December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Jeremiah A Blatz wrote: >ph(a)netcom.com (Peter Hendrickson) writes: >> It appears to be widely believed that cryptoanarchy is irreversible. >> Everybody believes that the race to deploy or forbid strong cryptography >> will define the outcome for a long time. >> >> I can't think of a reason why this should be so. ><snip> > Well, once I've got my strong crypto and electronic commerce, and 20 > or so virtual identities to do things for me, and the gub'ment can't > tell what money I'm making and spending, so they can't tax me. So if > they can't tax me, and they can't tax lots of folks, then they can't > pay their jack-booted thugs. So the goverment becomes irrelevant. It > can't support a huge police state infrastructure, and certainly can't > but mega-crays to break my crypto, so how're they going to retain > control? > When we say anarchy, we mean anarchy. This only works if there are large numbers of people who think it is a good idea. Otherwise, the resources of the Federal Government may be directed quite effectively against a small number of people. If you can get a life prison term for your strong crypto you may hesitate to use it. If not, then you may get to be an example for everybody else. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:37 PM 11/7/1996, Daniel T. Hagan wrote: > On Thu, 7 Nov 1996, Peter Hendrickson wrote: >> If strong cryptography were unpopular and highly illegal, very few >> people would be using it. This makes it easy to identify suspects. > I think the reasons are probably tied closely to your second point. > Unless strong cryptography was easily distinguishable from weak > cryptography without taking the time to break it, then how would they > (law enforcement) recognize that someone was using strong cryptography? > Or suppose that some one uses strong cryptography and then wraps it in > weak cryptography. The outer shell would seem legal, and the authorities > can't go around randomly breaking people's keys (or so one would assume), > and even if they did, it wouldn't necessarily be legal as evidence anyway. In the extreme case, everybody would be sending messages in the clear. In the case of mandatory GAK, it would be easy to open a bunch of messages and see if what was inside looked like cryptography. The privacy violation could be minimized by requiring a Congressionally approved test program to applied without any human reading it. If the test program said it was cryptography, then this could be considered just cause for a judge to issue a warrant to the authorities for the study of the actual message. The laws regarding what is considered legal evidence are easily changed if there is a need for it. Probably they don't need to be changed all that much. If you see a lot of PGP messages coming from somebody, you get a warrant and search their computer for illegal software. When you find it, you lock them up forever. > And finally, you have to consider the possibility of whether a person can > be identified merely by the fact that there is a message that is > intercepted that has strong cryptography in it. I don't know enough about > remailers and internet protocols/servers to say whether this is a > reasonable objection or not, perhaps someone else does? In the absence of strong cryptography, remailers do not offer much anonymity. > So, unless I'm incorrect about one of the above points (and I admit that I > may well be), once cryptography reaches a certain strength, there is no > reason to relinquish that strength, particularly if you are using it for > criminal activity. If the penalties for the use of cryptography are significantly greater than the penalties associated with the crime, you may opt not to use cryptography. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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[rant]Re: black high heal shoes?
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Clinton wearing black and white shiny vinyl high >heel shoes, and nothing else but a transparent >plastic raincoat. > >Embroided on the back of the clear plastic raincoat >is the bar code for the RSA algorithm. > >He is walking around the RSA Data Security Conference >with the outfit on, trying to hug and kiss the attendees, >but they all ignore and make fun of him! When I think about Clipper. In my personal opinion, Clinton is afraid of unrestricted crypto because when he thinks about all the things he would have done with it when he was (is?) a hippie radical, he shuders, then, he makes the error of assuming that everyone in the U.S. of A. has the same low morals that he has shown. He feels that he must protect us from the monsters, yet, he feels that we are all potential monsters. And when I think about the assualt rifle ban, I think the same thing. In my personal opinion. None of this should be taken for anything but my opinion. Oh the nightmares you must have Mr. President. I am grateful that I don't see the world through your eyes.

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:03 PM 11/7/1996, Timothy C. May wrote: > However, if guns are not outlawed, are not hard to get, may be bought and > sold at flea markets and gun shows (which is where most of my guns have > come from, and which is where over the years I bought and sold about a > dozen or so various guns, none of them transferred with any paperwork, > identities asked for, etc.), and once gun ownership reaches some threshold, > later attempts to ban guns, seize them, halt ammunition sales, etc., > require draconian steps. (This is why so many gun owners have schemes to > bury spare guns in plastic pipes deep underground, place them in safe > deposit boxes, etc. And why so many of us reload our own ammo.) > Without taking a stand on the issues of whether guns should or should not > be restricted, the situation is quite similar to the ongoing deployment of > strong cryptography. Once widely deployed and "ingrained" in the habits of > many, later attempts to seize the newly-outlawed items are problematic. > Speech is similar to this. Once mechanisms for free speech are present in a > society, once people are used to having the "right" to speak freely, once > many channels of communication are widely available, and so on, it becomes > well nigh impossible to go back to a non-free-speech situation. > I believe, Peter, that your arguments naively ignore this sort of point. > Those in D.C. actually understand it well, and would laugh at your argument > of "If crypto turns out to be a problem, we can always ban it later." The key here is that in these cases the practice has become widely accepted. By widely accepted, I mean that very significant numbers of people believe that there is nothing all that wrong with the practice. Those who disagree do not feel it is worth the trouble to put a stop to it. If the Four Horseman of the Crypto-apocolypse were real, we could certainly put a stop to cryptoanarchy if we wanted to. Very few people would be willing to tolerate strong cryptography if it meant that it was real easy to have people killed, resulted in many sarin attacks, or widespread kidnappings. I doubt you could find many readers of even this list who would find such scenarios acceptable. You are right that the people in D.C. understand your point quite well. And I am naive for expecting them to honestly discuss their policies. The reason they fear cryptoanarchy is not because it will be something people won't like - quite the opposite. If they are to succeed they have to stop it now before it is widely recognized to not be a problem for people who earn their living. I believe that if the people in D.C. honestly believed that the Four Horsemen were coming, they would wait for the first real evidence of it to rally the society behind their cause and write themselves into the history books as heroes. Today, strong cryptography has caused no noticeable problems. People who want to forbid it can only justify such intrusive and politically risky policies on the grounds that something irreversible occurs after deployment. But, I don't believe I have yet seen any sort of explanation for irreversibility that is not based on "well, it won't be all that bad." > I don't imagine the parallel argument, for free speech, would go over well > in, say, China: "We'll let people say what they want, publish what they > want, set up newspapers, buy whatever foreign magazines they want, use > computers, and gather as they wish to make whatever plans they wish to. If > we don't like the results, we'll just go back to what we had before." This argument would certainly not go over well with the leaders of China. The people of China may have another point of view. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by Ted Cabeen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:38 PM 11/7/96 -0800, you wrote: >>Jeremiah A Blatz wrote: >>ph(a)netcom.com (Peter Hendrickson) writes: >> Well, once I've got my strong crypto and electronic commerce, and 20 >> or so virtual identities to do things for me, and the gub'ment can't >> tell what money I'm making and spending, so they can't tax me. So if >> they can't tax me, and they can't tax lots of folks, then they can't >> pay their jack-booted thugs. So the goverment becomes irrelevant. It >> can't support a huge police state infrastructure, and certainly can't >> but mega-crays to break my crypto, so how're they going to retain >> control? >> When we say anarchy, we mean anarchy. > >This only works if there are large numbers of people who think it is >a good idea. Otherwise, the resources of the Federal Government >may be directed quite effectively against a small number of people. > >If you can get a life prison term for your strong crypto you may >hesitate to use it. If not, then you may get to be an example >for everybody else. That's why we have to develop stealth PGP and good stego so that the government doesn't even know that you're using the strong crypto that has been outlawed. If they can't prove that there's actually a message in the picture of the catsgills you just downloaded off of alt.binaries.pictures.nature, you can't get a life sentence in jail. -- ______________________________________________________________________________ Ted Cabeen http://shadowland.rh.uchicago.edu cabeen(a)netcom.com Check Website or finger for PGP Public Key secabeen(a)midway.uchicago.edu "I have taken all knowledge to be my province." -F. Bacon cococabeen(a)aol.com "Human kind cannot bear very much reality."-T.S.Eliot 73126.626(a)compuserve.com

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WebTV a "munition"
by Eric Murray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Page 3 of the San Jose Mercury News has a small blurb about WebTV's browser/set-top box that "uses computer-security technology so powerful that the government is classifying it as a weapon that will require a special export license before it can be sold overseas". "Few industry experts expect such a licsense to be granted, meaning the companies are unlikely to begin selling current versions of the US-made devices next year in Eurpoe and Japan as they had planned". [fluff about export laws] "We're the guinea pig" says Steve Perlman, chairman and CEO blah blah. So what's the story here? It's a web browser, so they're probably talking about SSL. SSL (both versions) already has mechanisims for allowing "export" level encryption, and although you still need to get a Commodities Jurisdiction, it's been done before so it shouldn't be too difficult. If they didn't use the "export" level SSL CipherTypes, then what're they up to? Are they fighting crypto export laws (for which they should be congratulated and supported) or are they just looking for free publicity? -- Eric Murray ericm(a)lne.com ericm(a)motorcycle.com http://www.lne.com/ericm PGP keyid:E03F65E5 fingerprint:50 B0 A2 4C 7D 86 FC 03 92 E8 AC E6 7E 27 29 AF

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:39 AM 11/8/1996, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 9:50 AM -0800 11/8/96, Peter Hendrickson wrote: >>At 11:29 AM 11/8/1996, Jeremiah A Blatz wrote: >>> Furthermore, terrorrim and etc do not depend upon secure >>> communications to work. People tend to be able to talk face-to-face in >>> isolated environs, this is just as effective as a good public-key >>> cryptosystem. Crypto won't suddenly protect the types of people who >>> are professional killers/terrorists from scrutiny. It meerly would >>> allow them to communicate securely over distances of more than 10 >>> feet. This, IMO, is not much of a win for them. >> Face-to-face communications in isolated environs does not a cryptoanarchy >> make. > Yes, but you're the one talking about bombings, mass killings, Sarin gas > attacks, and other such examples of "terrorism." You cite the presence of > these things as why the Constitution will effectively be suspended and why > neighbors will cheerfully conduct vigilante raids on their suspected > terrorists. > Crypto anarchy is not the same thing as terrorism. Calling terrorism > "crypto anarchy" does not make it so. I could not agree with you more. What I am working with is the hypothetical Four Horsemen scenario which you have described above. I am not endorsing that scenario. If that were the outcome of cryptoanarchy, and some people think it will be, would it be a manageable problem or would the technology just sort of get away? I believe it would be easily managed if there were broad public support. Jeremiah correctly pointed out that you don't need strong cryptography to commit terrorist acts. That just puts us where we are today - not in a cryptoanarchy. I don't think that strong cryptography helps terrorists much. Let's face it, biowarfare and sarin gas don't have anything to do with cryptography, no matter how much the GAKers will try to show that they do. But, if I am wrong and for some reason the availability of strong cryptography leads to these scenarios - as the GAKers say - then there would be broad public support for the suppression of strong cryptography. This effort would be successful. It would not dramatically erode the structure of the Constitution or our legal system in the short term. The effect of strong cryptography and the Net is that it makes it possible for people with common interests to find each other more easily and to develop long distance relationships. That's fine when we are talking about scientists, mathematicians, or cypherpunks. But, it also brings together people with less savory interests. It's undesirable for serial killers to find each other and trade notes on how to evade capture. (I think this usually happens now through the prison system.) Strong cryptography makes it harder for governments to manage ideas and relationships between people. There are many implications of this and I think they are almost entirely good. The Constitution may not survive GAK in the long run. If the world were to stay in 1996 and we outlawed strong cryptography this would not necessarily be the case. But the world won't stay still. Computer assisted population management technologies have been getting more effective and cheaper all the time. In the past it was hard to give everybody unforgeable internal passports and ear tags. In a GAKed future that is unlikely to be the case. Segments of the USG probably have the doctrine worked out. We've heard a lot about "the responsible use of cryptography" from the GAKers. In fact, it is highly irresponsible to propose GAK at this time when there is no evidence whatsoever that it is needed. These people may have moved beyond any concern with ideas such as "responsibility." Right now there is a tremendous opportunity to the elites of the world to enslave everybody else. Once you know everywhere somebody goes, everything they read, and everybody they talk about, you can manage their behavior quite effectively. Only a small number of people would be needed to tweak the "justice" computers to punish indiscretions, such as meeting a cypherpunk on the street. Many people would be happy to enslave their fellow citizens if it meant tremendous wealth, power, and prestige for themselves and their children, possibly for a long time. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Vulis now on the "Don't Hire" list
by Timothy C. May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just wrote: And, indeed, it is not likely to be who suffers in the job market as a result of ^me Dr. Vulis' rants and raves and generally insane postings; my situation is secure, but I understand that Vulis has joined L. Dettweiler on the "List of Unemployables" passed around Silicon Valley. ... I meant to say "it is not likely to be _me_ who suffers in the job market..." Sorry for any confusion. --Tim "The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology." [NYT, 1996-10-02] We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:00 PM 11/7/1996, Jim McCoy wrote: >ph(a)netcom.com (Peter Hendrickson) writes: >[...] >>> Once a terrorist has strong crypto, why should they stop using it if it >>> becomes illegal? >> Use of strong crypto would be a tip off that one is a terrorist. >> If strong cryptography were unpopular and highly illegal, very few >> people would be using it. This makes it easy to identify suspects. > But the difference between strong crypto and weak crypto is not > something which is visible to an outside observer unless they make > the effort to attack a particular system or decrypt a message. Such > an attack is beyond the capacity of most municipal or state governements > and is a difficult and expensive task for federal agencies other than > the NSA (who would nto be pleased if their machines were suddenly at > the beck and call of the FBI or any other organization; never underestimate > the power of inter-agency infighting :) If mandatory GAK were imposed, reviewing messages is easy, even with inter-agency fighting. Or, encryption in general could just be forbidden if GAK created too much hassle. > What make such detection even harder is that a good crypto system > generates output which is indistinguishable from noise, this makes it > much easier to hide the fact that an encrypted channel is being used. In practice I suspect that good stego is hard. You don't have to be right every time when you look for it, just some of the time. When you see packets that seem kind of funny to you, the judge issues you a warrant and you search the suspect's house and computer very carefully. If stego is in use, the software that generated it can be found. Then you hand out a life sentence. Yes, this would be somewhat expensive. But if the number of suspects is small, it is completely feasible. You might also identify suspects in other ways. Maybe that Jim McCoy is looking a little too successful or perhaps he made an unwise comment to a "friend" who reported him. That could easily be grounds for a warrant and subsequent change of quarters. > The funny thing about noise in the information theory sense is that it can > actually be _anything_ depending on context, and this sort of uncertainty > is the bane of a legal system which is solidly grounded upon technicalities > (such as the US legal system.) Which technicalities protected the Japanese-Americans during World War II? As you probably know, these people were not protected by our legal system. Their bank accounts were frozen and they were forced to sell their property in less than two weeks. They were effectively stripped of their assets. Then, they were carted off to concentration camps and left there for years. This was allowed to happen because there was strong public support for it. The legal system would have to be stretched considerably less to outlaw strong crypto and make it stick. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:18 PM 11/7/1996, Ted Cabeen wrote: >At 02:38 PM 11/7/96 -0800, you wrote: >>>Jeremiah A Blatz wrote: >>>ph(a)netcom.com (Peter Hendrickson) writes: >>> Well, once I've got my strong crypto and electronic commerce, and 20 >>> or so virtual identities to do things for me, and the gub'ment can't >>> tell what money I'm making and spending, so they can't tax me. So if >>> they can't tax me, and they can't tax lots of folks, then they can't >>> pay their jack-booted thugs. So the goverment becomes irrelevant. It >>> can't support a huge police state infrastructure, and certainly can't >>> but mega-crays to break my crypto, so how're they going to retain >>> control? >>> When we say anarchy, we mean anarchy. >> This only works if there are large numbers of people who think it is >> a good idea. Otherwise, the resources of the Federal Government >> may be directed quite effectively against a small number of people. >> If you can get a life prison term for your strong crypto you may >> hesitate to use it. If not, then you may get to be an example >> for everybody else. > That's why we have to develop stealth PGP and good stego so that the > government doesn't even know that you're using the strong crypto that has > been outlawed. If they can't prove that there's actually a message in the > picture of the catsgills you just downloaded off of > alt.binaries.pictures.nature, you can't get a life sentence in jail. What happens when they find it on your disk? Remember, you don't have an encrypted virtual disk, or if you do, the consequences are the same if you didn't. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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