December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

EZP_ikn
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

01-21-97: "Method and apparatus for end-to-end encryption of a data packet in a computer network (Assignee -- Digital Equipment Corporation)" Inventor(s): Hawe, William R., Lampson, Butler W., Gupta, Amar "Mykotronx Upgrades US Army Satellite Comms" Mykotronx will develop and manufacture the refurbished Batson encryption subsystem, called the RBatson. Also known as KIG-34, the system will provide critical command and control protection for the US Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS), including encryption, authentication, and anti-jamming capabilities. ----- EZP_ikn

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Re: Fighting the cybercensor.
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:50 PM 1/21/97 -0500, Phillip M. Hallam-Baker wrote: >Mission: > >Singapore and China are blocking certain net groups. I think >this is a bad thing, question is how can we stop it? The Web >was conceived as offering despots and dictators a choice >between remaining in the dark ages and allowing freedom of >speech. Blocking and filtering schemes threaten this ideal. > > >Requirements: > >A scheme which makes blocking of individual IP addresses >impractical. > > ... >2c) Some crypto hack I can't quite work out (hence the post to >cypher punks). I can phrase the challenge more compactly though. >We have two sets of opposed groups A and M. The A group wish to >establish a continued conversation with groups B and C. M is >willing to permit communication with group B but not C. Whenever >M discovers that a member of group B is willing to act on behalf >of group C, M transfers that member to the C group. > >The problem is to keep A's channels of communication open despite >the efforts of M for very large group sizes. > ... > >Comments? If people are willing to work on this I can provide >some facilities and act as a media contact. > I believe that I heard a suggestion here once involving accepting Vulis's posts, all of them, but only distributing them to Vulis. I have also heard, on a web-based bulliten board (please excuse the spelling), about setting up a proxy for the CDA supporters routing all of thier requests to a VAX loaded with only "clean" stuff, either by engineering it for them, or routing all of thier communications to an existing "clean" site. The idea here is, if the government doesn't know what sites to block, i.e. thier in office checks of said site checked out but everyone gets a different look, they can't block them. To begin blocking proxies, they would have to get spies in the population to tell them where the "trash" is, or pay a bounty for every such site, which they would then have to figure out how to verify. This would require spies on our part as well. Ones to say that so-and-so citizen has been informing to the government so that the operators could put that citizen on the government list, the list of people to give the filtered "wholesome" feed to. Such an effort would require a great amount of effort and would probably be best suited to the EFF or other existing freedom protection organization. The setup would be similair to a "pirate broadcast" in the views of the government and would thus be best operated from safe shores. The spy ring would be simple. A e-mail address or other semi-secure drop-off point would be maintained for snitches. This address would be well advertised on the board, a SINGLE system. When a tattler is fingered by a fellow tattler, the government side tattler is baited with highly inflammatory, but mostly worthless, articles about the government. If the site is blocked, the informer is blocked. There are several kinks to work out. The single site would be easier to maintain, having "disposible" repeater sites which the government can see to block. Thus the main site would never be seen unshielded, though if it was, it wouldn't mean anything.

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David Kahn advocates GAK
by Robert Rothenburg 'Walking-Owl' 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In today's (22 Jan 97) Long Island, NY Newsday Viewpoints, p. A31: "Let Feds Overheard Cellular-Phone Talk" by David Kahn (an editor at Newsday and author of "The Codebreakers") He intones the usual horseman: "...such criminals as terrorists, drug- runners, kidnappers and child-pornographers are increasingly using encryption to conceal their plans and activities, the FBI says." He also mis-states opponenents of GAK positions, claimingthe criticism is that "key escrow [at least he doesn't call it key recovery] won't work all the time", ignoring anti-GAK mentions of COINTELPRO, J.Edgar Stalin^H^H^H^H^H^HHoover, etc. etc. And the usual nonsense about "every day that criminal messages can be heard is a gain" w/out noting that anyone smart enough to use crypto now will not use it if GAK is fully implemented. Newsday is part of the LA Times Syndicate, so member papers may also have the same viewpoint appearing in their pages within the next couple of days. Their website is http://www.newsday.com ... I don't know if the viewpoint is on-line there. Rob ----- "The word to kill ain't dirty | Robert Rothenburg (WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com) I used it in the last line | http://www.asb.com/usr/wlkngowl/ but use a short word for lovin' | Se habla PGP: Reply with the subject and dad you wind up doin' time." | 'send pgp-key' for my public key.

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EZP_ikn
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

01-21-97: "Method and apparatus for end-to-end encryption of a data packet in a computer network (Assignee -- Digital Equipment Corporation)" Inventor(s): Hawe, William R., Lampson, Butler W., Gupta, Amar "Mykotronx Upgrades US Army Satellite Comms" Mykotronx will develop and manufacture the refurbished Batson encryption subsystem, called the RBatson. Also known as KIG-34, the system will provide critical command and control protection for the US Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS), including encryption, authentication, and anti-jamming capabilities. ----- EZP_ikn

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RE: ADSL (Was: GSM technology
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> wrote re: ADSL lines> They're not widely available yet; I don't know if any of the (US) phone companies offer it as more than trials. One limitation is that the technology works over copper wire, so it has to be offered at your local telco wire center. A previous poster mentioned that because of the copper wire restriction, that they may deploy first in older centers. This would appear to be the case, since a Canadian telco (Sasktel) is offering ADSL in Saskatoon for 60$/month with unlimited internet access. Saskatoon falls into this category - in my opinion. I was only is SK briefly over New Years, but perhaps Toto can fill in details. James

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David Kahn advocates GAK
by Robert Rothenburg 'Walking-Owl' 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In today's (22 Jan 97) Long Island, NY Newsday Viewpoints, p. A31: "Let Feds Overheard Cellular-Phone Talk" by David Kahn (an editor at Newsday and author of "The Codebreakers") He intones the usual horseman: "...such criminals as terrorists, drug- runners, kidnappers and child-pornographers are increasingly using encryption to conceal their plans and activities, the FBI says." He also mis-states opponenents of GAK positions, claimingthe criticism is that "key escrow [at least he doesn't call it key recovery] won't work all the time", ignoring anti-GAK mentions of COINTELPRO, J.Edgar Stalin^H^H^H^H^H^HHoover, etc. etc. And the usual nonsense about "every day that criminal messages can be heard is a gain" w/out noting that anyone smart enough to use crypto now will not use it if GAK is fully implemented. Newsday is part of the LA Times Syndicate, so member papers may also have the same viewpoint appearing in their pages within the next couple of days. Their website is http://www.newsday.com ... I don't know if the viewpoint is on-line there. Rob ----- "The word to kill ain't dirty | Robert Rothenburg (WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com) I used it in the last line | http://www.asb.com/usr/wlkngowl/ but use a short word for lovin' | Se habla PGP: Reply with the subject and dad you wind up doin' time." | 'send pgp-key' for my public key.

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Re: Fighting the cybercensor.
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:50 PM 1/21/97 -0500, Phillip M. Hallam-Baker wrote: >Mission: > >Singapore and China are blocking certain net groups. I think >this is a bad thing, question is how can we stop it? The Web >was conceived as offering despots and dictators a choice >between remaining in the dark ages and allowing freedom of >speech. Blocking and filtering schemes threaten this ideal. > > >Requirements: > >A scheme which makes blocking of individual IP addresses >impractical. > > ... >2c) Some crypto hack I can't quite work out (hence the post to >cypher punks). I can phrase the challenge more compactly though. >We have two sets of opposed groups A and M. The A group wish to >establish a continued conversation with groups B and C. M is >willing to permit communication with group B but not C. Whenever >M discovers that a member of group B is willing to act on behalf >of group C, M transfers that member to the C group. > >The problem is to keep A's channels of communication open despite >the efforts of M for very large group sizes. > ... > >Comments? If people are willing to work on this I can provide >some facilities and act as a media contact. > I believe that I heard a suggestion here once involving accepting Vulis's posts, all of them, but only distributing them to Vulis. I have also heard, on a web-based bulliten board (please excuse the spelling), about setting up a proxy for the CDA supporters routing all of thier requests to a VAX loaded with only "clean" stuff, either by engineering it for them, or routing all of thier communications to an existing "clean" site. The idea here is, if the government doesn't know what sites to block, i.e. thier in office checks of said site checked out but everyone gets a different look, they can't block them. To begin blocking proxies, they would have to get spies in the population to tell them where the "trash" is, or pay a bounty for every such site, which they would then have to figure out how to verify. This would require spies on our part as well. Ones to say that so-and-so citizen has been informing to the government so that the operators could put that citizen on the government list, the list of people to give the filtered "wholesome" feed to. Such an effort would require a great amount of effort and would probably be best suited to the EFF or other existing freedom protection organization. The setup would be similair to a "pirate broadcast" in the views of the government and would thus be best operated from safe shores. The spy ring would be simple. A e-mail address or other semi-secure drop-off point would be maintained for snitches. This address would be well advertised on the board, a SINGLE system. When a tattler is fingered by a fellow tattler, the government side tattler is baited with highly inflammatory, but mostly worthless, articles about the government. If the site is blocked, the informer is blocked. There are several kinks to work out. The single site would be easier to maintain, having "disposible" repeater sites which the government can see to block. Thus the main site would never be seen unshielded, though if it was, it wouldn't mean anything.

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Re: David Kahn advocates GAK
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yep, thanks for the pointer, Rob. Kahn's online at: http://www.newsday.com/mainnews/rnmi0522.htm Anybody unable to access, send us a note: KAH_nak

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Re: David Kahn advocates GAK
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yep, thanks for the pointer, Rob. Kahn's online at: http://www.newsday.com/mainnews/rnmi0522.htm Anybody unable to access, send us a note: KAH_nak

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Re: EZP_ikn
by Mike McNally 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

John Young wrote: > > 01-21-97: > > "Method and apparatus ... > > Inventor(s): Hawe, William R., Lampson, Butler W., Gupta, Amar I thought Lampson worked for Microsoft? -- ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Mike McNally -- Egregiously Pointy -- Tivoli Systems, "IBM" -- Austin mailto:m5@tivoli.com mailto:m101@io.com http://www.io.com/~m101 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

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