December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

[NEWS]
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Washington Post: Monday, October 21, 1996 CyberCash: Change Is Good, They Bet By David S. Hilzenrath Somewhere in cyberspace, shrouded in anonymity, someone surfed to the World Wide Web site for Virtual Vegas last Friday and saw casino betting tips for sale for 50 cents. With a few clicks of a computer mouse, using software called a "wallet," the surfer ordered the tip sheet. Almost instantaneously, the gambling advice crossed the Web to the buyer's computer, and payment traveled to the Web site in a new form of electronic money known as CyberCoin. When Virtual Vegas settles its accounts, the encrypted CyberCoin payment will be converted into a 42-cent deposit in the business's bank account. Its bank and the buyer's bank will share a fee of 2 cents, and CyberCash Inc., the Reston company that issued the electronic money, will cut itself in for 6 cents. Mere pennies -- but multiply the transaction by a zillion here and a zillion there and someday the company could be making real money. One of the Internet's hottest and most speculative stocks, CyberCash has emerged as the early front-runner in a race to handle the pocket change of electronic commerce, many merchants and analysts say. In the process, CyberCash could help transform the way people do business on the Internet, making it easier to buy and sell inexpensive items such as individual news articles, pictures, video-game plays, computer software, recipes, jukebox selections -- or odds on the third race at Belmont. "When the Internet comes into its own, and it will come into its own, then CyberCash and its competitors will have provided a key mechanism for going from worldwide chaos to worldwide commerce," said Ira Morrow, a financial services analyst for the Gartner Group. It's big talk about a tiny company that in the first six months of this year had only $ 37,705 in revenue and has yet to show a profit. Moreover, the company is one of many betting on an explosion of on-line commerce that more than a few savvy observers say may never come. "Are people really going to want to do real commercial transactions on the Internet? A lot of us involved in this aren't sure," said Sholom Rosen, vice president of emerging technologies at Citibank and point man for the bank's experiment in Internet currency. "There's more smoke out there than there is fire right now . . . more hype than there is reality in the marketplace." Until about two weeks ago, some analysts considered CyberCash's prospects to be tenuous at best. Then Netscape Communications Corp. agreed to package the CyberCash wallet with its Netscape Navigator software, by far the most widely used "browser" for surfing the Web. Suddenly, CyberCash appeared more plausible. "CyberCash, with the Netscape deal, has emerged with some kind of a leadership position . . . some clear viability," said Kris Tuttle of SoundView Financial Group, a technology research firm. CyberCash introduced a system for secure on-line credit card payments in 1995, but by its own account it will be just one of many players following a standard approach in that arena. It is also developing a system for on-line check payments. But it is CyberCoin, which debuted on Sept. 30, that holds the key to CyberCash's fortunes -- and the greatest potential to shake things up in cyberspace. With CyberCoin, the company is trying to facilitate purchases of 25 cents to $ 10, transactions typically too small to be made by credit card. The system could allow Internet merchants to charge for things they have been giving away, or to charge nominal tolls for visiting Web sites. It could allow virtual vendors to charge "by the sip" instead of by the bottle, as some industry analysts say -- for example, to eliminate costly subscription fees for on-line publications when the reader only wants a single story. "It seems to be the answer everybody's been looking for to make small-amount purchases on the Internet," said Ned Barnett, marketing director of HealthWorld Online Inc., which plans to use CyberCoin to sell chapters of books and brief audio recordings about nutrition and health on the Internet. The folks at Virtual Vegas agree, but their own receipts should temper such enthusiasm. As of Friday, Virtual Vegas, based in Venice, Calif., had rung up just 48 CyberCoin transactions for a grand total of $ 40.05 in sales. Only a dozen merchants are currently equipped to accept CyberCoin payments. Another 33, including the Los Angeles Times, have signed up to use the system. Netscape won't begin distributing the wallet software to consumers until next year; in the meantime, it can be downloaded for free from CyberCash's Web site, www.cybercash.com. But to CyberCash co-founder and chief executive William N. Melton, it's a fairly good bet. And Melton has a history of good bets. In a prior life, he created VeriFone Inc., building it into the world's largest provider of credit-card terminals, which retailers use to verify transactions. He serves on the boards of America Online Inc. of Dulles, the world's largest on-line service, and Transaction Network Services of Reston, which manages a network that connects retailers and credit card processors. Melton, 54, grew up on a farm in Nebraska, where he and his brother and mother tended to the cows and pigs and chickens. His father, a Methodist minister, died when he was 7. As a boy, he dreamed of being a truck driver, he said, because the trucks that rumbled through Nebraska represented freedom. At West Mar College in LeMars, Iowa, he majored in psychology before going to Honolulu for graduate work in Chinese language and philosophy. He spent five years in Asia, traveling to Taiwan, Vietnam and Japan, and returned to Hawaii fluent in Mandarin. In 1993, practicing venture capital with his own money, Melton watched the growth of the Internet and saw its "revolutionary and transformative power," he said. He envisioned a need for a kind of VeriFone for the global computer network, an automated on-line payment system. "Most of the banking world at that time was not paying attention to this new [Internet] phenomenon, and most of the people in the Internet were not paying attention to payments. And so there seemed to be a gap that needed to be filled," he said. Melton also perceived a gap in his knowledge of the Internet, and sought out Daniel C. Lynch, now chairman of the CyberCash board, to fill it. Lynch, 55, one of the Internet's pioneers, had already made a fortune of his own by creating and selling Interop Co., which ran Internet trade shows. Lynch also served on the board of UUNet Technologies, the Internet services company recently bought by MFS Communications. Early in his career, as a computer programmer for the U.S. Air Force, Lynch wrote software for missile-tracking radars. But in the early 1970s he decided that was "a boring game" because "the offense has it all over the defense," he recalled. Now, Lynch relaxes by working on his own vineyard in Napa Valley. Melton and Lynch found each other through their mutual interest in bionomics, the philosophy espoused by author Michael Rothschild in a 1990 book by that title. Bionomics views the economy as organic and evolutionary, like a rain forest, and doubts the power of governments or other institutions to direct it. The two entrepreneurs became sponsors and directors of Rothschild's Bionomics Institute. Rothschild describes Melton and Lynch in contrasting terms. "Bill is a man of few words. To me he's sagelike, just very wise," Rothschild said. Lynch "is both a mathematical wizard, a hyper hyper techie guy, the super-geek, if you will . . . and the ultimate party animal." They met for breakfast one morning in October 1993, and Melton told Lynch about his ideas. By the time Rothschild arrived, late for the meeting, the two were planning a business. Initially, they financed the venture themselves. "We're two guys that could write checks for millions of dollars, and if we lost, we lost," Lynch said. "We were going to shake the world up." As the company developed, they watched the share prices of publicly traded Internet upstarts, such as Netscape, rise to stratospheric heights. By last winter, it was their turn to play. CyberCash issued stock on Feb. 15, raising $ 44 million from the public and $ 15 million from Japanese investor Softbank in a private deal. Initially priced at $ 17, the stock has since traded between $ 24.75 and $ 63.50 and closed at $ 33 Friday. Melton's $ 4.7 million investment in the company is now worth $ 75.5 million on paper, and Lynch has turned $ 2 million into $ 25.6 million. What made the offering all the more remarkable was not only that CyberCash was losing millions of dollars at the time, but that it had yet to take in a penny of revenue. "That was a bit of a rush, wasn't it?" Lynch said. Today, CyberCash has about 190 employees and offices in Redwood City, Calif., and Bangalore, India, where labor costs for programmers are much lower than in this country. The CyberCash strategy is to distribute its system to the masses through alliances with banks, credit card-processing firms, makers of Internet software for businesses and consumers -- such as Netscape, Oracle Corp. and Sun Microsystems Inc. -- and service providers such as CompuServe. CyberCash decided early on that it was better off cooperating with banks rather than competing with them. "We knew that the Internet was going to so challenge all of . . . life's assumptions that we were not interested in asking consumers to also leave the safe haven of their current banking relationships," Melton said. The company wants banks to put their names on the CyberCash wallet and offer it to their customers. So far, it has forged relationships with dozens of financial companies, including First Union Corp. and First Data Corp., the nation's largest credit card processor. To accept CyberCoin payments, merchants must use a bank allied with the company, but consumers can establish CyberCash wallets using any bank or credit card company. The consumer begins by in effect buying CyberCoin currency -- up to $ 20 at a time. This is done by transferring funds from a credit card or checking account to a bank account controlled by CyberCash. Encoded digital currency is placed on the storage disks of the us er's computer, and is transmitted over the network when purchases are made. Merchants then redeem the digital currency for the conventional kind via electronic networks run by CyberCash and the banking system. In this closed loop, the digital money can be spent on ly once before being cashed in. That distinguishes CyberCoin from other forms of electronic money that can circulate endlessly and anonymously like traditional cash or "bearer instruments" issued by governments. It also reduces the danger that CyberCoin would be counterfeited or used for money-laundering, major concerns of law enforcement authorities who are closely studying the emerging electronic money systems. When consumers shop with CyberCoin, they do so under a veil of cryptographic confidentiality. They hold electronic "keys" that can unlock the code. With a subpoena, the government could compel users to surrender the keys, which would make it possible to trace their purchases. But unless the user surrendered the key, the most CyberCash could do to assist law enforcement would be to stop encrypting transactions for that person. That's CyberCash's attempt to balance the government's police interests with the consumer's privacy interests. "There are no easy answers in this area," said Raymond Kelly, the Treasury Department's undersecretary for enforcement. "We think electronic money is good for the country and the world. But there [are] still many outstanding issues" for policymakers to consider, Kelly said. The final pillar of CyberCash's strategy is to rely on software, which can be easily transmitted over the network, rather than hardware add-ons to a computer. Some alternative approaches would employ devices such as stored value cards -- plastic cards embedded with computer chips. Those systems -- roughly akin to Metro farecards -- would also require users to attach card readers to their computers. Some analysts predict that smart cards eventually could dominate the market, but CyberCash believes that software solutions will spread faster. The CyberCash wallet could be adapted to work with smart cards, but at a reduced level of profitability, Melton said. For all its progress, CyberCash has also missed opportunities, one former executive said. It failed to forge a relationship with America Online's 6.2 million-member service. "Shame on me for that," Melton said of his unsuccessful run at AOL, but he added that as a member of its board he was unwilling to push AOL too hard. CyberCash has yet to build an alliance with Microsoft Corp. For a long time it didn't even try, because Melton thought it should wait until it had more to show for itself. Former marketing vice president Magdalena Yesil questioned that judgment. "Putting your head in the sand doesn't get you away from trouble," she said. "It actually allows the trouble to get bigger." Perhaps most seriously, the company has yet to recruit many merchants to accept CyberCash payments. "As a consumer, what do I do with this thing?" Yesil asked rhetorically. "It's like somebody giving me Turkish liras in California." CyberCash's closest competitor, an Amsterdam company called DigiCash, requires consumers to open accounts at designated banks, and it has enlisted only Mark Twain Bank in the United States. Other competitors may soon appear, though. Citibank is working on its Electronic Monetary System. Melton's old company, VeriFone, is readying on-line card readers. And Digital Equipment Corp. promises it will launch a service called Millicent, with much lower transaction charges than CyberCoin's. Before long, these companies may count their fees not in pennies, but in fractions of pennies. Then, zillions of transactions won't ensure profitability. It will take bazillions to get there. FEWER MIDDLEMEN, BIGGER MARGIN The chief executive of Virtual Vegas sees products such as CyberCoin as nothing short of "revolutionary," and he says the proof is the cards -- blackjack cards, to be precise. The Virtual Vegas Turbo Blackjack computer game sells in stores for $ 29.95. But with CyberCoin, Virtual Vegas is selling it on the Web for $ 2.95, a tenth of the price. And CEO David Herschman says he could make more money doing it. Each $ 29.95 CD-ROM version of the game yields a profit of about $ 4.50 after deducting the retailers' and distributors' share of the price; production, packaging and shipping costs; sales commissions; and unpaid accounts. By contrast, each $ 2.95 copy of the game paid for with CyberCoin and delivered over the Web costs Virtual Vegas about 26 cents, yielding a $ 2.69 profit. At the Web price, Virtual Vegas could sell many more copies, Herschman said. "The profit margin is huge," he said. "We make it once and . . . we could sell that from here to eternity." HOW A CYBERCOIN TRANSACTION WORKS 1. CyberCash Inc.'s electronic wallet software is downloaded from its Web site at http://www.cybercash.com to a user's computer. The user fills the wallet with money by transferring funds from a checking account or credit card to a bank account controlled by CyberCash. The actual money stays in the account until after a purchase has been completed. To fill the wallet from a checking account, users must mail in a voided check. CyberCash then loads the wallet with digitally encrypted symbols representing the allotted money in the bank. 2. To buy something, the consumer clicks the PAY button on a participating merchant's Web site. The code for the money is verified by CyberCash. The electronic product -- such as an on-line document or news article -- is transferred to the user's computer. The code for the money is transferred from the user's wallet to the merchant's electronic "cash register." The user's wallet logs all transactions. 3. When the merchant empties the cash register of its coded payments, CyberCash transfers the actual money to the merchant's bank account from the account where it was holding the consumer's funds. CyberCash deducts a transaction fee from the merchant's payment. The fee is split among CyberCash, the consumer's bank and the merchant's bank. 4. The user can return unspent funds to a checking account, but not to a credit card. American Banker, 10/23/96 Phone alliance may rival banks in electronic cash A smart card alliance of five telephone companies could raise competitive obstacles to banks that desire to control electronic cash transactions. US West Communications, GTE, Bell Canada, PTT Telecom Netherlands, and Telekom Malaysia announced formation of the Global Chipcard Alliance at the CardEx 96 conference this month in the Netherlands. Additional members are welcome. Oracle Corp., the data base software giant, plans to join, said US West. The alliance wants to create an open standard to allow any smart telephone card to operate in any pay telephone network. Some partners' cards are already interoperable -- for example, GTE cards work in telephones installed by US West and vice versa -- and alliance members may have the power to affect technology in the banking and payments field. Though phone card standards are its initial target, the alliance could view electronic purses and other chip card applications as viable opportunities. The major bank credit card associations have produced a smart card standard called EMV, for Europay, MasterCard, and Visa. It is designed to assure that merchants' terminals accept all compatible cards. The chip card group could incorporate EMV into its operating standard. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Stopping the buying of candidates
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:40 PM 10/24/96 +0000, Matthew J. Miszewski wrote: >This is my last reply. I guess I forgot your overarching theory. >Reality, nah. "My last reply"? Sorta the rhetorical equivalent of "I think I heard my mommy calling," huh? >(snip) >> No, I didn't say I was "cutting off all prediction of money appearing." >> But it would be a long shot from having particular donor's names associated >> with particular dollar figures. And, the system would simply have to >(snip) > >It's not a long shot. When Bob the Big Bad Lobbyist comes into the >Senator's office and leads him to believe a donation will be made and >magically a sizeable one does, it can be reasonable infered from >whence it came. Except that "sizeable" donations won't appear. If you don't understand this, you haven't been reading the descriptions of how the system would work. Individual donations won't be identified either by name of amount; they'll be accumulated and only approximately reported. > In the real world, politicians have access to the >names and addresses of people who regularly donate to political >campaigns. I wonder how many people will still be donating if they can't get their name associated with the donation... > Trust me, the probability of others, i.e. regular working >people, donating to campaigns is zero to none. There is a finite >pool of political campaign money out there. And it'll be even less when this system is adopted. >> I'd prefer doing something far more...uh...permanent than to merely REPLACE >> officeholders. > >My fault. I forget whom I was replying to. Of course my reply above >was in response to your question about developing a "working" system. >Have fun in your politicianless world (with no physical >infrastructure, information infrastructure, national defense, etc.) Who needs "national defense"? As for "information infrastructure, are you under the illusion that private industry couldn't do it? Hell, it DOES it! The Internet is essentially fully privatized, NOW. And "physical infrastructure"? Sure they'll be physical infrastructure. It'll just be _privately_ owned. >I would much rather leave it to the market. There is, of course, no >corruption there. (WINK) The difference between private and public corruption is that in private corruption, individuals presumably have the right to fight that corruption where it impacts on their rights and assets. In PUBLIC corruption, the taxpayer is rarely given the opportunity to fight the loss of his assets. > >> >Every candidate ever endorsed by the Firefighters Union in my town >> >have been absolutely elected. Looking at the firefighters voting >> >records and matching with their addresses shows a distinct pattern of >> >voting in almost every election. >> >> "Firefighter's voting records"? I _thought_ we had a secret ballot in this >> country. Maybe you're from some town that I don't know about! > >I, unlike some people, live in the real world. It is trivial for >political groups to put together listings of public employee >addresses, their VOTING records (meaning whether they voted or not, >check with your city hall...hmmm...go figure, they keep track of >that) and public expressions of support (i.e. lawn signs, letters to >the editor, rally attendance). Compile this info and you have a >pretty good handle on who voted for whom (Yes I know it cant show >absolutely that someone voted a certain way, but most of campaigning >is simple probability. I dont have the time to explain this in >detail, look it up if you are really interested). It appears that you've convinced yourself that ESP exists and works. Given that, it isn't surprising that you would believe that donations to candidates can't be "blinded" sufficiently to help dramatically reduce political quid pro quo. >> Besides, what you're saying can be considered a bit of self-fulfilling >> prophecy. Some cities ALWAYS vote one way, or another. Over time, public >> employees simply adjust their politics to match their wallets, etc. >> Remember, these are PUBLIC employees after all, which really just means the >> employeees of the thugs who get into office. It does not serve their >> interests to go against the winning candidate. If, one year, the party >> normally out of office appears to be winning, the Firefighters will simply >> adjust their politics accordingly. Simple. > >What you are not getting is that, in this case, the public employees >are the edge that causes the win. How do you know this? > We have had some close races, the >winning margin is clearly less than the number of voting public >employees. The winning margin is ALSO clearly less than the number of many different identifiable groups. You seem to be making assumptions in support of your theory. > You don't need to control all the votes. Only the sure >number that you can "deliver", the need for which can be discerned >fairly easily (using those nasty historical voting records). ESP again, I see... >> > They have sufficient numbers to win every time. >> >> Whichever candidate wins, "has sufficient numbers to win." Tell me >> something else I don't know. >> > >This came from a discussion of vote delivery. X has a block Y that >will vote for Z (the endorsed candidate) every time. If victory >margin is less than Y, X's delivery controls the race. Except that plenty of voting blocks exist. And there's plenty of unknowns that you can't figure out with any certainty: How certain are you that "Block Y" ALL voted for Z? How do you know some other group didn't? Etc. >> >Power currupts. Not size of governement. >> >> Size of government is evidence of the size of the corruption. >> > >Unproven. Apparently you don't believe that some monarchies, which >can be extremely small governments, have been some of the most >corrupt in history. As I stated above, power corrupts. It is an >easy way out of arguments for libertarians and most republicans to >say that big government is the root of all evil. It's pretty close, even if not entirely the "root of all evil." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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[JIM RAY] Does anyone have the complaint number for Florida Barr Assocoation?
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I want to complaint to the FLoria Bar Association about Jim Ray sending complaints to postmaster(a)bwalk.dm.com (quoted before). Can someone please post their contact address? The lying motherfucker's resume follows. <html> <head> <title></title> </head> <body> <h2 align=center> JAMES M. RAY </h2> <pre> JAMES M. RAY 1150 Madruga Ave. #A-101 Coral Gables, FL 33146 (305) 666-1029 http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray e-mail liberty(a)gate.net EDUCATION: UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI SCHOOL OF LAW Juris Doctor - May 1995 Coral Gables, Florida * Society of Bar & Gavel, LAW SCHOOL NEWSPAPER OPINIONS EDITOR UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA Bachelor of Science, Psychology - May 1986 Gainesville, Florida EXPERIENCE: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Sept. 1994 to May 1995 Southern District of Florida * legal Intern For US District Judge William M. Hoeveler Attended trials and hearings. Wrote memoranda and orders. Conducted Lexis, Westlaw, and library research on a range of civil and criminal law issues including: possible fines in a corporate contempt of Court proceeding, 2255 prisoner claims, insurance, drug-smuggling and failed Savings & Loan cases. Organized and updated library. DADE COUNTY GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM Jan. 1994 to Aug. 1994 Miami, Florida * Volunteer Summer Intern, GAL Spoke for children in family Court hearings. Conducted interviews and investigations. Wrote reports, memoranda for attorneys, and performance agreement contracts. UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI Oct. 1993 to Aug. 1994 Miami, Florida * research Assistant For Law Professor Susan Stefan Conducted legal and CD-ROM database research for articles and speeches. Assisted in preparation of an ADA lawsuit. PEKNY INDUSTRIES, INC. 1987 to 1990 St. Petersburg, Florida * Small Business Partner, Vice-president & Director of Marketing Supervised and performed research at the United States Patent & Trademark Office. Consistently the top anchor seller at boat shows. Analyzed and satisfied customer needs. FLORIDA STATE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Election 1992 Dade County, Florida * Libertarian Party Candidate for District 113 Ran successful local and statewide ballot access petition drives. Participated in panel discussions and debates. Held TV and newspaper interviews. Organized a lean, clean campaign. CHARLOTTE COUNTY ORANGE GROVE 1978 to Present Punta Gorda, Florida * Farmer (part time) Transported and sold citrus and exotic fruit. ACTIVITIES: PADI Advanced Open Water SCUBA Diver. Competent sailor, fisherman and power boater. Florida State House Messenger. Volunteer high-school teacher. Recording for the Blind law book reader. Hurricane Andrew volunteer. Internet Guide. Amateur HTML Programming. PGP encryption teaching for e-mail confidentiality and authentication. </pre> <hr> <p align=center> <center> Return to Jim's Home Page </p> </body> </html>

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Re: slander again
by Benjamin Grosman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Sirs, Have either of you read my post to the coderpunks list concerning professionalism? I feel that it might be slightly applicable here. Surely this has gone on long enough, and in enough of a public manner, that enough people are sick of it. Yours Sincerely, Benjamin Grosman

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Re: NSA Report: Anyone seen this?
by field＠nyc.pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The 18 June 1996 report, "How to Make a Mint: The Cryptography of Anonymous Electronic Cash", was written by Laurie Law, Susan Sabett, and Jerry Solinas of the Office of Information Security Research and Technology, Cryptology Division, NSA. It is 30 pages, as follows: INTRODUCTION Section 1. What is Electronic Cash? 1.1 Electronic Payment 1.2 Security of Electronic Payments 1.3 Electronic Cash 1.4 Multiple Spending Section 2. A Cryptographic Description 2.1 Public-Key Cryptographic Tools (One-Way Functions, Key Pairs, Signature and Identification, Secure Hashing) 2.2 A Simplified Electronic Cash Protocol 2.3 Untraceable Electronic Payments 2.4 A Basic Electronic Cash Protocol Section 3. Proposed Off-Line Implementations 3.1 Including Identifying Information (Cut and Choose, Zero-Knowledge Proofs) 3.2 Authentication and Signature Techniques (RSA Signatures, Blind RSA Signatures, The Schnorr Algorithms, Schnorr identification, Schnorr Signature, Blind Schnorr Signature, Chaum-Pederson Signature, Implementations of the Schnorr Protocols) 3.3 Summary of Proposed Implementations (Chaum-Fiat-Naor, Brands, Ferguson) Section 4. Optional Features of Off-Line Cash 4.1 Transferability 4.2 Divisibility Section 5. Security Issues 5.1 Multiple Spending Prevention 5.2 Wallet Observers 5.3 Security Failures (Types of failures, Consequences of a failure) 5.4 Restoring Traceability CONCLUSION REFERENCES - Richard Field On Oct 24, 1996 09:52:25, 'declan(a)well.com (Declan McCullagh)' wrote: >Just got off the phone with the NSA. > >"There are so many places in the NSA that deal with cryptology >we haven't been able to find the document yet. We'll call you >back once we locate it and let you know if it can be released >or not. We've been getting phone calls about the document. Did >you read about it on the Internet?" > >-Declan >>______________________________ Forward Header >>21st Century Banking Alert No. 96-10-17 >>October 17, 1996 >> >>National Security Agency Report Raises >>Systemic Security Issues Related to Anonymous Electronic Money >> >> >> A recent report prepared by the Cryptology Division of the National >>Security Agency's Office of Information Security Research and Technology >>discusses the potential for security failures in certain electronic cash >>systems and their likely consequences. While demonstrating concern over the >>attributes of non-traceable electronic money, the report points out methods >>that may be used to minimize security breaches and losses, including >>limiting the number of coins that can be affected by a single compromise, >>requiring traceability for large transactions or large numbers of >>transactions in a given period, and the creation of a mechanism to restore >>traceability under certain circumstances. The report contains an excellent >>summary of basic electronic money cryptographic tools, electronic cash >>protocols, authentication and signature techniques and related security >>issues.

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PIS_son
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

10-17-96, BuWi: "Apple, IBM, JavaSoft, Motorola, Netscape, Nortel, Novell, RSA, and Silicon Graphics Announce PICA Crypto-Alliance" The PICA specification will also be designed to make the task of developing differing domestic and exportable security requirements much easier. [GAK alliance 2.] PrNe: "World Wide Web Casinos, Inc. Brings Gambling to the Internet at www.netpirates.com" "Placing bets cannot be illegal because, despite their origination, bets will technically be placed on the computers at our off-shore spy-based casino site." BuWi: "Cylink Partners with U.S.P.S to Build National Citizen Tracking System to Include Postmarking and Authentication for Legal/Medical Records, Tax Filings" PhIn: "Unsuspecting Internet Users' 'Cookie' Files Concern Privacy Advocates" But look at cookie users another way: You're the hydrant and they're the dogs, marking you for future reference. ----- http://jya.com/pisson.txt (24 kb for 4) ftp://jya.com/pub/incoming/pisson.txt PIS_son

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Merc: PacBell predicts imminent death of the net; film at 11
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Full text freely available at http://www.sjmercury.com/business/dial1023.htm (they do one or two net-related stories "free" per day) Pac Bell says Net use may collapse phone system ISPs rebut dire, 'trumped-up' prediction Published: Oct. 24, 1996 BY HOWARD BRYANT Mercury News Staff Writer As many as one of every six telephone calls in Silicon Valley now doesn't go through on the first try because Internet denizens are tying up the lines, Pacific Bell reported Wednesday. Under normal circumstances, less than 1 percent of calls go uncompleted, the company said. The situation is so dire that California's entire phone system is in danger of breakdown, a company executive said, with Silicon Valley especially on red alert. [...] But rather than being a sign of imminent collapse, critics called Pac Bell's startling statistic a trumped-up charge designed to scare the public and pressure federal regulators into ending a price break Internet service providers enjoy when tying into Pac Bell's network. ''The Internet is a baby and Pac Bell has been in this game since Alexander Graham Bell's bar mitzvah. Now they're saying that in the last three weeks, we broke the phone system? Come on,'' said the head of a service provider who asked not to be named for fear of reprisal by Pac Bell. [...] At the heart of the issue is a pricing conflict between Pac Bell and the ISPs. In 1983, the Federal Communications Commission gave companies that offered Internet services, and other ''enhanced service providers,'' an exemption from the per-minute fees that other companies, such as long-distance telephone companies, pay to use Pac Bell's network. [...] Wiping out the subsidy would force Internet companies to find new, more efficient ways of pricing that better reflect actual usage, Parker said. In all likelihood, Net service prices would increase for consumers. [...] ''This is clearly a ruse,'' said Dick Severy, director of public policy for MCI. ''They've added 691,000 access lines this year. Business lines are up. It's curious.''

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Fw: Area Code 809 Carribean Phone Scam
by Michael T. Babcock 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cypherpunks(a)hks.net Date: Fri Oct 25 11:13:26 1996 >> Just a heads-up about a current scam concerning numbers with "809" area >> codes.... spread the word! >> >> BE CAREFUL! This is a fraudulent message received the other day. >> >> "Subject: Unpaid Account >> >> I am writing to give you a final 24 hours to settle your outstanding >> account. If I have not received the settlement in full, I will commence >> legal proceedings without further delay. If you would like to discuss this >> matter to avoid court action, call Mike Murray at Global Communications on >> 1-809-496-2700" >> >> >> Subject: More Phone Scams >> >> The scam works basically like this: >> >> You get home and notice that the message light is blinking on your answering >> machine. You listen to the message, which has several wrinkles, but the >> best one is the caller asks you to call a number beginning with Area Code >> 809 to receive information about a family member who has been ill. (They >> may also tell you someone has been arrested, died, you have won a wonderful >> prize, etc.) >> >> In any event, concerned or curious, you make the call. >> >> Sometimes the phone is answered by someone who claims to speak broken >> English. (The idea is to keep you on the line to build up charges.) Or, >> sometimes you will just get a long recorded message. The bottom line is, >> when your phone bill comes, you see this incredible charge, oftentimes more >> than $100.00! >> >> Crooks are using the 809 numbers as "pay-per-calls" and to get around the US >> Regulations and 900 number blocking. Every time you call the number, they >> get a greatly inflated rebate from the foreign phone company. Since 809 >> numbers are in the Caribbean, they aren't bound by the US 900# regulations >> that require them to warn you of the charge and the rate involved, and also >> a time period during which you may terminate the call without being charged. >> >> The newest twist to this scam is to page people using the 809 numbers. With >> the new area code changes, people unknowingly are returning these calls. >> When the bill comes, there are HUGE charges for the calls. >> >> My suggestion is that no matter how you get the message, if you are asked to >> call a number with an 809 area code that you don't recognize, DON'T RETURN >> THE CALL! It is bad enough that the criminal is invading your privacy, >> don't let them invade your wallet as well! >> >> Scams of this type are extremely hard to prosecute and since you did >> actually make the call, neither your local phone company or your long >> distance carrier will want to get involved. They'll tell you that they are >> simply providing the billing for the foreign company. You end up trying to >> deal (over the phone) with a foreign phone company that feels they have done >> no wrong. It can turn into a real nightmare! >> >> Please fwd this message to friends and let people be aware of it! Message courtesy Michael T. Babcock http://www.cyberbeach.net/~mbabcock Send a message with subj. SEND PUBLIC KEY for PGP KEY. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQC1AwUBMnDZIdtTCwP6TF2xAQHNFwUAgV+gvgGng69r8wbzCUqr3ckbjimKoByb 5YovMm0vAnS7Ub/gC/ECYT4A9HI971xi3J8pzbiR0fRMJhPYjJw+XCNQ0glN9EQU wXONFDA4CmdUQaaKtzt2cx5HropnG90+ljBDE8f1xh/wEsqKpaBGwwRDefPlAKnl xw4oj28RTlsJqLULKelBFSRBOrvDMk5/anpgPDnpmPqVJ2UcKoJHSw== =eag2 - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMnDY8CoZzwIn1bdtAQEInQF+NOLgpfiHX0Z3qvuo5rtSh/lR4V1GKxYx G3dP1QaWt9qhBpWVcjMEntsKdUlQkYHc =Mo7x -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Stopping the buying of candidates
by Matthew J. Miszewski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> At 01:40 PM 10/24/96 +0000, Matthew J. Miszewski wrote: > >This is my last reply. I guess I forgot your overarching theory. > >Reality, nah. > > "My last reply"? Sorta the rhetorical equivalent of "I think I heard my > mommy calling," huh? Yes Jim, your sparkling wit and incredibly convincing argument has made me run for cover. Remind everyone what your "solution" is again. In case everyone hasn't already *PLONK*ed you. ++++==============---------------------------- Matthew J. Miszewski |The information revolution has changed wealth: |intellectual capital is now far more important mjmiski(a)execpc.com |than money. -Walter Wriston ----------------------------==============++++

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Re: [DES] Random vs Linear Keysearch.
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Steve Reid wrote: > > There are methods of protecting against some forms of sabotage: > > The running XOR of the round 15 output will always ensure that the > > keyspace has been searched, but requires duplicated work to check, > > and the half-match method should work well on large blocks; if the > > half-matches are distributed evenly, there should be a few in each > > 31 bit chunk. > Let's consider a worst-case, but entirely possible, scenario: > The NSA doesn't like what we're doing. They want DES to be seen as strong, > so they try to disrupt the effort. > The NSA presumably has a large DES cracking machine. They use this to > determine the key, then send a message to the servers saying that they've > searched that space and not found the key. So, because everyone thinks the > space has already been unsuccessfully searched, that space is avoided and > the key is never found. > This not only works for the NSA, but for any organization who can afford > to brute-force DES and find the key before we do. > Certainly any organization with a DES cracker wants DES to be considered > secure. That way, people will continue to use DES and the cracking machine > will still be of use. Speaking of the NSA, someone there once said "never underestimate what your enemy is willing to do to crack your code" (quote approx.), and you can extrapolate from that "never underestimate the power of disinformation".

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