December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

NSA Report on Anonymous E-Cash
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We've put the NSA report, "How To Make A Mint: The Cryptography of Anonymous Electronic Cash, June, 1996" at: http://jya.com/nsamint.htm (84 kb) It argues the dangers of anonymous cash and how to combat it. Thanks to the authors, Laurie Law, Susan Sabett and Jerry Solinas, NSA; Thomas Vartanian, Fried, Frank; and anonymous others.

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Montgolfiering Spoof
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:47 AM -0500 10/31/96, Rabid Wombat wrote: >On Wed, 30 Oct 1996, Bill Frantz wrote: > >> Gee, I put that post in the same place I carefully keep my back issues of >> the Cypherpunks Enquirer. >> > >Bill, you must be humor-impaired. That piece was a great send-up of >Woods. I was laughing 'til tears spilled down an shorted out my keyboard. >I dunno who posted that, but I'm in awe. Thanks. I know the author rather well, and he assures me he dashed off this satirical piece in about as much time as he takes to write his normal articles. He tells me that once he had "grokked" the inimitable (not) style of Don Wood, it was easy to write a screed that echoed Wood's wackiness. Of course, for people who read satire on this list, the initials at the end are a clue. But don't publish who you think it is, as KVFP doesn't want a lawsuit from Wood for hurting Wood's feelings. --KVFP -- --

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Discrete logs 1
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Even adders can multiply using log tables..." PGP is moving to discrete log based cryptography. It will still support RSA, but people will be encouraged to generate discrete log keys. It will use RSA to encrypt to people with RSA keys, and discrete log crypto to encrypt to people with discrete log keys. Many discrete log cryptosystems will be patent free after next year. It may be that they will become more popular over the next few years for that reason. RSA has several more years before its patents expire. Most people are not as familiar with the math behind discrete logs as they are with RSA. The general idea of the difficulty of factoring is pretty easy to understand. It's much easier to multiply two large primes together than to figure out what the primes were just by looking at the result. Discrete logs require a little more explanation. First I am going to write a little bit about the lore of logarithms. I think today a lot of people don't know what they are. When I was a boy, in the 1960's, computers and even calculators were not widely available. Yet engineers in many fields needed to perform calculations. Reaction rates, material strengths, friction, current flow, all such calculations require multiplication and division of numbers with several significant digits. The choices were basically to multiply it out the long way, which was slow, error-prone, and wasteful because it generates twice as many digits as you need; use a slide rule, which usually only gets you two or three digits of accuracy; or to use log tables, which could get you four or five, or sometimes even more, accurate digits. The logarithm of a number is the power that you have to raise some specified base (usually 10 for these purposes) to in order to get that number. The logarithm of 100 base 10 is 2 because 10**2 = 100. The log of 1000 is 3. For numbers not powers of 10, the logarithm has fractional parts. The logarithm of 20 is about 1.3, for example. To multiply two numbers, you find their logs and add them, and then turn the result back into a number. To divide, subtract the logs. So most of the work is just in looking up what the logs are using published tables. Actually we do use logs in a crude form in much of cryptography. Any time you say that the product of two 512 bit numbers is 1024 bits what you mean is that the log base two of the smaller numbers is about 512, and so the log base two of their product is 512+512 or 1024. By the time I was in high school calculators were becoming fairly widespread, but we still learned how to use log tables to do multiplication and division. Whole books were published containing nothing but tables of the logarithms of numbers. You can still find these sometimes in used book stores. There were lots of tricks to using these tables which we had to learn. Logarithms of numbers less than 1 are negative, but the trick was to treat them as the sum of a positive fractional part and a negative integer, so for example the log of .2 was treated as +.3 - 1. This made it easier to look up the values. And there were special sub-tables within the tables to help with interpolating, looking up log values between the entries in the table. Using these you could get more accuracy in your answers. All this was part of the craft of working engineers and scientists of the time. It's hard for people today, raised on throwaway and even virtual calculators, to understand the sense of power that came from using logs for calculations. Until we learned these advanced techniques the only accurate alternatives were the terribly tedious hand methods. Being able to get results by adding up a few numbers from a book was an amazing improvement. The discrete logs used in crypto have very different mathematical properties than regular logarithms, but I thought this bit of history would spark some memories in old-timers and give a new perspective for younger people. Hal

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Moneychangers and Shylocks
by Timothy C. May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There've been a couple of "you must be trolling us" responses to my point about the First World spending money in the Third World not being exploitation ("and we give them worthless trinkets like penicillin, schools, and roads"). I happen to believe economic development is a positive good. Were I living in a shantytown or favelo on the outskirts of some Third World town, I would want at least the _chance_ of eventually having running water, electricity, health care, and opportunity for me and my family, Arguing that native peoples were better off before the arrival of Europeans is fatuous nonsense--you can't go home again. Further, many of the leftist critiques of "moneylending as exploitation" are similar to past (and current) demonizations of moneychangers, moneylenders, shylocks, and other assorted stereotypes. I don't favor nationalistic lending and borrowing policies, which, for example, involve some central government borrowing money, sending the borrowed funds to personal Swiss bank accounts, and then sticking the nominal taxpayers with the debt. Nothing I have said here endorses this. But much lending is useful. It's the way factories get built, the way things get done. Much of the criticism of "moneylenders" is closely related, if you think about it, to criticism of "money launderers." Cypherpunks should relish the rise of new mechanisms for money laundering, moneylending, tax evasion, etc. I took the "Wired" quote about Walter Wriston "sounding like a cypherpunk" to represent this new view, in explicit contrast to his earlier views when he headed Citibank and they had a more statist approach. Your mileage may vary, but tired homilies about lending being exploitation are not very useful in this day and age. --Tim May "The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology." [NYT, 1996-10-02] We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: White House crypto proposal -- too little, too late
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Are there any current import restrictions for products on can legally >> manufacture, sell, and use in the United States? > >Sure. Firearms. The Gun Control Act of 1968 bans the importation of ... [snip] > >What does all that have to do with crypto? It is the *same* issue. In the >government's view, crypto is a danger to their future plans, just as >firearms are. Do you think it is a coincidence that crypto is listed as a >munition? Think about it for just a moment. Crypto is a weapon in the >hands of the people. And that's what Cypherpunks is all about. > >Starting from import restrictions, you will see restrictions on size of >keys (=maximum rounds in the magazine, now set at 10, proposed to be >lowered to six), who may own it (no felons, people convicted of certain >misdemeanors), who may sell it and how it can be purchased (must provide >identification, sales will be logged). I guess you can figure out the rest. > >--Lucky Yes, but crypto is one of the first intangible 'munitions'. It is much easier to constrain physical items than data. That is why anonimity, especially financial transaction anonymity, is so aboherant to LE. PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Snoop Daty Data | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Sacred Cow Meat Co. | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Hacker Opportunities (Let's Make Lots Of Money) I've got the brains, you've got the tricks Let's make lots of money You've got the code, I've got the hooks Let's make lots of ... I've had enough of scheming and messing `round with jerks My crypto code's compiled, I'm afraid it doesn't work I'm looking for a partner, someone who gets things fixed Ask yourself this question: do you want to be rich? I've got the hacks, you've got the keys Let's make lots of money You've got the code, I've got the hooks Let's make lots of money You can tell I'm educated, I studied at CalTech Doctored in mathematics, I could've been set I can program a computer, choose the perfect time If you've got the inclination, I have got the crime Ooooh, there's a lot of opportunities If you know when to take them, you know There's a lot of opportunities If there aren't, you can make them (Make or break them) I've got the brains, you've got the tricks Let's make lots of money Let's make lots of ... You can see I'm single-minded, I know what I could be How do you feel about it? Come, take a walk with me I'm looking for a partner regardless of expense Think about it seriously, you know it makes sense Let's (Got the brains) Make (Got the tricks) Let's make lots of money (Money) Let's (You've got the code) Make (I've got the hacks) Let's make lots of money (Money) I've got the brains (Got the hooks) You've got the code (Got the keys) Let's make lots of money (Money) Money!

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Re: White House crypto proposal -- too little, too late
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Are there any current import restrictions for products on can legally >manufacture, sell, and use in the United States? > >Thanks. Yes, all products which may create RF radiation (e.g., personal computers) are required to pass FCC certifications (e.g., Part 15). Also, telephone equipment (e.g., modems) must pass other Part 15 provisions before they may be sold in the U.S. to interconnect with our public switched network. PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Lamarr Labs | Voice: 1-702-658-2654 7075 West Gowan Road | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 Suite 2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Internet and Wireless Development Vote Liberatrian!

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Cranky Listserver?
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is anyone else having trouble getting their posts picked up on the list? Messages I send to: cypherpunks(a)toad.com sometimes have to reposted as many as three times before I see them in my incoming list traffic.

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Re: Sliderules, Logs, and Prodigies
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:30 AM 11/1/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >Sliderules were just becoming common when I was in high school.... > >Seriously, only a very few of us had and used sliderules...mine was a big >synthetic K & E (Keuffel and Esser, as I recall). The raging "DOS vs. Mac" >or "RISC vs. CISC" debate of that age was "aluminum" (the yellow Dietzgens) >vs. the old standby, "bamboo." Plus some oddball circular sliderules. Slide rules are still, IMHO, the best calculator to keep in a car for calculating gas mileage. They are rugged, have no batteries, are not attractive to thieves, and have sufficient accuracy for the problem. They also teach the logarithm relation, which is valuable for understanding the physical universe. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | Tired of Dole/Clinton? | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | Vote 3rd party. I'm | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | Voting for Harry Browne | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: WWII & Japan (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > > Again they knew something was up, just not where. > > You may well be right, but there are seemingly serious > historians who claim otherwise. Since you have studied > the subject for 30 years I would be interested in your > comments on the book 'Infamy' by John Toland (1982). I like Toland a lot. I do not accept what he says without reservation. > I remember being very taken by his arguments when I > read it. He has extensively studied the protocols from > the post war hearings and military court proceedings > dealing with the subject (and they were plentiful) > interviewed many of the involved persons years after. The war trials for the Japanese were compromised by a variety of political intrigues. Ranging from political issues regarding the best way to govern the war torn country (ie can't kill too many of them or the Japanese will simply pick up weapons again with an estimated 1,000,000 US dead as a result) to the biological weapons that were developed which were quite useful for the Allies sans the Soviets. > According to Toland: > > The US president, selected members of his cabinette and a > few admirals and generals knew - from Magic and the 'winds' > execute, radio traffic analysis, diplomatic sources, double > agents - exactly when and where the Japaneese were going to > attack, but didn't warn Hawaii, fearing that too efficient > counter-measures by the Oahu military might make the attack > abort and so not convince the isolationists. The unexpected > tactical capabilities of the Japaneese armada then made a > cover-up all the more important. Hawaii appears in *NO* MAGIC transmissions of that time period. If you, Toland, or anyone else can give specifig MAGIC intercepts I would be greatly appreciative. The MAGIC intercepts did mention Borneo, The Ka Peninsula, and the Phillipines (where the B-17's were headed that were destroyed at Pearl). The radio traffic analysis, ship movement analysis, etc. did not point to a specific target (how could they considering the breath of the Japanese opening attacks all over the Pacific) only that the Japanese were serious. The isolationists were never convinced (eg Lindbergh) that war was the right thing to do. There was nothing unexpected about the tactics. There were two previous test of shallow water torpedo attacks, both successful. The first was by the British and the second was by the US at Pearl (how is that for irony?) which was attended by Japanese observers. The heads of state and military did not seriously believe Hawaii was a realistic target and therefore looked elsewhere. Sun Tzu says the first target in war is your opponents mind, the Japanese took it to heart. Jim Choate

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Re: New Bihman-Shamir Fault Analysis Paper
by Timothy C. May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:18 PM -0800 11/1/96, Martin Minow wrote: >There is an inherent conflict between two claims that are >central to the fault-analysis paper(s): > "the secret key [is] stored in a tamperproof cryptographic device" >and > "the cryptographic key is stored in an asymmetric type of > memory, in which induced faults ..." > >If the device is truly tamperproof, the attacker should not >be able to induce faults. Even given susceptable "consumer- OK, so the authors might have better used the phrase "putatively tamperproof." Or the more accepted modern phrase, "tamper-resistant." As with safes, castles, and "bulletproof vests," all claims of absolute security are dubious. What the Bellcore and Biham-Shamir (and other, reportedly) attacks have done is to show another vector by which "tamperproof" is not. >quality" devices, it would be trivial to store the cryptographic keys >in a redundant memory configuration, such as ECC "error-correcting >code" memory that can self-correct a range of failures and detect >a much wider range. It would also seem reasonable to protect the >cryptographic core (algorithms and data) with a digital signature >that would "crash" the device, rather than proceed with incorrect >key information. Faults can be induced as well in logic devices. I agree that redundancy can be added to logic devices (I worked on this for Intel a while back), but this would require an almost complete re-doing of smartcard processors. (For starters, imagine implementing triple redundancy in smartcards....not cheap.) Again, what these recent attacks show is a theoretical avenue by which nominally tamper-resistant cards may have their defenses breached. Whether this is an important threat depends on a bunch of factors. Whether cardmakers change their chips also depends on a bunch of factors. --Tim May P.S. A while back there were a bunch of posts with the title "Professor Shamir Arrested." Was it ever established whether or not the arrested Shamir was in fact _our_ Adi Shamir? And what the charges were? "The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology." [NYT, 1996-10-02] We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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