December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

[JIM RAY] Does anyone have the complaint number for Florida Barr Assocoation?
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I want to complaint to the FLoria Bar Association about Jim Ray sending complaints to postmaster(a)bwalk.dm.com (quoted before). Can someone please post their contact address? The lying motherfucker's resume follows. <html> <head> <title></title> </head> <body> <h2 align=center> JAMES M. RAY </h2> <pre> JAMES M. RAY 1150 Madruga Ave. #A-101 Coral Gables, FL 33146 (305) 666-1029 http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray e-mail liberty(a)gate.net EDUCATION: UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI SCHOOL OF LAW Juris Doctor - May 1995 Coral Gables, Florida * Society of Bar & Gavel, LAW SCHOOL NEWSPAPER OPINIONS EDITOR UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA Bachelor of Science, Psychology - May 1986 Gainesville, Florida EXPERIENCE: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Sept. 1994 to May 1995 Southern District of Florida * legal Intern For US District Judge William M. Hoeveler Attended trials and hearings. Wrote memoranda and orders. Conducted Lexis, Westlaw, and library research on a range of civil and criminal law issues including: possible fines in a corporate contempt of Court proceeding, 2255 prisoner claims, insurance, drug-smuggling and failed Savings & Loan cases. Organized and updated library. DADE COUNTY GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM Jan. 1994 to Aug. 1994 Miami, Florida * Volunteer Summer Intern, GAL Spoke for children in family Court hearings. Conducted interviews and investigations. Wrote reports, memoranda for attorneys, and performance agreement contracts. UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI Oct. 1993 to Aug. 1994 Miami, Florida * research Assistant For Law Professor Susan Stefan Conducted legal and CD-ROM database research for articles and speeches. Assisted in preparation of an ADA lawsuit. PEKNY INDUSTRIES, INC. 1987 to 1990 St. Petersburg, Florida * Small Business Partner, Vice-president & Director of Marketing Supervised and performed research at the United States Patent & Trademark Office. Consistently the top anchor seller at boat shows. Analyzed and satisfied customer needs. FLORIDA STATE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Election 1992 Dade County, Florida * Libertarian Party Candidate for District 113 Ran successful local and statewide ballot access petition drives. Participated in panel discussions and debates. Held TV and newspaper interviews. Organized a lean, clean campaign. CHARLOTTE COUNTY ORANGE GROVE 1978 to Present Punta Gorda, Florida * Farmer (part time) Transported and sold citrus and exotic fruit. ACTIVITIES: PADI Advanced Open Water SCUBA Diver. Competent sailor, fisherman and power boater. Florida State House Messenger. Volunteer high-school teacher. Recording for the Blind law book reader. Hurricane Andrew volunteer. Internet Guide. Amateur HTML Programming. PGP encryption teaching for e-mail confidentiality and authentication. </pre> <hr> <p align=center> <center> Return to Jim's Home Page </p> </body> </html>

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Re: slander again
by Benjamin Grosman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Sirs, Have either of you read my post to the coderpunks list concerning professionalism? I feel that it might be slightly applicable here. Surely this has gone on long enough, and in enough of a public manner, that enough people are sick of it. Yours Sincerely, Benjamin Grosman

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Re: NSA Report: Anyone seen this?
by field＠nyc.pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The 18 June 1996 report, "How to Make a Mint: The Cryptography of Anonymous Electronic Cash", was written by Laurie Law, Susan Sabett, and Jerry Solinas of the Office of Information Security Research and Technology, Cryptology Division, NSA. It is 30 pages, as follows: INTRODUCTION Section 1. What is Electronic Cash? 1.1 Electronic Payment 1.2 Security of Electronic Payments 1.3 Electronic Cash 1.4 Multiple Spending Section 2. A Cryptographic Description 2.1 Public-Key Cryptographic Tools (One-Way Functions, Key Pairs, Signature and Identification, Secure Hashing) 2.2 A Simplified Electronic Cash Protocol 2.3 Untraceable Electronic Payments 2.4 A Basic Electronic Cash Protocol Section 3. Proposed Off-Line Implementations 3.1 Including Identifying Information (Cut and Choose, Zero-Knowledge Proofs) 3.2 Authentication and Signature Techniques (RSA Signatures, Blind RSA Signatures, The Schnorr Algorithms, Schnorr identification, Schnorr Signature, Blind Schnorr Signature, Chaum-Pederson Signature, Implementations of the Schnorr Protocols) 3.3 Summary of Proposed Implementations (Chaum-Fiat-Naor, Brands, Ferguson) Section 4. Optional Features of Off-Line Cash 4.1 Transferability 4.2 Divisibility Section 5. Security Issues 5.1 Multiple Spending Prevention 5.2 Wallet Observers 5.3 Security Failures (Types of failures, Consequences of a failure) 5.4 Restoring Traceability CONCLUSION REFERENCES - Richard Field On Oct 24, 1996 09:52:25, 'declan(a)well.com (Declan McCullagh)' wrote: >Just got off the phone with the NSA. > >"There are so many places in the NSA that deal with cryptology >we haven't been able to find the document yet. We'll call you >back once we locate it and let you know if it can be released >or not. We've been getting phone calls about the document. Did >you read about it on the Internet?" > >-Declan >>______________________________ Forward Header >>21st Century Banking Alert No. 96-10-17 >>October 17, 1996 >> >>National Security Agency Report Raises >>Systemic Security Issues Related to Anonymous Electronic Money >> >> >> A recent report prepared by the Cryptology Division of the National >>Security Agency's Office of Information Security Research and Technology >>discusses the potential for security failures in certain electronic cash >>systems and their likely consequences. While demonstrating concern over the >>attributes of non-traceable electronic money, the report points out methods >>that may be used to minimize security breaches and losses, including >>limiting the number of coins that can be affected by a single compromise, >>requiring traceability for large transactions or large numbers of >>transactions in a given period, and the creation of a mechanism to restore >>traceability under certain circumstances. The report contains an excellent >>summary of basic electronic money cryptographic tools, electronic cash >>protocols, authentication and signature techniques and related security >>issues.

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PIS_son
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

10-17-96, BuWi: "Apple, IBM, JavaSoft, Motorola, Netscape, Nortel, Novell, RSA, and Silicon Graphics Announce PICA Crypto-Alliance" The PICA specification will also be designed to make the task of developing differing domestic and exportable security requirements much easier. [GAK alliance 2.] PrNe: "World Wide Web Casinos, Inc. Brings Gambling to the Internet at www.netpirates.com" "Placing bets cannot be illegal because, despite their origination, bets will technically be placed on the computers at our off-shore spy-based casino site." BuWi: "Cylink Partners with U.S.P.S to Build National Citizen Tracking System to Include Postmarking and Authentication for Legal/Medical Records, Tax Filings" PhIn: "Unsuspecting Internet Users' 'Cookie' Files Concern Privacy Advocates" But look at cookie users another way: You're the hydrant and they're the dogs, marking you for future reference. ----- http://jya.com/pisson.txt (24 kb for 4) ftp://jya.com/pub/incoming/pisson.txt PIS_son

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Merc: PacBell predicts imminent death of the net; film at 11
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Full text freely available at http://www.sjmercury.com/business/dial1023.htm (they do one or two net-related stories "free" per day) Pac Bell says Net use may collapse phone system ISPs rebut dire, 'trumped-up' prediction Published: Oct. 24, 1996 BY HOWARD BRYANT Mercury News Staff Writer As many as one of every six telephone calls in Silicon Valley now doesn't go through on the first try because Internet denizens are tying up the lines, Pacific Bell reported Wednesday. Under normal circumstances, less than 1 percent of calls go uncompleted, the company said. The situation is so dire that California's entire phone system is in danger of breakdown, a company executive said, with Silicon Valley especially on red alert. [...] But rather than being a sign of imminent collapse, critics called Pac Bell's startling statistic a trumped-up charge designed to scare the public and pressure federal regulators into ending a price break Internet service providers enjoy when tying into Pac Bell's network. ''The Internet is a baby and Pac Bell has been in this game since Alexander Graham Bell's bar mitzvah. Now they're saying that in the last three weeks, we broke the phone system? Come on,'' said the head of a service provider who asked not to be named for fear of reprisal by Pac Bell. [...] At the heart of the issue is a pricing conflict between Pac Bell and the ISPs. In 1983, the Federal Communications Commission gave companies that offered Internet services, and other ''enhanced service providers,'' an exemption from the per-minute fees that other companies, such as long-distance telephone companies, pay to use Pac Bell's network. [...] Wiping out the subsidy would force Internet companies to find new, more efficient ways of pricing that better reflect actual usage, Parker said. In all likelihood, Net service prices would increase for consumers. [...] ''This is clearly a ruse,'' said Dick Severy, director of public policy for MCI. ''They've added 691,000 access lines this year. Business lines are up. It's curious.''

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Fw: Area Code 809 Carribean Phone Scam
by Michael T. Babcock 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cypherpunks(a)hks.net Date: Fri Oct 25 11:13:26 1996 >> Just a heads-up about a current scam concerning numbers with "809" area >> codes.... spread the word! >> >> BE CAREFUL! This is a fraudulent message received the other day. >> >> "Subject: Unpaid Account >> >> I am writing to give you a final 24 hours to settle your outstanding >> account. If I have not received the settlement in full, I will commence >> legal proceedings without further delay. If you would like to discuss this >> matter to avoid court action, call Mike Murray at Global Communications on >> 1-809-496-2700" >> >> >> Subject: More Phone Scams >> >> The scam works basically like this: >> >> You get home and notice that the message light is blinking on your answering >> machine. You listen to the message, which has several wrinkles, but the >> best one is the caller asks you to call a number beginning with Area Code >> 809 to receive information about a family member who has been ill. (They >> may also tell you someone has been arrested, died, you have won a wonderful >> prize, etc.) >> >> In any event, concerned or curious, you make the call. >> >> Sometimes the phone is answered by someone who claims to speak broken >> English. (The idea is to keep you on the line to build up charges.) Or, >> sometimes you will just get a long recorded message. The bottom line is, >> when your phone bill comes, you see this incredible charge, oftentimes more >> than $100.00! >> >> Crooks are using the 809 numbers as "pay-per-calls" and to get around the US >> Regulations and 900 number blocking. Every time you call the number, they >> get a greatly inflated rebate from the foreign phone company. Since 809 >> numbers are in the Caribbean, they aren't bound by the US 900# regulations >> that require them to warn you of the charge and the rate involved, and also >> a time period during which you may terminate the call without being charged. >> >> The newest twist to this scam is to page people using the 809 numbers. With >> the new area code changes, people unknowingly are returning these calls. >> When the bill comes, there are HUGE charges for the calls. >> >> My suggestion is that no matter how you get the message, if you are asked to >> call a number with an 809 area code that you don't recognize, DON'T RETURN >> THE CALL! It is bad enough that the criminal is invading your privacy, >> don't let them invade your wallet as well! >> >> Scams of this type are extremely hard to prosecute and since you did >> actually make the call, neither your local phone company or your long >> distance carrier will want to get involved. They'll tell you that they are >> simply providing the billing for the foreign company. You end up trying to >> deal (over the phone) with a foreign phone company that feels they have done >> no wrong. It can turn into a real nightmare! >> >> Please fwd this message to friends and let people be aware of it! Message courtesy Michael T. Babcock http://www.cyberbeach.net/~mbabcock Send a message with subj. SEND PUBLIC KEY for PGP KEY. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQC1AwUBMnDZIdtTCwP6TF2xAQHNFwUAgV+gvgGng69r8wbzCUqr3ckbjimKoByb 5YovMm0vAnS7Ub/gC/ECYT4A9HI971xi3J8pzbiR0fRMJhPYjJw+XCNQ0glN9EQU wXONFDA4CmdUQaaKtzt2cx5HropnG90+ljBDE8f1xh/wEsqKpaBGwwRDefPlAKnl xw4oj28RTlsJqLULKelBFSRBOrvDMk5/anpgPDnpmPqVJ2UcKoJHSw== =eag2 - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMnDY8CoZzwIn1bdtAQEInQF+NOLgpfiHX0Z3qvuo5rtSh/lR4V1GKxYx G3dP1QaWt9qhBpWVcjMEntsKdUlQkYHc =Mo7x -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Stopping the buying of candidates
by Matthew J. Miszewski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> At 01:40 PM 10/24/96 +0000, Matthew J. Miszewski wrote: > >This is my last reply. I guess I forgot your overarching theory. > >Reality, nah. > > "My last reply"? Sorta the rhetorical equivalent of "I think I heard my > mommy calling," huh? Yes Jim, your sparkling wit and incredibly convincing argument has made me run for cover. Remind everyone what your "solution" is again. In case everyone hasn't already *PLONK*ed you. ++++==============---------------------------- Matthew J. Miszewski |The information revolution has changed wealth: |intellectual capital is now far more important mjmiski(a)execpc.com |than money. -Walter Wriston ----------------------------==============++++

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Re: [DES] Random vs Linear Keysearch.
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Steve Reid wrote: > > There are methods of protecting against some forms of sabotage: > > The running XOR of the round 15 output will always ensure that the > > keyspace has been searched, but requires duplicated work to check, > > and the half-match method should work well on large blocks; if the > > half-matches are distributed evenly, there should be a few in each > > 31 bit chunk. > Let's consider a worst-case, but entirely possible, scenario: > The NSA doesn't like what we're doing. They want DES to be seen as strong, > so they try to disrupt the effort. > The NSA presumably has a large DES cracking machine. They use this to > determine the key, then send a message to the servers saying that they've > searched that space and not found the key. So, because everyone thinks the > space has already been unsuccessfully searched, that space is avoided and > the key is never found. > This not only works for the NSA, but for any organization who can afford > to brute-force DES and find the key before we do. > Certainly any organization with a DES cracker wants DES to be considered > secure. That way, people will continue to use DES and the cracking machine > will still be of use. Speaking of the NSA, someone there once said "never underestimate what your enemy is willing to do to crack your code" (quote approx.), and you can extrapolate from that "never underestimate the power of disinformation".

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Re: (null)
by Murray Hayes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 24 Oct 1996 10:51:00 +1000, Butler, Anthony wrote: >22/10/96 > >WASHINGTON - US First lady Hillary Rodham Clinton unveiled a new >Superman comic book for Bosnian children during an East Room ceremony >Monday. The comic book, written in three languages, shows the >mythical American hero flying down to save two little boys in Bosnia- ^^^^^^^^ Ahem, that would be Canadian hero.

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When did Mondex ever claim to be anonymous?
by David J. Phillips 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've been researching the ways in which new payment systems incorporate anonymity, traceability, or identification, and the ways in which those properties are presented by various people to various people. Recently I've been looking particularly at Mondex. I remember receiving the impression several years ago, when I first heard of Mondex, that it was purporting to be anonymous, or at least private. Now, however, I'm beginning a systematic analysis of their press releases and of press accounts, and I find very few references to privacy. One reference is in their web page FAQ, which says that Mondex transactions are "private, just like cash". Simon Davies, in his complaint to the British Trading Standards authorities, also cites this FAQ, claiming that it used to read "anonymous, just like cash". Davies also refers to an anonymity claim in the Mondex Media Pack. But I've found very little else that suggests that Mondex ever hyped privacy. Can anyone give me an idea of how I got the idea that Mondex was making privacy one of its selling points? David Phillips Visiting Instructor, Department of Communication Studies, University of Michigan Doctoral Candidate, Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania

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