST) >From: James Ogle <joogle(a)netcom.com> >Subject: NWLibs> LP: Browne's Vote Annulled, Chudov Still PM >To: Jack Dean <JackDean(a)webworldinc.com> >cc: usa-par(a)netcom.com, ichudov(a)algebra.com, rjschundler(a)aol.com, > nwlibertarians(a)teleport.com, brockman(a)netcom.com >Sender: owner-nwlibertarians(a)teleport.com >Reply-To: nwlibertarians(a)teleport.com > > >To: Jack Dean >Cc: Usa-par(a)netcom.com Listserver Members and Other Libertarians > >It turns out that according to Jack Dean, a campaign worker with the Harry >Browne in '96 campaign, the eballot vote for Igor Chudov (Libertarian - >OK) cast from HarryBrowne@HarryBrowne'96.com address, which was forwarded >to Mr. Jack Dean by me, was a fake - so the two votes are shaved off the >Chudov total. Can anyone speak with better authority on Browne then >Mr. Jack Dean, and say the Browne did cast the vote? On a positive >note however, Tim Ladd (Pot - CA) has agreed to list Mr. Chudov as his >first choice, so Mr. Chudov stays as PM for the time being with five votes. > >The new vote totals are shown below. > >BTW, a special welcome to the usa-par(a)netcom.com list to Evan Colletti >(Pot - NV), who joins the list from Reno NV, as a founder of the NV-PAR >and the Nevada Pot Party. > > --James Ogle > >On Mon, 20 Jan 1997, Jack Dean wrote: > >> >> You wrote: >> >> >Jack, i just received this email from Mr. Harry Browne. Will you >> >please confirm with him that he did indeed cast the vote? >> >> No, he didn't. It appears to be a faked e-mail message. I'll be >> investigating how it was done. >> >> Sorry. >> >> Jack >> >> >> ************************************************************************** >> J. Harris Dean | voice & fax> 714/870-5585 >> 2217 Vista del Sol | pager with voice mail> 714/935-3638 >> Fullerton, CA 92831 | e-mail> JackDean(a)webworldinc.com >> ************************************************************************** >> "LIBERTY is something you cannot have, unless you are >> willing to give it to others." - William Allen White > >---------------------------------------------------Votes for PM of USA PAR > > > ====**** ************************** ****==== > ====*** * THE 3RD USA PARLIAMENT * ***==== > ====== ************************** ====== > > Igor Chudov Taoiseach > >----------------------------------------------------------------------------- >For Immediate Release January 20, 1997 > > RESULTS OF VOTING FOR TAOISEACH > > Vote For # Of Vote For >MP Vote For PM Secretary Seats Rules >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >Monty Truitt 1 Monty Truitt 1 James Ogle > 2 James Ogle 2 Monty Truitt > 3 Donald Duck 3 Micky Mouse 1 no >Daniel Brockman 1 Valerie Madriaga 1 James Ogle > 2 Igor Chudov > 3 Mike Bogatirev > 4 Zachary Quest 2 yes >Mike Robinson 1 Daniel Brockman 1 James Ogle > 2 Steve Michael 2 Mike Robinson > 3 Mike Robinson 1 yes >Nathan Brown 1 John Mayer 1 James Ogle > 2 Michael Banon 1 yes >Patrick Seats 1 Patrick Seats 1 James Ogle > 2 Daniel Brockman 2 Gary Swing 1 yes >Kerby Hensley 1 Locke Heemstra 1 James Ogle 1 >Jack Clayton 1 Steve Michael 1 James Ogle > 2 Jack Clayton 1 yes >Igor Chudov 1 Daniel Brockman 1 James Ogle > 2 Igor Chudov 1 yes* >James Ogle 1 Daniel Brockman 1 James Ogle > 2 Igor Chudov > 3 Nathan Brown > 4 Zachary Quest 2 yes >Bruce Daniels 1 Daniel Brockman 1 Gary Swing 8 yes >Gorden Hartman 1 Daniel Brockman 2 James Ogle 3 yes >John Mayer 1 Steve Michael 1 James Ogle 1 yes >Mike Bogatirev 1 Daniel Brockman 1 James Ogle 2 abstain >Gene Marsee' 1 Valerie Madriaga 1 James Ogle 1 abstain >Locke Heemstra 1 Lock Heemstra 1 James Ogle > 2 Daniel Brockman 1 yes >Shirley Bradshaw 1 Bruce Daniels 1 James Ogle > 2 Valerie Madriaga 1 >Lloyd Llewellyn 1 Igor Chudov 1 >Eli Rozicki 1 Nathon Brown 1 >Laura Booth 1 Nathan Brown 1 James Ogle 1 yes >Ann Atkerson 1 Newt Gingrich 1 James Ogle 1 >Steve Duby 1 Steve Duby 1 James Ogle > 2 Nathan Brown > 3 John Mayer > 4 Laura Booth 1 >Greg Farley 1 Nathan Brown 1 James Ogle 1 >Tim Ladd 1 Igor Chudov 1 James Ogle > 2 Nathan Brown >------------------------------------------------------------------------ >Total 35 > > >*Voted yes on rules and other rules, and wrote in "Create USA PAR Web Page". > >Results As Of 1/20/97 > >Daniel Brockman (17 votes) Declines To Stand >Igor Chudov Elected Prime Minister - 5 votes >James Ogle Elected Secretary - 25 votes >Rules Approved - 23 votes > >--James Ogle, secretary > USA Parliament > > > Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

1 0

Re: Menwith Hill / NSA
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've just heard from Duncan Campbell (who made the documentary), he'll send me a copy of the script which can be put on the web. I'll let people know when it's available. Copies of the tape can be ordered from his company: IPTV Ltd 1 Meadowbank Edinburgh EH8 8JE Scotland, UK E-mail : duncan(a)gn.apc.org Tel : +44 131 659 6566 Cost is \pounds 14.50 stg + any postage costs for outside UK - \pounds 5 will cover it. They have no NTSC versions in stock but can make them from the master. Provided they get orders for at least 10, the cost will be the same. They accept payment in US$ cheques as well as \pounds stg cheques; no credit cards, sorry. He is, in theory, on holiday for another month or so and only has intermittent net connectivity, so please don't flood him with email just yet. Peter.

1 0

Re: GSM crypto upgrade? (was Re: Newt's phone calls)
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:41 PM 1/16/97 GMT, Adam Back wrote: > >Bill Frantz <frantz(a)netcom.com> writes: >> As long as the man in the middle can't imitate a familiar voice, >> this procedure is reasonably secure. > >This is the approach taken by PGPfone also. If the value of the >conversations was high (>$100,000?) passable voice imitation wouldn't >be that hard I suspect. I have long considered how easy it would be to use a sound card to modify the human voice to match within certain tolerances the voice of another. There are currently on the market, phones specifically designed to modify the voice of the user so that kids can answer as adults, women can answer as thier own protective boyfriends, bosses can answer anonymous calls as the secretary, etc... There are currently on the market keyboards that allow you to sample some real world sound and use it as a voice in your music, (the model I saw, a toy produced by Radio Shack, simply sped up or slowed down the sound to achieve this.) I have thought, if a machine were to take the incoming voice, analize (apologies for spelling) it to get a spectrum signature, a pattern that can be added or subtracted from another, and could then add the difference between that and the victims signature to the users voice, then real-time, on-the-fly con jobs would be easy. The only thing that the user would be responsible for would be the accent, and the day-to-day vocabulary of the victim. I told a friend about this and he confirmed that such was available if you knew where to look.

1 0