December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: If guilty of a lesser crime, you can be sentenced for a greater
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:10 PM 2/2/97 -0600, ichudov(a)algebra.com wrote: >jim bell wrote: >> >> Better yet, set up a system to encourage the public to USE those guns (and >> other weapons) to get rid of the people who pass such laws, and the problem >> is solved. >> > >How about this scenario: I borrow 1 million dollars from, let's say, >Phill Hallam-Baker. Not wanting to pay it back, I pay to the >assassination bot and arrange him to be murdered. Simple. Even if a lendor dies (whether by murder or some other cause, perhaps undetermined) you (the debtor) presumably will still be obligated to pay back the debt, to his estate if nowhere else. If you WEREN'T responsible for the killing, you should still make the payments. If you do, then you had no reason to kill him in the first place. Even in the hypothetical scenario that the lendor is single, has no family or other likely heirs, it would be in his interest to declare that his estate goes to charity, including debts to it such as yours. After all, we can assume that he doesn't want to get murdered, and the best way of avoiding that fate is to remove whatever incentive might otherwise exist for anyone else to kill him. Making sure that all of his debtors are revealed would make it difficult for any of them to get away with murder. Or, at least, prevent the fact of such a murder from eliminating the need to repay the debt. If the fact of the loan were revealed, perhaps only after the lendor's death, and ALSO the fact that you (alone among his other debtors) refused to pay it back, everyone else in that society might reasonably come to the conclusion (absent proof or a good explanation to the contrary) that you were probably responsible for the death. At the very least, they wouldn't want to deal with you for fear of a similar outcome (non-payment or death), and some of the public would be likely to punish you by donating money to see you dead. They would do this, even if they had no particular link to the dead lendor, precisely because the publicity from such an outcome would deter other people who might be contemplating a similar thing. The logic is essentially the same as the situation where a person would donate small amounts money to see car thieves dead, even if his car hadn't (yet) been stolen: If it is essentially certain that such a penalty will always exist, it will tend to deter future incidents. All car owners have a motivation to maintain that system. >Another story: suppose that I negligently caused fire that destroys >house of, say, Toto. Toto knows that if he sues me, I can arrange him >murdered for the amount less than the amount of damages. As he could, you. Remember, if your bad actions were publicized, your reputation would suffer. If he's satisfied that you are guilty, and can prove it to others, you'll be in trouble to have the information published. (On the other hand, if nobody knows it was you who were responsible, you won't suffer, but that's no worse than the status quo.) > As a result, >he refrains from suing me, or (if he is a mean person) pays additional >money to have me murdered. A suit would probably be a much better outcome. A "suit" implies that he needs assistance to get the fact of the obligation enforced. Assuming he has enough proof to win a lawsuit, he has more than enough proof to sour everyone else on dealing with you in the future, and possibly get them to donate to see you dead. Do you risk it? >Another story: suppose that OKSAS hired me to work for her, but then >our relationships go south and she fires me. Again, her fate is very >unclear, although I would probably spare her life if it were she. > >The bottom line is, it becomes very hard to do ANYTHING that disappoints >at least somebody. That can lead to a lot of inefficiencies. I predict that agreements will simply change to avoid (or anticipate) such disappointments, in order to ensure that neither party feels "taken" if things don't work out as planned. Or, if there is an innocent-and-unavoidable breach of the agreement that harms one person, the other will be motivated to make it up to the first. In effect, they'll have to find a mutually-agreeable middle ground. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Ireland: Bid To Ban "Tamper Proof" Phones
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:32 PM 2/2/97 +0000, Mani wrote: >>From today's Sunday Independent: > >Bid to ban "tamper proof" telephones. >Liz Allen, Crime Correspondent [...] >Justice Minister Nora Owen is presiding over the conference which will agree >on a memorandum of understanding whereby all of the 22 governments will >agree to allow the sale of only telephones which can be intercepted. [...] >Among the countries which will be in attendance at the conference >are America, Australia, Hong Kong, and Britain. I would like to point out two items: 1. A US ban on domestic sales of secure telephony products will require an act of Congress. 2. Insiders have known for months that the US Department of Justice is planning to introduce crypto legislation during the current session of Congress. You draw your own conclusions. IMHO, we will see the USG approaching Congress, pointing to the multilateral agreement, and ask that Congress pass a law to implement the agreement (which, let us not forget about it, has of course been instigated by the USG). It just might work. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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Voice Encrytion/Scrambling
by Huge Cajones Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can anyone comment on and give pointers to devices designed to encrypt voice transmission over POTS lines? I am interested in the respective sound qualities (if you've tried it) and relative strengths of encryption algorithms. Thus far, I've found: http://www-jb.cs.uni-sb.de/~khuwig/lc-1eng.html http://www.cescomm.co.nz/cesindex.html http://www.worldaccess.com/~djm/crytek.htm The first on the list claims to use RSA but gives no ordering or pricing information. Conversely, the last two seem more "available", however they are each vague on the specifics of their respective encryption/scrambling algorithm. Anyone?

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Re: PCS Encryption?
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

John Young wrote: | http://www.nsa.gov:8080/programs/missi/condor.html # How secure is CONDOR? # # Current proof-of-concept hardware is FORTEZZA(TM) based # (sensitive but unclassified) Product versions will use STU # for cellular voice and FORTEZZA(TM) Plus for net broadcast # mode and data I was under the impression that Fortezza was ok for classified traffic. Did I miss the changeover, was it unannounced, or was I simply misremembering? Adam -- Pet peeve of the day: Security companies whose protocols dare not speak their name, because they don't have one. Guilty company of the day is now V-One.

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Re: PCS Encryption?
by Greg Rose 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Douglas C. Merrill" writes: >At 03:30 PM 2/1/97 -0500, Steven Bellovin wrote: >>And an illegal wiretap besides, most likely -- with a warrant, they could >>simply put the tap at the base station. The story may be true, but it >>doesn't sound quite right to me. It doesn't sound quite right to me either. >Phil Karn is, of course, the expert on this -- I hope he'll chime in soon >-- Phil, you out there?? I'm not Phil, but maybe I'll do. The three different digital standards in North America are TDMA, CDMA, and GSM (in NY and DC only AFAIK). Newer analog phones use at least some of this, but I don't know much about them. I'll ignore GSM. There is a fair bit of commonality in the security of TDMA and CDMA because of their use of the "Common Cryptographic Algorithms". I like to think I'm only telling you things which are in the "Interface Specification for Common Cryptographic Algorithms Rev B.1". CAVE is used as a hashing algorithm for a number of purposes. Starting at the beginning (that's a very good place to start... shut up Julie) it is used to verify that the A-key programmed into the phone is correct; the dealer or whoever puts in 26 digits, 20 of which are the A-key, and the other 6 are a checksum calculated with CAVE, and the Equipment Serial Number. (The ESN is always used by CAVE -- I won't mention it again.) If they agree, the phone buries the A-key very deep, never to be seen again. (A_Key_Checksum, A_Key_Verify) >From time to time, but not very often, the network and the phone create "Shared Secret Data"; they start with a 56-bit random number and run CAVE on it and the A-key. The resulting 128 bits is split into two 64-bit chunks called SSD_A and SSD_B. SSD_A is used for authentication purposes only, while SSD_B is used for the generation of keys for other cryptographic stuff. (SSD_Generation, SSD_Update) At various times, the base station authenticates the phone by sending down a random challenge (32 bits); this is hashed by CAVE with some other use-dependent data (not secret, but intended to defeat replays) and SSD_A (either current or new, depending on context) to form an 18-bit signature. Since you only get one go to get it right, 18 bits was deemed enough. Again depending on context, the state of CAVE at the end of this process may be saved for use later. (Auth_Signature) The original intent seems to be that Auth_Signature would happen at the beginning of every call, but I don't think that is actually the case. I'm not certain about the telephony end of this stuff. Now comes the encryption stuff. At the beginning of each call, Key_VPM_Generation is called. (VPM is Voice Privacy Mask.) This uses CAVE, initialised to the saved state it had at the last Auth_Signature, and SSD_B, to achieve two things; it generates the CMEA key (64 bits), and it generates the Voice Privacy Mask. CMEA (Cellular Message Encryption Algorithm) is used to encrypt bits of the signalling stuff over the air, but never any end-user data. It is used in different ways by the three standards, as they have different message formats, but they all (AMPS, TDMA, CDMA) use it. The VPM is ignored by analog (I think). It is constant for the entire call, and is XORed with every frame for TDMA (cryptographically weak, as you can XOR any two frames to cancel it out, but since the frames are heavily compressed actually getting anything from this is not trivial). CDMA ignores all but the last 40 bits, which becomes the initial "long code" for the PN (Psuedo-random Noise) generator. This is a straightforward LFSR, which again, is not cryptographically strong in the face of known plaintext, but again, the input is heavily compressed. More importantly, though, for CDMA you need to have the long code before you can easily sort out the signal from the noise around it (it was originally developed from anti-jamming technology), and since it has a period of days before it repeats, the call will probably be over... The conclusion is that neither way of doing it is truly cryptographically strong, but both are a lot better than listening to Princess Di call Newt "Squidgy" on a Radio Shack scanner. Note, at this point, that neither the phone industry or the NSA particularly cares about end-user stuff being strong. The signalling messages have a 64-bit key used much more appropriately, and so cell-phone fraud is harder to achieve. >Many folks think that "digital = secure" because you can't use radio >shack(TM) listening devices. This much is true. However, you *Can* build >other devices to listen in, and computer hardware is so cheap it's almost >feasible -- though I haven't built one... Or you can take the bits out of existing phones. Greg. Greg Rose INTERNET: ggr(a)Qualcomm.com Qualcomm Australia VOICE: +61-2-9743 4646 FAX: +61-2-9736 3262 6 Kingston Avenue homepage. Mortlake NSW 2137 35 0A 79 7D 5E 21 8D 47 E3 53 75 66 AC FB D9 45

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GAK cracking?
by tmcghan＠gill-simpson.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just days after a U.S. graduate student cracked the most powerful computer encryption system allowed out of the country, the Commerce Department announced it would allow three companies to export an even stronger system. Until this year, computer encryption programs, which scramble information and render it unreadable without a password or software "key," were classified as munitions and stronger programs could not be exported. But under a controversial new Clinton administration policy that took effect Jan. 1, companies may receive permission to export stronger programs. "I'm happy that we've been able to do this within the first month without rancor or difficulty," Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration William Reinsch told Reuters in a telephone interview. To export stronger programs immediately, companies must agree to incorporate features within two years allowing the government to decode encrypted messages by recovering the software keys, however. The administration's policy has been widely criticized as not relaxing the export limits enough and some companies feared the requirement for a two-year plan would substantially delay export approvals. The quick approvals should quell some of the criticism and encourage more applicants, Reinsch said. "As a result of this, you will have more companies taking it seriously and we will expect more plans over the next couple of months," he said. Encryption was once the realm of spies and generals. But with the explosion of online commerce on the Internet, encryption has become a vital tool for protecting everything from a business' email message to a consumer's credit card number sent over the net. The amount of protection afforded by encryption is largely a function of the length of the software key measured in bits, the smallest unit of computer data. Companies said products with just 40-bit long keys, the old limit, were too easy to crack. The approvals came just days after Ian Goldberg, a graduate student at the University of California, cracked a message encoded with a software key 40-bits long. The government did not name the companies given permission to export stronger, 56-bit programs, but Glenwood, Md.,-based Trusted Information Systems acknowledged that it was one of the three.

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Fortune, 3 Feb
by Mike McNally 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Big article in Fortune about e-mail privace. One little paragraph about encryption ("scrambling"). Fairly clue-free overall, but entertaining. -- ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Mike McNally -- Egregiously Pointy -- Tivoli Systems, "IBM" -- Austin mailto:m5@tivoli.com mailto:m101@io.com http://www.io.com/~m101 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

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Re: PCS Encryption?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I was under the impression that Fortezza was ok for classified >traffic. Did I miss the changeover, was it unannounced, or was I >simply misremembering? Fortezza now comes in several implementations for various, variable and multiple levels of classification and message handling. There is info on latest mani-dexterous products at NSA's armadillo and missi sites. If you don't want to be logged by NSA, see the Mykronyx bouquet at: http://jya.com/fortezza.htm To be sure, you might get logged anyway: jya.com may have been approved by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for a snoop.

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Fortune, 3 Feb
by Mike McNally 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Big article in Fortune about e-mail privace. One little paragraph about encryption ("scrambling"). Fairly clue-free overall, but entertaining. -- ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Mike McNally -- Egregiously Pointy -- Tivoli Systems, "IBM" -- Austin mailto:m5@tivoli.com mailto:m101@io.com http://www.io.com/~m101 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

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Re: My Departure, Moderation, and "Ownership of the List"
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, On Mon, 3 Feb 1997, Timothy C. May wrote: > Unfortunately, Sandy responded to my post with his own flames ("piffle," > "disingenous," "straw man," etc.). Now he may well think his points are not > flames becuase they are "true," but to me they take the form of flames. But they are not ad hominem attacks on Tim May. The are my opinions of some of his arguments. Even very smart people such as Tim say poorly thought out or even silly things. > But then I have long disliked Sandy's method of argument. Nothing personal. But Nor I, Tim's. Nothing personal, but that's the point. It is still possible to conduct ourselves with mutual respect even if our views and styles differ. > As Sandy did a too-common section-by-section disssection, I'll do the same > for his comments. After reading through Tim's post, I don't think much would be served by doing another point by point response. From Tim's tone, it appears he is still seething about how this all came about, so I'll just leave our two expressions of opinions where they were. I have no wish to exacerbate any hard feelings Tim may be having. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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