December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Anonymous Auth Certificates [was: Re: Blinded Identities]
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

P.S. you might also check out http://www.clark.net/pub/cme/usenix.html for more on why ID certificates are useless in any case. - Carl +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)acm.org http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | |PGP: E0414C79B5AF36750217BC1A57386478 & 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2| | "Officer, officer, arrest that man! He's whistling a dirty song." | +-------------------------------------------- Jean Ellison (aka Mother) -+

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SKIP cryptanalysis?
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone looked into SKIP key management? I'm aware of Jeff Schiller's statement about OAKLEY/ISAKMP being the more flexible, useful system to be the main standard for IPsec. Adam -- "Every year the Republicans campaign like Libertarians, and then go to Wasthington and spend like Democrats." Vote Harry Browne for President. http://www.harrybrowne96.org

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Re: YES OR NO?
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:45 AM 10/17/96 -0700, you wrote: >On Thu, 17 Oct 1996, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: > >> It is a great honor to meet a net.legent in person. > >I hope Dimitri will stop hidding behind his computer and "honor" >us with his presence at an SF Bay area Cypherpunks meeting. I've >got pledges for nearly $1200 to bring him out here to speak. All >we need now is a serious response from Dimitri. I guess when the >going gets tough, the "net legends" get yellow. What are you >afraid of Dimitri? I can understand what he has to be afraid of. It is one thing to be a harassing bastard on the net. It is another to have to defend your actions to those people face to face. Dimitri has made insulting remarks about myself and good friends. He has been abusive and obnoxious all over the face of the net. I can see how some people might take that personally. (I would not do him personal harm. Ask him why he feels he needs to be a flaming asshole maybe...) I killfiled Dimitri because there was no use talking to him and no use listening to him. Currently he has taken the tact of posting news when his reputation capitol reaches into the heavy negative numbers. (And I still filter them all into the trash because I cannot trust him to not forge the posts into something containing something the author did not write or intend.) There are others I do not argue with for other, similar, reasons. It is pointless to debate with the closed minded and the compulsive flamers. (If I wanted to listen to compulsive juvenile flame I would go hang out on WWIV BBSes. It least there you know the people are probably fourteen, not just acting like it...) The only purpose such debate will ever serve is to influence the onlookers. The point is probably moot anyways. I doubt if I will get to any of the California meetings any time in the near future. (Work is hell, but at least it pays something. Unlike the regular brand of hell.) --- | "Remember: You can't have BSDM without BSD." - alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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EUP_hem
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

10-17-96. WaPo: "U.S. Considers Slugging It Out With International Terrorism" Officials contend that the main threat now comes from a murky network of home-grown, privately financed and largely independent groups forming a kind of international "terrorists' Internet." That network is proving extremely difficult for U.S. intelligence agencies to locate and penetrate. "Today's terrorists don't have to depend that much any more on states for access to financing or the technological means." "Postal Service Plans to Leave Its Mark on Electronic Mail" Cylink is developing a system for electronically postmarking and encrypting computer messages and Sun and Enterprise Productivity are developing software that will allow bulk mailers to calculate the price of mail shipments on the Internet. The Postal Service predicted that the new system ultimately will account for $5 billion in postage a year, about 9 percent of all postage. ----- http://jya.com/euphem.txt (18 kb for 2) ftp://jya.com/pub/incoming/euphem.txt EUP_hem

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[POINTERS] On Vulis' net background
by Douglas B. Renner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some *very* informative background data may be found at: http://www.math.harvard.edu/~verbit/scs/cranks/from-Schlomo.html#vulis Of course the title KOTM may also have been fraudulently obtained (if USENET vote forgery bears any relevance...) see: "Fraudulent votes from bwalk.dm.com cited" in (are we surprised?) news.admin.net-abuse.misc Here's a pointer to one archive: http://www2.altavista.digital.com/cgi-bin/news?msg@3945@misc%2enews%2einter… Doug

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ITAR/real law, copyright
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry for the rushed character of this note - am working on another project which is eating up my available time. I just wanted to respond because I think Tim and Marshall are talking about different ends of the same process. At 03:37 PM 10/16/96 -0800, Tim May wrote: >At 10:56 AM -0700 10/16/96, Marshall Clow wrote: >>A) This is not a change in the law. There is no law regarding export of >>encryption software. >>Congress has never passed any such law. These are State Department >>regulations, and presidential decrees. These regulations, which have the >>force of law to you and me, were never debated or voted upon by our >>elected representatives. They can be changed tomorrow the same way. In >>fact, they can be changed and the public need not even be notified. > >Actually, as Greg Broiles pointed out in an article (on the Cypherpunks >list) several weeks ago, Congress deliberately chooses to delegate much >regulatory authority to other agencies. As I understand the export-license process, there are multiple steps: 1. Commodity jurisdiction request: State Dept decides if ITAR controls the export of the item (e.g., is it a "defense article" or a "defense service" or "technical data", and not public domain, etc.)? 2. If ITAR does control the export, the State Dept decides (based on the characteristics of the item and the identity/location of the foreign recipient and the opinion(s) of other agencies consulted) whether or not to allow the export. The fact that these steps must be taken (and the general procedure for doing so) is a product of the Arms Export Control Act (passed by Congress, at 22 USC 2778 and thereabouts) and the ITARs (22 CFR 120 et seq), administrative regulations promulgated by the Dept of State. (To change the ITARs themselves, State Dept must publish notice of the proposed changes and solicit public comments, as well as make the final regs public in the CFRs and via the Federal Register). So the ITARs are "real laws", at least as real as any others. But the process by which these steps (deciding what will be a "munition", deciding whether or not a particular item is within one of those defined as munitions, deciding whether or not to allow an export) are taken involves policy choices whose motives and processes are not entirely clear, and which can be (and are) changed by the executive branch without notice or opportunity to comment. What I'm thinking of here are the rules like "40-bit RC4 is OK" and "3DES is never OK" and "56-bit DES with GAK is OK" and "disk bad, OCR text OK" which we're discovering through trial & error but are not, to my knowledge, part of the ITARs or elsewhere in the CFR or the USC. Also, Dept of State's decisions about individual exports and items are not subject to judicial review, by 22 USC 2778(h), an interpretation which is being challenged in the appeal in _Karn_. Interested readers might take a look at the district court's opinion in _Karn_ at <http://venable.com/oracle/oracle7.htm> and Stewart Baker's analysis of it at <http://www.us.net/~steptoe/summary.htm>. I think my understanding of the ITAR process is mediocre at best, I certainly welcome correction or clarification, although Jim Bell's predictable and wholly incorrect assertion that administrative regs only apply to government employees would be funny but for the fact that I know ordinary people (not government employees) who have been convicted of violating federal admin regs and the fines they paid (or are still paying), jail time spent, etc were all too real. My summary of admin law is deliberately vague because frankly admin law isn't my strong suit. Perhaps another list member with a superior understanding will fill in the gaps in my summaries. Also, Sean Sutherland wrote to ask (re the SPA's position on copyright liability): >I'm curious, do the Contributory Infringment >and the Vicarious Liability for Infringment By Another Person claims have any >legal basis, or are they just the inane rantings they appear to be? I sent a long message to the list a few days ago (Sunday?) discussing contributory infringement. The short version of the message is "Yes, contributory infringement is valid, but not necessarily in this particular case". And ditto for vicarious liability, although I think vicarious liability isn't even plausibly arguable. They are neither novel nor especially remarkable facets of copyright law, although as Sean notes they do not have explicit textual support in the Copyright act. Vicarious liability is an extension of the legal doctrine of "respondeat superior", e.g., an employer/principal is liable for the actions of an employee/agent for actions taken within the scope of employment/agency. Contributory infringement is an extension of the principles of enterprise liability, where (very generally) people who undertake a common purpose/project will share liability, even where only one party directly caused the actual harm. _Sony v. Universal City Studios_ 464 US 417, 435 (1984). Nimmer on Copyright 12.04[A] notes that it's possible to read 17 USC 106's grant of the exclusive right to "authorize" the exercise of the other exclusive rights as excluding the authorization of infringement by third parties (making the illicit authorizer a direct infringer). But that reading seems awfully technical, and Nimmer cites no cases which rely on it (and later describes it as "overly facile"). In any event, yes, vicarious liability and contributory infringement are viable theories of recovery, but neither seems especially promising. Matt Ghio wrote and asked if a direct infringement must exist before a third party can be held liable for infringement. Nimmer (a relatively authoritative treatise on copyright) argues that it should not be possible to have third party liability without a direct infringement, with a reference to cases I haven't had time to look at yet. (at 12.04[A][3][a], if anyone's fortunate enough to have a copy of Nimmer at hand) -- Greg Broiles | "We pretend to be their friends, gbroiles(a)netbox.com | but they fuck with our heads." http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | |

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EC patent
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Thu, 17 Oct 1996 14:03:34 +0800 From: James Lee <jlee(a)ccl.itri.org.tw> Reply-To: jlee(a)ccl.itri.org.tw Organization: Internet Tech Div, Computer & Communication Lab, Indudtrial Technology Research Institute Mime-Version: 1.0 To: set-discuss(a)commerce.net Subject: EC patent Sender: owner-set-talk(a)commerce.NET Precedence: bulk +----------------------------------------------------+ Addressed to: set-discuss(a)commerce.net +----------------------------------------------------+ I heard that CitiBank has filed for a patent in Japan with 140+ claims covering many aspects of electronic commerce, security electronic transaction, etc. Does anyone know more about it? What impact will it bring to all SET members? James Lee Director, Internet Technology Division Computer & Communication Laboratories Industrial Technology Research Institute W000/CCL, 195 Chunghsin Rd., Sec. 4, Chutung, TAIWAN 886-3-591-4533(W) 886-3-582-0085(Fax) jlee(a)ccl.itri.org.tw ------------------------------------------------------------------------ This message was sent by set-discuss(a)commerce.net. For a complete listing of available commands, please send mail to 'majordomo(a)commerce.net' with 'help' (no quotations) contained within the body of your message. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Q.E.D.
by IPG Sales 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some of you have sardonically written to say "Nihil Est Demonstrandum," N.E.D. because an OTP must be derived from a hardware source, that is, it must be a pure random sequence of limitless entropy. Accordingly, they unbashfully assert that an OTP generated by a computer program is not possible. How do they know that? Does the Bible tell them so, or the Koran, or do they get it from the Torah? Why not cite the source of their certainty instead of advancing an unsupported proposition. I do not mean to be rude, but excuse me, what scientific proof can they offer for that immovable avowal? There is no scientific proof whatsoever, none at all, except for the words and their steadfast, and maybe self serving, postulate. Accordingly, obviously it is they, not us, who are the ones that have "Nihil Est Demonstrandum," in this matter. There is not one scintilla of sustainable evidence to support such a doctrine. While the vast majority of people knowledgeable about cryptography have not heretofore believed that it is possible for software to produce an OTP, that does not make it a scientific fact, but merely means it is the consensus of scientific opinion that it is not possible. With all due respect to Bruce, and his exceptional work, Paul, Roy and many others who obviously know the subject matter of which we speak, I offer that history is replete with scientists supplying proof of the seemingly impossible. In support of their position, some have pointed out that John von Neumann, to paraphrase, stated that ARITHMETIC cannot produce random numbers, a thesis which I agree with; but where is that, in any way inconsistent with IPG's position on EUREKA? IPG has produced a system to generate software OTPs, albeit it within limited but but more than ample entropy, not software random numbers. We stipulate the obvious fact that the encryptor stream generated by EUREKA is a PRNG stream, though we do consider it gross denigration to castigate it as ONLY a PRNG stream. It is a PRNG issue that also happens to be an extremely well behaved OTP sequence, with limited but ample entropy, as well. It meets each and every criteria rationally established for an OTP in all reasonable aspects. Subjected to any and all statistical analyses, the EUREKA PRNG stream manifests itself as being random, though we know, as a scientific fact, that it is not. To substantiate that posit, and unlike the consensus of scientific opinion, obviously N.E.D., that believes that software cannot produce an OTP, IPG offers "Quod Erat Demonstrandum," Q.E.D. scientific proof that we can produce a humungous number of software OTPs sufficient to meet any and all current or future requirements. You do not need to be an Einstein, a Hawking, or a von Neumann, to understand the fundamental basis of the IPG EUREKA algorithm. Succinctly as I can , that is, given a truly random key of entropy N, and possibly truly random look up tables of combined entropy M, it is possible to generate up to N streams of characters of a length in this case of approximately 10^223, that manifest themselves as true OTPs. Think about that simple supposition for a moment. What do we mean by an OTP? We mean that an OTP is a stream of characters, or numbers, that cannot be derived in the absence of the key that was used to generate them, or alternately by trying all possibilities of that said key. Thus, when using the resultant as an encryptor stream, the only information derivable from the ciphertext is the determination of the maximum possible length. Furthermore, by using the exclusionary proof, you cannot preclude any possible message of that said length. If you think through that hypothesis, it becomes clear that such is not precluded by von Neumann's proffer, or by fundamental mathematical principles. The question then, is how can you go about doing that? That is all that IPG has done. We have figured out a mathematical certain way, ( Q.E.D.), of generating N number, or rather a number very close to N, of OTPs from a given key of entropy N, and we can prove it. Not only that, but you can prove it to yourself, Q.E.D. We maintain that it is discernible to any knowledgeable person who probes the algorithm, that the only analytical tack that can be mounted against EUREKA is brute force and that is patently impossible.. One of your Cpunk colleagues says he uses Triple DES, 168 bits, and he does not believe that it can be brute forced - I agree, 3-DES, 10^50+ possibilities, cannot be brute forced now, or in the foreseeable future - then what about the EUREKA's 10^34322 possibilities, 10^34271+ greater than 3-DES? No way, not now, not ever. Furthermore, EUREKA is an order, or more, magnitude faster than triple DES, easier to use, much more secure, etal. Another has suggested that if the key, and all the variables are hacked, then the system can be compromised. That is true, but again excuse me, does not that apply to any system, whether it be RSA, PGP, IDEA, and yes also a hardware sourced OTP. EUREKA's only edge in that regard is that built in means that facilitate safeguards which minimize such risks. EUREKA is not a panacea for all your encryption needs. RSA, PGP, ENTRUST, and other systems fill very important exigencies. Where EUREKA shines brightest is in two important strategic user applications: 1. To set up a permanent line of Internet/intranet communication privacy between two, or a group of, individuals. As a result, pass phrases, session encryption keys, and other work impediments of that genre can be largely eliminated. While applicable to everyone, this is especially true of newbies, computer novices, technophobes, and other non-techies. It is much faster, easier to use, and more flexible than other systems for this application. As such, it is ideal for intranets, or mixed Internet/intranet systems. 2. To protect your private hard disk files, programs or data, from compromise by hackers and interlopers. In this application it is unsurpassed because differential analysis of changing files is rendered impossible and it is extremely fast. See for yourself. Prove it to yourself, Q.E.D. The IPG algorithm is available at: http://netprivacy.com/algo.html or a condensed version at: http://netprivacy.com/condalgo.html P.S. My resume can also be found there http://www.netprivacy.com/resume.html > ================================================================== > > Donald R. Wood > ipgsales(a)cyberstation.net >==================================================================== > > Some p[eople are more certain of their own opinions than they are of > facts presented by those they disagree with - Aristotle > > ---------------------- Quod Erat Demonstrandum ----------------------

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rival Clipper products
by scrappo.reverb＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What somebody needs to do is make a rival for Clipper products. I propose that somebody with enough money should have a Clipper-type chip implementing Triple-DES or whatever developed and marketed. They should do the same things, except not be restricted by the government (obviously this wouldn't be for export) by the means of using weak crypto. These devices could probably be marketed to the same audience that Clipper products are aimed at, i.e. the general unsuspecting populace. The only problem I could see would be educating whoever buys into how the government is pulling the wool over their eyes. I'm sure with some funding from a major source, or some donation of time/supplies from a manufacturing company, it could be pulled off in grand fashion. Who said we can't play the government's little game? This along with some "Big Brother Inside" stickers massively propagated, and it might fly. Any insights?

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European Commission on "Illegal and harmful content on the Internet"
by wfgodot＠iquest.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- A recently released European Commission Communication on "Illegal and harmful content on the Internet" may prefigure the nature of coming European Union regulatory initiatives concerning the net. This Communication was in response to a 27 September resolution by the Telecommunication Council on "preventing the dissemination of illegal content on the Internet, in particular child pornography." The document reportedly reflects what will be ongoing work to "present practical measures in time for the next Telecommunications Council on 28 November 1996." The Communication describes its aims as: firstly to describe briefly the different types of illegal and harmful content, secondly to examine the technical context in which action can be taken to deal with illegal and harmful content, and finally to suggest a number of practical measures designed to be rapidly implemented Among the points of interest, it states with emphasis that "additional international cooperation is required to avoid 'safe havens' for documents contrary to general rules of criminal law." With respect to anonymous communications it discusses proposed "measures to close known loopholes and improve traceability and that anonymous remailers record details of identity." As is typical of these agendas, the devil will be in the evolving details of enforcement. It looks like 1997 will be a busy year for proponents of greater state control over internet content both here and abroad. If they can conjure up enough sufficiently compelling bogeymen, it could be a very successful one for them as well. The HTML version of this document can be found at: <http://www2.echo.lu/legal/en/internet/content/communic.html> Links to RTF and Word versions along with the accompanying press release and related documents can be found at: <http://www2.echo.lu/legal/internet/html> - -Michael -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3a Charset: cp850 iQCVAwUBMmaw0tGJlWF+GPx9AQGMLgP+JC5Lyd0NZDukq8AWipUNcDUgb6m16iUN 3smYcPdPYvsUDSWznx7ZQsklQV0oz9u5Ru7s8VoOQfA2wqSoiai3LiUiJg5WkfOg HTAbvVQCeoUaRmkmmbFJSzfqVzGB4VkJRCE4htPmmqYhCwwmMjooTi3bAClySGTD 7YcLjv0pC5w= =4EZY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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