December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

[rant]Re: black high heal shoes?
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Clinton wearing black and white shiny vinyl high >heel shoes, and nothing else but a transparent >plastic raincoat. > >Embroided on the back of the clear plastic raincoat >is the bar code for the RSA algorithm. > >He is walking around the RSA Data Security Conference >with the outfit on, trying to hug and kiss the attendees, >but they all ignore and make fun of him! When I think about Clipper. In my personal opinion, Clinton is afraid of unrestricted crypto because when he thinks about all the things he would have done with it when he was (is?) a hippie radical, he shuders, then, he makes the error of assuming that everyone in the U.S. of A. has the same low morals that he has shown. He feels that he must protect us from the monsters, yet, he feels that we are all potential monsters. And when I think about the assualt rifle ban, I think the same thing. In my personal opinion. None of this should be taken for anything but my opinion. Oh the nightmares you must have Mr. President. I am grateful that I don't see the world through your eyes.

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:03 PM 11/7/1996, Timothy C. May wrote: > However, if guns are not outlawed, are not hard to get, may be bought and > sold at flea markets and gun shows (which is where most of my guns have > come from, and which is where over the years I bought and sold about a > dozen or so various guns, none of them transferred with any paperwork, > identities asked for, etc.), and once gun ownership reaches some threshold, > later attempts to ban guns, seize them, halt ammunition sales, etc., > require draconian steps. (This is why so many gun owners have schemes to > bury spare guns in plastic pipes deep underground, place them in safe > deposit boxes, etc. And why so many of us reload our own ammo.) > Without taking a stand on the issues of whether guns should or should not > be restricted, the situation is quite similar to the ongoing deployment of > strong cryptography. Once widely deployed and "ingrained" in the habits of > many, later attempts to seize the newly-outlawed items are problematic. > Speech is similar to this. Once mechanisms for free speech are present in a > society, once people are used to having the "right" to speak freely, once > many channels of communication are widely available, and so on, it becomes > well nigh impossible to go back to a non-free-speech situation. > I believe, Peter, that your arguments naively ignore this sort of point. > Those in D.C. actually understand it well, and would laugh at your argument > of "If crypto turns out to be a problem, we can always ban it later." The key here is that in these cases the practice has become widely accepted. By widely accepted, I mean that very significant numbers of people believe that there is nothing all that wrong with the practice. Those who disagree do not feel it is worth the trouble to put a stop to it. If the Four Horseman of the Crypto-apocolypse were real, we could certainly put a stop to cryptoanarchy if we wanted to. Very few people would be willing to tolerate strong cryptography if it meant that it was real easy to have people killed, resulted in many sarin attacks, or widespread kidnappings. I doubt you could find many readers of even this list who would find such scenarios acceptable. You are right that the people in D.C. understand your point quite well. And I am naive for expecting them to honestly discuss their policies. The reason they fear cryptoanarchy is not because it will be something people won't like - quite the opposite. If they are to succeed they have to stop it now before it is widely recognized to not be a problem for people who earn their living. I believe that if the people in D.C. honestly believed that the Four Horsemen were coming, they would wait for the first real evidence of it to rally the society behind their cause and write themselves into the history books as heroes. Today, strong cryptography has caused no noticeable problems. People who want to forbid it can only justify such intrusive and politically risky policies on the grounds that something irreversible occurs after deployment. But, I don't believe I have yet seen any sort of explanation for irreversibility that is not based on "well, it won't be all that bad." > I don't imagine the parallel argument, for free speech, would go over well > in, say, China: "We'll let people say what they want, publish what they > want, set up newspapers, buy whatever foreign magazines they want, use > computers, and gather as they wish to make whatever plans they wish to. If > we don't like the results, we'll just go back to what we had before." This argument would certainly not go over well with the leaders of China. The people of China may have another point of view. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by Ted Cabeen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:38 PM 11/7/96 -0800, you wrote: >>Jeremiah A Blatz wrote: >>ph(a)netcom.com (Peter Hendrickson) writes: >> Well, once I've got my strong crypto and electronic commerce, and 20 >> or so virtual identities to do things for me, and the gub'ment can't >> tell what money I'm making and spending, so they can't tax me. So if >> they can't tax me, and they can't tax lots of folks, then they can't >> pay their jack-booted thugs. So the goverment becomes irrelevant. It >> can't support a huge police state infrastructure, and certainly can't >> but mega-crays to break my crypto, so how're they going to retain >> control? >> When we say anarchy, we mean anarchy. > >This only works if there are large numbers of people who think it is >a good idea. Otherwise, the resources of the Federal Government >may be directed quite effectively against a small number of people. > >If you can get a life prison term for your strong crypto you may >hesitate to use it. If not, then you may get to be an example >for everybody else. That's why we have to develop stealth PGP and good stego so that the government doesn't even know that you're using the strong crypto that has been outlawed. If they can't prove that there's actually a message in the picture of the catsgills you just downloaded off of alt.binaries.pictures.nature, you can't get a life sentence in jail. -- ______________________________________________________________________________ Ted Cabeen http://shadowland.rh.uchicago.edu cabeen(a)netcom.com Check Website or finger for PGP Public Key secabeen(a)midway.uchicago.edu "I have taken all knowledge to be my province." -F. Bacon cococabeen(a)aol.com "Human kind cannot bear very much reality."-T.S.Eliot 73126.626(a)compuserve.com

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WebTV a "munition"
by Eric Murray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Page 3 of the San Jose Mercury News has a small blurb about WebTV's browser/set-top box that "uses computer-security technology so powerful that the government is classifying it as a weapon that will require a special export license before it can be sold overseas". "Few industry experts expect such a licsense to be granted, meaning the companies are unlikely to begin selling current versions of the US-made devices next year in Eurpoe and Japan as they had planned". [fluff about export laws] "We're the guinea pig" says Steve Perlman, chairman and CEO blah blah. So what's the story here? It's a web browser, so they're probably talking about SSL. SSL (both versions) already has mechanisims for allowing "export" level encryption, and although you still need to get a Commodities Jurisdiction, it's been done before so it shouldn't be too difficult. If they didn't use the "export" level SSL CipherTypes, then what're they up to? Are they fighting crypto export laws (for which they should be congratulated and supported) or are they just looking for free publicity? -- Eric Murray ericm(a)lne.com ericm(a)motorcycle.com http://www.lne.com/ericm PGP keyid:E03F65E5 fingerprint:50 B0 A2 4C 7D 86 FC 03 92 E8 AC E6 7E 27 29 AF

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:39 AM 11/8/1996, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 9:50 AM -0800 11/8/96, Peter Hendrickson wrote: >>At 11:29 AM 11/8/1996, Jeremiah A Blatz wrote: >>> Furthermore, terrorrim and etc do not depend upon secure >>> communications to work. People tend to be able to talk face-to-face in >>> isolated environs, this is just as effective as a good public-key >>> cryptosystem. Crypto won't suddenly protect the types of people who >>> are professional killers/terrorists from scrutiny. It meerly would >>> allow them to communicate securely over distances of more than 10 >>> feet. This, IMO, is not much of a win for them. >> Face-to-face communications in isolated environs does not a cryptoanarchy >> make. > Yes, but you're the one talking about bombings, mass killings, Sarin gas > attacks, and other such examples of "terrorism." You cite the presence of > these things as why the Constitution will effectively be suspended and why > neighbors will cheerfully conduct vigilante raids on their suspected > terrorists. > Crypto anarchy is not the same thing as terrorism. Calling terrorism > "crypto anarchy" does not make it so. I could not agree with you more. What I am working with is the hypothetical Four Horsemen scenario which you have described above. I am not endorsing that scenario. If that were the outcome of cryptoanarchy, and some people think it will be, would it be a manageable problem or would the technology just sort of get away? I believe it would be easily managed if there were broad public support. Jeremiah correctly pointed out that you don't need strong cryptography to commit terrorist acts. That just puts us where we are today - not in a cryptoanarchy. I don't think that strong cryptography helps terrorists much. Let's face it, biowarfare and sarin gas don't have anything to do with cryptography, no matter how much the GAKers will try to show that they do. But, if I am wrong and for some reason the availability of strong cryptography leads to these scenarios - as the GAKers say - then there would be broad public support for the suppression of strong cryptography. This effort would be successful. It would not dramatically erode the structure of the Constitution or our legal system in the short term. The effect of strong cryptography and the Net is that it makes it possible for people with common interests to find each other more easily and to develop long distance relationships. That's fine when we are talking about scientists, mathematicians, or cypherpunks. But, it also brings together people with less savory interests. It's undesirable for serial killers to find each other and trade notes on how to evade capture. (I think this usually happens now through the prison system.) Strong cryptography makes it harder for governments to manage ideas and relationships between people. There are many implications of this and I think they are almost entirely good. The Constitution may not survive GAK in the long run. If the world were to stay in 1996 and we outlawed strong cryptography this would not necessarily be the case. But the world won't stay still. Computer assisted population management technologies have been getting more effective and cheaper all the time. In the past it was hard to give everybody unforgeable internal passports and ear tags. In a GAKed future that is unlikely to be the case. Segments of the USG probably have the doctrine worked out. We've heard a lot about "the responsible use of cryptography" from the GAKers. In fact, it is highly irresponsible to propose GAK at this time when there is no evidence whatsoever that it is needed. These people may have moved beyond any concern with ideas such as "responsibility." Right now there is a tremendous opportunity to the elites of the world to enslave everybody else. Once you know everywhere somebody goes, everything they read, and everybody they talk about, you can manage their behavior quite effectively. Only a small number of people would be needed to tweak the "justice" computers to punish indiscretions, such as meeting a cypherpunk on the street. Many people would be happy to enslave their fellow citizens if it meant tremendous wealth, power, and prestige for themselves and their children, possibly for a long time. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Vulis now on the "Don't Hire" list
by Timothy C. May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just wrote: And, indeed, it is not likely to be who suffers in the job market as a result of ^me Dr. Vulis' rants and raves and generally insane postings; my situation is secure, but I understand that Vulis has joined L. Dettweiler on the "List of Unemployables" passed around Silicon Valley. ... I meant to say "it is not likely to be _me_ who suffers in the job market..." Sorry for any confusion. --Tim "The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology." [NYT, 1996-10-02] We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:00 PM 11/7/1996, Jim McCoy wrote: >ph(a)netcom.com (Peter Hendrickson) writes: >[...] >>> Once a terrorist has strong crypto, why should they stop using it if it >>> becomes illegal? >> Use of strong crypto would be a tip off that one is a terrorist. >> If strong cryptography were unpopular and highly illegal, very few >> people would be using it. This makes it easy to identify suspects. > But the difference between strong crypto and weak crypto is not > something which is visible to an outside observer unless they make > the effort to attack a particular system or decrypt a message. Such > an attack is beyond the capacity of most municipal or state governements > and is a difficult and expensive task for federal agencies other than > the NSA (who would nto be pleased if their machines were suddenly at > the beck and call of the FBI or any other organization; never underestimate > the power of inter-agency infighting :) If mandatory GAK were imposed, reviewing messages is easy, even with inter-agency fighting. Or, encryption in general could just be forbidden if GAK created too much hassle. > What make such detection even harder is that a good crypto system > generates output which is indistinguishable from noise, this makes it > much easier to hide the fact that an encrypted channel is being used. In practice I suspect that good stego is hard. You don't have to be right every time when you look for it, just some of the time. When you see packets that seem kind of funny to you, the judge issues you a warrant and you search the suspect's house and computer very carefully. If stego is in use, the software that generated it can be found. Then you hand out a life sentence. Yes, this would be somewhat expensive. But if the number of suspects is small, it is completely feasible. You might also identify suspects in other ways. Maybe that Jim McCoy is looking a little too successful or perhaps he made an unwise comment to a "friend" who reported him. That could easily be grounds for a warrant and subsequent change of quarters. > The funny thing about noise in the information theory sense is that it can > actually be _anything_ depending on context, and this sort of uncertainty > is the bane of a legal system which is solidly grounded upon technicalities > (such as the US legal system.) Which technicalities protected the Japanese-Americans during World War II? As you probably know, these people were not protected by our legal system. Their bank accounts were frozen and they were forced to sell their property in less than two weeks. They were effectively stripped of their assets. Then, they were carted off to concentration camps and left there for years. This was allowed to happen because there was strong public support for it. The legal system would have to be stretched considerably less to outlaw strong crypto and make it stick. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:18 PM 11/7/1996, Ted Cabeen wrote: >At 02:38 PM 11/7/96 -0800, you wrote: >>>Jeremiah A Blatz wrote: >>>ph(a)netcom.com (Peter Hendrickson) writes: >>> Well, once I've got my strong crypto and electronic commerce, and 20 >>> or so virtual identities to do things for me, and the gub'ment can't >>> tell what money I'm making and spending, so they can't tax me. So if >>> they can't tax me, and they can't tax lots of folks, then they can't >>> pay their jack-booted thugs. So the goverment becomes irrelevant. It >>> can't support a huge police state infrastructure, and certainly can't >>> but mega-crays to break my crypto, so how're they going to retain >>> control? >>> When we say anarchy, we mean anarchy. >> This only works if there are large numbers of people who think it is >> a good idea. Otherwise, the resources of the Federal Government >> may be directed quite effectively against a small number of people. >> If you can get a life prison term for your strong crypto you may >> hesitate to use it. If not, then you may get to be an example >> for everybody else. > That's why we have to develop stealth PGP and good stego so that the > government doesn't even know that you're using the strong crypto that has > been outlawed. If they can't prove that there's actually a message in the > picture of the catsgills you just downloaded off of > alt.binaries.pictures.nature, you can't get a life sentence in jail. What happens when they find it on your disk? Remember, you don't have an encrypted virtual disk, or if you do, the consequences are the same if you didn't. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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[rant] Race
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy Sandfort wrote: ... >What you mean WE, white man? ... At first I was afraid to comment, as I have been more than vocal in the last 24 hours, but then I decided that I thought this important enough to bring up. This was the first time on this list that I noticed such an obvious reference to race, granted I'm fairly new to the list,(quite new in fact), and when I think about it, there were several references to Russians and Jews in some of the other posts about Dr. Vulis and his practices. In my rose colored view, I had not taken notice, possibly because they were comments about the statements made by an individual, more likely because I'm gratefully ignorant to most of the filth of this imperfect world. I was unaware of some of the hardships some of my friends and their friends still go through just because of their skin color. Not Just with recognized, individual bigots, but also with the police, and I live in a sparsely populated area. The point I was going to make was that this comment caught my eye, because it bridged my real, though I should say corporal as this is quite real, world with my online world. For a week there, I was a individual in a society of minds, our "race" depended on our individual views. I like being online, I am judged by what I think matters. When something threatens my ability to be free of the definitions put on my physical shell, I react. Does this have any relation to crypto? No But it does have relevance to anonymity. Online I can be who I feel like, not what I look like. For those wondering who I am, I may be an AI painted purple with a big intel sticker on my side, it doesn't matter, what do you think about my ideas.

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Re: Group order for "Secret Power" ... (San Francisco Bay Area only)
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I'm looking for 19 other people interested in "Secret Power" (Craig >Potton Publishers has indicated that there is a discount for 20 or >more copies). If you are in the San Francisco Bay Area, please >contact me by phone or E-Mail. If anyone is going to the Usenix e-commerce conference I can bring over some copies for them. I'm already taking over a whole bunch of copies, I can bring over a few more if I can get them (I've pretty much cleaned out the bookshops around here). I can bring them to the conference but what you do with them from there is up to you (ie I won't have time to find post offices to mail people copies or whatever). Cost is US$25 (the NZ retail price is $35 = US$25), delivery is in just over a week. Peter.

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